CEMAL PASHA'S GOVERNORATE IN SYRIA, 1914-1917

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by

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ABSTRACT

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History, PhD Dissertation
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This dissertation is on Cemal Pasha's Governorate in Syria during WWI. The aim is to explore the military, social and political reasons behind his existence in Syria. The outbreak of the WWI signified a new period in the history of Ottoman Syria and gave an occasion to the Ottoman Government to save themselves from all kinds of foreign influences and to assert state authority over Ottoman citizens in Greater Syria. With this motivation, the third man of the ruling party, the CUP, was sent to Syria to establish the state's authority there, and to organize an expedition against Egypt to liberate it from the "British yoke". This dissertation elaborates Cemal's preparations for an expedition against Egypt and his activities to remove all the intermediaries between state and its citizens in Syria, examining all the influential groups such as the Arabists, the Zionists and the Christians.

Keywords: Cemal Pasha, Syria, First World War, the Egyptian Expedition, Zionism, Arabism, the Armenian Deportations, Famine, Sharif Hussein.

ÖZET

CEMAL PAŞANIN SURİYE VALİLİĞİ, 1914-1917
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Bu çalışma, I. Dünya Savaşı dönemindeki Cemal Paşa'nın Suriye Valiliği hakkındadır. Çalışmanın amacı Cemal Paşa'nın olağanüstü yetkilerle Suriye'de bulunmasının arkasındaki siyasi, askeri ve sosyal nedenleri incelemektir. Birinci Dünya Savaşı'nın patlak vermesi Osmanlı Suriyesi'nin tarihinde yeni bir dönemin başlangıcına işaret etti ve Osmanlı Hükümetine bütün yabancı etkilerden kurtularak Suriye'de devlet nüfuzunu kurmak için fırsat verdi. Bu amaçlarla iktidardaki İttihat ve Terakki Fırkası'nın üçüncü adamı Mısır'ı İngiliz "boyunduruğu"ndan kurtaracak seferi organize etmek ve Osmanlı devlet otoritesini kurmak maksadıyla savaş başlangıcında Suriye'ye gönderildi. Bu tezin amacı Mısır Seferi'nin ve Cemal Paşa'nın Suriye'de devletle vatandaşları arasındaki barrierleri kaldırmak için yaptığı faaliyetlerin amacını irdelemektir. Cemal'in, Hıristiyanlar, Arapçılar, Siyonistler gibi Suriye'deki bütün etkin ve bir ölçüye kadar otonom gruplarla yaptığı mücadele incelenmiştir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Cemal Paşa, Suriye, Birinci Dünya Savaşı, Mısır Seferi, Siyonizm, Arapçılık, Ermeni Tehciri, Kıtlık, Şerif Hüseyin

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TABLE OF CONTENT

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

A.MTZ.CL.	: Mümtaze Kalemi, Cebel-i Lübnan
AA	: Auswaertiges Amtes
ATASE	: Askeri Tarih ve Stratejik Etüt Dairesi, Ankara.
BA-MA	: Bunderarchiv-Militararchiv
BEO	: Bab-ı Ali Evrak Odası
BOA	: Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivleri
CUP	: Committee for Union and Progress
DH-İ.UM.	: Dahiliye Nezareti, İdare-i Umumiye Evrakı
DH. UMVM.	: Dahiliye Nezareti Umûr-ı Mahalliye-i Vilâyât Müdüriyeti
DH.EUM	: Dahiliye Nezareti, Emniyet-i Umumiye Müdürlüğü
DH.EUM.EMN	: Dahiliye Nezareti Emniyet-i Umumiye Şubesi Emniyet Kalemi
DH.EUM.KLU	: Dahiliye Nezareti Kalem-i Umumi
DH.KMS	: Dahiliye Nezareti Kalem-i Mahsusa Müdiriyeti
DH.ŞFR	: Dahiliye Nezareti, Şifre Kalemi
FO	: Foreign Office
HHStA	: Haus-, Hof-, und Staatsarchiv, Vienna
HR. SYS.	: Hariciye Nezareti, Muhaberat-ı Umumiye Dairesi Siyasi Evrakı
İ.DUİT	: Dosya Usulü İrade Tasnifi
ltq.	: Türk Lirası
MAE	: Ministère des Affaires Etrangères
MAEE	: Archives du Ministère des Affaires Etrangères et Europeennes.
MF.MKT	: Maarif Nezareti, Mektubi Kalemi
NA	: United States National Archives
PA-AA	: Politisches Archiv des Auswaertiges Amtes, Berlin.
PRO	: Public Record Office, London.
SHD	: Service Historique de la defense, Vincennes.
TTK	: Türk Tarih Kurumu
WO	: War Office
WWI	: World War I

A Short Chronology of Events

Ottoman Entry into WWI	10 November 1914
Cemal's Appointment as Governor General of Syria and the Commander of the 4^{th} Army	18 November 1914
Opening of the Selahaddin-i Eyyubi Külliyesi	28 January 1915
The First Expedition against Egypt	2-3 February 1915
Appointment of Ali Münif Bey to Lebanon	4 August 1915
The Execution of the First Group of the Arabists	21 August 1915
The Execution of the Second Group of the Arabists	6 May 1916
Sharif Hussein's Revolt	10 June 1916
Fall of Jerusalem	9 December 1917
End of Cemal's period in Syria	13 December 1917
Fall of Damascus	1 October 1918



The Province of Syria: Binbaşı M. Nasrullah, Kolağası M. Rüşdü, Mülazım M. Eşref, *Osmanlı Atlası,* Istanbul: Osmanlı Araştırmaları Vakfı, 2003.



The Province of Beirut, and Lebanon: http://tarihvemedeniyet.org/2009/10/beyrut-vilayeti-ve-cebel-i-lubnan-mutasarrifligi/



The Province of Jerusalem: Binbaşı M. Nasrullah, Kolağası M. Rüşdü, Mülazım M. Eşref, *Osmanlı Atlası,* Istanbul: Osmanlı Araştırmaları Vakfı, 2003.



The Province of Aleppo: Binbaşı M. Nasrullah, Kolağası M. Rüşdü, Mülazım M. Eşref, *Osmanlı Atlası,* Istanbul: Osmanlı Araştırmaları Vakfı, 2003.

INTRODUCTION: MULTIPLE BACKGROUNDS

> "Of course it was our one hope to free ourselves through the World War from all conventions, which meant so many attacks on our independence, and to be able to live in future as an independent and free nation, which in its own territory, of its own ititiative introduces the reforms which local necessities have made imperative. Just it was our chief aim to annul the Capitulations and the Lebanon statute…"[1]

Ottoman Entry to World War I and Cemal Pasha's Appointment to Syria

Because of the aims described in the quotation, the outbreak of WWI made a fundamental impact on the course of the Ottoman political life. Immediately after the commencement of the hostilities in Europe, the Ottoman Government, dominated by the members of the CUP [Committee for Union and Progress], ascribing great importance to the immunity of the governmental affairs from all the internal and external interventions in the political sense for the strengthening of the Ottoman Empire, announced the abolition of the Capitulations, and terminated all the privileges of the foreign states in the Ottoman lands.[2] Concordantly, the CUP leaders embarked on a quest for a military alliance with the

[1] Djemal Pasha, *Memoires of A Turkish Statesman, 1913-1919,* Newyork: George H. Doran Company, 1922, p.138; Cemal Paşa, *Hatırat 1913-1922,* Dersaadet, 1922, p.112.

[2] For a recent study on the abolition of the Capitulations, see: Muhammet Emin Külünk, *Kapitülasyonların Kaldırılması,* İstanbul: Yeditepe Yayınları, 2011.

Great Powers, not to be exposed to a possible partitioning of the Empire after the conclusion of the war. The failure to take any guarantee from the Entente Powers regarding the integrity of the Ottoman Empire[3], directed the Unionists towards Germany for an alliance to realize the aims mentioned in the quotation above. At the end of the process, an alliance treaty was signed with the German Government, which gave an equal status to the Ottoman Empire as its ally.[4] As a result of intense pressure by Germany, on 10th November, the Ottoman cabinet declared war against the Entente powers and their allies Belgium, Montenegro, and Serbia.[5]

The Ottoman authorities took the proclamation of the war as an occasion to save the country from the yoke of the Great Powers throwing off all kinds of international pressure, and to increase the sense of the loyalty of their citizens. With the remarks of Cemal Pasha, their aim was "either to live like an honorable Nation or to exit the stage of history gloriously".[6] With these considerations, the Empire entered into a new period of political and military mobilization for "full independence" by way of a reorganization of the Empire in the direction of the Young Turks' political ideas. As part of these ideas, the Unionist leaders, with the suggestion of Germany, also calculated to propagate the liberation of Muslims under the rule of the Entente States in the context of the policy of Pan-Islamism, which aimed at instigating the rebellion of the Muslim peoples under the rule of the Entente.[7] In this regard, they primarily performed military operations within the

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[3] For a description of this process, see: Kazım Karabekir, *I.Dünya Savaşı Anıları,* İstanbul: Yapı-Kredi Yayınları, 2011, pp. 52-57.

[4] For a detailed analysis of the Ottoman quest for alliance in Europe, see: Mustafa Aksakal, *Ottoman Road to War,* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008, pp. 93-118; For another study on the Ottoman-German alliance and Enver Pasha's role in this event, see: Mustafa Çolak, *Enver Paşa Osmanlı-Alman İttifakı,* İstanbul: Yeditepe Yayınları, 2008.

[5] Aksakal, Ibid, p. 183.

[6] Aksakal, Ibid, pp.19.

[7] For an analysis of Germany's policy of causing a rebellion in Egypt applying *Jihad* propaganda, see: Salvador Oberhaus, "*Zum wilden Aufstande entflammen": Die deutsche Propagandastrategie für den Orient im Ersten Weltkrieg am Beispiel Ägypten,* Saarbrücken: VDM Verlag, 2007; For a comparison of the British and the German Policies of Egypt, see: Donald M. McKale, *War by Revolution: Germany and Great*

territories under direct or indirect rule of the Entente Powers neighboring the Ottoman country on the advice of Germany. Besides that, they used the freedom of action that came with the proclamation of war, to secure "the internal order of the Empire" for the forestallment of any loss of territory in future, which could be emanated from the demands of the non-Turkish nationalist movements.

In this context, immediately after the proclamation of the war, the third man of the CUP and the Minister of the Marine, Cemal Pasha was sent to Syria to put the mentioned aims into practice in the Syrian realm, when he was 42 years old. According to the remarks in his memoirs, he took over the commandership of the Ottoman 4th Army in order to "prepare (and carry through) the attack on the Canal, and also maintain peace and internal order in Syria."[8] With these considerations, Cemal was appointed as the Commander-in-Chief of the 4th Army and the Governor General of the Syrian District authorized with absolute power on both civil and military officials. The proclaimed reason of his presence in Syria was the reconquest of Egypt from the British "yoke". As will be clarified in the first chapter, he strove wholeheartedly to realize this aim, and believed in this idea till the end of the year 1916.

As for the second goal that Cemal made a great effort, he would strengthen the weak image of the Ottoman Government in the eyes of the Syrians by the establishment of the Ottoman authority and the increase of the direct control of it over its citizens in Syria as well as undertaking some activities to make the Syrians ideal Ottomans, who were loyal to the idea of the unity of the Empire and were meant to be against any supremacy of foreign states. Because of these goals, the boundaries of his authority were far more than a military commander; he was rather a governor of all the provinces in Syria, Palestine and the West Arabia and his position was exceptional. All the commanders in the coastal cities and the whole of the gendarmerie divisions were subordinated to Cemal's command. All the civil bureaucrats were required to implement his orders on the political issues regarding the defense of the country and the maintaining of the internal order. The bureaucrats in Syria had to give the first priority to the orders of Cemal rather than that of the central

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Britain in the Middle East in the era of World War I, Kent: The Kent State University Press, 1998.

[8] Djemal Pasha, Ibid, p.138; Cemal Paşa, Ibid, p.112.

government.[9] In the beginning, the governors of the principal cities in Syria, such as Beirut, Damascus and Aleppo, were surprised with this decision and they opposed to the Central Government about that. But the order of the Ministry of Interior compelled them to accept Cemal's authority in Syria.[10]

Immediately after his appointment, as precondition of his agreement with Enver, Cemal sent a telegram to Enver and requested to announce to all it may concern, not to intervene in military and political issues of Syria without his consent.[11] In summary, in the words of Muhittin Birgen, the Chief Editor of the *Tanin* Newspaper during the War period, he was "the regent of Sultan [*Sultan Naibi*]" in Syria,[12] and, in the remarks of a German military official, the "Vizekönig" [Vice king] there.[13] Similarly, his chief of staff Ali Fuad Bey called him the "uncrowned king" of Syria.[14]

Besides the organization of the expedition against Egypt, Cemal would secure the maintenance of "peace and internal order in Syria". These are the key concepts to understand the nature of Cemal's rule in Syria, and the reasons behind his actions towards the different sections of Syrian society. Cemal attributed the maintenance of a perpetual peace in Syria to the establishment of an excellent authority of the Ottoman state in Syria, which would work in a smooth way even after the war. To achieve this, the Syrians had to be made as loyal as the Turks to the ideal of the Ottoman unity and had to oppose the

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9 **BOA**, DH.EUM 5.Şb 3/23, Cemal to Vali of Syria, 27 Teşrin-i Evvel 1330 [10 November 1914].

10 For the opposition telegrams of the Valis see: **BOA**, DH.EUM 5.Şb 3/23, Hulusi to Talat, Damascus, 27 Teşrin-i Evvel 1330 [10 November 1914]; Bekir Sami to Talat, Beirut, 26 Teşrin-i Evvel 1330 [9 November 1914]; Celal to Talat, Aleppo, 26 Teşrin-i Evvel 1330 [9 November 1914].

11 **ATASE Arşivi,** Kls. 4130, Ds. H-1, Fih. 1-84, Cemal to Enver, 18 November 1914, in *Birinci Dünya Harbinde Türk Harbi: Sina-Filistin Cephesi,* Vol IV, Part I, Ankara: Genelkurmay Basımevi, 1979, p. 135.

12 Muhittin Birgen, *İttihat ve Terakki'de On Sene,* İstanbul: Kitap Yayınevi, 2006, p. 223.

13 **BA-MA,** RM 5/2321, Humann to the Chef of the Admiralty of Marine, "Eindrücke in Syrien", Constantinople, 30 January 1917.

14 Ali Fuat Erden, *Birinci Dünya Savaşı'nda Suriye Hatıraları,* İstanbul: Türkiye İş Bankası Yayınları, 2006, p. 107.

occupation of any foreign power in Syria. In Cemal's viewpoint, all the obstructions for this aim had to be either checked or destroyed. As will be analyzed in the following chapters in detail, in his belief, the achievement of such an order would be realized by the elimination of the social and religious interlayers, preventing the penetration of the state authority into the Syrian realm and the allegiance of the Syrians like the citizens of the nation-states. His struggle with the Arabists, Zionists and the other independent-minded religious and administrative bodies like the Maronite clergy and the Government of Lebanon was to serve this aim. As could be easily realized, all these actions were quite convenient to the monolithic state idea of the CUP.

Geographically, Syria was important since it was a bridge connecting Anatolia to Hijaz and it had Jerusalem the first qiblah of the Muslims before Mecca and therefore sacred for the Muslims. Besides that it had a large number of the Arab population, who are a fundemental nation of Islam. Due to those, the CUP leaders set a premium on the fortification of the Ottoman authority in Syria to maintain the Caliphal and Pan-Islamist claims and to continue the Empire's influence over the Muslim World. Before an evaluation of the existing literature to determine the contribution of the present study, a description of the prehistory of the Syrian Governorate will be beneficial for a better understanding of the reasons behind Cemal's appointment to Syria as the "authority builder".

Pre-History of Cemal's Syrian Governorate

Ahmed Cemal Pasha was born in Mytlene in 6th May 1872. His father, Mehmed Nesib Bey, was a pharmacist in the Ottoman army. He was graduated from the Military High School in *Kuleli* [*Kuleli Askeri İdâdîsi*] in 1890. Following his graduation from the Imperial War School [*Mekteb-i Harbiye-i Şâhâne*] in 1893, he completed the Ottoman War Academy [*erkân-ı harbiyye*] education. He rose in rank of an *erkân-ı harb* captain in 1895. He was employed in the construction department [*istihkâm inşaat şubesi*] in Kırkkilise within the body of the Second Ottoman Army till 1898. From this date onwards, He was

appointed to Salonika as the chief of staff of the reserve squadron [*redif fırkası*] under the command of the Third Army. In 1905, he was promoted to the rank of major.[15]

Beginning with his appointment to Salonika, Cemal sympathized with the CUP organization, although he did not actively participate in the activities of that society till October 1906, when he became a member of the Ottoman Freedom Society [*Osmanlı Hürriyet Cemiyeti*], a society in Salonika inspired by the CUP's ideas[16] that was established in 5 September 1906.[17] There, he was assigned as the military inspector of the railway construction. He would control and accelerate railway construction around Salonika.[18] By means of this post, Cemal could easily travel in Rumelia and could make a significant contribution to the organization of the Freedem Society there.[19] His efforts to spread the influence of the society in Rumelia made him one of the most prominent figures of the society. On 26th December 1906, Cemal was assigned by the society to make negotiations by the pro-CUP officers to open a branch in Bitola. As a result of his visit, on 30th December 1906, a center of the society was established there.[20] It is worth to mention that he was a member of Veritas Lodge of the Freemasonry organization.[21]

Following the 1908 Revolution[22], Cemal was selected by the central office of the CUP in Salonika to the delegate to negotiate with the Government together with Talat,

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[15] M.Şükrü Hanioğlu, "Cemal Paşa", *TDV İslam Ansiklopedisi,* Vol: 7, p. 305; in his biography, in *Nevsal-i Milli* journal the birthplace of Cemal was wrongly written as Istanbul. See: *Nevsal-i Milli,* "Miralay Cemal Bey", 1330 [1914], 1. Sene, p. 288.

[16] Hanioğlu, "Cemal Paşa", p. 305.

[17] Tarık Zafer Tunaya, *Türkiye'de Siyasi Partiler I,* İstanbul: Hürriyet Vakfı Yayınları, 1988, pp. 53-54.

[18] Nevzat Artuç, *Cemal Paşa: Askeri ve Siyasi Hayatı,* Ankara: TTK Yayınları, 2008, p. 10.

[19] Artuç, Ibid, p. 20.

[20] Kazım Karabekir, *İttihat ve Terakki Cemiyeti,* İstanbul: Yapı Kredi Yayınları, 2009, p. 88.

[21] Tunaya, Ibid, p. 412.

[22] For some studies on the 1908 Revolution, see: M. Şükrü Hanioğlu, *Preparation for a Revolution,* Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001; Aykut Kansu, *1908 Devrimi,* İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1995; Karabekir, Ibid; Tunaya, Ibid.

Hakkı, Necib, Rahmi, Hüseyin and Cavid Beys.[23] After that, he was chosen as a member of the reform delegation [*Heyet-i Islahiye*] to investigate the possible reforms in the Eastern Anatolia.[24] Because of the outbreak of the 31 March Incident the dispatch of this delegation to the Eastern Anatolia was abandoned.[25] Upon this, Cemal fled to Salonika and returned to Istanbul with *Hareket Ordusu* [the Movement Army] under the command of Mahmud Şevket Pasha.[26] When the army arrived at İstanbul, Cemal was chosen to the membership of the court martial created to provide peace and order at the Capital. After the restoration of order there, Cemal Bey was appointed to the sub-governorate [*mutasarrıflık*] of Üsküdar. In this post, Cemal shone out with his implementations, which could be interpreted as the steps in the direction of the "Westernization" and "control" of the society. He applied to the strict measures to give an order to the public life there.[27] The most outstanding action applied by Cemal in Üsküdar was the prohibition of taking a roll with the evening dresses in the street like loose robe [*entari*] for men and putting on patten [*takunya*] without socks to give an end to the "recklessness" [*laubalilik*] of the people of İstanbul. Cemal strictly implemented those prohibitions to all without discrimination.[28] In those days, according to the famous author Yahya Kemal, he was talked as a newly emerging reformer with these implementations.[29] The prominent Westernist Abdullah Cevdet interpreted those actions as "the opposition to the continuance of the lifestyle belonging to the Middle Ages in the twentieth century in the Capital" of the Ottoman

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[23] Yusuf Hikmet Bayur, *Türk İnkılabı Tarihi,* Vol: I, Part II, Ankara: TTK Basımevi, 1991, pp. 68-69.

[24] Artuç, Ibid, p. 53-54; Hanioğlu, "Cemal Paşa", p.305.

[25] Artuç, Ibid, p. 54.

[26] *Nevsal-i Milli,* Ibid, p. 288.

[27] *Nevsal-i Milli,* Ibid, p. 288.

[28] Ziya Şakir, *Paşalar: Enver Talat Cemal,* İstanbul: Kaknüs Yayınları, 2010, p. 173; Abdullah Cevdet, "Nafia Nazırı Cemal Paşa Hazretleriyle Mülakat", *İctihad,* 15 Şubat 1914 [28 February 1914]No: 93, p. 2077.

[29] Yahya Kemal, *Siyasi ve Edebi Portreler,* İstanbul: Yapı Kredi Yayınları, 2006, p. 107.

Empire. Those were enough "to see the tendency in his [Cemal's] mind [*ruh*] to order [*intizam*] and to the customs of the civilized world".[30]

On 2nd August 1909, upon the outburst of the conflict between the Muslims and the Armenians in April 1909, Cemal Bey was appointed to the Governorate of Adana to give an end to the conflict in that city and to provide order there.[31] His activities in Adana are conductive to understand both his personality and his political attitude towards the problems of the Ottoman Empire. The British Vice Consul depicted Cemal with the following words:

> "Djemal Bey dressed like an English gentleman, and possesses a most courteous presence, a fair knowledge of French, and a pretty wit... I should judge that he possesses an untiring energy and a determination brooking no interference… The principle danger to his career is perhaps its rather headlong nature…"[32]

In his another report the Vice-Consul states that he was excessively optimistic like most of the young turks. [33]

Immediately after his arrival, Cemal aggregated the Muslim *Ulema* and notables, and "advised" them to finish the hostilities in the city and to break the ices between the Armenians and the Muslims.[34] Similar to that Cemal addressed to the heads of the Armenian and Syrian Churches and, with the remarks of the British Vice-Consul, left "a happy impression on all his hearers".[35]

Similar to his construction works in Syria, Cemal applied the labor force of the local people for the reconstruction of the ruined city by the incidents. With the remarks of the British Vice-Consul in Adana, Cemal was "dead set against idling and battening on

30 Abdullah Cevdet, Ibid, p. 2077.

31 **BOA,** DH. MKT, 2892/34, Ministry of Interior to Cemal, 22 Temmuz 1325 [4 August 1909]

32 **PRO,** FO 195/2307, British Vice-Consulate to the British Ambassador in Constantinople, Adana, 25 August 1909.

33 **PRO,** FO 195/2307, British Vice-Consulate to the British Ambassador in Constantinople, Adana, 13 October 1909.

34 **BOA,** DH. MKT, 2914/1, Cemal to Ministry of Interior, Adana, 11 Ağustos 1325 [24 August 1909].

35 **PRO,** FO 195/2307, British Vice-Consulate to the British Ambassador in Constantinople, Adana, 1 September 1909.

temporary relief doles, and means to drive the loafers from tavern and bazaar to lend a hand in the work of reconstruction"[36]. At the public reading of his *firman* of appointment, Cemal "called down a thousand curses ("bin kader [kadar] la'net") on the authors and perpetrators of the massacres, referred to the necessity of the union of all the classess in the work of reconstruction, and declared his intention or suppressing all idling with a strong hand". The Governor also created committees for the restoration of peace and order in the city under his presidency in collaboration with the foreign assistance organizations. Some of those committees were as follows: "a committee for the finding of work for the unemployed", " a committee to draw up a plan for the reconstruction of the ruined quarter of the town", "a committee to draw up a plan for the foundation of orphanages".[37]

In a month, Cemal was able to clean the ruined houses and the streets by the gangs of prisoners.[38] He wanted to reconstruct the city "enlarging the streets with a view to tramway traffic, and of laying out the city on an approved model are all very well for Midhat Pashas".[39] Before the winter many of the Armenians in the villages was settled to the houses.[40] In cities, between 11st and 15th December, 25 Muslims were hanged, which were tried in the courd and found responsible for the Armenian massacres.[41] By 13th December 1909, with the zealous efforts of the Governor of Adana, according to the report of the British vice-consul, all was well in Adana.[42] The Vice-Consul states in another

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[36] **PRO,** FO 195/2307, British Vice-Consulate to the British Ambassador in Constantinople, Adana, 25 August 1909.

[37] **PRO,** FO 195/2307, British Vice-Consulate to the British Ambassador in Constantinople, Adana, 25 August 1909.

[38] **PRO,** FO 195/2307, British Vice-Consulate to the British Ambassador in Constantinople, Adana, 22 September 1909.

[39] **PRO,** FO 195/2307, British Vice-Consulate to the British Ambassador in Constantinople, Adana, 10 November1909.

[40] **PRO,** FO 195/2307, British Vice-Consulate to the British Ambassador in Constantinople, Adana, 27 October 1909.

[41] **PRO,** FO 195/2307, British Vice-Consulate to the British Ambassador in Constantinople, Adana, 16 December 1909.

[42] **PRO,** FO 195/2307, British Vice-Consulate to the British Ambassador in Constantinople, Adana, 13 December 1909.

report that, by February 1910, "much material progress" had been "made with relief and rebuilding" of the ruined city.[43] By 23rd February, in the words of the British Vice consul the following improvements had been provided in Adana:

> "1. The general condition of the town and its inhabitants is satisfactory, and promises well for the future.
> 2. General security is good.
> 3. Local trade is reviving, and things are on the upgrade.
> 4. The ruined houses are gradually being rebuilt.
> 5. The vali is taking everything in hand in a most energetic way, and is the object of commendation from all classes of the population".[44]

His relations with the British Vice-Consul in Adana were quite well, and the remarks of the Vice-Consul on Cemal was very positive. An interview of the Vice-Consul with Cemal is illuminating about his political ideas and gives us important information about his evaluations on the general Ottoman politics, his ideas about the opposition to the CUP, his approach to any alliance with a foreign power etc. The following remarks reported by the British Vice-Consul is valuable to uderstand Cemal's mentality of giving a new order to the Ottoman state by way of controlling the "autonomous" structures and opposition organizations within the boundaries of the Ottoman Empire:

> "Touching on the general conditions of the country, he [Cemal] said that the present time was most critical as "they" [the CUP] had many enemies, but that, if, the present line of the policy could be continued for five years, all opposition would be done away with and the country saved. To this end, went on the Vali, a general disarment [disarmament] must be carried out; -we have found a "pretext" in Albania for this and we shall now disarm the Hauran, and Syria; afterwards we shall do the same to Kurdistan; the Yemen is not so important and such measures will not be necessary there yet awhile. Then branching into more general politics His Excellency said that he for his part did not want to see Turkey entering into any alliance whatsoever at present; the country was far to[o] weak and poor and would, therefore, be certainly given the worst of the bargain."[45]

It is clear in these statements that Cemal had a monolithic and authoritarian state idea and saw the opposition as a danger for the Ottoman Empire as well as the maintenance of the armed autonomous structures, like tribes in Hauran and Kürdistan.

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[43] **PRO,** FO 371/998, Lowther to Grey (Tranmitting the Vice-Consul in Adana), 7 February 1910.

[44] **PRO,** FO 371/998, Lowther to Grey (Tranmitting the Vice-Consul in Adana), 23 February 1910.

[45] **PRO,** FO 195/2337, British Vice-Consulate to the British Ambassador in Constantinople, Adana, 27 August 1910.

After the restoration of peace and order in the city on 26th August, Cemal was sent to Baghdad by the Ottoman Government to restore the Ottoman authority in that province and its around, which was weakened by the increase of the British influence there and to reorganize the state institutions in the city.[46] As stated in his *firman* of appoinment, which was publicly read at the *saray* of the Governor on the 30th August, the Governor was "to turn the rivers of Mesopotamia to account (?) [sic.] by means of navigation and irrigation". For that purpose, "at least 40.000 turkish liras would be granted annually". His authority on the Bureaucracy was quite extensive. Cemal was "empowered to appoint and dismiss all civil officers, except those of the ordinary Judicial and Shar'i Departments". Similar to this, the Governor was "to reorganize the Police and open a Police School if possible". Furthermore, he had some authority over the bureaucrats in the neighboring provinces. As expressed in the *firman* "in case of urgent or important internal questions" Cemal Bey was "authorized to summon the Wali of Basrah to Baghdad for consultation". According to the documents revealed by Artuç, Cemal was authorized to solve most of the important issues for the Ottoman Government in Mosul and Basra.[47] Finally, he would "formulate a scheme, with the least possible delay, for the settlement of the nomad tribes upon the land", which could be considered as a component of giving a modern "order" to the state's representation in Baghdad.[48]

His speech, following reading of the *firman,* was quite indicative regarding the aims of Cemal's existence in Baghdad. Quite the reverse of his "pro-British" and "Ottomanist" attitude in Adana, Cemal was exactly an "Islamist" and "anti-imperialist" in Baghdad. Similar to his anti-French policy in Syria, and in accordance with his strong conviction in the necessity of a strong state authority on the conduct of its citizens for the continuation of the Ottoman Empire, Cemal aimed at the reduction of the British influence in Iraq since the British had some future plans in Iraq, like that of France in Syria. According to the reports of the British Consul in Baghdad,

> "His speech was garnished with pious Muhammedan expressions; and to have made slanting allusions to foreigners against whom, he said, 'an iron door' must be closed at

[46] Artuç, Ibid, pp. 86-89.

[47] Artuç, Ibid, p. 90.

[48] **PRO,** FO 195/2369, the British Consul to FO, Baghdad, 26 September 1911.

> Basrah. The 'iron door' phrase is not reproduced in the published account of the speech. He is also said to have remarked that 'the hand coming from the south must be warded off'."[49]

In addition, Cemal heralded the construction of a great street through the middle of the town to carry an electric tramway to provide a modern appearance to the city. His first action reported by the British consul was to dismiss the Christian Mayor of Baghdad and to replace him by a Muhammedan, which can be evaluated as an attitude to win the hearts of the Muslim population.[50]

Throughout his governorate in Baghdad, Cemal maintained his Islamist and anti-imperialist attitude with his meetings and visits. In the first days of his governorate, the Governor visited *Muadhdham*, where the tomb of Abu Hanifah, the great Sunni theologian, is situated. According to the report of the British consul, at that time, similar to the *Selahaddin-i Eyyubi Külliyesi* in Jerusalem, the Ottoman Government proposed to establish a famous college on the model of the *Nizamiyeh*, which existed at Baghdad in the days of Abbasid Khalifate. In this visit, Cemal expressed his unhappiness that the Ottoman Government had only one school at Baghdad.[51]

During his governorate in Baghdad, Cemal's anti-imperialist language showed itself in every occasion. In the words of the British consul, in a dinner meeting held in his house to all the editors of newspapers in Baghdad, on 17th September, the Governor stated that "the contract given to the Germans for the construction of the Baghdad Railway would ruin Turkey". In this speech Cemal accused Abdulhamid of "giving 'too much face' to foreigners in general, with the result that the said foreigners now considered themselves the rulers of the country". By that reason, the supremacy of the foreigner had been so increased that "even foreign travellers conducted themselves in Turkey as if they were *Walis* [Governors]". He promised to the journalists of Baghdad that the present constitutional Government of Turkey would not "give way to foreigners any longer. The interests of Turkish subjects should be considered before those of foreigners; at present they came in the second place". To manage this goal, Cemal "advised the editors to

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[49] **PRO,** FO 195/2369, the British Consul to FO, Baghdad, 16 October 1911.

[50] **PRO,** FO 195/2369, the British Consul to FO, Baghdad, 16 October 1911.

[51] **PRO,** FO 195/2369, the British Consul to FO, Baghdad, 16 October 1911.

impress these ideas on those whom they met". He also promised that the Baghdad official newspaper, the '*Zaura*,' "should again appear in Arabic as well as Turkish, as was the custom before Nazim Pasha's time". Similarly, in another meeting at the military club, he added that Europeans were "accustomed to think that the Turks are afraid of them. This is no longer the case, and Europeans ought to know it".[52]

Cemal did what was necessary to forestall the spread of the British activities in the province of Baghdad. Two examples are significant in this sense. Once, in April 1912, the British consul appointed the British officials with the British official dresses to guide the Indian Shiites, who would visit *Najaf* and *Karbala*. Those Indians entered into Baghdad accompanied by the mentioned British officials. The Governor strongly protested this action and reported to the Ottoman Foreign Ministry that the real aim of this action was to employ the British officials in Baghdad.[53] According to Cemal, allowing the British consul to employ those officials would increase the influence of his state while humiliating the Ottoman Governor.[54] Upon Cemal's request, the Ottoman Ministry of Interior prohibited the mentioned British officials to maintain their works.[55]

Another problem with the British Consul emerged due to the establishment of a British court in *Kazımiyeh* and appointment of the British *mukhtars* by the Consul to some quarters in the same city. The *mukhtars* would give residence permit to the British citizens, who did not have one. Frustrated with this action, Cemal urgently demanded from the Ottoman Foreign Ministry to intervene in the issue and to close the court and to dismiss the *mukhtars.* The Governor threated the Ministry of Interior to resign from his post. Upon this, the British Consul visited Cemal and agreed with him on closure of the court and dismissal of the *mukhtars.[56]*

[52] **PRO,** FO 195/2369, the British Consul to FO, Baghdad, 16 October 1911.

[53] Artuç, Ibid, p. 94.

[54] **BOA,** HR.SYS, 91/4, Cemal to the Foreign Ministry, Bagdhad, 17 Nisan 1328 [30 April 1912] in Artuç, Ibid, p. 94.

[55] **BOA,** HR.SYS, 91/4, Cemal to the Foreign Ministry, Bagdhad, 7 Mayıs 1328 [20 May 1912] in Artuç, Ibid, p. 94.

[56] Artuç, Ibid, p. 95.

Similar to his attitude in Syria and in accordance with his belief in the damage of the opposition parties to the unity of the Ottoman Empire, Cemal also struggled with the Ottoman opposition movements in Baghdad. He wholeheartedly strove for the victory of the CUP candidates in Baghdad in the 1912 elections for the Ottoman Parliament and made an effort against the candidates of the Liberty and Concord Party [*Hürriyet ve İtilaf Fırkası*][LCP hereafter].[57] According to Muhammed Kamil Bey, a member of the LCP, Cemal left his post for three months and propagated for the Unionist candidates. He influenced the members of the courts to prevent the activities of the opposition. In the last days of his governorate in Baghdad, on 3 August 1912, Cemal closed the branch of the LCP in that city.[58]

Besides emphasizing the European threat for the Muslims and the struggle to forestall it, and the strivings to "do away with" the opposition movement, Cemal also made it remember the "backwardness" of Muslims and emphasized the need for the development of the Muslims to be saved from the European colonization. In one of his speech to the prominent *ulema* of Baghdad, his remarks referring the glorious past of the Islamic civilization and the were too much similar to those of the famous Islamist scholars Afghani and Abduh:

> "The Muhammadan scholars of Baghdad who composed and put into literary form (sic) the invention of the clock, -that orderer of the time of man, -the proof of the roundless of the world, the determination of the meridian and, finally, countless and innumerable eternal monuments including medicine, philosophy, literature, mathematical sciences and astronomy, breathed the air of this very land, were warmed by this very sun, slaked their thirst with the water of this very land, and lived on the natural products afforded by this very land for the use of humanity.
> But, alas, the successors who came after them did not make the necessary effort to follow the traces of their glorious ways; the bright sun of learning and knowledge which had been revealed in the land of Iraq became gradually dim; and naturally, in this manner, wealth and affluence disappearing, they were left in a state of ignorance, nomadism, dispersion, and weakness. Some attribute the present ruined state of the country to the 33-year long Hamidian regime, but this view is not correct; the period of decline of the land of Iraq

[57] **BOA,** BEO 4015/301052, Sadaret to Ministry of Interior, 29 Şubat 1327 [13 March 1912]

[58] **BOA,** DH.MTV 18/47, Müftüzade Muhammed Kamil Bey to Ministry of Interior, Baghdad, 22 Temmuz 1912 [3 Ağustos 1912].

> began five or six hundred years ago, and the Hamidian regime has only been the cause of is reaching an extreme point."[59]

As will be shown in Chapter 6, Cemal showed great interest to the restoration of the historical monuments during his governorate in Syria. It seems that he had a similar interest while he was in Baghdad. In the second week of his appointment, Cemal visited *Salman Pak,* on the left bank of Tigris, near which were the celebrated ruins of Ctesiphon and Seleucia. The British Consul stated the aim of the visit as unknown. However, its aim could be to inspect the monuments to prevent their smuggling by the British and to protect them in the boundaries of the Ottoman State.[60]

The change of the political balance in mid-1912 to the detriment of the CUP sounded the death knell for Cemal Bey in Baghdad. Upon the accession of the Freedom Party to the power, on 12th August 1912, Cemal resigned from his post and returned to Istanbul.[61]

Upon the outbreak of the Balkan Wars, Cemal applied to the army to take charge in the war. He was appointed as the commander of auxiliaries from Konya and his troop had to retreat like the Other Ottoman forces. He stayed in this post till 14 November 1912, when he was stricken by cholera epidemic.[62]

Following the First Balkan War, the CUP made a *coup d'etat* [*Bab-ı Ali Baskını*] and captured the Government. Immediately after that, on 27th January 1913 Cemal was appointed as "the military governor of Istanbul" [*İstanbul Muhafızı*] with a broad authority to provide "order" in the city, who was famous with his "disciplinarian" and "organizer" character.[63] With Cemal's own remarks, by this event, he directly started to be busy with the general policy of the Empire. He managed to restore the public order in Istanbul and prevent a counter attack against the CUP. Two measures applied by Cemal Bey during his governorate in Istanbul are worth to mention to understand the mind and character of him.

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[59] **PRO,** FO 195/2369, the British Consul to FO, Baghdad, 16 October 1911.

[60] **PRO,** FO 195/2369, the British Consul to FO, Baghdad, 16 October 1911.

[61] Artuç, Ibid, p. 98.

[62] Artuç, Ibid, p. 99-103.

[63] Artuç, Ibid, p. 110.

Firstly, “There were… a number of smugglers who were offering smuggled tobacco (in Government packets) in the streets of the city, Sultan Hamam, Sirkedji, and Mahmud Pasha Hill and Bayadzid Square”[64]. According to Cemal, that open smuggling showed weak the Government in the eyes of the people. Therefore, he “announced to all those concerned that anyone who indulged in illicit trading, whether wholesale or retail, would be arrested and banished from Constantinople”. In the next week, he had four or five at most of these individuals deported, and “the court martial passed sentence on a few smugglers who were caught in a kiosk no far from the Seraglio”. With Cemal’s own remarks, “the result was that the common swindling which had become an everyday occurrence was soon exceptional, and the people of Constantinople and its suburbs could henceforth enjoy perfect security.”[65]

The second one is more interesting to demonstrate Cemal’s vision of modernization. In Cemal’s own words, “there were many people in Constantinople who indulged in the vicious habit of making amorous remarks to Mohammedan ladies as they passed them out walking, on the boats and bridges, or in the streets and bazaars”. Those people “laid hands on elegant and well-dressed women”. Cemal applied severe measures against them and threatened those people to exile interior parts of Anatolia. After punishing four or five men, with the remarks of Cemal, the “women were able to walk in the streets without further molestation”.[66]

Cemal’s interpretations on this measure are important in terms of clarification of his approach to the place of women in the “development” and “modernization” of a country. He states in his memoirs that:

> “For the first time a definite step had been taken to place the personal freedom of Turkish women on a secure basis… I believe firmly in the important part which woman is called upon to play not only in social life, but also in public affairs… I am absolutely convinced that the civilising agencies of a country can best and soonest be promoted with the help of woman, and that those nations which keep their womankind in a state of slavery are on the high road of inevitable decay.” [67]

[64] Djemal Pasha, Ibid, p. 16.

[65] Djemal Pasha, Ibid, p. 17.

[66] Djemal Pasha, Ibid, p. 17.

[67] Djemal Pasha, Ibid, p. 17-18.

By these remarks, it can be concluded that the reforms performed by Mustafa Kemal regarding the status of women in the Early Republican Era were also thought by Cemal as required for the development of a country. Similarly, his activities of opening girl's schools in Syria to increase of education of women with Halide Edib emanated from that conviction.

After the abolition of the military governorate of Istanbul, on 16th December 1913, Cemal was appointed as the Minister of Public Works [*Nafia Nezareti*]. Although he prepared some construction projects of railroads and chausseed roads as well as some channeling projects for irrigation, on 11th March 1914, some 85 days later, he was appointed as the Minister of Navy.[68] He also made some reform projects for the Ottoman Navy, but some 10 months later, upon the entry of the Ottoman Empire into WWI, Cemal was appointed to the Governorate General of Syria and the Commander of the 4th Army there, when he was 42 years old.

Cemal's prehistory and personality played a crucial role in his appointment to the Governorate General of Syria. As can be easily realized from the information given above, "disciplinarian", "reformer", "state-worshipper" [*devletperest*], "anti-imperialist" and "order builder" characteristics of him due to his personality and background made him a good candidate for the Syrian Governorate. In Adana, he had restored the interrupted state order with his severe measures and applied an Ottomanist discourse. In Baghdad, Cemal struggled with both the British influence and the activities of the Arabists. Because of his experiences in Baghdad, according to his memoirs, Cemal was treated by the CUP as an expert on the Arab affairs.[69] In Istanbul, he suppressed a counter-revolt of the opposition and gave strength to the state with his severe actions against the "disorderliness", and again in Baghdad, he struggled with the opposition. As a result of all these experiences, Cemal was seen by the CUP as the most suitable candidate for the Syrian Governorate General, where the authority of the state was thought by the Unionists as weak. Therefore, Cemal was sent to Syria with an extraordinary authorization to re-form there the Ottoman state in a modern sense.

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[68] For detailed information about these projects, see: Artuç, Ibid, pp. 134-138, 146.

[69] Djemal Pasha, Ibid, p. 58.

Nature of the Ottoman Reforms in Syria: An assessment of the Literature

A number of scholarly works published over the last decades have greatly contributed to the study of the Ottoman modernization in the Arab provinces. One of the first to mention in this sense is *Ottoman Reform in Syria and Palestine, 1840-1861* by Moshe Ma'oz. The study evaluated the *Tanzimat* reforms in the Syrian Provinces during the years 1840-1861 and described their impact on government and administration, on social and economic developments and on the position of the non-Muslim subjects. Ma'oz claimed about the impact of those reforms that "It brought an end to centuries of confusion and backwardness and opened a new age of stability and modernization. During these years local forces were destroyed, regional autonomies undermined, and a solid foundation of Ottoman direct rule was established".[70] Similar to Ma'oz, Albert Hourani states that,

> "The reforms of the *tanzimat* period in the Ottoman Empire…would, if carried to their logical conclusion, have destroyed the independent power of the notables and the mode of political action it made possible. The aim of the reforms was to establish a uniform and centralized administration, linked directly with each citizen, and working in accordance with its own rational principles of justice, applied equally to all."[71]

However, more recent studies made on the same period question this argument and demonstrate that the Ottoman reforms took the local interest groups into consideration from its very beginning. In her study on the nature of the *Tanzimat* reforms Jens Hassen indicates the reflections of the Ottoman reform during this period on the local elites:

> "The practices of integration that evolved during the stormy mid-decades of the nineteenth century represented multiple processes of negotiations between imperial an local interest groups and their representations. Focusing specifically on certain imperial strategies of crisis management in the Arab provinces, such as imperial inspection tours, local petitions and councils, and model provinces, there emerged distinct and subtle modes of contestation, appropriation ad co-operation in the provincial peripheries that determined the application of *Tanzimat* reforms. Moreover, what have consistently been considered impositions of state power, malicious or benevolent, under closer scrutiny turned out to be

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[70] Moshe Ma'oz, *Ottoman Reform in Syria and Palestine 1840-1861,* London: Oxford University Press, 1968, p. V.

[71] Albert Hourani, "Ottoman Reform and the Politics of Notables", in Albert Hourani, Philip S. Khoury and Mary C. Wilson (eds.) *The Modern Middle East,* Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993, pp. 94-95.

attributable to socio-political processes and agencies in the provincial peripheries that were then adopted in İstanbul as imperial legislation."[72]

Leila Fawaz demonstrated, in the case of Beirut, another aspect that compelled the Ottoman officials to take the local notables into consideration. According to her study, during the year 1840-1860 "the duality of European and Ottoman influence in Beirut insured a certain political and social openness that remained characteristic of the city in modern times".[73] As a result of this competition, the local notables could find a place in the local political life in Beirut. According to the scholarly works made on the Hamidian era, the situation did not change in this period and competition between the Ottomans and the European Powers gave shape to the local politics in Syria. Adil Baktıaya demonstrates in his study this competition through the educational institutions. In his words, "the aim of the [Ottoman] State with the centralization policy and the reform efforts after 1860 was to retard the Western penetration".[74] However, Baktıaya doesn't emphasize the role of the local notables in this rivalry. This gap is filled by the work of Abdülhamid Kırmızı: In his study on the Governors of Abdulhamid II, Kırmızı confirms, for the period of the mentioned Sultan using the Ottoman arcival sources, that the Governors of the Hamidian

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[72] Jens Hassen, "Practices of Integration-Center-Periphery Relations in the Ottoman Empire", in Jens Hassen, Thomas Philipp, Stefan Weber (eds.), *The Empire in the City: Arab Provincial Capitals in the Late Ottoman Empire,* Beirut: Orient-Institut der DMG Beirut, 2002, p. 74; for another study on the central role of Damascus Council, consisted of the local notables, in the public life of the province, see: Elisabeth Thompson, "Ottoman Political Reform in the Provinces: Damascus Advisory Council in 1844-1845", *IJMES* 25 (1993), pp. 457-475.

[73] Leila Fawaz, "Foreign Presence and the Perception of the Ottoman Rule in Beirut", in Jens Hanssen, Thomas Philipp, Stefan Weber (eds.), *The Empire in the City: Arab Provincial Capitals in the Late Ottoman Empire,* Beirut: Orient-Institut der DMG Beirut, 2002, p. 93; for another study on the Ottoman-European competition in Acre with similar arguments, see: Thomas Philipp, "Acre, The First Instance of Changing Times", in Jens Hanssen, Thomas Philipp, Stefan Weber (eds.), *The Empire in the City: Arab Provincial Capitals in the Late Ottoman Empire,* Beirut: Orient-Institut der DMG Beirut, 2002, pp. 77-92.

[74] Adil Baktıaya, *Osmanlı Suriyesi'nde Arapçılığın Doğuşu,* İstanbul: Bengi Kitabevi, 2009, p.109.

era always took the local notables into consideration while they were trying to centralize the Ottoman realm and they clashed with the Center for the demands of the periphery.[75]

The situation was similar after the proclamation of the second constitution. Hasan Kayalı's acclaimed study, *Arabs and Young Turks*[76] shed light on the Arab policy of the CUP as well as a discussion of the Arab concerns between 1908 and 1918. In this regard, he demonstrates that the ideology of Islamism remarkably overshadowed Arab and Turkish nationalisms during this period. On the other hand, Kayalı demonstrates that the CUP leaders always took the political demands of the Arab notables into consideration "for a larger representation in state offices and a wider use of Arabic in the Arab provinces".[77] According to him:

> "The Young Turk policies were perceived as discriminatory partly because the Unionist purge of the Hamidian cadres from important positions had resulted in the dismissal of many Arabs, the influential ones from the palace coterie of Abdülhamid… Setting aside the aberration of the Hamidian regime, which departed from bureaucratic norms in the recruitment of a palace administration, the Young Turk period compared more favorably to past patterns with respect to the recruitment of Arabs. A comparison of the 1877-78 and 1908 Parliaments does not show a relative decline in the size of Arab representation…"[78]

However, Kayalı disregards the rupture in the Arabist and Syrian policy of the CUP beginning with the appointment of Cemal as the governor general in Syria. Immediately after Cemal's arrival at Syria, the policy of reconcilition, which was followed throughout the whole period of the reform century, was abandoned, and a policy of control and elimination was adopted. Similarly, as will be demonstrated in the second chapter, the Unionist intentions to eliminate the Arabist movement, which belonged to the pre-War period, were not taken into consideration by Kayalı. Furthermore, the CUP rarely saw the Arabists as sincerely demanding reform in Syria. Rather they were assessed by the Unionists as several self-seekers. This point was also underestimated in his study.

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[75] For detailed informations about the relations between the Central Government and the periphery, see: Abdulhamid Kırmızı, *Abdülhamid'in Valileri,* İstanbul: Klasik Yayınları, 2007.

[76] Hasan Kayalı, *Arabs and the Young Turks: Turkish-Arab relations in the second constitutional period of the Ottoman Empire 1908-1918,* Berkeley: California University Press, 1997.

[77] Kayalı, Ibid, p. 210.

[78] Kayalı, Ibid, p. 209.

Another study that treats Cemal's governorate is *Nevzat Artuç*'s work, *Cemal Paşa: Askeri ve Siyasi Hayatı.*[79] The author dedicates more than one hundred pages to the Syrian period of Cemal's life. Half of it is a summary of the military preparations for the Egyptian expedition. The other half tries to describe his administrative activities in Syria. Although the book at times engages in some analysis, there is no consistent narrative throughout the book. On the other hand the language of the book implies that it was written by an admirer of Cemal Pasha, who really likes what he did, rather than trying to understand and contextualize of Cemal's period in the history of Syria. Furthermore, many critical subjects for the period were glossed over in a few pages. For example, the Famine, the most staggering event of the period for the common people, was summarized in four pages without touching upon the reasons and consequences of it. Similarly, the educational acitivities were handled in three pages. Evaluation of the existing literature is sometimes made with scanty information. For example, Hasan Kayalı's study, which is a pioneer in terms of its application of the Ottoman sources in the Arab studies is evaluated with these words: "Kayalı disregarded the Turkish archives, the main source of the subject, and was influenced by the foreign writers and archives." [80] After that he accuses Kayalı of being subjective in his evaluations on Cemal Pasha.

This aside, in recent years, another discussion regarding the character of the Ottoman modernization in the Arab provinces has begun in the literature by the study of Ussama Makdisi claiming that the Turkish rulers of the Empire adopted an orientalist attitude towards their treatment of the Arabs. He maintains that "in an age of Western dominated modernity, every nation creates its own orient. Nineteenth century Ottoman Empire was no exception".[81] In Makdisi's viewpoint,

> "Through efforts to study, discipline, and improve imperial subjects, Ottoman reform created a notion of the pre-modern within the empire in a manner akin to the way European

[79] For the related chapter in the book, see: Artuç, Ibid, p. 208-245.

[80] Artuç, Ibid, p. XLI.

[81] Ussama Makdisi, "Ottoman Orientalism", *American Historical Review,* 107/3, (June 2002), p. 768; similar evalulations can be found in Selim Deringil's studies on the tribal Arabs: Selim Deringil, "'They live in a state of Nomadism and Savagery': The Late Ottoman Empire and the Post-Colonial Debate", Comparative Studies in Society and History, Vol. 45, No. 2 (Apr., 2003), pp. 311-342.

> colonial administrators represented their colonial subjects. This process culminated in the articulation of a modern Ottoman *Turkish* nation that had to lead the empire's other putatively stagnant ethnic and national groups into an Ottoman modernity".[82]

In a similar way, he asserts that,

> "Nowhere, perhaps, was this paradox of Ottoman reforms –inclusivist insofar as it sought to integrate all provinces and peoples into an official nationalism of Ottomanism and yet also temporally segregated and ultimately racially differentiated- more apparent than in the Arab provinces of the empire".[83]

According to the classification of Makdisi, in the progressive way of civilization, the West was in the first floor whereas the Ottomans followed them in advance of the Arabs. Makdisi created a hierarcy as Westerner-Turk-Arab in the viewpoint of the Ottoman elites. With their civilizing mission, like the colonial governments of the Western States, the Ottomans legitimized their domination over the non-Turkish territories, the Arab countries being in the first place. In summary, he implies that the Turks established a colonial empire over the other ethnies of the Ottoman country, like those of the French in Africa and the British in India.

Considering Cemal Pasha's Governorate and its before, Makdisi's approach can be criticized in several aspects. First of all, he totally neglects the Ottoman struggle with the Western powers on the Arab provinces for influence. In the article, the Ottomans were represented as the only absolute authority of the region, and the Arab people were totally disregarded as a factor in the process of modernization. Yet the Ottoman Empire was competing in the Arab provinces with the Western Powers, and had to persuade its Arab citizens that their State was as progressed as that of the Western states, prevent them from orientating sympathies to the Western powers. As claimed by Makdisi, the Ottoman Empire was not in a position to mediate between its own "backward" orient and the civilized West since the Western civilization was inside the Arab provinces thanks to its educational and religious institutions and, in many cases, they were more influential over the different Arab peoples than those of the Empire. As demonstrated by Fawaz and

[82] Makdisi, Ibid, p. 769.

[83] Makdisi, Ibid, p. 770.

Philip[84], the Ottoman elites got involved in a process of modernization in the Arab lands commenced by the Western institutions opened in the Arab provinces, and they tried to create their loyal citizens against the Western threat of colonization. Secondly, the difference between nation-building and colonization is not clear in his text. For example, the author is not clear whether we can classify the creation of Modern France under the same ideal type with that of the transformations experienced in India in the direction of modernization under the British colonization, or the Ottoman treatment of the Arabs with that of the British India and the French Africa. It seems to the author of the present study that the Ottomans modeled the treatment of the Western states towards their own citizens rather than their conduct in the colonies. Third, it is true that the Ottoman elites regarded some sections of Arab society as "backward". But that was not special to the Arabs, similar remarks by Turkish authors or statesmen can be found for the Turks. For example, some words in the novel of prominent Turkish writer Yakup Kadri, called *Ankara,* demonstrate that this representation could not only be limited to Arabs.[85] Non-modern Turks were also classified in the same category. On the other hand, there could rarely be found orientalist remarks for the nationally-spirited modernized Arabists in case of Cemal Pasha. Contrarily, his struggle with the Arabists was, in a sense, a competition of the different kinds of modernizations. Therefore, this is rather the perception of the non-moderns by the moderns. Fourth, Makdisi's claim regarding that the Empire was aimed to transform into a Turkish-dominated structure[86] seems to be controversial, at least, for Cemal's governorate. It is true that Cemal, to a considerable extent, turkified the Syrian bureaucracy. But he did not apply this method to "civilize" Syria with a colonial mission, but to replace the Western influence –a higher category in Makdisi's classification- with that of the Ottomans. As a proof of this, the Arab bureaucrats, who were thought to be influenced by the Western Powers, were not dismissed, but appointed to equal posts in Anatolia, i.e., assigned to govern "the first class citizens" of the Empire by the words of Makdisi. Was it

[84] Fawaz, Ibid, p. 93, Philip, Ibid, p. 77-92.

[85] This dialogue regarding the native people of Ankara is interesting: "instead I resemble them, they resemble me. We brought civilization here": Yakup Kadri Karaosmanoğlu, *Ankara,* İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2005, p. 31.

[86] Makdisi, Ibid, p. 795.

possible for an Indian to be a sub-governor in a British town? This is a question worth to consider. Fifth, it seems that the author differs from Said's definition of orientalism. As expressed by Kayapınar, there is no historical, cultural, ethnic and geographic basis to define the "ontological and epistemological" differences of a Turkish orientalism towards the Arabs. In other words, in the eyes of the Turks during the Ottoman times, some parts of Arab society was "backward", like some other parts of the Turks, but the "backwards" were also a part of Ottoman society. Namely, there was not any necessary differentiation between Turks and Arabs in the eyes of the Ottoman elites.[87]

The Character of Cemal's Governance in Syria

Different from what Makdisi claims, the aims of Cemal's reforms were, first, to abolish the influence of the great powers, and, second, to eliminate the local particularisms, which, according to him, prevented for years the proper establishment of the State's authority and the creation of a sense of the Ottomanness in Syria. They were also a threat for Cemal's aims due to their "connections" with the Great Powers. For those aims, Cemal established a special bureaucracy in Syria, consisted mainly of Turks. Throughout his governorate, he strove to create a powerful [*Muktedir*] team of high-ranking bureaucrats in Syria, which would be able to work in harmony with him. In one of his telegrams to Talat about the appointment of *kaymakam*s to Salt and Kerak, he explained some characteristics of the bureaucrats that were needed in Syria with the following remarks:

> "For one year, there has been no *kaymakam* in Kerak and Salt. In these days, which we strive for the establishment of the authority of the state in a sound [*sağlam*] way, [the questions of] that lack of bureaucrats [*memur*] or the arrival of the incapable [*fena*] bureaucrats must be solved...I request you to appoint a powerful official [as the *kaymakam*] to Salt"[88]

[87] M. Akif Kayapınar, "Ussama Makdisi ve Osmanlı Oryantalizmi", *Divan* 20 (2006/1), pp. 311-317.

[88] **BOA,** DH. ŞFR. 507/83, Cemal to Talat, 19 Kanun-ı Sani 1331 [1 Feburary 1916]

As inferred from this telegram, he wanted to redesign the Syrian bureaucracy to strengthen the existence of the Ottoman state and to implement other projects there. For this aim, Cemal prerequisites two personal characteristics for the bureaucrats, who would be appointed in Syria: might [*iktidar*] and capability. Some other prerequirements were mentioned in another telegram. When he requested the appointment of a new Governor to Jerusalem, he assumed the characteristics of the new Governor for Jerusalem as follows: "...of being a Turk; of having a morality, which would not possible to be corrupted; of having served as sub-Governor or *kaymakam*...; of having a sense of justice;... of being brave...; of being a member of the Committee of Union and Progress..."[89]

As can be inferred from the telegram, besides some personal capabilities, Cemal attributed importance to the ethnicity of the high-ranking Bureaucrats. In Cemal's viewpoint, since most of the Arab high-ranking bureaucrats in Syria were either sympathizers or members of the Arabist parties, which influenced by the Great Powers and since they advocated the reorganization of Syria in a decentralized way, or they did not adopt the ideals of the Ottomanness, they weren't reliable bureaucrats in a process of re-formation of the State in Syria. In one of his telegrams, the supreme ruler of Syria demanded the appointment of the governor [*Mutasarrıf*] of Hauran to a place in Anatolia on grounds that he wanted to solve the Government's problems with the Druzes and the sub-governor was incapable to serve this goal since "he is an Arab before anything else".[90] In the same way, he requested from Talat the appointment of the [Arab] *kaymakams* of Syria to the Anatolian towns.[91] Most of his demands in this direction were fulfilled by the Central Government for the sake of the strengthening of the state authority in Syria.[92] In

[89] **BOA,** DH. ŞFR. 536/71, Cemal to Talat, 19 Teşrin-i Evvel 1332 [31 October 1916]; in another telegram about the appointment of a *kaymakam* to Birüssebi, he repeats the precondition of being a Turk for that position: **BOA,** DH.ŞFR. 487/19, Cemal to Talat, 25 Ağustos 1331 [7 September 1915].

[90] **BOA,** DH.ŞFR. 507/56, Cemal to Talat, 17 Teşrin-i Sani 1331 [30 November 1915].

[91] **BOA,** DH.ŞFR. 506/8, Cemal to Talat, 6 Kanun-ı Sani 1331 [18 January 1916].

[92] For some example in this direction, see: **BOA,** DH.ŞFR. 487/11, Cemal to Talat, 21 Ağustos 1331 [3 September 1915]; **BOA,** DH. ŞFR. 488/13, Cemal to Talat, 26 Ağustos 1331 [8 September 1915];İ **BOA,** DH.ŞFR. 479/21, Cemal to Talat, 28 Temmuz 1331 [10 August 1915].

spite of his regulations for the appointment of the Turks to posts in the Syrian bureaucracy, it can not be claimed for Cemal that he was a turkifier. Because, as will be demonstrated in the second and sixth chapters, Cemal did not undertake any systematic action to remove, transform or eliminate the Arab culture, language or any other thing, which belonged to the Arabs. Rather, he tried to replace the Western influence with the Ottoman one and attempted to spread the Ottoman ideals. Cemal's insistence on teaching Turkish to the Arabs was due to the desire of a direct communication between the state and its citizens in Syria.

For further comprehension of the reasons behind Cemal's insistence on the appointment of the Bureaucrats, who had Turkish origins, it is important to analyze Cemal's remarks on Turkishness and Arabness. He, indeed, explains his ideas on the place of Turkishness and Arabness in the Ottoman Empire in his memoirs:

> "Speaking of myself, I am primarily an Ottoman, but I do not forget that I am a Turk, and nothing can shake my belief that the Turkish race is the foundation-stone [*temel taş*] of the Ottoman Empire and the rise of the Ottoman Empire in the sense of civilization and education [*irfan*] strengthens the Ottoman community [*camia*] and fortifies [*te'yid*] the Ottoman Empire, because, the Ottoman Empire is a Turkish creation in its origins.[93]
> If any evidence is required, look at the tragic situation in which we find ourselves to-day. Look at the Arabs, who rose against us in the hope of gaining their independence Where are they to-day? I have referred to this point before…
> Does anyone in those countries ever speak of Ottomanism ? On the contrary, the cry "By the grace of God we are freed from Ottomanism," is ever on the lips of a crowd of traitors who have lived on the favour of the Government. But the voice raised in Anatolia –that sacred land to the Turks- proclaims that the "Ottoman Empire" still exists, her noble sons who dwell in Western Thrace –that little Turkish corner- have never ceased to strive for their union with the Empire. In short, all Turks –wherever they are- endeavour to assert themselves and seek refuge in the glorious Ottoman name…"[94]

These remarks were quoted by Makdisi as the proof of the Turkish priority in the Ottoman Empire and "Turkish responsibility to conduct the affairs of state".[95] However, this

[93] Cemal Pasha, Ibid, p. 246. English translation of this paragraph is a little diffent: "Speaking of myself, I am primarily an Ottoman, but I do not forget that I am a Turk, and nothing can shake my belief that the Turkish race is the foundation-stone of the Ottoman Empire. The educational and civilising influence of the Turks cements Ottoman unity and strengthens the Empire, for in its origins the Ottoman Empire is a Turkish creation." Djemal Pasha, Ibid, p. 251.

[94] Djemal Pasha, Ibid, p. 252, Cemal Pasha, Ibid, p. 246.

[95] Makdisi, Ibid, p. 794.

privilege rather belonged to the "conscious" Turkish elite rather than to all the Turks. The privileged position of those Turks in the Ottoman Empire stems from their allegiance to the ideal of the Ottoman unity, and their strivings to maintain the Ottoman existence against the Great Powers. In the quoted text, he criticizes the Arab elite of not following the ideal of the Ottomanism, similar to his critics to Sharif Hussein. By the term "Arab", he means those, "who rose against us [the Ottomans] in the hope of gaining their independence", rather than blaming the whole Arabs. That was the reason for the so-called "unpreferrable" treatment of the enlightened Arabs. In summary, there were a certain group of "modernized" Arabs in Cemal's view, but they were not sufficiently loyal to the ideal of the Ottoman unity. Therefore, the Turks were more "preferable" in comparison to the Arabs, and, in the struggle for the establishment of the Ottoman state authority in Syria, he employed the "enlightened" Turks in his bureaucracy instead of untrusted Arabs. His educational and other activities in Syria should be evaluated in this regard. The increase of the sense of loyalty to the Empire could be measured by the struggle for continuance of the Ottoman state. As the result of the position of the Turks in Cemal's mind, he regarded Anatolia as his motherland.[96] This is nothing than a strong sense of patriotism, required for the citizens in the nation-states, and the process introduced by Cemal Pasha in Syria was the re-formation of a modern state according to the nation-state model. Cemals himself answers the claims of Turkification in his memoirs with the following remarks:

> "I reply emphatically that our policy was not a 'Turkish' policy, but the policy of Ottoman unity. If we had accepted the decentralisation principle, the Committee would, indeed, have had to pursue a 'Turkish' policy, for we should have had to demand the same local autonomy for vilayets inhabited solely by Turks as for the other provinces. So those who confess themselves 'Turks' only are really advocates of 'decentralisation', for in effect they are simply following a purely Turkish policy. We, on the other hand, whose policy was Ottoman unity, had accepted as a fundamental principle that the influence of the Central Government on the vilayets should not be diminished, though the local

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[96] He described the delegate of authors visited Syria towards the end of the year 1916 as "the most distinguished faces of the motherland [*Anavatan*]". For the whole of the document, see: **BOA,** DH.ŞFR. 538/11, Cemal to Talat, Jerusalem, 8 Teşrin-i Sani 1332 [21 November 1916]; similarly, in his memoirs he depicts Anatolia as the motherland with the following remarks. Cemal uses in his memoirs the term *"mader vatan"* while he is describing the situation of the roads connecting Anatolia to Syria; Cemal Pasha, Ibid, p. 118; the sentence is as follows in the English version: "And here is the only road which keeps my army in touch with the home country !": Djemal Pasha, Ibid, p. 143.

> administration should be granted the most extensive powers, always provided that the unity of army organisation should not be prejudiced…
> Can it be said that the 'Turkification' of the nations was involved in the demand that the Turkish language should be the official tongue in the Ottoman Empire? Were we engaged in the 'Turkification' of the other nations when we said that public education in the Ottoman Empire must be under the supervision of the Government and well conducted?"[97]

Especially the second paragraph is significant to understand the character of Cemals policy of "Turkification". By the partial 'turkification' of the Syrian bureaucracy and education, he did not undertake a transformation process regarding the Arab culture. It was rather a part of his policy of re-formation of the state existence in Syria. When these steps were considered together with his actions to eliminate the social intermediaries, like the notables, Zionists, clergy etc. the imposition of Turkish will be more meaningful.

On the other hand, being a Turk on its own was not adequate for Cemal to be employed in Syria. For those, who did not have the conditions mentioned before were in some ways dismissed regardless of their ethnicity. The governors, sub-governors, or *kaymakams*, who couldn't adopt to Cemal's way of administration was either dismissed or they resigned. In the first year of his existence in Syria, he changed almost all the governors of the principal cities in Syria. At the end of his first year, the Governors of Beirut, Damascus, Lebanon and Aleppo had all been changed with the new ones. He made the Governor of Beirut Bekir Sami Bey dismissed, accusing him of extortion[98] [*irtikab*] and punting with the Bank managers.[99] The Governors of Aleppo and Damascus changed their places of duty since they were not attuned to Cemal's way of administration. According to the report of the Austrian Consul in Damascus, the Governor Hulusi Bey resigned from his post due to his disapproval of boundless rigor applied by Cemal

[97] Djemal Pasha, Ibid, p. 251.

[98] **BOA,** DH. ŞFR. 483/63, Cemal to Talat, 28 Temmuz 1331 [10 August 1915]

[99] However, Bekir Sami Bey refused this accusation: **BOA,** DH. ŞFR. 483/63, Bekir Sami to Talat, 7 Kanun-ı Sani1330 [20 January 1915].

Pasha.[100] Almost all of these administrators had good relations with the members of the Arabist parties.[101]

When the Central Government appointed a bureaucrat in contradiction to the requests of Cemal, he was usually able to secure the bureaucrat's dismissal from his post. The most outstanding example of this was the appointment of a new Governor to Syria following Hulusi Bey. Cemal suggested the Governor of Erzurum, Tahsin Bey, to the central governor as the successor of Hulusi.[102] However, the Central Government appointed Azmi Bey [not Azmi Bey of Beirut] to Syria. As a result, that governor couldn't maintain his office in Syria and had to return to Istanbul in a short span of time. Upon the request of Cemal that Azmi was not sufficiently experienced and powerful to administrate the province of Syria, he had to resign from his post.[103]

The characteristics of the high-ranking bureaucrats appointed by Cemal demonstrate his intentions regarding Syria. The case of Azmi Bey, appointed as the Governor of Beirut upon his request is a good example of his ideal bureaucrat. When he resigned from his office in June 1918, the German Consul in Beirut identified him with these remarks: "extremely strong headed" towards the foreign representatives, "relentless", and "chauvinist" against all the foreign powers including the allies of Turkey. On the other

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[100] **HHStA,** PA 38/366, Ranzi to Burian, "Wechsel des hiesigen Generalgoverneurs", 21 October 1915, Damascus.

[101] Informations regarding the relations between Celal Bey, the Governor of Aleppo, and the Arabist notables,see: **HHStA,** PA 38/366, Ranzi to Burian, "Wechsel des hiesigen Generalgoverneurs", 21 October 1915, Damascus; Hulusi Bey spoke the local dialect of Syria very well and had good relations with the local people and notables, see: Muhammad Kurd Ali, *al-Mudhakkirat, al- Juz al-Awwal*, Damascus, Matbaatu al-Tarakki, 1948, p. 103; From the memoirs of Salim Ali Salaam, it is inferred that Bekir Sami had established close relations with the Arabists of Beirut: Salim Ali Salaam, *Mudhakkiratu Salim Ali Salaam (1868-1938)*, Hassan Ali Hallak (ed.), Beirut: al-Dar al-Jami'iyya, 1982, p. 188-189.

[102] **BOA,** DH.ŞFR. 493/61, Cemal to Talat, 30 Eylül 1331 [13 October 1915].

[103] Shakib Arslan claims in his memoirs that Cemal didn't like Azmi Bey since the Central Government appointed the latter without consent of Cemal. Therefore, Azmi had to return shortly after his appointment: Shakib Arslan, *Siratu Zatiyya,* Beirut: Dar al-Tali'a, 1969, p. 177-178; presumably with the similar reasons, Cemal proposed the dismissal of Azmi by reason of that he couldn't make governorate in Syria: **BOA,** DH. ŞFR. 516/34, Cemal to Talat, 3 Nisan 1332 [16 April 1916].

hand, the consul states, Azmi worked in Beirut during his governorate with a tireless energy.[104] The typical bureaucrat that was undesirable by Cemal could be schematized by the first Governor of Jerusalem, Macid Bey. According to the diaries of the Spanish consul of Jerusalem, he had a conflict with the commander of Jaffa, Hasan Bey, who was favored by Cemal, and therefore, resigned. When "he had tendered his resignation, which produced a real panic in the city" the Spanish consul visited the other consuls and "all telegraphed Constantinople asking that his resignation not be accepted. Even the four Patriarchs (the Latin, the Greek, the Armenian and the Coptic) sent a message too".[105] As can be inferred from this quotation, Macid Bey had good relations with the local interest groups and the foreign consuls, two barriers in the eyes of Cemal for the establishment of a direct diffusion of the state power into the realm.

As will be analyzed below, in Cemal's viewpoint, Syria was a semi-colonized part of the Empire, which ought to be cleaned from foreign influence and had to be integrated to the body of the Ottoman State. By the regulations in Syrian bureaucracy and the appointment of the powerful bureaucrats, Cemal wanted to amend the image of the weakness of the Ottoman Government among the Syrians and set his seal on Syria as its founder in the modern sense. He opened schools, built streets[106] and fountains there called after his name; People hanged Cemal's photos signed by him to the most conspicuous places of their houses as the symbol of their loyalty to the leader of their country[107]; he organized *selamlık* ceremonies when he was going to friday prayer, which were in fact, special to the Ottoman sultan; the most conspicuous places of the Syrian provincial capitals, like Damascus, Jerusalem, Aleppo, were reserved for him as headquarter.[108] In summary, during his governorate, he wanted to remove the weak image of the Ottoman

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[104] **PA-AA,** Türkei 177, Bd.17, Mutius to Hertling, Beirut, 23 June 1918.

[105] Conde de Ballobar, *Jerusalem in World War I: The Palestine Diary of a European Diplomat,* Eduardo Manzano Moreno and Roberto Mazza, London: I.B. Tauris, 2011, p. 36.

[106] Erden, Ibid, p. 89.

[107] **PA-AA,** Türkei 177, Bd.17, Weber to Hertling, Constantinople, 26 June 1918,

[108] Ziya Şakir, Ibid, p. 180; he also listened to the complaints of the people after the Friday prayer like the second Caliph Umar: Erden, Ibid, p. 89.

Government by his authoritarian personality, and didn't hesitate to demonstrate the strength of the State to the Syrians for this aim. Second, by his policies towards the different components of the Syrian society, Cemal wanted to increase the sense of the Ottomanness of the Syrians.

A Review of the Literature

This study sets out to portray the aims of Cemal Pasha's appointment to Syria as military commander and governor general, and the transformations caused by his policies the "governmentality" of the Ottoman rule in Syria throughout the war period will be well within the scope of the present study which aims to utilize primary as well as secondary sources. In the sense of the first hand sources, the documents in the Ottoman Archives (BOA) have primary importance for the subject under the study. Availability of many telegrams and reports in these Archives belonging to Cemal and his bureaucrats enabled the author of the present study to analyze the ideas of the actors of the period on the subjects discussed throughout this study. However, the writers of those documents could sometimes hide the realities not to disclose that they were unsuccessful to overcome the problems. Usage of the German and Austrian consular reports minimized this problem for this study. Another archive that has the Ottoman documents is the archive of the Turkish General Staff (ATASE Arşivi), the documents of the Ottoman War Ministry. As the commander of the Ottoman 4th Army, this archive includes very valuable documents for Cemal's era in Syria. Unfortunately, the documents of this archive are not completely open to scholars. The officials employed in the Archives survey the documents and select the related documents according to the subject of the researchers. In addition, there are some special document collections in the Archives of the Turkish History Association [*Türk Tarih Kurumu*], (TTK Arşivi). The collection of Kazım Orbay, the aide-de-Camp of Enver Pasha and the collection of Enver himself are in this archive and open to all scholars. There can be found many samples of correspondence between Enver and Cemal regarding political and military situation in Syria.

On the other hand, the Archives of the European states include valuable files regarding Cemal Pasha's governorate in Syria. Since it was the war period, as the allies of the Ottoman Empire, the reports of the German and Austrian officials are the most valuable ones among the others. Many times, they could reflect the local conditions better than the Ottoman documents since they were not responsible for governing the region. Especially, the close relations between some German officials and Turkish officials make the information in the German documents (PA-AA, BA-MA) valuable to understand the background of some events. A similar statement can be made for the Austrian Archives (HHStA). Since there was no British or French representative in Syria as a result of the hostilities between the Ottoman Empire and the Allied states, the Archives of those states (PRO, MAEE) have a lesser importance. Indeed, there can be found plenty of inaccurate information in those archives regarding Syria. However, the remarks of some Arab deserters and some intelligence reports could be used for the War period. In this study, the documents of the Entente states have been used counter-checking them with the Ottoman, German and Austrian Archives as much as possible.

The period is also generous in terms of the memoirs and diaries in Turkish, Arabic, German and English. In this sense, the availability of Cemal's own memoirs has a capital importance as well as the accounts of some others from his immediate entourage. In his memoirs, Cemal touches on many subjects examined in the present study and asserts claims pertaining them. However, he is understandably and considerably apologetical in his assessments and does not deal with any subject, which would tarnish his name. For example, he never mentions his treatment against the Zionist movement for presumably not to present himself with difficulties in the international political arena taking into consideration the strength of the Zionists in shaping the international polıtıcs. Obviously, for him, the international circumstances would have a big say in determining the new leader of Turkey that Cemal had a big desire to get. Similarly, the bases of his policy towards the Druzes, being only explained in the Turkish version, probably to give an answer to the critics of his policy in Syria among the Turks. Cemal's words in his memoirs will be critically evaluated in this study in detail.

Besides Cemal Pasha, persons from his immediate circle left valuable accounts on the events and policies with regard to this study. In Turkish, first to mention is the memoirs

of Ali Fuad Erden, the Chief of Staff of Cemal's army in Syria. He is considerably "objective" in the evaluation of Cemal's activities. He doesn't hesitate to criticize Cemal, when necessary. For example, in the case of the execution of the Arab notables, he did not avoid to accuse his commander of setting the law at naught and of hanging the innocent Arabs.[109] Similarly, he frankly explained the failure of the Ottoman Army in the first expedition against Egypt.[110] However, the memoirs are contradictory regarding the aims of that expedition. In the beginning of the memoirs, Erden claims that the aim of the expedition was to bind the British troops in the Canal and Egypt.[111] But, throughout the book, he publishes numerous documents demonstrating that Cemal actually planned an operation of conquest towards Egypt.[112] In addition, the memoirs include valuable information on Cemal's other activities in Syria, such as public works,[113] struggle with the epidemics,[114] and the Armenian question.[115]

Another crucial account has been provided by Von Kress, the German Commander of the troops in the Sinai Desert, who made the preparations for the second expedition against Egypt following the first one. The book is a good account of all the operations towards the Canal, from the first expedition against Egypt to the capture of Palestine by the British. Besides those, Von Kress provides significant details regarding the daily life in Syria during the WWI. For example, he narrates the excitement of the Palestinians vividly, while the Sacred Flag of the Prophet Muhammed [*Sancak-ı Şerif*] was brought there to

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[109] Erden, Ibid., p.273-274.

[110] Erden, Ibid, p. 58.

[111] For their evaluations regarding the Expedition see: Erden, Ibid, p.2.

[112] Enver to Cemal, 23 Kanun-ı Sani 1330 [5 February 1915], in Erden, Ibid, p. 46; Cemal to Enver, 23 Kanun-ı Sani 1330 [5 February 1915], in Erden Ibid, p. 47; Enver to Cemal, 20 Şubat 1330 [5 March 1915], in Erden, Ibid, p. 72: Cemal to Enver, 6 Temmuz 1331 [18 July 1915], in Erden, Ibid, p. 149-154. In addition, Erden places a considerable place to the preparations for the Egyptian Expedition: Erden, Ibid, p. 85-101, 157-161.

[113] Erden, Ibid, p. 143-146.

[114] Erden, Ibid, p. 141-143.

[115] Erden, Ibid, p. 119-124.

motivate the people and soldiers to the Canal Expedition.[116] His words regarding impact of the locust plague,[117] famine[118], epidemics[119] and on the provisioning conditions are also valuable to understand the difficulties of daily life in Syria.

Finally, the book *Zeytindağı* by *Falih Rıfkı* should be mentioned. The book was written in the Republican period and reflected the orientalist prejudices of the Republican elites towards the Arabs. An orientalist approach to Arabs in the sense that was portrayed by Makdisi can be, indeed, found in this book. Although it is a literature book and far from the hard facts, Falih Rıfkı's opinions put forward in *Zeytindağı* deeply influenced the Turkish perception of the Arabs until today. All the Ottoman background of the Arab countries was neglected in the book, and, in accordance with the Republican ideology, the Arabs were described as aliens to the Turks. He depicted Beirut as "hundred times more alien than Dobruca".[120]

In addition, some of the Arabs in Cemal's immediate circle also wrote their memoirs regarding Cemal Pasha. In this regard, Shakib Arslan and Muhammad Kurd Ali should be mentioned in the first place. Shakib Arslan makes important assessments on the character of Cemal Pasha's regime and, in this regard, dedicates a large place in his memoirs to critisize in a harsh way Cemal's policy of executions and exiles towards Arabists. Shakib accuses Cemal of planting seeds of hate between the Turks and the Arabs, as the one, who set his heart on the ideal of the Ottoman unity and who was an opponent of the Arabist movement.[121] In spite of his Arabist tendency, Kurd Ali's memoirs doesn't engulf into the Arab nationalist narrative created after the Ottoman era and evaluates Cemal's governorate in a broader perspective. As a journalist, he gives valuable details about the propaganda policy of Cemal by way of the press in competition with the

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[116] Friedrich Freiherr Kress von Kressenstein, *Mit den Türken zum Suezkanal*, Berlin: Verlag Otto Schegel, 1938, p. 78.

[117] Von Kressenstein, Ibid, p. 119-120, 168, 179-180.

[118] Von Kressenstein, Ibid, p. 143.

[119] Von Kressenstein, Ibid, p. 196.

[120] Falih Rıfkı Atay, *Zeytindağı,* İstanbul: Ülkü Yayınevi, 1943, p. 43.

[121] For some examples, see: Arslan, Ibid, pp. 154-219.

Germans[122] as well as the plans of the Arabists with the outbreak of the War.[123] Some close relations between the CUP and the Arabists are also indicated by Kurd Ali. For example, he conveys the appreciation of Talat Pasha to Abdulwahhab al-Inglizi due to his useful service to the Ottoman state and the efforts of the former to help him to go abroad to save him from the wrath of Cemal.[124] Furthermore, he skilfully describes the aversion of Cemal Pasha to any kind of foreign influence in Syria –especially those of the Germans.[125]

Apart from those, a considerable number of memoirs were published by the prominent Arabists involving evaluations on Cemal's rule in Syria. However, these sources were widely influenced by the nationalist atmosphere of the post-war period, and contextualized Cemal's governorate in harmony with their nationalist narrative. According to the claims of that narrative Cemal's persecutions demonstrated the independence will of the Arab people and the proof of the maturation of the nationalist feelings among the Arabs. However, Cemal's atrocities could not prevent this desire, and following the death penalties, the Sharifian Revolt broke out.[126] For example, Faris el-Khoury and Amin Said describe in their memoirs that upon the executions, Faysal escaped from Damascus and launched with his father, the Sharif's revolt in response to Cemal's executions.[127] Another problem of these memoirs is that they restrict their descriptions regarding the War period only to Cemal's executions. Yet, the War period witnessed more disastrous incidents like famine, epidemics, and battles. Since they were written in the mandate period, the authors of those memoirs set their narratives to legitimize the place of the Arab nationalist movement in the post-war period.

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[122] Kurd Ali, Ibid, pp. 107-111.

[123] Kurd Ali, Ibid, pp. 111-114.

[124] Kurd Ali, Ibid, pp. 152-153.

[125] Kurd Ali, Ibid, pp. 148-152.

[126] For some examples, see: Ahmad Kadri, *Mudhakkirati an Thawrat al Arabiyya al Qubra,* Damascus: Manshuratu Wizarati al-Thakafah, 1993, pp. 39-281, Izzat Darwazah, *Mudhakkiratu Muhammad Izzat Darwaza-al-Mujallad al-Awwal,* Beirut: Dar al Gharb al Islami, 1993 pp. 270-278; Faris al-Khoury, *Awraku Faris al-Khoury,* Damascus: Talas, 1989, pp.134-142; Amin Said, *al-Thawrat al-Arabiyya al-Qubra,* Cairo: Maktabatu al-Madbuli, pp. 108-118.

[127] Al-Khoury, Ibid, pp.134-142; Said, Ibid, pp. 108-118.

Finally, the Diaries can be mentioned as another first hand source of the present study, written at the period of the War. In this regard, the diaries of Ihsan Turjman, a common soldier in Cemal's Army in Jerusalem, and the diaries of Conde de Ballobar, the Spanish Consul in Jerusalem, deserve special attention. Ihsan Turjman's diaries are important in terms of exploration of the life of the common people and their feelings towards the Ottoman Empire and the activities of Cemal Pasha. The transformations in the daily life caused by the entrance into the War and their impact on the attitude of the ordinary people towards the Ottoman Government were explored throughout the diaries.[128] Since it was a contemporary account, it is possible, at least to some extent, to measure the real attitude of the people. Similar information can be found in the diaries of Ballobar. In addition, his diaries were useful to conceive the transformation of the Ottoman Government in its treatment of the foreign consuls. Furthermore, the diaries show the Ottoman sensitivity in regard to their independence and their efforts to remove the foreign influence from the Ottoman realm as well as the resistance of the old bureaucrats to the new implementations of Cemal Pasha. For example, the Governor of Jerusalem requested from Ballobar to apply to the Spanish ambassador in İstanbul to lobby at the Ottoman Government for the dismissal of the *kaymakam* of Jaffa.[129]

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Chapter 1 of the present study examines the primary reason for Cemal's appointment to Syria, i.e. the organization of an expedition against Egypt. In his memoirs Cemal Pasha claims that:

> "I should never have seriously pretended to myself that with resources which did not permit of our remaining more than four days on the Canal…we could have crossed a Canal at least a hundred meters wide defended by an army so mobile and brave as the English

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[128] For pro-Ottoman feelings of the common people, see: Salim Tamari, *Year of the Locust,* Berkeley: California University Press, 2011, p. 105; For the dissatisfaction of the people in Jerusalem with the entrance of the Ottoman Empire into the War, see: Tamari, Ibid, p. 107; For some evaluations about the epidemics, see: p. 108; For the image of Cemal Pasha, see: p. 110; for the public works, see: p. 124; for the locust plague, 125. The examples can be increased.

[129] Conde de Ballobar, Ibid, p. 36.

> and provided with every conceivable means of defence from the largest warships to armoured trains."[130]

Ali Fuad Erden, from Cemal's immediate military entourage, agrees with what Cemal explained regarding the aims of the Expedition claiming that neither Turkish nor German Headquarters demanded an expedition of conquest against Egypt.[131] Some scholarly works also support Cemal's claims. İsmet Üzen claims in his voluminous book on the expeditions against Egypt/Canal that the primary goal was"to bind the British troops as much as possible"[132]. Apart from that, a critical analysis of these sources was not made in *Üzen*'s study. On the other hand, the study has a defensive language towards what Cemal did in the Suez Canal. It seems that the author felt himself obliged to show Cemal successful in his military undertakings. Likewise, Nevzat Artuç asserts that "in our viewpoint, from the beginning of the expedition, Cemal Pasha was aware of the impossibility of the conquest of Egypt…he might aim at busying the British troops at Canal as long as possible"[133] Different from those, the present study demonstrates that, at least till the end of 1916, Cemal had a plan to reconquer Egypt. In this regard, firstly, the organization of the Egyptian Expedition will be examined to see the goals of this operation. Quite the reverse of what the actors of this expedition and the mentioned academics claimed, a close examination of the contemporary documents indicate that Cemal himself sincerely desired and worked for the conquest of Egypt. The denial of the primarily responsible persons of this aim most probably stems from the effort to cover the failure of this aspiration.

The second reason for Cemal's existence in Syria was "to maintain peace and internal order in Syria."[134] In relation to this, Chapter 2 investigates the meaning of "peace" and "order" with reference to his activities while struggling to eliminate the Arabist movement. This chapter fills a gap in the existing literature. In such a way that the origins and development of the Arabist movement, till the outbreak of the War and for the

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130 Djemal Pasha, Ibid, p.155; Cemal Paşa, Ibid, p.127.

131 Erden, Ibid, p.2.

132 İsmet Üzen, *Osmanlı'nın Çöl Yürüyüşü: Kanal Seferleri*, İstanbul: Paraf Yayınları, 2011, p. 596.

133 Artuç, p. 231.

134 Djemal Pasha, Ibid, p.138; Cemal Paşa, Ibid, p.112.

post-war period, was studied from various aspects. Ernst Dawn demonstrated that the Arabist ideology was mainly Ottomanist till the outbreak of the War.[135] Different authors following the path opened by Dawn clarified the Ottomanist character of the Arabist movement in various Arab provinces.[136] In the same way, as assessed earlier, Hasan Kayalı made a significant contribution to relations between the Arabists and the CUP demonstrating the Ottomanism of the former and the Islamism of the latter. In Turkish, a study has been recently published by Şaban Ortak on the deportation of the Arabs to Anatolia by Cemal Pasha, called *Suriye ve Garbi Arabistan Tehciri.* The author describes the process of the deportation by utilizing the documents from the Ottoman Archives. However, the study lacks a persuasive narrative giving the reasons and consequences of the subject. In addition, the author asserts the aim of the Arab deportation in its introduction as the prevention of a rebellion by the Arabs, "while fighting against the supreme forces of enemy"[137]. However, the book is not able to document this claim by reliable sources. Furthermore, the evaluations of Cemal's immediate entourage in Syria on the reasons for the deportation, such as Ali Fuad Erden and Falih Rıfkı Atay, have not been dealt with adequately. On the other hand, the study does not bear the requirements of an academic work as to the form: the last chapter of the book consists of writing the reasons of the deportation for each exile, item by item. Normally, it should be in the section of the appendix since it doesn't have any study question and doesn't have any consistent narrative.[138]

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[135] Ernst Dawn, *From Ottomanism to Arabism; Essays on the Origin of the Arab Nationalism,* University of Illinois Press, Urbana: 1973.

[136] For the articles assessing the development of nationalist sentiments in Syria, Iraq, Hijaz, Egypt and Libya, see: Rashid Khalidi, Lisa Anderson, Muhammad Muslih and Reeva S. Simon (eds.), *The Origins of the Arab Nationalism,* Columbia University Press, New York: 1991; for various articles on Arabism and Arab nationalism, see: James Jankowski and Israel Gershoni (eds.), *Rethinking Nationalism in the Arab Middle East,* Columbia University Press: New York: 1997; Derek Hopwood (ed.), *Arab Nation Arab Nationalism,* Macmillian Press, London: 2000.

[137] Şaban Ortak, *Suriye ve Garbi Arabistan Tehciri,* Ankara: Pegem Yayıncılık, 2011, p. V.

[138] Ortak, Ibid, pp. 165-227.

The Arab scholars also paid considerable attention to Cemal's governorate in Syria in connection with the Sharifian Revolt. However, following the foot prints of the memoirs of the Arabist leaders assessed above, almost all the studies in Arabic on this era examine Cemal's governorate a part of the history of the Sharifian Revolt, by their words "the Great Arab Revolt", and only lay stress on his persecutions of the leaders of the Arabist movement. They claim that the Arabist movement was seeking independence from the Ottoman Empire, and therefore, Cemal Pasha atrociously crushed that movement. For example, in his work on the Sharifian Revolt, Kadri Kal'acı claimed, following an analysis on the relations between the Sharif and the Arabists in Syria, that "the Turkish government discovered in Syria the signs of a wide range scheme, which organized secretly in various centers in Damascus and Beirut and Baalbek and the other cities, and its goal was to announce a revolt against the Turks and it desires the independence of the Arabs, and the severe measures were taken".[139] They also evaluated the Sharif's rebellion as a counterreaction to the hangings, which were outputs of considerably different processes. Furthermore, these studies do not endeavor to understand the nature of Cemal Pasha's rule in Syria stressing the different policies implemented by him towards the Jews, Christians or the Lebanese. On the other hand, as will be indicated below, their evaluations regarding the Arabist movement are quite miscontextualized due to the impact of the later periods of Arab nationalist ideologies. In other words, today's image of Cemal Pasha among the Arabs was created by the later process of Nation-building in the Arab countries based upon the otherization of the Ottoman rule during Cemal's period.[140]

Differing from those scholarly works, the present study focuses on the changing direction of the policies towards the Arabists by the governorship of Cemal in Syria, thus, questioning Kayalı's thesis of continuity of the Unionists' Arab policy before and during the War period. First of all, it is worth to mention that the conclusions of this study on

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[139] Kadri Kal'acı, *Al-Thawrat al-Arabiyya al-Qubra,* Beirut: Shariqat al-Matbuatu li al-Tawzi' wa al-Nashr, 1994, p. 155; for similar evaluations, see: Sulayman Mousa, *Husayn bin Ali wa al-Thawrat al-Arabiyya al-Qubra,* Amman: Lajnatu Tarikh al-Urdun, 1992, pp. 62-71.

[140] For a study analyzing that aspect of the Arab nation-building, see: M. Talha Çiçek, "Şerif Hüseyin İsyanı'nın Türk ve Arap Kimlik İnşa Süreçlerine Etkisinin Analizi", Unpublished M.A Thesis, Sakarya University, 2007.

Cemal's policy of Arabism don't match up with those drawn in Cemal's memoirs. He claimed that, while he arrived at Damascus, he did not consider, in the beginning, eliminating the Arabist movement and damage the unity of the Muslims,[141] but the unearthing of "treasonous" activities of the Arabists to organize a rebellion against the Ottoman Government compelled him to take action against this movement. In Cemal's own words, "the discovery of these traitorous activities showed the aim and purpose of the enemy's operations, and henceforth I, of course, considered it would be simply fatuous on my part to place any further trust in the reformers. I decided to take ruthless action against the traitors".[142] If these remarks are taken into consideration together with Cemal's words at the first pages of the Chapter in his memoirs regarding the Arab movement, his intention will be clearer:

> "Yet to take immediate legal action against these traitors might well endanger the success of the Islam unity movement, which was the goal of our endeavour. If we had taken such action at once, Mohammedan countries such as Egypt, India, Algiers and Morocco, which had lost contact with us, would have thought that the Turks were yielding to feelings of vengeance or endeavouring to secure the supremacy of the Turanian nation by taking the lives of the most influential Arabs. In the mighty struggle upon which we had entered to free the Mohammedan world from a foreign yoke it was our principal task to preserve unity of aim and effort in the lands of Islam. For that reason we decided not to breathe a word about this matter for the time being."[143]

As implied in this paragraph, quite the reverse of his claim, Cemal's struggle with Arabism was a result of his political aims rather than a fear of military threat. The thought of elimination of the Arabist movement go back to the pre-War period. In this regard, an analysis of the opinions the CUP leaders in the preceding years of Cemal's appointment shows that, in spite of their reconciliatory attitude towards the Arabs, they considered the Arabist movement "harmful" for the continuation of the Ottoman administration in Syria, and thus, desired to eliminate it due to their perception of an ethnicity-based policy as "separatism". Cemal's punishment of the members of the Arabist parties was nothing else, but an implementation of these ideas in a radicalized way. Cemal saw the Arabist notables of Syria as a barrier preventing the Syrians of being ideal citizens of the Empire, and

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[141] Djemal Pasha, Ibid, p. 197.

[142] Djemal Pasha, Ibid, p. 207.

[143] Djemal Pasha, Ibid, p. 197; Cemal Pasha, Ibid, p. 164.

implemented a rule of terror to abolish the existense of this movement in Syria. Another method used by Cemal to struggle with Arabism was Panislamist propaganda. He reflected the Arabists as the enemies of Muslim unity. For this aim, he published a newspaper in Damascus called *al-Sharq.* Towards the end of the war, the deteriorating conditions of the War had to make him abandon this policy, and, by the pressure of the Central Ottoman Government, he had to moderate his policy. Peace negotiations to give an end to the Sharif's revolt could be evaluated in the same context. By this action, Cemal and his successors planned to forestall any shift of sympathy among the Syrians towads the Sharif. Quite the reverse of what is claimed in the existing literature,[144] the correspondence with the Sharif shows that the latter sincerely wanted a peace agreement with the CUP. But playing for time by the Ottoman Government to delay an agreement making some concessions to the Sharif and unexpected end of the Ottoman rule in Syria gave an end to this process. As a final remark it is worth to maintain that Cemal's struggle with Arabism was a result of his political aims rather than a fear of military threat.

Another aspect of Cemal's policy to make the Syrians ideal and loyal Ottomans consisted the measures directed to various autonomous entities such as Zionism, the Government of Lebanon and the Christian clergy. Chapter 3 aims at the analysis of Cemal's struggle with these intermediaries. As part of this policy, he directed his attention to restrict the authority of the Zionist movement on the Jewish population of Palestine. First, he naturalized non-Ottoman Jews to broaden the Ottoman state authority on them as well as disarming the Jewish colonists. Second, he exiled or deported the Zionist leaders from Palestine for better integration of the Jews with the state. Although the history of

[144] In a recent study on the abolition of the Caliphate by Nurullah Ardıç, The rivalry between the CUP and the Sharif was portrayed in a way that the Sharif was playing with the British against the Ottoman Caliphate. The author totally ignores the Sharif as an actor. Totally overpassing what the CUP intended about the Sharif's existence in Hijaz, Ardıç claims that "When it became clear that the Ottoman Empire would indeed join the German side in the war, Sharif Hussein, who was already semi-independent, stood out as the best option for Britain's hopes of undermining the Caliphate": Nurullah Ardıç, *Islam and the Politics of Secularism,* London: Routledge, 2012, p. 200; However, as demonstrated by Kayalı, the Sharif was compelled by the CUP policies to change his side during the War, for details, see: Kayalı, Ibid, pp. 181-192; As will be shown in the first chapter of this study, in the beginning of the War, he supported the Ottoman proclamation of War and sent troops to the first expedition against Egypt.

Zionism has been analyzed in every detail, Cemal's policy of Zionism did not attract the attention of the scholars. A notable exception is Fuat Dündar, who touches upon Cemal's policies claiming that he made ethnicity engineering by expulsion of the Jews. However, the broadening authority of the State over its Jewish citizens by the outbreak of the War was considerably disregarded by Dündar. Besides Zionism, Cemal focused his attention on the autonomy of the Christian clergy and the autonomous Government of Lebanon, and managed to assert the Ottoman state authority on them. The clergy of the Maronites, Greek-Orthodox and Greek-Catholics lost their autonomies and were put under the authority of the Ottoman Sultan. Similarly, all the autonomous institutions of the Lebanese Government were either removed or controlled by the Central Government with the intervention of Cemal Pasha.

While Cemal was governing in Syria, as a result of the deportations from Anatolia, he had to resettle enormous numbers of the Armenians in Syria. Chapter 4 concentrates on the integration of the Armenian deportees into the Syrian society in connection with Cemal's general policy towards the various peoples of Syria. This study analyzes deportation and settlement policies of Cemal Pasha and connecting them with his general policy of re-formation of the state in Syria. As will be detailed in Chapter 4, Cemal's aim in Syria was neither to destroy the Armenians nor to make an ethnic engineering in the sense that would create a balance for the Arabs in Syria using the deported Armenians. But he dispersed them through Syria to make them a "harmless minority" [*zararsız cüz'iyet*], and in this sense, he was an ethnic-engineer. In addition the Pasha tried to do his best both during the deportations and its aftermath, to protect the Armenian deportees. To save them from the policy of the deliberate negligence by the radical wing of the Central Government, Cemal pretended to enforce them to change their religions and established a special committee for the resettlement of mainly "converted" Armenians. He also opened orphanages for the Armenians orphans. Both the consular reports and the accounts of the Armenians themselves indicate that all of those activities were a measure to protect them from the implementations of the radical group within the CUP. By this way, Cemal mainly intended to "transform the dangerous Armenian multitude [*külliyet*] into harmless minority

[*cüziyet*]".[145] In other words, to make them loyal citizens, who did not have any political aspiration for a separation from the Ottoman Empire in future.

Besides the internal threats for the diffusion of the state authority in Syria, Cemal struggled for the abolition of the foreign influence there, mainly that of France, which created a considerable impact in Syria for years with their educational and religious institutions and displayed the Ottoman authority as weak in the eyes of its citizens, which is analyzed in Chapter 5. In this regard, first, Cemal launched a process of deportation for the religious and educational men of France from Syria, who acted as the agents of the French influence there. After that, he either closed or ottomanized those institutions. As another part of the policy of struggling the foreign influence, Cemal prevented the replacement of any other ally of the Ottoman Empire of France. Thus, he harshly reacted to any action of foreign consuls in the direction of the intervention to the internal affairs of the State as well as inhibiting any cultural propaganda of those states, Austria and Germany being in the first place.

In accordance with the policy of the elimination of internal and foreign "barriers" between the state and its citizens, Cemal Pasha implemented a policy towards the Syrians to turn them into ideal Ottoman citizens, and a policy of modernization of the Syrian cities to make these more penetrable for the State. Chapter 6 examines Cemal's pursuit for the ideal citizens in Syria. In this sense, the liable Syrians were conscripted and, by this way, intended to be disciplinized both mentally and bodily. Their alienation to the military life and loss of motivation after the first expedition of Egypt caused an increase in the number of the desertions, and the recruitment became the nightmare of the Syrians throughout the War period. As a second pillar of that aim, Cemal opened schools in Syria aiming at the creation of the modern Ottoman Syrians. The absolute ruler of Syria did not neglect to transform cities in a way that would facilitate the penetration of the state. As part of the modernization project of the cities, the Pasha restored the historical artifacts from the Byzantine, Umayyad and the Ottoman times. It is worth to mention here that he did not follow a Turkist policy in these restorations and renovated the Arabic monuments as well

[145] See, **BOA,** DH.ŞFR. 486/118, Cemal to Talat, 30 Ağustos 1331 [12 September 1915]; Cemal to Enver, 27 September 1917, *Arşiv Belgeleriyle Ermeni Faaliyetleri VII,* p. 698

as the Ottoman ones.

Chapter 7 studies the policy followed by Cemal towards the tribal groups and nomads of Syria during his governorate. Differing from the policies followed towards the city-dweller of Syria, Cemal maintained the traditional Ottoman policy and gave freedom of action to those groups in return for their loyalties. This policy was rather different than the policies followed by his predecessors to settle those groups and attach them to the government.[146] Since it was war period, Cemal avoided any action to frustrate those groups and applied a policy of balance towards them. In this regard, he gave a large autonomy to the Druze and made them immune from much responsibility to the government. Although it was not as much as those of the Druze, the Bedouin groups also enjoyed a certain freedom and were not exposed to any action of subjugation to the state authority. That policy was due to a competition with Great Britain for the allegiance of those groups and Cemal was mainly successful till the last moment to secure their loyalties. Especially after the outbreak of the Sharifian Revolt in Mecca and the advance of the Sharif's troops towards Akaba, that competition was heated up and the freedom provided to those groups was increased. As a result, none of the Druze supported the Sharif and the British and a considerable amount of the Bedouins remained loyal to the Ottoman authority till the end of the Ottoman rule in Syria.

Throughout the WWI, one of Cemal's greatest "enemies", both militarily and in terms of the implementation of the reforms, was famine and its consequences influencing the whole Syrian territory. The ways that Cemal struggled to cope with the famine and its consequences are dealt with in Chapter 8. The mutual responsibility of the sides –the British, Ottoman- in the event of famine in Syria was persuasively demonstrated by Linda Schatkowski Schicher as well as Cemal's attempts to forestall the famine in Syria. In general, the Ottoman requisitions of the agricultural production and the conscription of its labor for the Army were the Ottoman activities causing the famine. The Entente's blockade of the Syrian coasts prevented the foreign assistance to Syria from the neutral states. Furhtermore, Schicher suggests that famine was not a disaster special to Lebanon, but for

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[146] For an analysis of the Ottoman policy to subjugate those groups in the case of Transjordan, see: Eugene L. Rogan, *Frontiers of the State in the Late Ottoman Empire,1850-1921,* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999.

the whole Syrian realm. Thus, Schicher proved that Cemal did not deliberately starve the Lebanese because of their sympathy to France. Agreeing with Schicher's study, the present study also touches upon the reasons of the famine and measures taken by Cemal with further reference to the Ottoman, German and Austrian sources. On the other hand, the famine made considerable social impact on the Syrian realm. The increasing needs of the Army for provisioning and the decreasing amount of the grains in Syria paved the way for the intensification of the state pressure over the farmers. Those kinds of actions both reduced the agricultural production and increased the frustration of the Syrians to the Ottoman State. The struggle with famine also shows the changing nature of the state in Syria with Cemal. For example, some high-ranking officials appointed by Cemal strongly opposed the foreign assistance on the grounds that it would show the State weak in the eyes of its citizens. Furthermore, the struggle with epidemics indicates Cemal's new policy based on the State's control of the bodies of its citizens.

The capture of Baghdad by the British troops signified the beginning of the end for Cemal. The Ottoman and German Headquarters made a plan of combination of the Ottoman troops in Syria and Iraq under a German commander. As will be detailed in the last Chapter, General Falkenhayn was appointed for this job and Cemal was disempowered militarily. Following the Ottoman victories in the first and second battles of Gaza, while the Ottomans were busy with the change of the General Commander in Syria, the British completed their preparations for a third attack against Gaza, which was considered the gate of Jerusalem. As a result, Jerusalem was captured by the British troops, on 10th December 1917, and ten days later Cemal resigned from his post because of his disagreement with Falkenhayn. Thus a crucial period in the history of Syria was closed. Cemal accuses Falkenhayn, and implicitly Enver, for being responsible for the loss of Jerusalem in his memoirs with these remarks:

> "For myself, I maintain that if (1) the idea of recovering Bagdad had never been mooted and all available troops had been concentrated on the Palestine front, (2) von Falkenhayn had not been put in command of the army in Palestine, we could have held the Gaza-Beersheba [sic] line for years, and on the day of the armistice Syria and Palestine would still have formed part of the Ottoman Empire."[147]

Indeed, an examination of the contemporary documents shows that this failure of the

[147] Djemal Pasha, Ibid, p. 193.

Ottoman troops, to a large extent, emanated from Enver's insistence on an offensive operation to recapture Baghdad instead of defending Palestine with the troops in the hands of the Ottomans. Falkenhayn was a result of this project.

CHAPTER I

THE EGYPTIAN EXPEDITION

As emphasized above, the first aim of Cemal in Syria was to organize an offensive against Egypt. The idea of an expedition against Egypt was originated from the German Emperor himself in the beginning of the War. It was a part of Germany's policy of alliance with the Ottoman Empire. The main goal of Germany in its alliance with the Ottomans was to provoke a rebellion of the Muslim peoples under the rule of the Entente states against their political masters,[148] and to dislocate the center of the War from the Western war theatre, and thus, to relieve the German troops there and to climb over the congestion in that front. That idea also seemed very attractive to the CUP leaders since they thought that an operation against Egypt would be quite convenient for the Ottoman war aims.[149]

In this regard, opening of a new front in Egypt looked as if very sensible for both states. First, as will be examined below, the Egyptian public opinion kept faith overwhelmingly with the pan-Islamist ideal under the leadership of the Ottoman Caliph, and dissatisfied with the British protectorate. Therefore, an uprising in Egypt would put Great Britain in a very difficult position to overcome and possibly would pass the

[148] Aksakal. Ibid., p. 155.

[149] Çolak, Ibid, p. 24.

domination of Egypt into the hands of the Ottoman Empire. The second reason for an Expedition against Egypt was to invade the Suez Canal, and thus, to cause the interruption of the traffic between Great Britain and India, which provided the largest part of the British supplies throughout the war.[150] The expedition would also produce a considerable benefit for the international and domestic policies of the Ottoman Empire, especially in the Arab provinces. A defeat of the British troops in Suez or a conquest of Egypt would extremely increase the prestige of the State among its citizens, who were influenced by the Great Powers, and among the Muslims outside its territory.[151] As will be examined in Chapter 6, the expedition would be used to agitate the Syrians against the Great Powers, which was considered by Cemal a part of the Ottomanness.

By these considerations, preparations were commenced to open a new front in Syria some 4 months before the Ottoman official entrance into the war. First, Zeki Pasha and later Cemal Pasha were appointed to command this operation. As will be explained in the following sections, half of the war period passed in Syria to put this project into action and those preparations became the reason for most of the miseries that hit Syria during that span of time. Apart from that, earlier commencement of the preparations also shows that the Ottomans planned to enter into the war from the very beginning.

The preparation process of the Egyptian expedition and its performance influenced the region very deeply during the WWI. It is partly because of this expedition that conscription and famine, the nightmares of the Syrians, were introduced to those lands. Many problems like epidemics and desertions occurred, are in fact, related to those events, which ruined the smooth flow of the daily life in Syria as well as the attitude of the people towards the Ottoman Government. In spite of its centrality in the history of the region, there is no proper study in English examining that expedion. In Turkish, on the other hand, the expedition process is relatively well-described by some academics in spite of some

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[150] The Germans were aware of the importance of the Canal for Great Britain. The German academic Franz Stuhlmann evaluated the place of the Canal in the British Policy with these remarks: "England regards the possession of Egypt as a question of life and death, and that she is also most vulnerable there.": **PRO**, FO 371/2783, Holderness to FO, "Germany, Turkey, England and Arabia, Dr. Franz Stuhlmann's recently published book", India Office, London, 2 November 1916.

[151] Ziya Şakir, Ibid., p. 179.

crucial problems of those studies. The first to be mentioned in this sense is the work of Nevzat Artuç, who wrote a biography of Cemal Pasha. He reserved a broad place in his book to the examination of the expedition. But, the text is not organized in a consistent 0way to answer some study questions. Furthermore, there are many ruptures in the description of the process. The flow of the text implies that the writer arrayed all the documents in his hands according to their dates of issuance without endeavoring to create a consistent narrative. On the other hand, the social impact of that process is never tackled with.[152] Another book on the subject under the study was written by İsmet Üzen. Different from the first one, this study describes the process in every detail. But, the writer is usually unable to reach the contemporary documents of the period. Since its arguments are, to a large extent, built on the memoirs and the Turkish and British official histories of the War, the study is largely a repetition of the narrations of Erden, Von Kress, Cemal Pasha and those military histories. In summary, Üzen's book is rather a military history of the Sinai Front.[153]

Different from these works, this chapter will set out to clarify the political and military aims of Cemal Pasha with this expedition and transformations that caused by the expedition in the Syrian realm rather than giving a detailed account of the military operations. Our focus will rather be Cemal himself than the process of the preparations for the Egyptian Expedition. The detailed analysis of the preparations will be made to understand Cemal's intentions with this attack. Since the process created multi-lateral consequences combined with the Syrian policies of Cemal Pasha and its government, the analysis of the social impact of this expedition is distributed to the following chapters.

1.1 Mobilization of the Troops for the Canal Expedition

[152] For the related chapter in the book, see: Artuç, Ibid, p. 208-245.

[153] Üzen, Ibid, 664 p.

In accordance with the abovementioned war aims of the Ottoman Empire and Germany, the preparations for an expedition against the Suez Canal were commenced in Syria by the wish of the German Emperor, Wilhelm Iii, on 2nd August 1914.[154] It was planned in the beginning as an operation to bind the British troops in Egypt and to threat the Canal.[155] For that purpose a general mobilization of the troops was proclaimed and the Ottoman Army in Syria entered into a period of preparations with great energy.[156] For this purpose, Zeki Pasha was appointed as the General Commander for the Syrian provinces immediately after the proclamation of the mobilization.[157] Although he was an opponent of the expedition, it can be said that Zeki performed his duty at all points. The agricultural and human sources of Syria were mobilized for the needs of the Army. As an initial step, 10 % production of cereals from Hauran, 280 000 kg of barley from local cereal merchants, 1500 sacks flour from the local mill owners were requisitioned by the Army. For these items, nothing was paid to them. They were collected in the context of war taxes. For further purchases, the promises were made for payment.[158]

Towards the end of the second month of the preparations, the Germans directly intervened into the activities to accelerate the process. For this aim, Colonel v. Kress, with four other German military officers, joined the Syrian Army on 20th September 1914.[159] These officers were distributed between Damascus, Nablus and other military centers. Some of them, in conjunction with Turkish staff officers, reconnoitered the lines of

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[154] Aksakal, Ibid, p.155.

[155] Von Kressenstein, Ibid, p. 24.

[156] **HHStA.** PA 38/363, Ranzi [Austrian Consul in Damascus]to Berchtold[Minister of Foreign Affairs], Damascus, 10 August 1914; **MAEE**. Guerre 1914-1918, 867/Turquie, Syrie et Palestine, Cote [French Representative in Port-Said] to MAE, Port- Said, 29 August 1914.

[157] **ATASE Arşivi,** Kls. 126, Ds. 590, Fih. 23-29, Harbiye Nezareti to Army Commanders, 3 August 1914; Because of his opposition to the Egyptian Expedition, on 9th September 1914, the boundaries of his authority was restricted to the completion of the preparations. The implementation of the operations was assigned to Mersinli Cemal Pasha, the Commander of the 8th Army Corps. For further details, see: *Birinci Dünya Harbinde Türk Harbi,* Cilt I, p. 121.

[158] **HHStA.** PA 38/363, Ranzi to Berchtold. Damascus, 18 August 1914.

[159] Von Kressenstein, Ibid, p. 27.

advance towards Egypt, whereas the remaining officers took care of the exercise and training of the troops to enable them to reach the standards of those nearer the capital.[160]

In the third month of the preparations, a considerable number of soldiers had been mobilized in Syria. To the estimation of the British Military Attache, in the midst of October 1914, the mobilised strength of a Turkish division (with 3 battalion regiments) was about 12 000 men. At Homs division, the number of the soldiers was approximate to one division with 30 guns. Adding some reserve battalions of gendarmerie, the full would be about 45 000 men. Finally, with the arrival of the 35th division which moved south, another 10 000 men must be added to the troops at Homs (2 battalion regiments only) with 42 guns. The 73rd and 75th infantry regiments of the 25th (Damascus) division had been moved down the line, the remainder of the division still being at Damascus. Of the 27th (Jerusalem) division, 2 battalions of the 80th regiment and 2 mountain batteries were reported at Birüssebi, the remainder of the division was at Nablus-Jerusalem. Of the Homs division, the engineer and transport units began to move down the line and have been followed to Damascus by an advanced party of the 67th regiment. Already at Gaza and along the frontier, there were 2 battalions of Gendarmeries.[161]

Besides the mobilization of the regular army, another important part of the preparations for the Egyptian Campain was to gain the support of the Bedouin tribes in Syria, to ensure both pack animals for the transportation of the Army needs in areas where no railways were available and manpower contributions as volunteers. Furthermore, since the Syrian land had large groups of the tribes, they should be won over for the Ottoman side not to cause any disturbance by the agitation of Great Britain. For those purposes, initially, the local Algerian notable Amir Said al-Jazairi was employed within the body of the Army by Zeki Pasha to acquire the allegiance of the Bedouins living around the Canal Zone. As an achievement of his mission a group of Bedouin chiefs, consisted mostly of the chiefs of the smaller tribes, came to Damascus to assure their allegiance to the Government, and to notify their readiness for help in the Jihad (the Holy War). Besides,

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[160] **PRO**, FO 371/2141, Cunliffe Owen to Louis Mallet. Military situation in Syria and as affecting Egypt. Constantinople, 15 October 1914; **PRO.** FO 371/2140, Mallet to Said Halim Pasha. Constantinople, 2 October 1914.

[161] **PRO,** Cunliffe Owen to Louis Mallet, Ibid.

Amir Said created a volunteer troop from the Algerian immigrants in Syria.[162] Three days after the declaration of mobilization, in his telegraph to German Foreign ministry, Amir Said stated his readiness for service with 500 Algerians to march against France.[163]

The intensification of the military mobilization paved the way for an increasing interest of the Central Government towards Bedouins. Enver Pasha's Aide-de-Camp Mümtaz Bey was appointed by Enver himself as the commander of the tribes [*urban kumandanı*]. He was assigned with the mission to create forces from the Bedouin tribes, and Senator Abdurrahman Bey el-Yusuf was appointed to facilitate gaining the support of them for the expedition.[164] Mümtaz would also recapture the Sinai Desert from the British troops there.[165] In one and a half months, following the mobilization order for the Ottoman Army, the allegiance of almost all the Bedouins and the Druzes in Maan, Deraa and Amman was assured by the efforts of Hulusi Bey, the Governor of Syria, Senator Abdurrahman Bey el-Yusuf, and Mümtaz Bey.[166] Because of their proximity to the field of the Expedition, the support and allegiance of the Bedoins in and around Jerusalem placed a vital importance for the Government. For this aim, Mümtaz and Hakkı Beys went to Jerusalem and ensured the political loyalties of the Bedouin Sheikhs around there. They promised 5.000-6.000 Camels and equal number of volunteers. Abdurrahman Bey took the

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[162] **HHStA**. PA 38/363, Ranzi to Berchtold. Damascus. 3 September 1914.; **ATASE Arşivi**, Kls. 159, Ds. 703/1, Zeki to Başkumandanlık, Damascus, 26 July 1914 [13 Temmuz 1330].

[163] Most probably, he intentionally mentioned France instead of the Britain, Because of his pro-French fame and the given Franchophile sentiments prevailing among the Algerians settled in Syria: **PA-AA**, Der Weltkrieg, No:11a Amir Said to AA, Damascus, 5 August 1914.

[164] **ATASE Arşivi**. Kls.159, Ds.705/23-1, Macid to Başkumandanlık Ministry. Jerusalem, 17 September 1914[4 Eylül 1330].; Cemal Paşa, Ibid, p.112, Djemal Pasha, Ibid, p.137; **PRO.** FO 371/2141.Cunliffe Owen to Louis Mallet. "Military situation in Syria and as affecting Egypt", Constantinople, 15 October 1914; According to Philip Stoddard they were appointed as the members of the Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa to gain the support of the Bedouins and Mümtaz Bey was the head of the delegation. Philip H. Stoddard, *Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa,* İstanbul: Arma Yayınları, p. 99.

[165] *Birinci Dünya Harbinde Türk Harbi,* Cilt I, p. 125.

[166] **ATASE Arşivi.** Kls.159, Ds.705/23, Zeki to Başkumandanlık Ministry. Damascus, 14 September 1914 [1 Eylül 1330].

road for Hama and Homs and met the chief of the tribes annexed to these cities administratively. Regarding the Bedouin support in Hauran, the Government didn't have the intention to benefit from the Bedouins in and around Hauran in a long expedition. They promised, however, to provide volunteers in the defense of Syria and not to occupy the Governmental posts in a case of invasion by the Entente.[167]

Another critical center for an expedition against the Canal was Birüssebi, which was located in the Sinai desert. Again, Mümtaz Bey visited the Bedouins around that town with Asad Shukayr. The leaders of these tribes were invited to a meeting at Bayt Jaydin village. In the meeting, Shukayr expressed to the aims of the Ottoman Government in the War to the Bedouins. They declared their allegiance to the Caliph and their obedience to the orders of the State. As a requirement of this declaration, they promised 3000 dromadery, 2.000 camel and 25.000 infantry. All of them swore their loyalty to the Sultan.[168] Following a feast for the Bedouins settled in the Had Kasıl and Lazkiye, They also assured their participation to the Army in case of an operation.[169] Efforts to gain the support from the Bedouins produced its fruits in a short span of time. According to the report of the Austrian Consul, in two months after the mobilization, 12.000 horses and 5.000 mules and 5.000 camels were collected for the military transportation.[170] As stated by Von Kress, although they couldn't be benefitted militarily since their battle techniques were obsolete, the Bedouins in the Sinai Desert remained loyal to the Ottoman Government till the end of the Ottoman rule.[171]

While making preparations for the Canal Expedition, the first commander of the expedition, Zeki Pasha was opposing to the idea of an operation against Canal from the

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[167] **ATASE Arşivi.** Kls.159, Ds.705, Fih. 23, Zeki to Başkumandanlık Ministry, Damascus, 14 September 1914 [1 Eylül 1330].

[168] **ATASE Arşivi.** Kls.159, Ds.705, Fih. 23-1, Macid to Başkumandanlık Ministry, Jerusalem. 17 September 1914[4 Eylül 1330]; **ATASE Arşivi.** Kls.159, Ds.705, Fih. 23-2, Zeki to Enver, Damascus, 18 September 1914 [5 Eylül 1330],.

[169] **ATASE Arşivi.** Kls. 159, Ds. 705/23-3, Zeki to Başkumandanlık Ministry. 2 October 1914 [19 Eylül 1330]. Damascus.

[170] **HHStA**, PA 38/363, Ranzi to Berchtold, "Agitation gegen England". Damascus, 9 October 1914.

[171] Von Kressenstein, Ibid, p. 52.

very beginning, and always advocated the organization of a strong defense in Syria instead.[172] In his telegrams to Enver, Zeki firstly pointed out that the Army that would go to Egypt would have to suffer from water scarcity in the Sinai Desert, and would meet with a strong British defense at the Canal. Moreover, more training was required for the Ottoman soldiers in Syria. Finally, he thought it dubious to enter into Egypt with these troops.[173] Apart from that, since he was not a member of the CUP, it was not easy for him to make his requests accepted by the civil authorities in Syria.[174] On the other hand, there was a diarcy in the Syrian Army: Zeki Pasha was not the chief commander of the troops, which had been organized for the conquest of Egypt. He would only carry out the preaparations for the expedition and would command the forces reserved in the rear to defend Syria. The actual Expedtion would be commanded by the Commander of the 8th Army Corps, Mersinli Cemal Pasha.[175] Besides those military difficulties, according to the remarks of Von Kress, there was also a passive resistance among the civil governmental authorities of Syria.[176] As a result of all these problems, both to harmonize the commands of the defense and the offensive forces in Syria combining them under one commander, and to maintain the preparations in a more enthusiastic manner,[177] Enver contemplated that Cemal Pasha was ideally suited for this job, who previously proved his efficacy during his governerships in Adana and Istanbul.

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[172] In spite of all these activities by Zeki Pasha for the Canal Expedition, Nevzat Artuç wrongly claimed in his book that Enver's requests to take over the commandership of the expedition was refused by Zeki. Quite the reverse, such a request were never made to him: Artuç, Ibid, p. 208.

[173] **ATASE Arşivi,** Kls. 126, Dos. 590, Fih. 23-9, Zeki to Enver, Damascus, 25 August 1330 [7 Eylül 1914]; For further correspondence of opposition by Zeki Pasha to the idea of such an expedition see: *Birinci Dünya Harbinde Türk Harbi,* Cilt I, pp. 109-120.

[174] Von Kressenstein, Ibid, p. 33.

[175] **ATASE Arşivi,** Kls. 126, Ds. 590, Fih. 23-2, Enver to Zeki, 27 August 1330 [9 September 1914]; For this appointment, see footnote 157.

[176] Von Kressenstein, Ibid, p. 71.

[177] **ATASE Arşivi,** Kls. 159, Ds. 704, Fih.15, Cemal to Enver, 19 Teşrin-i Sani 1330 [2 December 1914]; see also: *Birinci Dünya Harbinde Türk Harbi,* Cilt I, p. 134.

1.2 Cemal Pasha and the Expedition against Egypt

As mentioned earlier, Cemal had been authorized by Enver "prepare (and carry through) the attack on the Canal."[178] However, in his farewell speech at the Haidar Pasha station, Cemal scaled-up the aim of the expedition and added the conquest of Egypt to his goals in Syria. He delivered the following remarks regarding his aims in Syria:

> "I was fully conscious of the greatness as of the immense difficulties of the task before me. If our enterprise failed, and my corpse and those of the brave men going with me were left at the Canal, the friends of our country who would then have to take up our work must sweep over us and rescue Egypt, the rightful property of Islam, from the hands of the English usurpers."[179]

The prospective conqueror of Egypt was welcomed in Damascus like a tiaraed king[180] and, as will be seen below, after the appointment of Cemal to Syria, in all the correspondences regarding the expedition, both Enver and Cemal defined it as the conquest of Egypt. However, Cemal explained in his memoires that he personally "was not so sure of the ultimate success of this campaign" and he was aware "of perfection the English had brought their Canal defences". In spite of this awareness, he "used to talk to the troops every night about the victory in store, and what a glorious victory it would be". By doing so, Cemal claims that he intended "to keep the sacred flame alive in the whole force".[181]

Furthermore, Cemal set forth in his memoires that he contemplated this attack merely as a demonstration that targeted two aims: first, "to make the English realize that … [they] had no idea of sitting down quietly on the Canal", and secondly, in accordance with their "design of tying down considerable forces in Egypt." These statements are more than enough to clarify his alleged intention:

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[178] Djemal Pasha, Ibid, p.138; Cemal Paşa, Ibid, p.112.

[179] Djemal Pasha, Ibid, p.138; Cemal Paşa, Ibid, p.114: Muhittin Birgen, Behiç Erkin and Ziya Şakir convey similar remarks in their memoirs about the ceremony of Cemal's farewell: Birgen, Ibid, p. 224; Behiç Erkin, *Hatırat 1876-1958,* Ankara: TTK Yayınları, 2010, p. 151; Ziya Şakir, Ibid, p. 178.

[180] Von Kressenstein, Ibid, p. 71.

[181] Djemal Pasha, Ibid, p.154; Cemal Paşa, Ibid, p.126.

> "…I should never have seriously pretended to myself that with resources which did not permit of our remaining more than four days on the Canal, i.e., fourteen thousand rifles, a few mountain gun batteries, a single howitzer battery, and nothing but ten pontoons with which to cross the obstacle –we could have crossed a Canal at least a hundred meters wide defended by an army so mobile and brave as the English and provided with every conceivable means of defence from the largest warships to armoured trains."[182]

Besides him, Ali Fuad Erden, his Chief of the Staff, expressed in his memoires that the expedition was rather a threat attack than having occupatory aims. Erden claims that both German General Staff and Ottoman Head Quarters didn't give any order in the direction of the conquest of Egypt. It was only *propaganda* to motivate public opinion for the Expedition.[183] In contrast to this remarks, he publishes many documents by Cemal Pasha in his memoirs demonstrating Cemal's enthusiasm on the conquest of Egypt. A comparative analysis of his memoirs can easily show the contradiction between these documents and Erden's arguments regarding the aims of the expedition.[184] In a similar way, Eşref Kuşçubaşı, who was the head of the *Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa*[185] in the Arab provinces, claimed in his interview with Stoddard that none of the Ottoman commanders believed in the realization of the plan to conquer Egypt.[186] Reading of Artuç and Üzen about the aims of the expedition aren't different than those arguments. They also neglected to question the reason for such great preparations in the desert to facilitate the transfer of the troops.[187] Von Kress is suspicious about the aims of Cemal by this expedition. He expresses in his memoirs that he never understands "whether Cemal Pasha believed in the actuality of the

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182 Djemal Pasha, Ibid, p.155; Cemal Paşa, Ibid, p.127.

183 For their evaluations regarding the Expedition see: Ali Fuat Erden, Ibid, p.2.

184 Enver to Cemal, 23 Kanun-ı Sani 1330 [5 February 1915], in Erden, Ibid, p. 46; Cemal to Enver, 23 Kanun-ı Sani 1330 [5 February 1915], in Erden Ibid, p. 47; Enver to Cemal, 20 Şubat 1330 [5 March 1915], in Erden, Ibid, p. 72: Cemal to Enver, 6 Temmuz 1331 [18 July 1915], in Erden, Ibid, p. 149-154. In addition, Erden places a considerable place to the preparations for the Egyptian Expedition: Erden, Ibid, p. 85-101, 157-161.

185 *Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa* is a special intelligence organization founded by Enver Pasha prior to the WWI. During the War, the organization made important activities within the scope of the propaganda activities. For detailed information on this organization, see: Philip H. Stoddard, *Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa,* İstanbul: Arma Yayınları, 1993.

186 Stoddard, Ibid, p. 104.

187 Artuç, Ibid, p. 226, 231; Üzen, Ibid, p. 25.

capture of Egypt" or used that operation as propaganda to motivate the Arab soldiers to the expedtion.[188]

On the other hand, the prominent Kemalist Historian Yusuf Hikmet Bayur claims that, even before the war, Cemal Pasha planned to take over the conquest of Egypt in case of any hostility with Great Britain. He claims that Cemal told the French Ambassador Bompard that "Egypt is my *Alsace Lorraine*", and planned to be the *Khedive* of Egypt. However, this argument seems weak. If Cemal had drafted such a plan, then he would go to Syria immediately after the proclamation of the mobilization instead of waiting in Istanbul for 4 months.[189]

The fact that all these statements belonged to the post-war period makes it mandatory for an analysis of the contemporary documents, which is going to make the aims of the Expedition clear. The examination of the documents, which belong to the preceding months of the first expedition, don't confirm that the Canal expedition aimed at a demonstration, or a threat, or an exploratory offensive.

However, we can make some inferences from the preparations for the expedition and conclude about the aims of it. For example, in his action plan, which he sent to Talat two weeks before the expedition, Cemal Pasha was planning to pass and conquer Egypt with approximately 20-25.000 men.[190] The impossibility of carrying out the occupation of a country, guarded by 80.000 troops[191] by these troops, could easily be realized for anyone who knew the circumstances of the region.[192] On the other hand, gathering troops in such a

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[188] Von Kressenstein, Ibid, p. 98.

[189] Yusuf Hikmet Bayur, *Türk İnkılâbı Tarihi,* Vol: III/I, Ankara: TTK Yayınları, 1991, p. 412; The same argument is repeated by Behiç Erkin in his memoirs. He asserts in his memoirs that Cemal explained his plan of being the *Khedive* of Egypt before his movement to Syria, Erkin, Ibid, p. 151.

[190] **BOA**, DH.ŞFR. 458/6, Cemal to Talat, 15 January 1915 [2 Kanun-ı Sani 1330]; **MAEE**, Guerre 1914-1918, 868/Turquie, Syrie et Palestine, Maucops to MAE, Cairo, 20 February 1915.

[191] **MAEE**, Guerre 1914-1918, 868/Turquie, Syrie et Palestine, Maucops to MAE, Cairo, 20 February 1915.

[192] It is obvious in his long report, that he sent to Enver after the expedition, he more or less estimated the number of the troops deployed in the Canal region: **ATASE Arşivi,** Kls. 171, Ds. 742, Fih. 2-1.

great amount before the Canal only for threat or demonstration and making some 1400 of them cross to the other side of the Canal with pontoons shows that, this operation had a more serious aim. In this point the most plausible explanation is that Cemal attached greater importance in his plan to a rebellion of the Egyptians. According to the memoirs of Von Kress, the Egyptian nationalists informed Cemal that the people in Egypt would assist the Ottoman troops in the widest range. As soon as the first Ottoman soldier appeared before the Canal, all Egypt would rebel against Great Britain as a united body.[193] For this purpose, Cemal Pasha assigned Eşref Kuşçubaşı to engage in a propaganda to foment an uprising in Egypt, following the passage of the Army through the Canal. By Eşref's remarks in Stoddard's book, it is understood that the success of the troops in front of the Canal through igniting a rebellion of the Egyptians was seriously taken into consideration by the CUP leaders in advance of the first expedition.[194] It is impossible to guess whether Cemal Pasha would be successful in the Canal front, if the Egyptians had actually rebelled against the British authority. However, it can be said that, before the first expedition, he believed in the success in case of a general uprising in Egypt.[195]

In the preceding months of the first expedition, Cemal always defined the aim of the expedition as the conquest of Egypt in his reports.[196] However, after performing the first expedition, quite the reverse of what he said before the expedition, he changed the name of the first expedition and defined it as an "exploratory offensive", most probably to appease the public critics against his movement. He expressed in his declaration to the

[193] Von Kressenstein, Ibid, p. 76.

[194] Stoddard, Ibid, p.99-124.

[195] The reports, which belongs to the pre-expedition period show this belief. For details, see: **PA-AA**, Türkei 177, Bd.17, Mutius to Hertling. Beirut, 20 December 1917; **HHStA**, PA 12/209, Pallavicini to Burian, "Die Chancen der egyptischen Expedition. -Deutsche Herrscht in Syrien", Damascus, 28 January 1915; Colonel A.P. Wavell, *The Palestine Campaigns*, London:1928.

[196] For an example, see: **BOA,** DH.ŞFR. 458/6, Cemal to Talat. 15 January 1915 [2 Kanun-ı Sani 1330]; In a similar way, Cemal explained in Palestine to the people around him that he would either conquer Egypt, or become martyr in the Canal. These words of the Spanish consul in Jerusalem is remarkable for the purpose of the Expedition: "Djemal Pasha left yesterday morning for the canal. To my friend, 'Abd al-Rahman Pasha, he wrote: 'See you soon, on the other side of the canal… on in heaven..", Ballobar, Ibid, p. 46.

newspapers that, with this "exploratory offensive", they understood well the requirements for the conquest of Egypt, and guaranteed that soon a new attack would take place and would result with success[197]. But, it is very easy to comprehend that 20.000 soldiers transcend very much the number of an exploratory offensive. As was expressed by Ali Fuad Erden, "the failure was called the exploratory offensive".[198]

In a report, sent by Cemal Pasha to the Ottoman Headquarter on the reasons of failure, the Pasha explained that he didn't calculate that an attack –with the number of the troops and ammunitions at his disposal-, would fail, although his enemies doubled their troops. In spite of the prevalence of the Enemy in number, he planned to demolish the Canal, and thus to settle and fortify the occupied shores of the Canal preventing the help of the British warships. In addition, he estimated that, during the attack, the British warships wouldn't have fired with heavy artilleries from the Canal. It is worth to mention that, in this report, he never implied that the aim of the expedition was a threat or should have transformed into a threat and didn't give any recommendation to the Headquarter advising any revision in the aims of the expedition from conquest to threat. Quite the reverse, Cemal highlighted the necessities for the conquest of Egypt.[199] The developments, which occurred in the aftermath of the first expedition –the battle of Dardanelles, famine, and inflation etc.- compelled the Ottoman center –and also Cemal- to delay –but not a total abandonment- the aim of the conquest of Egypt.

The failure in the first attack and the withdrawal of the troops back to the Birüssebi-Gaza line caused suspicious interpretations on the aims of the expedition among the people. The remarks of an Armenian doctor, who worked in the 4th Ottoman Army and afterwards captured by the English, prove us that, at least immediately afterwards the first attack, the objective of the expedition came to be questioned among the people. He said that the object was "partly to retain troops in Egypt, but mainly with the idea of making it

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[197] **ATASE Arşivi,** Kls. 162, Ds. 713, Fih. 23, 23-1, Cemal to Enver, 23 Kanun-ı Sani 1330 [5 Şubat 1915].

[198] Erden, Ibid, p. 58.

[199] Erden, Ibid, p.51-52; **ATASE Arşivi,** Kls. 163, Ds. 717A, Fih. 1,1-1,1-2, Cemal to Enver, 29 Kanun-ı Sani 1330 [11 Şubat 1915].

believed that they always intend to attack with a small force”.[200] However, none of the contemporary expressions, which belonged to Cemal Pasha and other high officials, confirm that kind of remarks.

The object of the expedition was changed by Cemal only as an excuse when it became apparent that the conquest became impossible: In a public speech in Lebanon, in the third year of the War, Cemal confessed that due to the insufficiency of the sources, Egypt could only have been seriously threatened.[201] In the same way, at the end of the year 1916, in his conversation with the Austrian ambassador while he was in Istanbul, mentioning the difficulties of a conquest, Cemal expressed wholeheartedly his regret about the attachment of such great sources for this expedition and said that “from the very beginning, the aim of the expedition must have been restricted to the binding of the British troops to Egypt”.[202]It is the most obvious statement that the aim of the Expedition was not only to threat the British existence in Egypt.

The conquest of Egypt was not crucial for the Germans. They rather aimed with this expedition to threat the Suez Canal and to shed blood between the Turks and Great Britain. By this way, they would achieve both to dislocate the center of the war to the non-Western theatres and to assure the loyalty of the Ottomans to the alliance between two states.[203] However, for Cemal, the situation was not like that. He paid attention to the conquest of Egypt, for both his personal career and the war aims of the Ottoman Empire.

It is reasonable to conclude that after the arrival of Cemal, the aim of the expedition became clearer and transformed into an operation of conquest for Egypt with the help of a prospective rebellion in Egypt caused by his success at the Canal. He believed that a conquest of Egypt would have taken place if he were able to capture the Canal Zone of Egypt for a few days. But, failure prevented the Ottoman troops from entering into Egypt.

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[200] **PRO**, FO 141/801, Clark to FO, Cairo, 31 August 1915.

[201] **PA-AA**, Türkei 177, Bd.17, Mutius to Hertling, Beirut, 20 December 1917.

[202] **HHStA**, PA 12/210, Pallavicini to Burian, "Unterredung mit Djemal Pasha. Türkische Friedensbedingungen", Constantinople, 27 December 1916.

[203] Von Kressenstein, Ibid, p. 76.

After the first attack, he prepared a long list of the deficiencies to realize the conquest,[204] and continued the preparations for a second larger expedition spending great amounts of money. Before an analysis of the preparations undertaken following the first expedition, the public opinion in Egypt and the operations itself will be analyzed to understand Cemal's aims with this expedition and the character of the operations in a better way.

1.2.1 The Expedition, Egyptian People and the Ottoman Caliph

With the beginning of the war, the dissatisfaction of the Egyptians from the British protectorate made them overwhelmingly pro-Ottoman. Therefore, as stated above, even before the entrance of Turkey into the war, Germany considered an operation against Egypt to benefit from this potential for their goals. In accordance with this, one of the most important part of Cemal's plans for the conquest of Egypt was a rebellion of the Egyptians to support the Ottoman troops attacking there. Therefore, an analysis of the attitude of the Egyptians will show the reciprocity of Cemal's plans among this people.

After the outbreak of the WWI, for the success of the expedition, firstly, the Ottomans and Germans closely cooperated with the Egyptian nationalists and the ex-*Khedive* Abbas Hilmi, both of whom enjoyed a considerable amount of popular support in Egypt.[205] Immediately after the Ottoman entrance to the War, the *Khedive* issued a proclamation, with the approval of Enver Pasha, to the Egyptians and invited them to help the Ottoman forces, which would attack Egypt to save it from the British yoke.[206] In a

[204] **ATASE Arşivi,** Kls. 163, Ds. 717A, Fih.1,1-1,1-2, Cemal to Enver, 29 Kanun-ı Sani 1330 [11 Şubat 1915].

[205] For Germany's policy of Egypt, see: McKale, Ibid; Oberhaus, Ibid.

[206] For the text of the proclamation, see: Muhammad Farid, *Awraku Muhammad Farid: Mudhakkirati Ba'de al-Hijra-Mujallad al-Awwal*, Cairo: al-Hay'at al-Mısriyyeti al-Ammati li al-Kitab, 1978, p. 176-177.

similar way, all the prominent members of the Egyptian Nationalist Party, *al-Hizb al-Watani,* supported Cemal's expedition with the same reasons.[207]

As for the approach of the Egyptian people towards the Ottomans, their loyalty to the Ottoman Caliphate and their support to the British rule in Egypt were diversified depending on the social class that they belonged to. According to *Kemalist* historiography, the Egyptians were induced by the British and turned against the Ottoman Caliphate. For example, Bayur claimed that, for this aim, the Ulema of *Al-Azhar* were applied to persuade the people for their support in the British side, and they managed to reach their goals.[208] However, the picture drawn by the contemporary documents is quite different. In this regard, information given by the French representative in Cairo, who held an interview with a prominent merchant of Cairo, clarifies the attitude of the Egyptians in this issue. The consul states that the most crucial part of the Egyptian society was the people who held the power in their hands; they consisted of the members of the court, senior officials and members of the upper classes. Most of them had Turkish origins, and in the case of the destruction of the Ottoman Caliphate, these families could accept the possibility of conferring the title of caliph to the Sultan of Egypt. But for the period of the wartime, they were undoubtedly pro-Ottoman.[209]

The second were the enlightened classes who shared a concrete attitude in regard to the Ottoman Caliphate. Most of them claimed that the title of the Ottoman Sultan as Caliph didn't base on Islamic doctrine, and they always regarded the Turks as usurpers of the Caliphate and professed a profound horror for them. They considered that the Caliphate should be transferred to a Sherif, but not pointing any special person. It is worth to mention that their impact on the people was limited.[210] However, among the members of the traditional Ulema of *Al-Azhar,* there was plentiful numbers of people who had a pro-

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[207] For detailed informations about the attitudes of the members of the Nationalist Party, see: Farid, Ibid.

[208] Bayur, Yusuf Hikmet, *Türk İnkilabı Tarihi,* Vol III, Part III, Ankara: TTK Basımevi, 1991, p. 182.

[209] **MAEE**, Guerre 1914-1918, 868/Turquie, Syrie et Palestine, Maucops to MAE, Cairo, 16 March 1915.

[210] **MAEE**, Guerre 1914-1918, 868/Turquie, Syrie et Palestine, Maucops to MAE, Cairo, 16 March 1915.

Ottoman attitude. With the beginning of the War, they got stronger. According to a British report, at the end of the year 1915, the Pro-Turkish party was gaining ground while pro-English members of the University were losing confidence.[211] As an indicator of their pro-Ottoman attitude, on 21st Haziran 1915, a delegation of prominent Egyptians, consisted of Ulema and Notables, appeared before the Sultan of Egypt to express that their religious feelings were offended by the war that Great Britain was carrying out against the Caliph of Islam. By that reason, they requested for the Sultan to hold an official talk to the English for the ending of this war.[212]

The common people, overwhelmingly the largest part of the Egyptian society, had unshakeably believed in the legitimacy of the Ottoman Caliph. They were firmly attached to the idea that the Ottoman Empire would have the final victory and believed in the invincibility of the Ottoman Sultan. They refused to debate the transfer of the title of the Caliph to anyone else, even to their Khedive.[213] According to an Ottoman intelligent report, in a Friday prayer in the Abdusselam Mosque, Shaikh Mecdi Efendi from the Ulema Class, compared the Sultan of Egypt to the Prophet during his preach. The People in the Mosque raised a protest to him and took him off the pulpit. The attempt of the Education Ministry to convert the orthography of Qur'an was strongly opposed by the People.[214] As conveyed in the memoirs of Muhammad Farid, when the Ottoman aviators bombarded Cairo in 14th November 1916, the people cheered for the fall of the bombs with *takbirs* in the hope that the Ottomans would save them from the British "yoke".[215]

Although the Egyptians had not rebelled against Great Britain, in a way they made considerable contributions to the Ottoman side militarily, as their country had to be policed by the British troops. The preparations and attacks of the Ottoman troops on Egypt and

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[211] **PRO**, FO 371/2486, Sykes to FO, "Arab Question and Egypt", Cairo, 2 December 1915.

[212] **BOA**, HR. SYS. 2411/6, Enver to Hariciye, 3 July 1915 [21 Haziran 1331].

[213] **MAEE**, Guerre 1914-1918, 868/Turquie, Syrie et Palestine, Maucops to MAE, Cairo, 16 March 1915.

[214] **BOA**, HR. SYS. 2349/20, Ambassador of Athens to Hariciye, 29 January 1916 [29 Kanun-ı Evvel 1331],

[215] Farid, Ibid, p. 337.

their propaganda for the conquest of Egypt caused great excitement among the Egyptian people. By that reason, the British Government had to bind considerable number of troops in Egypt. A revolt was seriously feared by the international public. Italy fortified Tripoli considering the possibility of the spread of the revolt there. The Petrograd Consul of Italy visited Fahreddin Bey, his Ottoman Colleague, to bid a farewell to him and requested the Ottoman help in the case of skittering the Egyptian revolt to Tripoli and Eritrea to appease them.[216]

Becoming aware of this reality, even before the Ottoman entrance to the War, the British authorities in Egypt sent the Muslim officers to Sudan and transferred 400 British officers to lead the British Army there.[217] Proving the British suspicion right, in March 1915, according to the diaries of Muhammad Farid, a Sudanese officer in the British Army at Sinai had turned his coat with 20 Sudanese soldiers under his command.[218] Furthermore, the British were attentive not to deploy Muslim Indians in Egypt, but to bring Buddhist soldiers instead.[219] Similarly, after the commencement of the War, the passport issues in Egypt were taken over by the British officials, but later, because of the lack of the sufficient number of personnel, they assigned it back to the Egyptians.[220]

However, the Ottoman and German officials had over-estimated the likelihood of the Egyptians taking any active measures to throw-off the over-lordship of Great Britain".[221] According to the information given by a citizen of an allied state [the name of the state is not specified in the text], who lately returned from Egypt, to the Ottoman Consul at the Hague, the Egyptian people didn't consider a rebellion against the English

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[216] **BOA**, HR. SYS. 2404/17, Fahreddin bey to Said Halim Pasha, 7 November 1914.

[217] **BOA**, DH.EUM.KLU 1/17, Macid to Dahiliye, 7 Ağustos 1330. [20 August 1914];

[218] Farid, Ibid, p. 296.

[219] **BOA,** DH.EUM.EMN. 91/17, Macid to Dahiliye, Jerusalem, 27 August 1914 [14 Ağustos 1330].


[220] **ATASE Arşivi,** Kls. 248, Ds. 1031, Fih. 16, Yusuf to Başkumandanlık, 9 Teşrin-i Evvel 1330 [22 October 1914]

[221] Wavell, Ibid, p.13.

authority. Instead, they were expecting of the Ottoman Army to save them from the British yoke. But, as time went by, their expectation in this direction had been disappointed.[222]

[222] **BOA**, HR. SYS. 2349/20, Lahey Ambassador to Hariciye,29 January 1916 [29 Kanun-ı Evvel 1331],

1.2.2 The First Attack: “Conquest” or “Reconnaissance”



Source: www.firstworldwar.com

In this section, a description of the first expedition will set out to be made to check the truth of the claims regarding the aims of the expedition. It will be seen below that the expedition was not an exploration or demonstration, but rather an undertaking for the capture of the both sides of the Canal. If that attempt had been succeeded, then the conquest of the whole Egypt would be taken into consideration through the support of the Egyptian people.

For this purpose the expeditionary force moved from Jerusalem in the night of January 14-15, 1915 under the command of Cemal Pasha. Some 16 days later, they would arrive before the Canal.[223] The offensive was able to take up to advance against the Canal at 03:30, in the night of 2-3 February [*20-21 Kanun-ı Sani*]. The amount of the Ottoman troops and its artilleries attacking the Canal was reported by Cemal as follows: 10 battalions of the 8th Army Corps, 6 battalions of the 10th Division. In Addition to that, 4 quick-fire field batteries, an ordinary battery, and 2 ordinary mountain batteries which belonged to 8th Army Corps, and 2 ordinary batteries and a quick-fire obusian battery. They made at 4 different points a demonstative offensive at the Canal: at al-Kantara through about 3.000 soldiers, at al-Fardan by 2.000 soldiers, and towards Ismailiyya, Shaluf and Suez by similar troops. In El-Fardan, there was only a demonstration during which several shots were exchanged throughout the day of the 2-3 February. In front of El Kantara, the attack had emerged a little more clearly and was driven, up to 700 meters of fortifications nearer to the Indians.[224]

As defined before, the main offensive was carried out between Toussoun and Serapeum by the help of the pontoon bridges, which had been carried by the soldiers throughout the desert. The column headed this part of the troops consisted of 12.000 men. The largest part of this column was supported with the pontoon bridges on the chosen point for passage. It was flanked on the north and south by smaller squadrons. The southern flank guard was merely skirmishing with the position of Serapeum. The flank guard of the

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[223] Von Kressenstein, Ibid, p. 85.

[224] **ATASE Arşivi,** Kls. 531, Ds. 2076, Fih. 38-1, Cemal to Enver, 5 February 1915[23 Ocak 1330]; **MAEE,** Maucops to MAE, 20 February 1915, Ibid; **SHD**, GR 6 N 33, Defrance to MAE, Cairo, 4 February 1915; Wavell, Ibid, p. 29; For a detailed inventory of the Ottoman troops and ammunitions, see: *Birinci Dünya Harbinde Türk Harbi,* Cilt I, pp. 173-178.

North attacked the positions at Toussoun. These troops advanced about 3:30 am up to 200 meters of that position.[225]

Firstly, the whole of the 74th and the half of the 73rd regiment were able to cross the Canal and attacked the British soldiers there with bayonets, not to make the British troops aware of their existence. However, the British trenches in the shore of Africa were close enough to the pontoons to sink them with the help of the lighting service of the Canal Company by the fire of the batteries. Therefore, the passage for the remaining of the troops to the Egyptian side of the Canal wasn't actualized. Those who were able to cross the Canal were all killed or taken prisoner. Many were drowned.[226] On the other hand, two British battle cruisers in the Lake Timsah and one in the Bitter Lake had made interlocking fire on the Ottoman artilleries in the eastern side of the Canal and to the soldiers who were trying to cross the Canal.[227]

During the two days of 2-3 Febraruy, the Ottoman Army renewed its attacks again and again. The firing of artillery caused little damage and loss on the side of their enemies. A small column that marched against Ismailia on the morning of February 2nd, sent a few missiles at the hospital without reaching it, and many of them fell into the lake Timsah. The British auxiliary cruiser Hardinge received several blows, one of its captains was slightly injured and one of its chimneys was damaged. The Warship Requin, by a lucky shot, blew out the fire of the heavy piece. The British side executed a counter-attack with a company of Gurkhas.[228]

On the evening of 3rd February, Cemal realized the impossibility of getting through the British defense at the Canal and decided to retreat the Ottoman troops from the

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[225] **ATASE Arşivi,** Kls, 531, Ds. 2076, Fih, 38, Cemal to Enver, Ibid; **MAEE,** Maucops to MAE, 20 February 1915, Ibid; **SHD**, GR 6 N 33, Defrance to MAE, 4 February 1915, Cairo; *Birinci Dünya Harbinde Türk Harbi,* Cilt I, p. 211-212.

[226] **ATASE Arşivi,** Kls. 531, Ds. 2076, Fih. 38, Cemal to Enver, 5 February 1915 [23 Ocak 1330]; **MAEE,** Maucops to MAE, 20 February 1915, Ibid.

[227] **ATASE Arşivi,** Kls. 531, Ds. 2076, Fih. 38-1, Cemal to Enver, 5 February 1915 [23 Ocak 1330];

[228] **ATASE Arşivi,** Kls. 531, Ds. 2076, Fih. 38, Cemal to Enver, 5 February 1915 [23 Ocak 1330]; **MAEE,** Maucops to MAE, 20 February 1915, Ibid.

Canal.[229] The Ottoman losses varied in Cemal's and the Entente records. The former calculated the losses -not all killed- as 803 men and 16 officers, and 124 men killed, while the latter gave the number of the killed as 10 officers, 800 men. The difference enlarged on the wounded and the prisoners: the French records calculated the number as 700 prisoners, 100 wounded, several hundred drowned. Cemal informed the Ottoman headquarters that the number of the wounded was determined as 417. The British headquarters calculated the total at least 3,000 men while Cemal reported it as 1360. The British casualties were only a hundred men: killed: one officer and 20 men wounded: 5 officers and 80 men.[230]

With this attack, Cemal Pasha did not only intend to create a threat in the Canal for the English, but also to cross it and, with a temporary invasion of the Canal zone, to pave the way for a general uprising in Egypt, and possibly to conquer Egypt. The population in Cairo and around the Canal, for one can say that all, that is Muslim, was at heart, anti-English. According to the evaluations of the French Consul, "If the Turks were informed about the forces defending the Canal, they could not hope to pass." But, from the Ottoman intelligence reports we understand that the Turks had the knowledge of the number of the troops defending the Canal.[231] Then, what was the aim of the troops attacking Egypt? The answer was, too, given by the French Reprensentative; "They were probably relying on a revolt of the Egyptian population, if successful even temporarily. But it was difficult to know the cowardice and apathy of Egyptians."[232] The mentioned consul defined the Second aim of the attack incisively. He accepted that "the Turks, or rather the Germans showed the English that the Sinai desert could be crossed" and the troops that they settled in the Canal and Egypt was not enough to save these places from the enemy attack from Palestine.[233]

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[229] *Birinci Dünya Harbinde Türk Harbi,* Cilt I, p. 212.

[230] **ATASE Arşivi,** Kls. 531, Ds. 2076, Fih. 38, Cemal to Enver, 5 February 1915 [23 Ocak 1330]; **MAEE,** Maucops to MAE, 20 February 1915, Ibid.

[231] **ATASE Arşivi,** Kls. 171, Ds. 742, Fih. 2-2, Cemal to Enver, 15 Şubat 1331 [28 February 1915].

[232] **MAEE,** Maucops to MAE, 20 February 1915, Ibid.

[233] **MAEE,** Maucops to MAE, 20 February 1915, Ibid.

1.2.3 Preparations for a Second Larger Expedition to conquer Egypt

Immediately after the first attack, due to the issues of water and foodstuff, it seemed impossible to stay in and around the Canal. As a result of that, Cemal ordered the expeditionary force to retreat to the line of Nahıl-Ibin-Arish, then gathered them at Gaza, Hanyunus, Birüssebi and Maan.[234]

In spite of that fiasco, Cemal didn't abandon his goal of the conquest. He reported to Enver that:

> "Even if the attack, which took place as a raid, couldn't be achieved, the requirements for an attack against the Canal were properly realized. I am going to start the preparations to pass the Canal by more powerful troops…I ensure that none of our hopes was perished. Quite the reverse, due to that the required means were comprehended, the hopes for the success have increased"[235]

Immediately after the first expedition, Cemal sent a telegraph to the newspapers stating that the troops moved towards the Canal for an exploratory offensive, and with this operation they understood very well the requirements for the conquest of Egypt. Due to the impact of the failure of the first attempt, he launched the preparations for a larger second expedition. Within a month of the first expedition, he completed the list of the requirements for a second expedition and sent it to both Istanbul and Berlin with his Aide-de-Camp von Frankenberg.[236] His report included all the details for a successful operation to capture the Canal and later Egypt: firstly, he planned a better reinforcement of the Desert in terms of water and foodstuffs supplies for the longer stay of the Army. Secondly, his plan included the construction of railroads and chausseed roads for the transportation of

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[234] **ATASE Arşivi,** Kls. 531, Ds. 2076, Fih. 38-3, Cemal to Enver, 23 Ocak 1330 [5 February 1915]; For a detailed report by Cemal on the reasons of the defeat in the Canal, see: *Birinci Dünya Harbinde Türk Harbi,* Cilt I, pp. 248-252.

[235] **ATASE Arşivi,** Kls. 531, Ds. 2076, Fih. 38-3, Cemal to Enver, 23 Ocak 1330 [5 February 1915]; **MAEE,** Maucops to MAE, 20 February 1915, Ibid.

[236] **ATASE Arşivi,** Kls. 162, Ds. 713, Fih.27, Cemal to Enver, 23 Şubat 1330[7 March 1915]. For the list of the requirements see: **ATASE Arşivi,** Kls. 163, Ds. 717A, F.1 to F.1-7, Cemal to Enver, 1 Haziran 1331 [14 June 1915]; For a Latinized

the soldiers and their provisions and ammunition, and finally he decided to deploy troops on the shores of Palestine, Aleppo and Lebanon in the case of an operation against the Canal.[237]

The following preparations demonstrate that this telegram was not sent only to console Enver for the failure of the first attack. Following this, Cemal was convinced that the conquest of Egypt couldn't come to be realized without heavy artillery, which requires a railway for transport.[238] Becoming aware of this necessity, Cemal Pasha, in agreement with Germans, accelerated the construction of the Birüssebi railway, which would be reaching the Canal as "the Egyptian branch of the Hejaz railroad".[239] For the realization of the ultimate goal of the Egyptian Campaign, Meissner Pasha, a German Engineer, was assigned by Cemal Pasha to build these new railroads as the head engineer.[240]

The first expedition made it clear for Cemal Pasha that, for the capture of the Canal and later for a conquest of Egypt, he must considerably have fortified the Desert. In a report to Enver on the requirements for the conquest of Egypt, Cemal stated that he needed at least 150.000 soldiers. With the available means of transportation it seemed impossible to him to move these troops to the Canal and to supply their needs for a longer expedition. Therefore, he made the construction of the Egyptian Branch accelerated that had already been started to construct in order to provide a connection between Egypt, Syria and Hijaz.[241] For this purpose, in consultation with Liman v. Sanders, Enver Pasha had decided to send Meissner Pasha to Damascus for the building a new railway in Southern Palestine right after the Ottoman entrance to the War. He was given a monthly salary of 150 liras, and 200 liras premium in every three months. The Ottoman Cabinet reserved montly

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[237] **ATASE Arşivi,** Kls. 163, Ds. 717A, F.1 to F.1-7, Cemal to Enver, 1 Haziran 1331 [14 June 1915].

[238] **MAEE**, Guerre 1914-1918, 868/Turquie, Syrie et Palestine, Maucorps to MAE. Cairo, 18 March 1915; **PRO**, FO 371/2483, Elliot to FO. "Turkish Attack on Egypt". 26 February 1915. Athens; **MAEE**, Guerre 1914-1918, 868/Turquie, Syrie et Palestine, Fournet to Ministry of Marine. 30 March 1915. Cairo.

[239] **PA-AA**, Türkei 152, Bd. 79, Wangenheim to AA, Constantinople 12 February 1915,

[240] İsmet Üzen, "Sina Cephesinde Strateji ve Taktik", *Eski Çağdan Modern Çağ'a Ordular,* Feridun M. Emecen (ed.), İstanbul: Kitabevi Yayınları, 2008, p.451.

[241] **ATASE Arşivi,** Kls, 163, Ds. 717A, Fih. 1,1-1,1-2.

40.000 lira for this construction and for the wages of the labourers.[242] However, at the end of the 8th month of the construction only 90.000 of 320.000 could be sent.[243]

On the other hands, the Cabinet strictly emphasized in its decision to construct the Egyptian branch that all the rights of that branch belonged to the Hijaz Railroad Company[244] to prevent any greed of the great powers –presumably Germany- on this branch. In the same decision, they cancelled the agreement, which was signed with France before the war for the construction of a railway from Tulkarem, to forestall any dispute with her after the War.[245]

After the first attack against Egypt, Meissner Pasha accelerated the construction process working with an everlasting energy. As a result of that, the first part of the railway was completed, and on 5th May, the first train was able to enter into Lejda station (63 km.).[246] According to the estimation of the German Consul in Jerusalem, the construction works would go 45 km. beyond Birüssebi at the end of 1915.[247] Further extention of the lines to Suez was stipulated by the progress of the military movement planned against Egypt.[248] But, the extension of the rails beyond it would never be enacted because of the problems caused by the war. Simultaneously, the construction of a railway was given a start on 15th January from Tulkarem via Al-Tirah to Ludd, and on 20th January, from Ludd towards the North. For the construction of this branch, 450 trained soldiers were recruited under the command of Meissner. In addition to that, at the end of January a

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[242] **BOA**, BEO, 4341/325535, Sadaret to Maliye, 19 şubat 1330 [2 Mart 1330].

[243] **PA-AA,** Türkei 152, Bd. 83, Loytved Hardegg to Bethmann Hollweg, Damascus, 11 September 1915.

[244] For a study on the history of Hijaz Railroad, see: Özyüksel, Murat, *Hicaz Demiryolu,* İstanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, 2000.

[245] Walter P. Pick, "Meissner Pasha and the Construction of Railways in Palestine and Neighbouring Countries", *Ottoman Palestine, 1800-1914,* (ed. Gad Gilbar et al), Leiden: Brill, p.181.

[246] **BOA**, BEO 4354/326497, Sadaret to Harbiye Nezareti, 5 May 1915, [22 Nisan 1331].

[247] **PA-AA**, Türkei 152, Bd.79, Schmidt to Wangenheim, Jerusalem, 8 February 1915.

[248] **PA-AA,** Türkei 152, Bd.79, Padel to Wangenheim, Damascus, 1 February 1915.

labour battalion consisted of 700 men had arrived on their locations and, at that time, another 800 were about to arrive.[249]

His assiduous works produced the first considerable fruits on Saturday, 30th October 1915. The Egyptian branch arrived at Birüssebi (158 km. from Ramin), which was determined as the center for the Desert Corps after the first attack against the Canal.[250] In his speech in the opening ceremony, Meissner expressed that this enormous work was accomplished owing to Cemal Pasha, who provided all the means at his disposal.[251] When the circumstances of the war were taken into consideration the work was achieved quite fast. It was constructed in 9,5 months (15th January-30th October). In five months 64 km. of the road was accomplished to finish (15th May) building 17,5 km. per month.[252]

Since it was the wartime and the transportation of the construction materials by the way of sea was impossible because of the blockade, Meissner encountered a series of problems throughout the construction period. However, Cemal offered all the resources of Syria to his service to overcome the problems of the construction process. First and foremost, Meissner had to deal with the deficiency of the Metals to construct railways. It was coped with taking up the rails of Mezerib-Midan railway (101 km.)built by France and the Railway between Beirut-Meameltin??(20km.). With some parts of them, The Ramleh-Jerusalem gauge was widened.[253] In the same way, 20 km. of Jaffa-Jerusalem railway till

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[249] **PA-AA,** Türkei 152, Bd.79, Padel to Wangenheim, Damascus, 1 February 1915; **PRO**, FO 371/2783, WO to FO. "Report of an Inhabitant of Athlit, Mount Carmel, Syria", 3 November 1916.

[250] **BA-MA.** RM 40/678, Humann to Chef des Admiralstabs der Marine. "im Anschluss an den Bericht vom 6 September 1915. Damascus. 29 November 1915; **PRO**, FO 371/2491, FO to McMahon, "Turkish Preparations Against Suez Canal", London, 23 October 1915.

[251] **PA-AA,** Türkei 152, Bd. 84, [Newspaper clipping],Al-Muqtabas, 2 November 1915.

[252] **PA-AA,** Türkei 152, Bd. 83, Loytved Hardegg to Bethmann Hollweg, Damascus, 11 September 1915.

[253] **BOA**, BEO 4332/324853, Sadaret to Nafia, 13 January 1915 [1 Kanun ı sani 1330],; **PRO**, FO 371/2783, WO to FO, "Report of an Inhabitant of Athlit, Mount Carmel, Syria", 3 November 1916.; the same document also available at : **SHD**, GR 7 N 1282, French Military Attache in Cairo to MAE, Cairo, 27 August 1916,; and **SHD**, GR 16 N 2946; **BOA**, BEO, 4350/326204, Sadaret to Evkaf Nezareti, 26 Mart 1915 [13 Mart 1331]; Pick, Ibid, p.190; **PRO**, FO 371/2767, General Officer Commanding, Force D. to India Office,

Leyda station was ripped in February 1915, to use its rails in other constructions. It is worth to mention that, like Midan-Müzeyrib line, the operating rights of this line were hired to France before the War.[254] Presumably, the aim of those actions was to prevent staking any claim by France on the railways of Syria after the War. Apart from that, taking up the railways connecting the towns of Syria to reach Egypt demonstrate the cruciality of the expedition for Cemal Pasha.

The second problem preventing the building of the new railroads were the scarcity of the traverses (the battens under the rails). Besides that provided by the picked up railways, the ocaliptus trees were cut to satisfy this need.[255] But, all these measures could provide the extension of the railway to Birüssebi. After that point, due to the deficiencies of construction materials, instead of the railroad, a road for wheel traffic was made across the desert.[256]

Thirdly, Meissner had to wait for the arrival of the construction materials with trains. The overload of Hijaz Railway delayed the completion of the railways in the scheduled time. By the same token, burning the wood as rolling stock in the locomotives reduced the speed of the trains. The railway was carrying foodstuffs for both the soldiers and the Syrians, who were exposed to Famine. Additionally, in some places, the Armenian deportees from Anatolia were transported by the same lines. Last, but not the least, the troops were moving by these lines.[257]

German Consul of Damascus conveyed from Meissner that the railway construction would have continued beyond Birüssebi in the direction of Egypt till Hafir al-Auja (240 km.), if the required construction materials had been supplied properly. In

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Cairo 4 January 1916; **BA-MA,** RM 5/2321, Humann to the Marine-Attache. "Bericht über die Operationen zum dem Suezkanal 1916", 29 November 1916.

[254] **PA-AA,** Türkei 152, Bd. 81, Brode to Bethmann Hollweg, Jaffa, 7 May 1915.

[255] **MAEE**, Guerre 1914-1918, 868/Turquie, Syrie et Palestine Maucops to MAE, Cairo, 18 March 1915.

[256] **PRO**, FO 371/2491, Rodd to FO, "Turkish Preparations against Egypt", Rome, 1 November 1915.

[257] **PA-AA,** Türkei 152, Bd. 83, Loytved Hardegg to Bethmann Hollweg, Damascus, 11 September 1915.

September 1915, he estimated to complete it on 13th January 1916, 2 days before the anniversary for the commencement of the contruction of the Egyptian branch. Therefore, It is plausible to claim that the construction works were interrupted as the consequence of the transportation of the Armenian refugees, the movement of the troops, the supply of the foodstuffs for the starving people. The ripping of the old railways to extend the Egyptian branch was not actuated due to the impossibility of their transportations with trains because of the abovementioned reasons.[258]

The extension of the desert railroad built by Meissner Pasha was emergent to reinforce the preparations in the Desert, and must have been, therefore, swiftly constructed. As was explained before, at Birüssebi, a military colony had been established to coordinate all the military activities in the Canal region.[259] For that reason, these railroads were not built in high standard and they were seriously damaged by the unusual desert rains. The speed of the trains was significantly limited by that reason –only reaching 9 km. speed in an hour between Birüssebi and Ramleh. In spite of that, 2-3 train services could be accomplished in a day.[260] In October 1917, A British official compared the railways of the two battling sides in Sinai as follows:

> The ends of the two railways, British and Turkish, are now only two miles apart, but whereas the British railway is magnificently laid and will last for all time, the Turkish is merely thrown down anyhow. They are now beginning to double the British lines through the desert.[261]

The hurried construction of the railway was the first priority for the Ottomans, hence the railway was constructed in a low quality. Although the construction works had some long term purposes, its primary objective was to accelerate the organization of the second attack against the Canal. The construction process of this branch that explained above shows that

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258 **PA-AA,** Türkei 152, Bd. 83, Loytved Hardegg to Bethmann Hollweg, Damascus, 11 September 1915.

259 **MAEE**, Guerre 1914-1918, 868/Turquie, Syrie et Palestine, Maucorps to MAE, Cairo, 18 March 1915.

260 **BA-MA**, RM 40/678, Busse to Chef des Admiralstab. "Bericht des Korvettenkapitaens Busse über Küstennachrichtenwesen in Syrien". 7 February 1916; **BA-MA.** RM 40/678, Braasck to Chef des Admiralstab. "Bericht über die Operationen gegen den Suezkanal 1916". 16 October 1916.

261 **PRO**, FO 371/3058, Thomson to Campell, “Situation in Turkey”, 4 October 1917.

Cemal Pasha's military build-up in the Canal Front was not only for the tactical reasons regarding to bind the British troops in the Canal, but a real intention of the conquest of Egypt.

Another activity of the construction that could be considered in the context of the expedition was the digging the tunnels of Amanus and Taurus. By these tunnels, the barriers between Anatolia and Syria would be removed and a direct railroad connection would be provided. For that purpose, the efforts continued throughout the war and the Amanus tunnel was finished at the end of the year 1917, whereas the other one could be put into service towards the end of the War.[262] Apart from their military benefits, these two tunnels would facilitate the communication between Anatolia and Syria and, thus, would provide a considerable contribution to the purpose of the integration of the Syrian land to the imperial body both politically and economically.

Besides those railway enterprises, carriage roads and chausseed roads were constructed in the desert. One chausseed road was built in the desert till Hassana and another one connected El-Arish with Hafir. However, they were not true roads. But they were suitable for the heavier loads. These roads were badly influenced by the unusually strong rains whose floodwaters were reaching up to 30 m. As a result of that, the chaussee between Jerusalem and Birüssebi were covered by muck.[263] Besides that, a really good carriage road was made between Nablus and Silet ed Dahr from the old road-steam rollers work on it. The construction of new carriage roads Hebron to Birüssebi and South Latrun to Gaza, Jericho to Amman, Nazareth to Damascus were completed. A carriage road was also constructed up the hill from Jaauneh to Safed. A stage road [*Etappenstrasse*] was built from Damascus to Afula-Djenin and in this road the lorries could carry the supplies. A carriage road was being made from Jaauneh to Nabatieh to join the road from Sidon to Jediedeh Merj Ayun on the left bank of Litani.[264]

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[262] Üzen, Ibid, p. 154.

[263] **BA-MA,** RM 40/678, Busse to Chef des Admiralstab. "Bericht des Korvettenkapitaens Busse über Küstennachrichtenwesen in Syrien", 7 February 1916.

[264] **PRO**, FO 371/2783, WO to FO. Report of an Inhabitant of Athlit, Mount Carmel, Syria. 3 November 1916; **BA-MA**. RM 5/2321, Humann to the Marine-Attache. Bericht über die Operationen zum dem Suezkanal 1916", 29 November 1916; **PA-AA,** Türkei 177, Bd.12, Metternich to the Admiraltabs of Marine, 13 March 1916.

Cemal wanted to make further investment in the Desert for that goal. But the policies of the Central Government and Germany changed. Enver Pasha's telegram to Cemal Pasha on 11th August 1915, on the realization of the Second Expedition shows the shift in this sense. He explained that:

> "With regard to general [international] political situation and especially to our own situation, I have to state to your highness that the preparations for the Second Expedition of Egypt, unfortunately, is not going to be completed on the determined time. [However] As a result, the planned undertaking will not be abandoned, but will only be delayed. It is a must to keep this new decision secret inside the country."[265]

In his answer, Cemal Pasha pronounced the reality regarding the Egypt Expedition: "I strongly believe that the delay in the implemetation of the operation to next year means the total abandonment of it." Similarly, "it was impossible to keep secret an essential change in the war strategies from the people".[266] The remarks in the whole of the telegram show Cemal's frustration due to the new decision and his disagreement with Enver's remarks demonstrates Cemal's willingness to conquer Egypt.

Immediately after this telegram, Enver wrote a long report to the German Headquarters and stated that

> "till now, neither in Flander nor in the Dardanelles we have not been able to inflict heavy losses to the English to enforce them to make a peace with us that may [include] acceptable [items] for us. In my opinion, if we attack them at their home, India and Egypt, we may compel them to such an action. The last of them seems the most hopeful one to me, even though the great difficulties in the implementation of it."[267]

In the same report, he notified to the Germans that, with the available means, the capture of the Canal and the conquest of Egypt appeared impossible. In order to put the plan into practice, he conveyed that Cemal Pasha calculated that, with an army consisting of 100.000 soldiers, he would be able to conquer Egypt. First of all, with roughly 50.000 man in three columns to advance Kantara, Ismailiya and than enforce the Canal. After the crossing of the Canal, they were going to build a bridge-head-courteous, as the first job,

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[265] Enver to Cemal, 29 Temmuz 1331 [11 August 1915], Erden, Ibid, p. 157; *Birinci Dünya Harbinde Türk Harbi IV/I,* pp. 295.

[266] Erden, Ibid, p.158; *Birinci Dünya Harbi'nde Türk Harbi IV/I,* p. 296.

[267] **BA-MA,** RM 5/2320, Enver Pasha to Chief of the Admiralty, "Denkschrift über eine Unternehmung gegen Egypten", Constantinople, 4 September 1915.

accross the Canal to draw the second 50.000 man. Cemal Pasha had calculated that, after that with 70 or 80.000 man, he would be able to expel the English from Egypt.[268]

It is true that a second larger expedition against the Canal could not be actualized, because of the hardening conditions of life in Syria and that the British troops in Eygpt started to move via the Sinai Desert towards Syria in the second haof of the year 1916. But, the construction of these roads, first of all, clarifies the reason why the British Expeditionary Force lost so many great number of their troops while capturing Syria, and why the Ottoman troops were able to resist the operations of the British forces for so long a time. Secondly, It seems meaningless to make that much investment to the Sinai Desert only for tying down the British forces in the Desert. These investment in the Desert is the most obvious evidence of Cemal's intention of the conquest of Egypt. Besides these military aims, the construction activities also contributed to the settlement of the desert as well as the control projects of the Ottoman state regarding the Bedouins of the Sinai Desert in future.[269]

Taking the preparations for the first and so-called second expeditions, the realization of the first attack and the exorbitant loyalties of the Egyptians towards the Caliph into consideration, quite the reverse of the general opinion in the existing literature, it is reasonable to conclude that Cemal really wanted to be the second conqueror of Egypt after Selim II, and thus, transformed the aim of the expedition from a threat attack to the conquest. The reasons of this enthusiasm could be the Napoleonic megalomania,[270] which means to reach the achievements of Napoleon's, and, related to this, to sit on the first seat in the Ottoman Cabinet honored with a victory against Great Britain.

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[268] **BA-MA,** RM 5/2320, Enver Pasha to Chief of the Admiralty, "Denkschrift über eine Unternehmung gegen Egypten", Constantinople, 4 September 1915.

[269] Cemal to Enver, 27 Eylül 1333 [27 September 1917], in *Arşiv Belgeleriyle Ermeni Faaliyetleri,* ATASE Yayınları, Ankara: 2007, p. 697-698.

[270] the concept was used by an Austrian diplomat in Istanbul: **HHStA,** PA 12/211, Trauttmansdorff to Czernin, “Das Regime Djemal Paschas in Syrien und Palaestina”, Constantinople, 14 April 1917.

CHAPTER II

ABOLITION OF THE "ARABIST BARRIER": CEMAL PASHA AND THE ARABIST MOVEMENT

As already stated, Cemal Pasha's second aim in Syria was "to maintain peace and order" there. In Cemal's mind, that meant the elimination of all kind of "barriers" between the State and its different peoples in Syria preventing the creation of the ideal citizen. For that purpose, immediately after his arrival at Syria, Cemal undertook an action for the elimination of those "barriers". In terms of its social impact, undoubtedly, the most drastic "measures" were taken against the Arabist movement, which demanded a certain autonomy for the Arab provinces.[271] In such a way that, after a short while of his arrival in Syria, Cemal launched a process of prosecution against the members of the Arabist party in the light of the documents seized from the French Consulates in Beirut and Damascus revealing the negotiations between the reformist Arabs and the French consuls mainly on utilizing the French influence in the Ottoman Government to implement the decentralist

[271] Although some Arabs claimed in their memoirs that the real aim of the movement was to obtain the independence of the Arab provinces from the Ottoman Empire, (for an example, see: Yusuf al-Hakim, *Beyrut wa Lubnan fi Ahd al-Uthmani,* Beirut: Dar al-Nahar li al-Nashr, 1980, p. 116-117.) the studies, which will be evaluated below, showed that the Arabist movement, to a large extent, did not demand an independence from the Ottoman Empire till the last moments of the Ottoman rule.

reforms in Syria. Applying those documents as evidence, Cemal accused the mentioned party members of being traitors against the Ottoman Empire and punished the party members severely. Some of them were hanged in the squares of Damascus and Beirut, while some others were sent into exile to the cities of Inner Anatolia, which was populated by Turks in an overwhelming majority. Understandably, as a result of those actions, Cemal became one of the most "black hearted" figures in the history of the Arabist movement.

It is today well known that the adherents of the Arabist movements, to a large extent, supported the continuation of the Ottoman rule in the Arab lands. Rather than a demand of independence from the Ottoman Emprie, they demanded the increase of the proportional participation of the Arabs to the Government, and insisted that more place to be given to Arabic culture in the Governmental policies implemented in the Arab provinces. In spite of the abundance of the academic studies on Arab nationalism, and its history[272], academic studies devoted to understand the intentions of the CUP regarding the Arabist movement and the perception of the political actions of the leading Arabs by the Unionists are very small in number.[273] This chapter mainly concentrates on the Ottoman

[272] For some studies assuming the Arab Nationalism as an independency-seeking movement from the Ottoman Empire, see, George Antonius, *The Arab Awakening:the story of the Arab national movement,* Simon Publications, Harbor: 2001; Kal'acı, Ibid; for similar evaluations, see: Mousa, Ibid; for some revisionist studies on the historical development of the Arab Natinoalism, see: Dawn, Ibid; Khalidi, Rashid, Lisa Anderson, Muhammad Muslih and Reeva S. Simon (eds.), *The Origins of the Arab Nationalism,* Columbia University Press, New York: 1991; Jankoswki James and Israel Gershoni (eds.), *Rethinking Nationalism in the Arab Middle East,* Columbia University Press: New York: 1997; Hopwood, Ibid.

[273] The only exception of this in English is Hasan Kayalı's study examining the relations between the Arabists and the Young Turks in the second constitutional period, However, he gives very small place to the policies of Cemal Pasha in Syria: Kayalı, Ibid. There are two studies in Turkish including information on Cemal Pasha's policy of Arabism. The first one is Şaban Ortak's study on the exiles from Syria to Anatolia. This study, however, rarely tries to analyze the principles, impact and consequences of Cemal's policy. Rather, it gives the impression to the reader that the study classifies the documents available in the Ottoman Arcives regarding the topic: Şaban Ortak, *Osmanlı'nın Son Manevralarından Suriye ve Garbi Arabistan Tehciri,* Pegem Akademi, Ankara: 2011; Nevzat Artuç also devoted a short section to the subject in his book. The chapter, to a large extent, is made up of a repeat of Cemal's claims in his memoirs. The writes implies throughout the section that he defends what Cemal did regarding the Arabists. Besides that, there can be found noteworthy information errors in the book. The writer attributes Cemal

policies regarding the Arabist movement in the Greater Syria taking Cemal Pasha's Governorate in Syria as a case. Before an analysis of his draconian actions to suppress the movement, an analysis of the Young Turk mind and policies on the Arabist movement in the preceding years of the war will contribute to our understanding of the origins of Cemal's actions and to see the continuity and change in the CUP policies.

2.1. Young Turks and the Arabist Parties before the War

Hasan Kayalı asserts in his acclaimed book that "in the Unionist view of Ottomanism, ethnic, religious and linguistic differences were of no import"[274]. From this point of view, he concludes that the principal aim of the Unionists was to centralize the Empire with a Turkish leading ideology. However, the point that he left unexamined is that the Unionist attitude towards the different *ethnie*s did not only cause the assessment of those *ethnie*s as insignificant variables in the CUP policies, but also resulted with the projects to eliminate the opposition movements ascribing importance to the *ethnie*s of the Empire, especially following the Balkan Wars. In this context, it will not be an exaggeration to claim that, from the beginning of its acquisition of the governmental instruments in 1913, the CUP wanted to make the Arabists abandon their reform demands giving them some governmental posts, persuading or punishing them, instead of taking their demands into consideration. They thought that giving some privileges to those people

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Pasha's letters to the Bedouin tribes and Imam Yahya inviting them close cooperation, to his conciliatory politics regarding the Arabists (p. 300). The remarks in the book on these tribal leaders give the impression that the writer assessed those chiefs as members of the Arabist movement. Similarly, Artuç claims that Cemal used the documents seized from the French Consulates following the first hangings took place in August 1915. Yet, As will be demonstrated below, he demanded this documents in May 1915, and the first executions also were made applying the evidences available in those documents (p. 306): Artuç, Nevzat, Ibid.

[274] Kayalı, Ibid, p. 85.

would save the Empire from a "separatist" movement. In this sense, they considerably followed the classical methods of the Empire to eliminate a movement of opposition within the Imperial realm. However, in the first years of their acquisition of the governmental apparatus, the Unionists had to give some reform promises to the members of the reformist Arabist Parties, such as *Al-Fatat*, *Al-Lamarkaziyya* and *Al-Muntadi al-Adabi,* probably, since they were afraid of any foreign intervention in favor of the demands of the Arab reformists. To be more specific, the Arab Congress held by the participation of all the reformist Arab parties in Paris between 18 and 23 June 1913[275], constituted a turning point in this sense. Following that, the prominent Arabist participants of the Arab Congress visited the Ottoman Embassy in Paris and the French Foreign Ministry to declare the decisions they made. They requested from the Ottoman Empire via the Ambassador the implementation of the decisions of the Congress. As for the French Government, they demanded support for their reform requests and the pressure on the Ottoman Government to materialize these reforms. They also emphasized to the French officials that they were loyal to the Empire. The CUP sent the prominent Unionist Midhat Şükrü, and informed that their demands for reforms were accepted by the government and, will be implemented in a short span of time.[276] Their demands, as agreed with the CUP leaders, were principally to make the government more decentralized, to reset the curriculum of the primary and secondary schools as to include the Arabic language, court decisions in Arabic in addition to Turkish, and to be able to submit a petition to the official authorities in Arabic.[277]

[275] The records of the congress was published in Cairo in the same year. For details, see: *Al-Mu'tamar al-Arabiyya al-Avval,* Kahire: 1331-1913.

[276] For the details of the process, see: Salaam, Ibid, pp. 168-190; Afterwards, the Arab nationalist considered this Congress as the first towards the Arab independence. For an example, see: Al-Hakim, Ibid, pp. 117-118.

[277] For the text of the agreement, see: *Majallat al-Manar,* Vol: 16/8, 2 August 1913, p. 638-640; In the high schools, the language of instruction was presumably in Arabic. We know that the Imperial High School in Damascus taught in Arabic till March 1916: **HHStA,** PA 38/369, Ranzi to Burian, "Einführung des deutschen Sprachunterrichtes in der hiesigen Sultanieshule", Damascus, 21 March 1916.

According to the memoirs of Shakib Arslan, the CUP repeated the similar promises to a pro-Ottoman Arab delegation in a meeting held in Istanbul during those days.[278]

The most important one among the demands of the Arabists was the change of the instruction language to Arabic in the Arab provinces. In this regard, on 11th August 1913 [29 Temmuz 1329] the *Sadaret* demanded the Ministry of Education to start preparations for teaching in Arabic in the state schools of the Arab provinces.[279] For that purpose, a "Commission for the Arabic Education" [*Arabca Tedrisat Komisyonu*] was established within the body of the University of Istanbul [*Darülfünun*]. The main task of the commission was to prepare schoolbooks in Arabic for the Ottoman Arabs. In this regard, the Commission demanded from Egypt[280] and Beirut[281] the dispatch of schoolbooks in Arabic as examples. While some of the books from Egypt were approved, some others were refused on grounds that they were written for Egypt and were not suitable for the Ottoman country. Especially, the history and geography books were considered in this context. By mid-December 1913, most of the books had been determined by the commission.[282] In the same regard, a *sultani* school was established in Beirut on 7th October 1913 [24 Eylül 1329], which would instruct in Arabic.[283] In regard to the demands of the Arabists, the state officials, who could not speak Arabic, were started to be

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[278] The prominent members of the pro-Ottoman party, like Abdurrahman el-Yusuf, Şeyh Esad el-Şukayri and Şekib Arslan, were among the members of the delegation: Arslan, Ibid., p. 108; According to memoirs of Salim Ali Salaam, the Unionists aimed at a mutual meeting consisted of the members of the reformist and the pro-Ottoman Arabs. However, due to the coincidence of the date of the meeting with the date of the departure of the reform party members, this meeting couldn't realized: Salaam, Ibid, p. 184-185.

[279] **BOA,** BEO 4223/316719, Sadaret to Maarif, 6 Teşrin-i Evvel 1329 [19 October 1913]

[280] **BOA**, MF.MKT., 1190/74, The High-Commissary in Egypt to Ministry of Interior, 1 Teşrin-i Sani 1913 [14 November 1913].

[281] **BOA**, MF.MKT., 1190/74, Ministry of Interior to the Commission for the Arabic Education, 23 Teşrin-i Sani 1913 [6 December 1913]

[282] **BOA**, MF.MKT., 1190/74, The Chair of the Commission for the Arabic Education to Ministry of Education, 2 Kanun-ı Evvel 1329 [15 December 1913]

[283] **BOA**, MF.MKT., 1190/59, Ministry of Education to the Governorates of Syria and Beirut, 24 Eylül 1329 [7 October 1913].

changed.[284] For example, the secretary of Jaffa Custom House was dismissed since he did not know Arabic.[285] Similarly, upon a complaint, the judge of Nablus was demanded by the Central Government to be dismissed if he could not speak Arabic sufficiently.[286]

Whereas the CUP gave promises to the reformist Arabs on the one hand, they examined the methods to eradicate the movement of Arabism, on the other. This is mainly because that the CUP leaders didn't saw them well-disposed, and thought that they were selfish profit seekers as self aggrandizers, and aimed at the separation of the Arab lands from the Empire. A conversation between Talat and Mahmut Nedim, the last Ottoman Governor in Yemen and also a CUP member, clearly reveals the Unionist opinions and intentions regarding the personality of the Arabists:

> "One day, Talat Bey took me aside and asked:
> - I don't find those [Arabists] [*Arap iftirakçıları* in the original text] well. Yet, we are not so blind for not to see the aims that they seek… What do you say? Have you learnt their real aims thoroughly in details? In particular, is there a full agreement among them?
> I replied:
> - I don't think that there is an agreement among them regarding ideals and intentions, as affairs stand. Almost all the prominent Arabs have gathered here [in the Arabist parties]… In my opinion, since the self-seekers constitute the majority [of them], first of all, they should be satisfied. By saying they should be satisfied, I should add that I think it is not appropriate to silence them by the means violence [*cebrü şiddet*], in these days.
> Talat Bey,
> -… When you dissect their demands, you see that the demands and claims they voice are the product of their intolerance to our rule.
> It was this opinion of the CUP. However, they [the CUP] could not hold that against them [the Arabists]. It was appropriate then not to hold that against them…"[287]

As inferred between the lines of the conversation, there was a tendency among the CUP leaders to eliminate the Arabist movement by various means. Especially Talat saw them as

[284] In a telegram, the Ministry of Interior warned the Directorate General of Security to appoint those, who could speak Arabic to the Arab provinces. For details, see: **BOA**, DH.MTV. 60/19, Ministry of Interior to the Directorate General of Security, 18 Mart 1330 [30 March 1914].

[285] **BOA**, DH.MTV. 49-2/43. Ministry of Interior to the Governorate of Jerusalem, 7 Kanun-ı Sani 1329 [20 January 1913].

[286] **BOA**, DH.İ.UM. 67/23, Ministry of Interior to Undersecretary, 9 Teşrin-i Sani 1329 [22 December 1913].

[287] Mahmud Nedim Bey, *Arabistan'da Bir Ömür,* Ali Birinci (ed.), İstanbul: ISIS Press, 2001, p. 178.

“separatists”, who had “intolerance” to the Ottoman rule, and accordingly, “collaborators” of the Great Powers in Syria. An unsigned report sent from Beirut on 26th March 1914 regarding the methods of struggle against Arabism, presumably written by a prominent CUP member, who was probably sent there to examine the state of Arabism, is another example of the Unionist approach towards the Arabs in the same direction. Similar to the speech quoted above, the beginning of this report clarifies the Unionist doubt about the Arabist movement; the author describes Arabism as a movement, which had some connections with foreign powers, and therefore, aiming at separating the Arab provinces from the Ottoman rule. Because of its foreign origins, the movement was harmful for the country. Therefore, the movement should be eliminated by way of gaining its members applying various methods. In this regard, the writer gives some advice to the Central Government on how to eliminate the decentralist parties in Beirut, which had some similarities to the policies applied by Cemal during his governorate. He advises three methods to struggle with Arabism; some of the Arabists should be rewarded with the Governmental posts, while some others should be punished moderately. As for the third way, the writer advised to use the method of persuasion.[288]

As the first measure, the Government should gratify some members of the party, such as Refik el-Azm and Muhtar Beyhum appointing them to prestigious governmental posts. Secondly, Abdülgani el-Ureysi, the editor of *El-Mufid* newspaper, should be persuaded about the good intentions of the Turks, since this man was acting with his conscience. The third way, that the writer recommends to prevent further participation of the people of Beirut in Arabism, was to punish the members of the movement, who tried to manipulate the sentiments of the common people against the Government, and who undertook to show the government weaker before the Great Powers. He claims that the people of Beirut would be spoiled, if the government had shown indulgence to them about their political concerns. However, if the government punishes them, they would repent

[288] **BOA,** DH.EUM. 4.Şb. 10/18, 13 Mart 1330 [26 March 1914]; a transcription of this document has been published in *Ortak'*s book, in spite of some reading faults, for example, he transcribed “satvet” [power] as “sukut” [silence], and some unread words. The text published by *Ortak* didn’t follow the original order of the document: Ortak, Ibid., pp. 241-245.

their partisanship. Interestingly enough, the writer cites decrease in smuggling following the arrest of the smugglers as an example to prove his argument.[289]

The journalist Ahmet Şerif, the interviewer of the Unionist newspaper *Tanin,* writes in 1910 indicating that a similar approach was common among the Turks at that time. The following remarks delivered by him are significant with regard to demonstrate the perception of the Arab question among the Turkish governing elite:

> "People say and have been saying that there is not [such] an Arab question; this is the invention of some self-seekers, some ill-disposeds and a few Arabic newspapers that have monkey businesses. It is an illusion of sentiments and opinion that was followed by some to sow discord among the combined Ottoman elements..."[290]

It is worth to mention that, as quoted by Şerif, none of the references of the CUP rulers dealt with the reform demands of the Arabists. They primarily saw the members of the Arabist party as self-seekers, and never made a reference to their political demands. Four aspects of these assessments are crucial to understand Cemal's way of action against Arabism: the evaluation of the Arabists as self-seekers and, therefore, could be bought in return for prestigious posts; secondly, the underestimation of their political demands regarding the administration of the Arab provinces; finally, considering them the agents of the foreign powers. The most important one is the belief in the necessity of bribing them towards the political line of the CUP to eliminate a possible danger of "separation" from the Arabists.

2.2. Cemal's Perspective and Intentions on the Arabist Movement

Cemal was not different from the mainstream of the CUP in his approach on the aims and intentions of the Arabist movement. His remarks both in his memoirs and in his contemporary correspondence apparently demonstrate that reality. However, his actions

[289] **BOA,** DH.EUM. 4.Şb. 10/18, 13 Mart 1330 [26 March 1914].

[290] Ahmet Şerif, "Türk-Arab", Damascus, 12 December 1910, *Arnavudluk'da, Suriye'de, Trablusgarb'de Tanin,* Ankara: TTK Basımevi, 1999, pp. 126-129*:* for the original of the article, see: *Tanin,* 29 Teşrin-i Sani 1326 [12 December 1910].

were quite radical from the methods offered in the pre-war period. First of all, similar to many of the CUP leaders, Cemal regarded the Arabists as self-seekers. The statements quoted below demonstrate that Cemal also thinks that the Arabists could be bought in return for money and they were deceitful in their causes:

> "…Through his agency [Abdul Kerim el-Halil] I had a meeting with some of the most influential revolutionary leaders, including one of their greatest zealots…I explained to them the views of the Government, and insisted that it would be possible to liberate the Mohammedan world from a foreign yoke if the great war ended with a victory for us. All of them –without exception- agreed with what I said … In the same breath these so-called revolutionaries, starting with Abdul Kerim el Halil, began a doleful tale about their poor financial position and great need of money. I distributed pretty substantial sums between Abdul Kerim el Halil, Melumed Kurd Ali [sic.] and Abdul Gani el Arisi. From that time onwards these gentlemen were my most humble servants, and assured me that they would lose no time in doing everything in their power to assist me…"[291]

Moreover, his contemporary writings are filled with revilement and contempt against the Arabists. Before he started the process of prosecution targeting the Arabists, Cemal appeased the concerns of Talat with regard to possible disturbance among the Arabs due to the punishment of the prominent members of Arab society with these remarks: "by breaking the heads of these accurseds [*mel'un*], there would be no Arab question to emerge."[292] In another telegraph, Cemal described those Arabists as "well-known traitors", "wickeds" [*hain*], and "lacking backbone" [*mesleksiz*].[293] However, there is no mention of the political concerns of the Arabists in Cemal's telegraphs, and no reference to Arabism as an ideology demanding reforms in the Arab provinces.

Because of that conviction, Cemal thought that the Arabist movement must be eliminated. On the other hand, in his memoirs, he claims that, when he arrived in Syria, he invited the prominent members of the Arabist party to his headquarter, and agreed with them upon their support for the war effort. However, afterwards, he decided to punish the Arabists upon finding out the activities of Abdülkerim el-Halil and Rıza es-Sulh to prepare a revolt against the Government in Tyre [Sur] and Sidon [Saida].[294] It means that a fear of

[291] Djemal Pasha, Ibid., p. 198-199.

[292] **BOA,** DH.ŞFR. 482/127, Cemal to Talat, Damascus, 25 Temmuz 1331 [7 August 1915],

[293] **BOA,** DH.ŞFR. 471/47, Cemal to Talat, 3 Mayıs 1331, Jerusalem, [16 May 1915]

[294] Djemal Pasha, Ibid, p. 206-207

revolt organized by the Arabists in Syria compelled Cemal to punish them. Quite the reverse of that, and apart from the pre-war considerations of the CUP leaders, both his contemporary telegraphs and the testimony of persons around him demonstrate the existence of a prior planning. In a telegram sent to Talat at the beginning of the process, Cemal expresses that the appropriate time came to begin the punishment of the Arabists, whose "treason" were well-known, notifying the mentioned activities of Abdülkerim el-Halil and Rıza es-Sulh.[295] By these remarks, Cemal demonstrates that he took advantage of that event to destroy the Arabist movement. He also undertook to arrest the prominent Arabist, who presided at the Arab congress in Paris, and senator in the Ottoman Parliament, Abdulhamid Zahrawi[296] using this event as an opportunity. But, Cemal notes that, because of Talat's opposition, he abandoned the idea of hanging him at once.[297] The Austrian consul in Beirut, on the other hand, wrote that most of the Muslim members of the reformist Arabs had cut all their ties with Egypt, and therefore, they felt themselves relieved against any punishment of the state.[298] Moreover, in the estimation of the celebrated orientalist Martin Hartmann, who was employed within the body of the German Army in WWI as an expert on the Orient, the Arabist movement was not as strong as to drag its members to a revolt against the Ottoman Government. The Arabs, who cooperated with Great Britain, were rather those, who resided in Egypt.[299]

It is worth to mention that Cemal's activities met with little resistance at the level of Central Government. In the beginning, Talat was opposed to the hanging of Abdulhamid Zahrawi since he was afraid of a public disturbance in Syria.[300] According to the memoirs

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[295] **BOA,** DH.ŞFR. 471/47, Cemal to Talat, 3 Mayıs 1331 [16 May 1915].

[296] For a study on the political and religious views of Abdulhamid Zehravi, see: Christoph Herzog, *Abd al-Hamid az-Zahrawi und das Problem des Osmanismus, 1908-1916",* Unpublished M.A. Thesis, Albert-Ludwigs-Universitaet zu Freiburg.

[297] **BOA,** DH.ŞFR. 483/75, Cemal to Talat, 28 Temmuz 1331 [10 August 1915].

[298] **HHStA,** PA 38/366, Nedwed to Burian, "Hochverratspozess gegen die Mitgleider des revolutionaeren Komités", Beirut, 25 August 1915.

[299] **PA-AA,** Türkei 177, Bd. 12, Hartmann to Legationssekretaer von Wesendonk, 29 August 1915.

[300] **BOA,** DH.ŞFR. 483/75, Cemal to Talat, 28 Temmuz 1331 [10 August 1915].

of Muhittin Birgen, the editor of *Tanin,* Talat refused several times Cemal's requests to deliver Zahrawi due to the reasons expressed above. But later he had to send the senator to Syria due to the pressure from Enver and Cemal.[301] Similarly, Falih Rıfkı notes that Enver Pasha wanted to prevent the execution of Shafik al-Muayyad.[302] The convinced Arab member of the CUP, Shakib Arslan claims in his memoirs that Enver and Talat, gave shrouded consent to Cemal's atrocities giving him freedom of action in Syria.[303] In the same way, Falih Rıfkı expresses that, the requests of Talat and Enver from Cemal, to forgive the punishment of some Arabists did not mean that they were against Cemal's implementations. In essence, they agreed with Cemal that the "traitors" must be punished. But, due to some personal relations, they demanded an exemption for some persons.[304] Having considered the general CUP attitude against the Arabists, it is not surprising to see the approval of Cemal's rule of terror by the Central Government.[305]

Looking at Cemal's attitude toward the Arabs in general, it can be inferred from Cemal's remarks quoted above that he didn't generalize these ideas to all of the Arab population. Moreover, he expresses his confidence to the civil population of Syria in his memoirs.[306] This confidence is not because of his perception of Syria as the loyal supporters of the Ottoman unity, but, of their apolitical situation. He mentions Anatolia as "the motherland" [*Anavatan*] both in his memoirs and his contemporary writings.[307] This

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[301] Birgen, Ibid, p. 272.

[302] Atay, Ibid, p. 50.

[303] Arslan, Ibid, p. 159-160.

[304] Atay, Ibid, p. 50.

[305] In one of his telegram, Enver reported to Cemal that there was no opposition to his activities in Syria among the prominent CUP members: **TTK Arşivi,** KO Koleksiyonu 10/5, Cemal to Enver, 4 Kanun-ı Evvel 1332 [17 December 1916].

[306] These remarks in his memoirs show his confidence to the Arab population: "… As I felt perfectly sure of the civil population, I had no hesitation whatever in committing the safety of the country to the Arab formations and leaving the coastal districts practically without surveillance. I am certain that if the English had had the slightest doubt about the loyalty of the civil population of Syria and Palestine they would certainly have attempted a landing…": Djemal Pasha, Ibid., p. 206; Cemal Paşa, Ibid., p. 178.

[307] He described the delegate of authors visited Syria towards the end of the year 1916 as "the most distinguished faces of the motherland [*Anavatan*]". For the whole of the

separation was presumably due to his approach to the Syrians. At that time, as will be analyzed in chapter six, he did not assess the Syrians as the ideal citizens of the Empire because of the weakness of their political consciousness in terms of the loyalty to the Ottomanness. As a result of these considerations, he doesn't equate Syria in his mind with Anatolia as an equal part of the Empire. A different interpretation of these words makes his attempts to create ideal citizens from the Syrians meaningless.

As for Cemal's attitude regarding the cultural demands of the Arabs, it can be put forward that he was not against those ideals in principle, but he did not believe in the Arabists' themselves. Most of the nationalist Arabs claim in their memoirs that Cemal aimed at the elimination of the Arab culture and undertook to Turkify it. He saw the Arabists as threats to his designs in the direction of the Turkification of Syria, and therefore, severely punished the members of this movement.[308] However, Cemal didn't make a fuss about the increase of the Arab national awareness. In a speech that he delivered in an event organized by the prominent Arabists, Abdulkerim el-Halil and Abdurrahman Shahbandar, in the beginning of January 1915,[309] he openly advised the Arab Youth to work for the national awakening of the Arabs, following his suggestion to gather under the flag of the Caliph:

> "…Today I am in a position to assure you that the Turkish and Arab ideals do not conflict.[310] They are brothers in their national strivings, and perhaps their efforts are complementary. The aims of the Young Turks[311] are to awaken national feeling in the Turkish nation, train their countrymen to work, free them from the Slav yoke, give them health and national expansion, increase the welfare and prosperity of Turkish countries…

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document, see: **BOA,** DH.ŞFR. 538/11, Cemal to Talat, Jerusalem,8 Teşrin-i Sani 1332 [21 November 1916]; similarly, in his memoirs he depicts Anatolia as the motherland with the following remarks: "

[308] For example, Shakib Arslan puts this claim into words while evaluating the exile of the prominent Arab families to Anatolia: Arslan, Ibid., p. 156.

[309] That date is determined in the memoirs of *Amin Said*: Said, Amin, *Al-Thawrat al-Arabiyya al-Qubra: Tarihu mufassal cami' lilkadiyyeti'l-Arabiyye fi rub' kurn,* Vol:1, Maktabatu'l-Madbuli, Cairo: Undated, p. 64.

[310] The sentence is different in the Turkish version of the memoirs: *Türklük Cereyanı Arabluk Cereyanının katiyyen düşmanı değil:* Turkism is not an enemy of Arabism; Cemal Pasha, Ibid, p. 172.

[311] Turkish Youth [*Türk Gençliği*] in the original, Cemal Pasha, Ibid, p. 172.

> The Young Turks have resolved to work tirelessly to achieve these objects. As one of them, I appeal to you in your own tongue that, as the representatives of Young Arabia, you, too, should work for the success of this cause… I turn to the youth of Turkey and Arabia and say these two nations will be doomed to destruction the moment they separate. Discord between these two great pillars of the Islam religion will bring it the downfall of the Mussulman pover, and ultimately it will be impossible to avert slavery under the Slavs…"[312]

As is understandable from the text, for Cemal a national awareness was not dangerous as long as it was not influenced by the foreign powers, which undermines the loyalty to the Ottoman Empire, and as long as it doesn't prevent the integration of the Syrian lands to the Imperial body, offering an alternative political system. His focus was rather on the increase of the loyalties of the Syrians towards the Ottoman Empire. The Arabists were hanged by Cemal Pasha not because they championed the Arab awakening, but they upheld the decentralization of the Empire and they had connections with the great powers. If he had been aware that the Arabists were pro-Ottoman in essence, in all likelihood, he wouldn't punish them by applying such severe methods. As a matter of fact, there is no reference to the demands of the Arabists in the documents penned by Cemal. The "separatist" perception in Cemal's mind, prevented him from comprehending the true nature of the Arab movement.

The Pasha didn't touch those Arabists, who didn't have a relation with the foreign powers and who undertook to revive the cultural nationalism among the Arabists. The most conspicuous example of that is his treatment of journalist Muhammad Kurd Ali. In the preceding years of the war, the former wrote provocative articles in his newspaper *Muqtabas,* on the impact of the Ottoman period in Syria and accused the Turks for the sluggishness of the Arabs. He required the national awakening of the Arabs to throw off this idleness. In addition, he promoted academic studies to increase the cultural awareness of the Arabs.[313] However, the documents seized from the French consulates manifested

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[312] Djemal Pasha, Ibid., p. 200-201; Cemal Pasha, Ibid., p. 172; the same speech is mentioned in the memoirs of *Amin Said, Izzet Darwaza* and *Ahmad Kadri:* for details, see: Said, Ibid., p. 64-65; Kadri, Ahmad, *Mudhakkirati an al-Thawrat al-Arabiyya al-Qubra,* Manshurat al-Wizarat al-Thakafa, Damascus: 1993, p. 39; Darwaza, Ibid., p. 223.

[313] Hermann, Rainer, *Kulturkrise und konservative Erneuerung: Muhammad Kurd Ali (1876-1953) und das geistige Leben in Damaskus zu Beginn des 20. Jahrhunderts",* Peter Lang, Frankfurt am Main: 1989, pp. 113-124.

that Kurd Ali had a sincere allegiance towards the Ottoman Empire.[314] Furthermore, Kurd Ali's mistrust to the Great Powers and his repeated refusal of the cooperation offers of the foreign consuls[315] and German diplomats[316] provided him of being in the most immediate circle of Cemal Pasha, even if he was among the founders of the LCP in Syria.[317] A similar situation came into the question for Salim Ali Salaam; he was apprehended and tried in the Court Martial at Aliye, but neither was hanged nor exiled as a result of that Cemal were informed about his negative attitude towards the intervention of the Great Powers.[318] In such a way that, in his memoirs Cemal explains that:

> "A Mohammedan of Beirut, member of the Arab Congress which met in Paris at the beginning of 1913, said to Monsieur Pichon, the French Foreign Minister: Although we have called our congress in Paris, our only object is to obtain reforms for the Arab provinces from the Ottoman Government. We want neither a French occupation of Syria nor a French protectorate".[319]

The person mentioned in the quotation was most probably Salim Ali Salaam himself. Possibly, Cemal learned this by the documents seized from the French consulate and did not punish Salaam like the other members of Arabism.

As a result, following the first expedition against Egypt, as expressed in the previous chapter, it became apparent that carrying out of the second expedition would take time. Taking this as an occasion, Cemal embarked upon his second task: in his words in his memoirs, "to maintain peace and internal order in Syria" interrupted by "great activity on the part of the revolutionary Arabs". As a result, he commenced a process aiming at the

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[314] Kurd Ali, Ibid., p. 104-105.

[315] Once, he refused the offer of Shahbandar to communicate with Great Britain to bargain for the future of Syria: Kurd Ali, Ibid., p. 111; in another occasion, he refused the assistance proposal of the German consul for his newspaper *al-Muqtabas:*Kurd Ali, Ibid., p. 125. He writes that all of these were espionaged to Cemal Pasha.

[316] When he refused the cooperation offer of Baron Oppenheim, the latter complained him to Cemal Pasha that Kurd Ali was pro-French and, therefore, should be hanged. As an opponent of Germany, Cemal assessed the complaint of Oppenheim as a good reference for the reliableness of Kurd Ali: Kurd Ali, Ibid., p. 149-150.

[317] Kurd Ali, Ibid., p. 111.

[318] For the details of his trial process see: Salaam, Ibid, p. 210-223.

[319] Djemal Pasha, Ibid, p. 264.

elimination of the Arabist movement for the sake of preventing "general disturbance in the country".[320] When these remarks were combined with the Unionist intentions and perceptions regarding the Arabs, it will be apparent that the punishment of the Arabist was intended by Cemal, while he took the road for Syria.

2.3. The Process of Punishment: Executions and Exiles

As explained in the previous section, when Cemal first arrived in Syria, he formed good relations with the prominent Arabists. He sought the friendship of the Arab notables, and showed hospitality to them.[321] He appointed the prominent Arabist Abdurrahman Shahbandar as his physician.[322] However, during the battles at Dardanelles, the members of the Arabist parties thought that, at the end of that war, the Ottoman Empire would collapse and Syria would be occupied by the foreign powers. Therefore, the Arabists planned to become organized in order to be effective in the fate of Syria and to negotiate with Great Britain on a plan.[323] Rıza al-Sulh and Abdulkerim el-Halil held a meeting in Tyre and Sidon and decided to rebel against the Ottoman Empire in the case of an Ottoman defeat.[324] It was a dangerous movement militarily for Cemal Pasha, since those places were far from the control of the Ottoman Government, and close to the coast. By that reason, they could receive assistance from the Entente Navy in case of a rebellion.[325] But, after a

[320] Djemal Pasha, Ibid, p. 138.

[321] **PRO,** FO 371/2781, Sykes to WO, "Information from two Arab officers recently arrived in England from the Caucasus [Lieutenant Shurbaji and Lieutenant Shaikha], 25 September 1916.

[322] Amin Said, Ibid, p. 64.

[323] For the details of these plans, see: Kurd Ali, Ibid., p. 111-112;

[324] Salaam, Ibid, p. 204-205.

[325] Erden, Ibid, p. 168.

short while, their intentions were denounced to Cemal. According to Kurd Ali, even their meetings and the themes of those meetings were reported to Cemal by the spies.[326]

According to the documents in the Ottoman Archives, Cemal began to think in the beginning of May 1915, to launch a process of punishment of the Arabists. In a telegram to Talat he explained that a movement of elimination against the Arabists was necessary to keep Syria undisturbed.[327] As a result of this thought and his general bias towards Arabism, in July 1915, he started to arrest the prominent members of the Arabist parties. His telegram about the reasons of the apprehensions demonstrates that Cemal was reported all the details of the Arabist plans:

> "Accusations about those [Arabists] are very simple. Although we gratify them in many ways, they incorporated the Arab Caliphate into their official programs to separate Arabness from Turkishness. They dealt with these issues following the general amnesty. After we proclaimed the mobilization, they resorted to the necessary tools and warned their branches that the time has arrived to realize that [aim]. Finally, during the Entente's campaign in Gallipoli, they assumed that the collapse of [the Ottoman] Government was nearing and they started to propagate in the vicinity of Sur [Tyre], Sayda [Sidon] and Merc-i Uyun. Then, I put my hands on their shoulders [*işte o zaman onların omuzlarına ellerimi yapıştırdım*]. I am about to complete my investigation. Their numbers are little and I arrested almost all of them…"[328]

It is worth to mention, however, that there is no reference in the memoirs of the Arabists to the plans of the Arabists regarding the creation of an Arab Caliphate. Possibly, Cemal referred the programs of the Arabists in Egypt by this.

At the end of the investigations, the Court Martial decided to hang 11 of the arrested persons. These decisions were implemented on 21st August in Beirut.[329] The hanged persons were the prominent notables in Syria. The most outstanding person among them was the president of the Arabist society *Munteda al-Adabi* [the Literary Club][330],

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[326] Kurd Ali, Ibid., p. 111.

[327] **BOA,** DH.ŞFR. 471/47, Cemal to Talat, 3 Mayıs 1331, Jerusalem, [16 May 1915]

[328] **BOA,** DH.ŞFR. 483/75, Cemal to Talat, Damascus, 28 Temmuz 1331[11 August 1915].

[329] **BOA,** DH.ŞFR. 485/8, Azmi to Talat, Beirut, 9 Ağustos 1915.

[330] An Arabist opposition movement founded by the Arab students in İstanbul. For detailed information, see: Eliezer Tauber, *The Emergence of the Arab Movements,* London: Frank Cass, 1993, pp. 101-109.

Abdulkerim al-Halil[331], who had a Shi'ite origin from Jabal 'Amil in Lebanon.[332] Upon the opposition of Talat, Cemal delayed "the conviction" of Abdulhamid Zahrawi.[333] According to the report of the Austrian Consul the majority of the hanged persons were state officials like mayors, tax collectors etc. as well as journalists.[334] The consul states in another report that the aim of the committee was to create an Arab caliphate.[335] According to the Consul, Emir Abdullah, who was arrested in August 1915, from the celebrated Jazairi family of Damascus, had established a society called *Cemiyet-i Muhammedi* aiming at the transfer of the Caliphate from the Turks to the Arabs in the previous years of the war.[336] After executing the death penalties, Cemal sent a delegation to Istanbul under the presidency of the *Mufti* of the Army Esad al-Shukayr, consisted of the scholars [*ulema*] and journalists from Syria, to explain the loyalty of Syrian to the Caliph and to expound that everything was fine in Syria.[337] There were 33 people in the delegation from the various cities of Syria, such as Hama, Jerusalem, Damascus, Kerak and Hauran. Only two of them were journalists; the others were scholars.[338]

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331 **HHStA,** PA 38/366, Ranzi to Burian, "Das Geheimkomite zur Errichtung eines arabischen Khalifats", Damascus, 20 August 1915.

332 Tauber, Ibid*,* p. 101.

333 **BOA,** DH.ŞFR. 483/75, Cemal to Talat, Damascus, 28 Temmuz 1331[11 August 1915]: **BOA,** DH.ŞFR. 482/127, Cemal to Talat, Damascus, 25 Temmuz 1331 [7 August 1915].

334 **HHStA,** PA 38/366, Ranzi to Burian, "Das Urteil des Kriegsgerichtes in Aleh", Damascus, 26 August 1915.

335 **HHStA,** PA 38/366, Ranzi to Burian, "Das Geheimkomite zur Errichtung eines arabischen Khalifats", Damascus, 20 August 1915.

336 **HHStA,** PA 38/366, Ranzi to Burian, "Der Geheimbund zum Zwecke der Errichtung eines arabischen Khalifats", Damascus, 6 August 1915.

337 **PA-AA,** Türkei 177, Bd. 12, Hartmann to Legationssekreater of Wesendonk, 29 August 1915; for Cemal's report on the departure of the delegation, see: **BOA,** DH.ŞFR. 490/84, Cemal to Talat. Damascus, 30 Ağustos 1331 [11 September 1915]; **BOA,** DH.ŞFR. 491/18, Cemal to Talat. Damascus, 14 Eylül 1331 [27 September 1915]

338 **HHStA,** PA 38/366, Ranzi to Burian, "Die Lokalerereignisse der letzten Woche; Hinrichtung der Brüder Zreik aus Tripolis; die Syrische Deputation nach den Dardanellen", Damascus, 1 October 1915.

Following those executions, Cemal extended the scale of investigations transforming it into a process to eliminate the Arabist movement in Syria. That time, the prosecutions had considerably expanded. Besides the members and sympathizers of the Arabist parties, their relatives and some non-Arabist notables had also been arrested regardless of their affiliation with the Arabist movement. There were ex-mayors, muftis, deputies etc. among the arrested people.[339] Some of them, like *Abdulghani al-Uraisi, Taufik al-Bisat, Arif Shahab,* could escape to the desert. However, they were caught by the Bedouins and delivered to the authorities.[340] According to the memoirs of Kurd Ali, when *Abdulwahab al-Inglizi* was about to be arrested, he was outside Syria and Talat Pasha suggested his escape abroad. However, being sure of him, al-Inglizi preferred to go to Syria.[341]

This time, the accusations were more ambiguous. In the light of the documents seized from the French consulate, all the members of the Arab opposition parties were interrogated, regardless of the degree of their active operation to provoke people against the Government after the proclamation of the war. They were accused to separate the Arab lands from the Ottoman Government, and by this way, to cooperate with the greatest enemies of Islam.[342] At the end of the trial process, 21 leading figures of the Arabist party were sentenced to death on 6th May 1916. 14 of them were hanged in Beirut and the others were put to the gallows in Damascus.[343] Besides the hangings, Cemal sent plenty of the members of the notable families into exile. Most of the exiles were the relatives of the hanged notables.[344] It is worth to mention that the decree of the Ottoman Sultan, approving the executions of those Arabists, bears the date 14th June 1916. It means that Cemal

[339] **HHStA,** PA 38/366, Ranzi to Burian, "Straf- und Coercitifmassregeln", Damascus, 14 November 1915.

[340] **BOA,** DH.ŞFR. 502/90, Asaf to Talat, Maan, 13 Kanun-ı Evvel 1331 [26 December 1915].

[341] Kurd Ali, Ibid., p. 152-153.

[342] **PA-AA,** Türkei 177, Bd. 13, Müller to Wesendonk, 29 May 1916.

[343] **PA-AA,** Türkei 177, Bd. 13, Loytved to Bethmann Hollweg, Damascus, 8 May 1916.

[344] **HHStA,** PA 38/369, Nedwed to Burian, "Hochverratprozess", Beirut, 10 May 1916.

implemented those decisions before the approval of the Sultan.[345] There was a special law that was brought into effect in the beginning of the War, enabling the Army commanders to approve and implement the decisions of the court martials before the confirmation of the Sultan. The Sultan had to approve it following its implementation.[346]

The Damascus Consul of Germany interpreted the death sentences and the aim of Cemal's existence in Syria as the reconquest of Syria. After his failure to cross the Suez Canal, Cemal changed his decision and set that reconquest as a task for himself. In accordance with this aim, he established his headquarter in Damascus, the political center of Syria, instead of Birüssebi, the military center for the second expedition to the Canal.[347] The Consul continues that the trial of the Arabs was used as an occasion to destroy all the political opposition whether it had a "treasonous" aim or not.[348] Cemal had not distinguished the Arabists as the "separatists" and the "reformists" and made all of them subject to the same treatment.[349] It was very much appropriate to Cemal's approach towards the Arabists explained in the previous section.

Some details given by Ali Fuad Bey, the Chief of Staff of the 4th Army, make this argument stronger. Before the commencement of the trial process, some members of the court martial were changed; when the new members of the court arrived in Damascus, they asked directives about their new tasks. In spite of this allegiance, at the end of the judgment process, they had only decided to put 3 or 4 people to death sentence. Other prisoners had been convicted to be interned and punished with hard labour. However, Cemal changed this judgment and decided to put to death all the accused persons without bothering the warnings of the president of the court martial, Şükrü Bey, that Cemal would

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345 **BOA,** İ.DUİT 171/60, 1 Haziran 1332 [14 June 1916].

346 Erden, Ibid., p. 275-276.

347 **PA-AA,** Türkei 177, Bd. 13, Loytved to Bethmann Hollweg, Damascus, 18 April 1916.

348 **PA-AA,** Türkei 177, Bd. 13, Loytved to Bethmann Hollweg, Damascus, 8 May 1916; The same evaluations were made by another German official in 1918: **PA-AA,** Türkei 177, Bd. 17, Weber to Hertling, Aleppo, 26 June 1918.

349 **PA-AA,** Türkei 177, Bd. 13, Loytved to Bethmann Hollweg, Damascus, 18 April 1916.

be responsible before history. Cemal's answer to these warnings was meaningful: "may history rip up on your head" [*tarih kafanda paralansın*].[350] It means that, even the president of the court martial, who decided to put the Arabists into death penalty, saw Cemal's decisions as unjust.

When the documents confiscated from the consulates are analyzed, there was in fact very little thing to be considered as "treason" in the circumstances of the Ottoman politics of that time. First of all, before the war, the Ottoman state didn't have full authority on its realm. As a result of the Capitulations, the Great Powers obtained considerable privileges within the Ottoman lands and they could interfere in the course of the events in the Ottoman domestic politics even within the boundaries of the Ottoman law. In the same way, they could enforce the state to make reforms in some regions of the Empire, as in the cases of Macedonia and Armenia. Taking the support of a Great Power was one of the most effective ways in the Ottoman Empire to enforce the government to make reforms. In this regard, in 1903, while the Young Turk movement was in opposition, Cemal himself had applied to a British diplomat with a Young Turk delegate to support the reforms in the Ottoman Empire.[351] In the Unionist era, Cemal was the head of the pro-French faction in the CUP, and he established a Turco-French Friendship society to improve the relations between France and the Ottoman Empire.[352] Most of the negotiations between the Arabists and the French consuls should be evaluated in this context. As the most influential power in Syria, the attitude and projects of France was crucial for the Arabists, who aimed at the prevention of any foreign intervention in Syria. As a matter of fact, most of the documents were about the Arabist interrogation about the future planning of France regarding Syria. The Muslim reformists of Syria, who constituted almost all of the persecuted Arabists, principally demanded French protection to prevent any intervention of the Ottoman central government in the reform process in Syria. Besides France, the reformists had also established relations with the British consuls. However, the British consulates had destroyed their documents as a measure, when they left Syria in the beginning of the

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[350] Erden, Ibid., p.273-274.

[351] Hanioğlu, Ibid, p. 211.

[352] Kazım Karabekir, *I.Dünya Savaşı Anıları,* Yapı-Kredi Yayınları, İstanbul: 2011, p. 29.

war.[353] Moreover, the members of the reformist societies, who applied to this was limited to a few persons; Damascus Consul of Germany states that there was the accusation of only four persons “in these interesting documents”.[354] Many of the death penalties were therefore implemented without at least such evidence.[355]

The trial was also problematical in terms of the existing Ottoman law at that time. In such a way that the documents referred in the decisions of the court martial in Aliye was belonged to the preceding years of a general amnesty, i.e. after those negotiations, in 1913, the Ottoman Government had proclaimed a general amnesty forgiving all the guilts to that date. However, the Arabist reform parties maintained their activities in Egypt in a more radical way against the Ottoman Empire. According to Ali Fuad Bey and the Austrian Consul in Beirut, the Arabists had stated that they cut their relations with Egypt after the general Amnesty, and therefore they thought to be left well alone.[356] But, the court martial neither accepted this statement nor could prove that they maintain their ties with Egypt. In other words, Cemal punished the Arabists in Syria for the activities of the Arabists in Egypt.[357]

Besides the death penalties, Cemal decided to send into exile a great number of notable families from many Syrian provinces into Anatolian cities, which were populated mainly by Turks. They would be distributed in those towns for permanent settlement and their properties and lands would be compensated with equivalents in the towns of their resettlement. Cemal established a commission to determine the value of the properties that belonged to the exiles. Those families would be comfortably transported to their permanent settlement places in a way that was worthy of the honor of the Government

[353] **PA-AA,** Türkei 177, Bd. 13, Müller to Wesendonk, 29 May 1915.

[354] **PA-AA,** Türkei 177, Bd. 13, Loytved to Bethmann Hollweg, Damascus, 8 May 1916.

[355] For the origins of the documents, see: *Journal de Beyrouth, 6 May 1916*; for the Turkish translation, see: *Aliye Divan-ı Harb-ı Örfisinde Tetkik Olunan Mesele-i Siyasiye Hakkında İzahat,* Tanin Matbaası, Dersaadet: 1332 [1916].

[356] **HHStA,** PA 38/366, Nedwed to Burian, “Hochverratspozess gegen die Mitgleider des revolutionaeren Komites”, Beirut, 25 August 1915: Erden, Ibid, p. 276.

[357] Erden, Ibid., p. 276.

[hükümetin şanına yakışır bir şekilde]. They would never be permitted to live in misery and the officials, who would act against those orders, would be delivered to the court martial.[358]

The families that were decided to be deported from Syria were as follows: from Damascus: all the members of the celebrated Izzet Pasha el-Abid's family, the family of Sham'i Pasha [Sham'izades], which had a great influence in Damascus in Cemal's viewpoint, the family of Shukri el-Asely and Shafik el-Mueyyed; from Homs, the family of Izzet el-Cundi, the most "harmful" branch of the Atasi family according to Cemal, some other families in Homs; in Baalbek, the celebrated Mutran family and the whole of Said Suleiman Pasha's family, and the whole of Haidar family, the whole of some Christian families. In total, the number of the households to be deported consisted of 154 households. Cemal added that the number of the families could change in future. [359] According to a contemporary American report, the number of the deportees was 5.000.[360] Meanwhile, in the first trial in 1915, the vast majority of the Arabists condemned in Aliye had migrated to Egypt during and before the war. The court martial invited them to Syria for trial. If they didn't come, their assets would be confiscated.[361] On the other hand, according to the remarks of the Austrian consul in Damascus, the exile of some Christian families was not due to the political considerations. Their guilt was to violate the military regulations such as selling alcohol to the officers. They, too, were exiled with all their families.[362]

The process of the deportation took place more or less in the direction of the orders of Cemal Pasha and many Arab families were transported to the various towns of Anatolia

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[358] **BOA,** DH.ŞFR. 504/65, Cemal to Talat, 26 Kanun-I Evvel 1331 [8 January 1916]; in another telegram, he again warned Talat to order the governorates in Anatolia to act carefully to the Arab deportees: **BOA,** DH.ŞFR. 505/73, Cemal to Talat, 2 Kanun-ı Sani 1331 [15 January 1915].

[359] **BOA,** DH.ŞFR. 504/65, Cemal to Talat, 26 Kanun-ı Evvel 1331 [8 January 1915]

[360] Kayalı, Ibid., p. 193.

[361] **HHStA,** PA 38/366, Ranzi to Burian, "Das Geheimkomite zur Errichtung eines arabischen Khalifats", Damascus, 20 August 1915.

[362] **HHStA,** PA 38/369, Ranzi to Burian, "Exilierung von Notabeln", Damascus, 24 May 1916.

in prosperity considering the war conditions. Cemal strictly followed whether his orders were properly implemented in Anatolia.[363] Any request to change his decisions was harshly opposed by Cemal Pasha. On all occasions, he reminded to the Central Government that the exile of the Syrians to Anatolia were not temporary.[364] They were dispatched there to be permanent residents. When Cemal was informed that the exiles changed their locations, he warned the Central Government with heavy remarks.[365] Apart from that, they lived in good conditions in their temporary settlement places. In so much as that, when the Government decided to forgive their punishments and to resend them to Syria, some of them applied to Shakib Arslan for retention.[366] All these executions and exiles caused considerable impact in Syrian society and significant changes in the attitude of the Syrians towards the Ottoman Government:

2.4. Aims and Impact of the Executions and Exiles

As is set out to demonstrate throughout this study, one part of Cemal's aim of being present in Syria was to create an order there and make the Syrians ideal and loyal citizens

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[363] For some telegrams in this regard, see: **BOA,** DH.EUM.4.Şb. 9/29 Cemal to Talat, 5 Kanun-ı Evvel 1332 [18 December 1916]; **BOA,** DH.EUM.4.Şb. 6/43, Cemal to Talat, 25 Mayıs 1332 [7 June 1916]; see also, p. 127.

[364] Once, he refused the demand of a child to return to Syria, whose parents had been died: **BOA,** DH.EUM. 4.Şb. 14/7, Cemal to Talat, 21 Teşrin-i Evvel 1333 [21 October 1917]. He refused several times the demands for return. For some example, see: **BOA,** DH.EUM. 4.Şb. 9/10, Cemal to Talat, 23 Kanun-ı Sani 1332 [5 January 1917]; **BOA,** DH.EUM. 4.Şb. 7/26, Talat to Governors of Konya, Kastamonu, Sivas, Bursa, Ankara, 17 Temmuz 1332 [30 July 1916]; **BOA,** DH.EUM.4.Şb. 14/44, Ministry of War to Ministry of Interior, 27 Teşrin-i Sani 1333.

[365] **TTK Arşivi,** KO Koleksiyonu 10/5, Cemal to Enver, 4 Kanun-ı Evvel 1332 [17 December 1916].

[366] Arslan, Ibid, p. 197.

to the Empire. The most important component of this goal was his policy implemented towards the “adversary” components of the Muslim population of Syria, i.e. the Arabists, who were believed by Cemal to possess the potential to influence the Muslim population, which constituted the great majority of the Syrian society. Therefore, an analysis of social and political reflections of Cemal’s policies of terror towards those Muslim individuals of Syria, who were suspected of being an Arabist, will contribute to understand the reasons that were brought him to Syria.[367]

In the existing literature, there are two approaches regarding the aims of Cemal’s policy towards the Arabist movement. The first claims that Cemal aimed to Turkify Syria by executing and exiling the prominent Arabists.[368] On the other hand, Hasan Kayalı highlights the possible military dangers of the Arabists with the following remarks:

> “Cemal’s actions in Syria were comparable in nature, if not in extent, to those policies pursued with respect to the Armenians in Eastern Anatolia. Both emanated from a fear that a nationalist uprising would come into being with encouragement from enemy powers. The threat was more perceived than real.”[369]

The first argument seems only partially to be true. There is no doubt that Cemal took a pride in his Turkishness following his Ottomanness. As he express in his memoirs:

> “I am primarily an Ottoman, but I do not forget that I am a Turk, and nothing can shake my belief that the Turkish race is the foundation-stone of the Ottoman Empire. The

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[367] The exile had been used as a method of settlement or punishment throughout the Ottoman History. For a study on this subject, see: Kemal Daşcıoğlu, *Osmanlı’da Sürgün,* İstanbul: Yeditepe Yayınları, 2007.

[368] Arslan, Ibid., p. 185; The contemporary accounts of the German and Austrian officials are also in the same direction. For some examples, see: **BA-MA,** RM 5/2321, Humann to Chef of Admiralty of Marine, “Eindrücke in Syrien”, Constantinople, 30 January 1917; **HHStA,** PA 38/367, the Jerusalem Consul to Burian, “Politisches Situationsbild”, Jerusalem, 7 June 1915; **HHStA,** PA 38/369, Nedwed to Burian, “Tuerkifizerung”, Beirut, 27 May 1916; **HHStA,** PA 38/369, Ranzil to Burian, “Die Turcisierung des öffentlichen Lebens in Syrien”, Damascus, 30 March 1916.

[369] Kayalı, Ibid., p. 194; similar remarks were made by the Austrian and German consuls in Syria. For some examples, see: **HHStA,** PA 38/366, Ranzi to Burian, “Das Urteil des Kriegsreichtes in Aleh”, Damascus, 26 August 1915; **PA-AA,** Türkei 177, Bd. 12, Mutius to Bethmann Hollweg, Beirut, 25 August 1915; Artuç also repeats the similar claims, for details, see: Artuç, Ibid, p. 298.

> Educational and civilizing influence of the Turks cements Ottoman unity and strengthens the Empire, for in its origins the Ottoman Empire is a Turkish creation."[370]

However, when his policies in Syria are examined, it will be apparent that he restricted the turcification with the public sphere that could be evaluated as an attempt to increase of the Ottoman visibility in Syria. As examples in this sense, Cemal forbade the usage of Arabic in the government offices;[371] and changed the language of instruction to Turkish in the *Sultani* school of Damascus while the teaching of Arabic continued, while there is no evidence that he changed the language of intstruction at the other state schools.[372] It was made compulsory to use Turkish in the shop signboards and the other notice boards.[373] All these actions were implemented in regard to all the languages except Turkish, for the sake of the fraternity of the Ottomans.[374] In the same vein, some consuls were ordered to write their correspondence only in Turksh. The Spanish consul in Jerusalem interpreted this action with these remarks: "The Turkish government continues with its policy of humiliating us all, it has been ordered that from now on correspondence cannot be written in Spanish".[375] Possibly, many of these activities were applied to demonstrate the people that the Great Powers were no longer influential in Syria and to prove that the Ottoman Government was the only sovereign in Syria. In the same vein, he probably aimed a direct communication of the Ottoman state with its citizens in Syria via the Turkish language. The imposition of Turkish upon the Syrians was a part of the destruction of interlaying elements, like notables, between state and the Syrians. By this way, the state wouldn't need any mediator to express itself to its Arab citizens. Otherwise, Cemal didn't aim a total exchange of all the components of the Arab culture in Syria with that of Turkish. As will

[370] Djemal Pasha, Ibid., p. 251.

[371] **HHStA,** PA 38/369, Nedwed to Burian, "Tuerkifizerung", Beirut, 27 May 1916

[372] **HHStA,** PA 38/369, Ranzi to Burian, "Einführung des deutschen Sprachunterrichtes in der hiesigen Sultanieschule", Damascus, 21 March 1916.

[373] **HHStA,** PA 38/369, Ranzil to Burian, "Die Turcisierung des öffentlichen Lebens in Syrien", Damascus, 30 March 1916.

[374] **HHStA,** PA 12/209, Pallavicini to Burian, "Zur allgemeinen Situation", Constantinople, 15 July 1915.

[375] Ballobar, Ibid, p. 93.

be detailed in Chapter 6 Cemal undertook, to a degree, to protect the Arabic heritage of Syria with his restoration of the historical monuments built in the Arabic styles, and also opened schools instructing in Arabic, as in the case of the *Salahiyya* School.

As for the military threat, as detailed in the section regarding the conscription of the Syrians, before the execution of the death penalties, a group of suspected Arab officers in the Army had been sent to other fronts. Furthermore, instead of executions, as in the case of the Armenians, exile could be preferred as a measure, or hanging of three or four persons would be enough to forestall a military danger. Meaning of the arrest of an Arabist senator in Istanbul and bringing him to Syria for the execution has a deeper meaning than the military danger. The aims of these actions can be better understood with the analysis of its impact.

From the time of Mahmut II, local notables used to be seen by the Ottoman central government as the obstacles of the centralization. This became even more true during the age of reforms and Tanzimat period. The CUP resumed the policy of centralization after the Young Turk revolution. In the case of Syria, many of the local notables were intellectual leaders of society and were struggling actively with the cultural concerns against the Ottomanist policies of the central government on the grounds that the Ottomanization process was destroying the Arab spirit of Syria. On the other hand, they proposed an administratively decentralized and culturally Arab Syria, as an alternative to the policies of the CUP and the projects of Cemal Pasha. As explained above, they didn't avoid contacting the Great Powers when necessary. In contrast, in the projected Syria of Cemal Pasha, the Government ought to have full independence in its internal affairs and the components that would cause the foreign intervention must, at least, be checked. Therefore, his policy towards Arabism should be evaluated as part of a whole together with his policies of Zionism, Christians and Lebanon.

On the other hand, it is apparent in the correspondence between the CUP and Sharif Faysal, which had begun at the end of the year 1917 about signıng a peace treaty whıch was expected to put an end to Sharif Hussein's revolt. The Unionist leaders felt anxious during the war period that the Arabs would bring into question some demands regarding

the situation of Syria in the Ottoman Empire in the peace negotiations.[376] Presumably, a demand for the autonomy of Syria, which would be demanded by the Arabist opposition, would pave the way for the later independence of Syria. The Ottoman experience of nationalism made them thought in this way. Because, all the nationalist movements had been resulted with the independence of their nations from the Ottoman Empire, Cemal thought to eradicate the Arabist movement as much as possible taking the war conditions as an occasion.

Cemal applied execution and exile as methods of solution for the Arab question. In his mind, the destruction of the Arabists meant the solution of the question. In a telegram, he revealed this idea. Upon the increase of the desertions among the Arab exiles in Anatolia to join Sharif Hussein, he proposed to deliver all the political exiles in Anatolia to the court martial and by this way to be saved from that question.[377] A German report also states that Cemal saw the despotic measures as a method to solve the Arab Question.[378]

As for the social impact of his draconian rule, while trying to turn the Syrians into good citizens for the Empire, Cemal damaged considerably the image of the Ottoman Government in the eyes of the common people. His justification for the punishment of the Arabists was to destroy the endeavors of those parties "to separate Arabness from Turkishness".[379] However, as inferred from the consular reports describing the reaction of the common people to Cemal's actions, the biggest contribution to plant seeds of hate between Arabs and Turks was made by Cemal himself. The reports in the beginning of the war demonstrate that the support of Syrian society for the activities of the Arabist parties were rather small. For example, according to the report of the Austrian Consul of

[376] By that reason, they avoided to give Sharif written assurances about the demands put into word by the latter. For some examples, see: **TTK Arşivi,** KO Koleksiyonu 1/70, Talat to Tahsin, 1 Şubat 1334 [1 February 1918]; **TTK Arşivi,** KO Koleksiyonu 11/66, Enver to Cemal [Mersinli], 21 Ağustos 1334 [21 August 1918]

[377] In the same telegram, he says that he spared their lives as a beneficence [*lütuf*] to them: **BOA,** DH.ŞFR. 559/31, Cemal to Talat, Aleyh, 11 Temmuz 1333 [11 July 1917]

[378] **PA-AA,** Türkei 177, Bd. 17, Weber to Hertling, Constantinople, 26 June 1918.

[379] **BOA,** DH.ŞFR. 483/75, Cemal to Talat, Damascus 28 Temmuz 1331 [10 August 1915].

Damascus in the beginning of October 1914, with the outburst of the European war, the popularity of the Arabist movement in Damascus was considerably reduced. The great majority of the people began to believe that the Turkish administration would defend them against the foreign enemies.[380] According to the report of the German journal *Der Nahe Orient,* "the worst agitators of the past" had become "ultra-patriots" after the proclamation of the War.[381] In the same way, as described in the section on the conscription, in the beginning of the war, there was an overwhelming pro-Ottoman atmosphere among the Muslims of Syria to be nourished by the anti-imperialist propaganda. When the first decisions of the executions were put into action, the German Consul in Beirut expressed his embarrassment about the punishment of such a movement, that still didn't have a massive support among the Syrians.[382]

However, the implementation of the death penalties and the exiles changed this weather for the reverse considerably. The Beirut Consul of Austria states, even the most pro-Ottoman members of Syrian society thundered out, that the execution of those Arab notables spoiled the approach began with the war between Arabs and Turks.[383] That was, to a large extent, due to the atmosphere of terror created by the executions and exiles over society.[384] The common people saw the punishments as unjust, arbitrary, and therefore they were afraid of being captured and punished by the same methods.[385] According to the remarks of the Austrian consul in Beirut, Cemal's persecutions caused to form an idea among the Syrians that he didn't only try to defeat the Entente powers, but also worked for

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[380] **HHStA,** PA 38/363, Ranzi to Berchtold, "Agitation gegen England", Damascus, 9 October 1914.

[381] **PA-AA,** Türkei 165, Bd. 41, "Die Arabische Frage", *Der Nahe Orient II*, 17 January 1917.

[382] **PA-AA,** Türkei 177, Bd. 12, Mutius to Bethmann Hollweg, Beirut, 25 August 1915.

[383] **HHStA,** PA 38/366, Nedwed to Burian, "Hochverratspozess gegen die Mitgleider des revolutionaeren Komités", Beirut, 25 August 1915.

[384] **PA-AA,** Türkei 177, Bd. 12, Loytved to Bethmann Hollweg, Damascus 10 December 1915.

[385] **PA-AA,** Türkei 177, Bd. 13, Loytved to Bethmann Hollweg, Damascus 18 April 1916.

weakening and elimination of the Arab element in Syria.[386] Complaining about Cemal's implementations in Syria, an Austrian representative in Constantinople states that Cemal could have solved the Arab Question with more moderate means, and by this way the loyalty of the Arabs to the Ottoman Government could be increased. Acting quite thoughtlessly in this issue, Cemal shifted all the sympathies of the Arabs to the British and French rules.[387] If the British forces were to achieve to invade the south of Syria, it would be a weak possibility to find the Ottoman Government a support among the Syrians.[388] According to an Austrian official in İstanbul, by April 1917, all the Arabs without exception were waiting to welcome the British troops with open arms.[389] According to an interview held by a German official with some Arabs, with his draconian activities, Cemal made some groups that never acted against the State an enemy of state and alienated them to the Government.[390]

Cemal's despotic rule in Syria also contributed to a rapprochement between Muslims and Christians in Syria. According to a British intelligence report, their relations were excellent since both were "sick of the war and of the exaction of the Government".[391] In a similar way, it is stated in a German report that a concord emerged between Christians and Muslims "never seen before". "The hate felt against the Turkish oppressor made a unifying effect and the profound and numerous contrasts between the Arabs have been temporarily bypassed". The consul continues that "it was a result of Djemal's dictatorship and vexatious behavior" towards the Arabs.[392]

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[386] **HHStA,** PA 38/370, Kwatkowski to Czernin, "Überblick über die heutige Lage Syriens und Palaestinas", Beirut, 16 March 1917.

[387] **HHStA,** PA 12/211, Trauttmansdorff to Czernin, "Das Regime Djemal Pashas in Syrien und Palaestina", Constantinople, 14 April 1917.

[388] **HHStA,** PA 38/370, Kwatkowski to Czernin, "Überblick über die heutige Lage Syriens und Palaestinas", Beirut, 16 March 1917.

[389] **HHStA,** PA 12/211, Trauttmansdorff to Czernin, "Das Regime Djemal Pashas in Syrien und Palaestina", Constantinople, 14 April 1917.

[390] **PA-AA,** Türkei 177, Bd. 17, Weber to Hertling, Constantinople, 26 June 1918.

[391] **PRO,** FO 371/2777, McMahon to FO (transmitting an intelligent returned from Syria), Cairo, 20 May 1916.

[392] **PA-AA,** Türkei 177, Bd 17, Weber to Hertling, Constantinople, 26 June 1918.

His existence in Syria was so disturbing for the people that, when Cemal visited Istanbul at the end of the year 1916, the notables of Syria sent telegrams to the Governmental authorities requesting them to prevent him from returning to Syria.[393] As a result of all these pressures, according to the report of a German official, the upper classes of society were, to a large extent, alienated and turned against the Ottoman Rule.[394] It is worth to mention as a final remark that all these actions also damaged the German image in the eyes of the Syrians. Arabs, both Christians and Muslims, hated the Germans because they saw them as the supporter of the "brutal Turkish rule".[395]

In spite of its instigating consequences of antagonism between Arabs and Turks, the impact of his policies demonstrate that Cemal managed, to a large extent, his objectives in Syria. By way of the executions and exiles, he destroyed the resistance of the Syrian notables against the increasing control of the state. On the other hand, he had eliminated any probability for the demands of autonomy or independence in future by those Arabist groups if the Ottoman rule over Syria would still be continuing at the end of the war. According to the remarks of the German physician Mühlens, who worked for a while with Cemal Pasha as the health superwiser of the 4th Army, there could scarcely be found a notable family in Syria that some of its members were not hanged or exiled by Cemal Pasha.[396] At the end of his rule, the aims of these actions were summarized by Cemal's remarks as follows:

> "The people, who were not directly affiliated to the *El-Lamerkeziyye,* but in close contact with the executive members; and those who were suspected by the administrative authorities to be working against the political domination of the government; and those who made prevalence [*tagallub*] and fractiousness [*serkeşlik*] attempting to libel the honor of the government in the eyes of the people [*hükümet üzerinde ahalinin mevki-i haysiyyetini ihlal edecek derecede*] were dislocated from Syria to Anatolia.

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[393] **HHStA,** PA 12/210, Pallavicini to Czernin, "Djemal Pasha", Constantinople, 30 December 1916.

[394] **PA-AA,** Türkei 177, Bd. 14, Mühlens to Bethmann Hollweg, Constantinople, 24 February 1917.

[395] **BA-MA,** RM 5/2323, Grafen to Chef of the Admiralty of Marine, "Militaerische und Militaerpolitische Lage in Syrien, Palaestina, Arabien und Mezopotemien", Constantinople, 26 Febrary 1918.

[396] **PA-AA,** Türkei 177, Bd. 14, Mühlens to Bethmann Hollweg, Constantinople, 24 February 1917.

> The formation of a certain organization composed of notables aiming at challenging the domination of the government by setting up of an equal or even by a more powerful structure was thus eliminated…"[397]

In summary, as he aimed at, Cemal managed to destroy an interlayer between the Ottoman state and the Syrian society. The abolition policies of the notables, which had begun with Mahmud II in the Imperial realm, were completed in Syria by the draconian rule of Cemal Pasha.[398] It is certain that Cemal estimated about the reaction of the Syrian society against his implementations and he was quite aware that the Syrians would take a dislike to the Ottoman rule as the consequence of his punishments. However, Cemal did not calculate that the Ottoman rule would come to an end following the WWI, and presumably considered that, although the Syrians were disturbed with his policies at that time, in long term, as a result of his measures a change in the sentiments of the Syrians towards the State would be managed.

2.5. The Ottoman Caliphate and the Arabist Movement

Besides the executions and exiles, Cemal used Pan-Islamist policies as means of struggle against Arabism. This is not only because a public justification of his actions, but he became concerned about the Arabists of Syria that they could support an Arab Caliph in future. Although they focused on the issue of reform in the Syrian provinces, and although they were principally against the foreign interventions, in his telegrams, Cemal assessed them as the collaborators of the Entente and accused them of trying to establish an Arab

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[397] Cemal to Enver, 29 Eylül 1333 [27 September 1917], in *Arşiv Belgeleriyle Ermeni Faaliyetleri,* p. 697: English translations of the text in the same book were, to a certain extent, benefitted: Ibid., p. 328.

[398] For an analysis of the centralizations policies, which began with Mahmud II, see: Hourani, Ibid.

Caliphate.[399] By this way, they could combine with the British policy of the Caliphate. In such a way that, in the preceding years of the War, the Caliphate was assessed by Great Britain as a potential danger to its imperial rule, because of its spiritual and political claims addressing to all Muslims including the ones in its colonies.[400] As a result of that concern, taking back the Caliphate to the Arabs and thus, to divide the Muslims in theory had become the most important aim of the British policy regarding the Ottoman Caliphate.[401] On the other hand, beginning with Abdulhamid II, the Ottoman Sultans used their title of Caliph as a political weapon against all the imperial powers.[402] Especially in WWI, the Pan-Islamist propaganda created the most important tools of the Central Powers applied against the Entente, which had a considerable Muslim population in their colonies.[403] The

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399 **BOA,** DH.ŞFR. 483/75, Cemal to Talat, Damascus, 28 Temmuz 1331[11 August 1915].

400 For an analysis of the British approach to the Ottoman Caliphate, see: Tufan Buzpınar, "The Question of Caliphate under the Ottoman Sultans", in *Ottoman Reform and Muslim Regeneration,* Itzchak Weismann and Fruma Zachs (eds.), London: I.B. Tauris, 2005, pp. 17-36.

401 However, the British side didn't want to be seen as the protector of the Arab Caliph, and sought to solve this question with the agreement of the Muslims. "any proposal as regards an Arab Khalifa should come from the Arabs themselves": **PRO,** FO 371/2480, Clayton to Grey, "Military Operations against Turkey", Cairo, 3 January 1915; for the discussions of the British officials regarding the issue of the Arab Caliphate, see: **PRO,** FO 371/2482, Grey to McMahon, "Moslems and the Caliphate", London, 14 April 1915; **PRO,** FO 371/2480, Holderness to FO, "Possible Measures for Influencing Moslem Opinion", London, 15 January 1915: The French side expressed an opinion that, the new caliph shouldn't have paved the way for the passion to a strong Caliph among the Muslims and shouldn't have provoke the sentiment of unity among them: **MAEE,** Guerre 1914-1918, 868/Turquie, Syrie et Palestine, Defrance to MAE, Cairo, 15 March 1915; for a study on the negotiations between Sharif Hussein and the *Kemalist* leaders regarding transfer of the Caliphate to the Arabs, see: Teitelbaum, Joshua, "'Taking Back' the Caliphate: Sharif Husayn Ibn Ali, Mustafa Kemal and the Ottoman Caliphate", *Die Welt des Islams,* New Series, Vol: 40, Issue 3, (November 2000), pp. 412-424.

402 For a study on the Ottoman policy of Panislamism towards the Indian Muslims beginning with Abdulhamid II, see: Azmi Özcan, *Panislamism: the Ottomans and Britain (1877-1924),* Leiden: Brill, 1997.

403 Max Roloff stated in his book that the aim of the Turks in the World War I was to found a Caliphate state. For that aim, they excited the national sentiments of the Muslim peoples against the common enemy: Max Roloff, *Arabien und Seine Bedeutung für die Erstarkung des Osmanenreiches,* Veit, Leipzig: 1915, p. 6; for a study on the German and

Arabists had an alleged relation with Egypt and disseminated Arabist feelings among the Syrians, which, in Cemal's viewpoint, could separate Arabs from Turks. Similarly, an uprising in Syria could terminate the Pan-Islamist propaganda of the Ottoman Caliphate. All these concerns were used as an argument, both to justify his actions and to prevent any Arab inclination towards the British propaganda of Arab Caliphate.[404] Thus, Cemal would benefit from the anti-imperialist sentiments of the Syrians to make counter-propaganda against the Arab "separatists".

For those reasons, the main object of Ottoman Pan-Islamist propaganda was rather Great Britain. With this propaganda, it is implied that, if the Muslims didn't create a unity under the rule of the Ottoman Caliph, then the British occupation would be unavoidable for all the Muslim nations. In this regard, with the outburst of the war, the local politicians delivered orations harshly criticizing the British actions in Egypt. Similarly, The local *"Club des Emigrés Africains"*, which had been established to awaken an anti-imperialist consciousness among the Algerians in Syria, propagated to create such a feeling among the Algerian immigrants.[405] In addition, pamphlets were distributed in the cities demonstrating the British "atrocities" against the Muslims under their rule. For example, in a pamphlet prepared by Shakib Arslan distributed in Damascus with the newspaper of the *vilayet*, it is described in detail how the British Government invaded Egypt and Yemen using the method of playing off the Muslims against each others.[406] With such pamphlets, an open

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Ottoman Panislamist propaganda in the WWI, see: Lüdke Tilman, *Jihad made in Germany,* Münster: LIT Verlag, 2005.

[404] A movement in Syria against the Ottoman Caliph would terminate the policy of Pan-Islamism. A French report proposed to provoke a revolt in Syria to remove the Pan-Islamist danger: **MAEE,** Guerre 1914-1918, 867/Tuquie, Syrie et Palestine, Reffye to Defrance, Alexandria, 31 December 1914.

[405] It was difficult for this club to act freely in the pre-war period since the French and British consuls opposed to this club. After the outbreak of the war, the members of the club felt themselves free in their actions: **HHStA,** PA 38/363, Ranzi to Berchtold, "Agitation gegen England", Damascus, 9 October 1914

[406] "They provoked the nationalist movement in Egypt and, by this way, wanted to fish in muddy waters.": **HHStA,** PA 38/363, Ranzi to Berchtold, "Agitation gegen England", Damascus, 9 October 1914; in response to that argument, the British side claimed in their pamphlets that their hostility was not directed to the Arabs, but Germany and its allies: **PRO,** FO 371/2486, Grey to India Office, London, 19 June 1915.

message was given that, when the Ottoman rule came to an end in Syria, the fate of the Syrians wouldn't be different than that of the Egyptians, and if the "separatists" among the Arabs were supported and given an opportunity to perform their intentions, the result will be the same. According to the Austrian consul, by the impact of those activities Great Britain became an enemy in the eyes of the Syrians in the beginning of the war.[407]

Although it is not an activity directed against the Arabists, the illumination of the tomb of Saladin by the German Emperor was another activity to provoke the feelings of the Syrians to fight the enemies of the religion and to oppose their extentions in Syria, i.e. the Arabists. Saladin was the most famous Muslim commander among the Arabs, who fought against the Crusades. By way of Saladin's example, the message was tried to be given that the Entente powers were the contemporary Crusades and it was a religious duty for the Muslims to resist them.[408] In the circulars distributed in the cities for Panislamic propaganda, the Entente was frequently compared to the Crusades. In a brochure signed by Abdulaziz Chavish in February 1915, they were defined with the remarks "the adorers of the Cross" and "the descendants of the Crusades". As understood from the diaries of the Spanish consul in Jerusalem, these words caused anxiety among the native Christians.[409]

The publication of newspapers was the most important part of Pan-Islamist propaganda in Syria as an alternative of Arabism. The foundation of *al-Sharq* newspaper can be considered a significant step in this sense. In the beginning, the newspaper was meant to be named as *al-Islam.* It was an idea of the celebrated German orientalist von Oppenheim, and the Germans would support the undertaking. However, Cemal opposed the German assistance and decided to publish it on behalf of the Government[410] keeping a

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[407] For some propaganda pamphlets and brochures with these theme throughout the war, see: Gottfried Hagen, *Die Türkei im Ersten Weltkrieg,* Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 1990, p. 185, 198-199, 204-207, 210-213.

[408] **HHStA,** PA 38/366, Ranzi to Burian, "Feier der Übergabe der vom deutschen Kaiser Ufer das Grab des Sultans Salah ed Din gestifteten Ampel", Damascus, 10 August 1915.

[409] Ballobar, Ibid, p. 51.

[410] Artuç, Ibid., p. 290-291; Kurd Ali expresses in his memoirs that Cemal warned him to shrink away from Oppenheim stating that he was a very dangerous man: Kurd Ali, Ibid., p. 147.

propaganda favoring the German-Ottoman alliance as one of the aim of the newspaper.[411] But, there is not any newspaper in Syria published with this name. Presumably, in the last minute the name of the newspaper was changed and *al-Sharq* was decided to be published.[412]

The newspaper was intended by Cemal "to be the best disseminated newspaper in Syria".[413] According to Austrian consul in Damascus, the newspaper had two aims: for inland and for foreign lands. For abroad, the newspaper aimed at the propaganda of the Ottoman Caliphate. As for the inland, "the newspaper will be advocating the Young Turks' idea of state in Arabic". The consul continues that the aim of establishment of the newspaper was to save Syria from the foreign influences and to transform the political relations. He states that the establishment of such a newspaper in Syria was necessary, since all the newspapers in Syria were more or less influenced by the Arabist movement. Moreover, the Government had demonstrated its goodwill towards Arabness and Arab language by the publication of this newspaper.[414] The aims of that newspaper wer declared with similar remarks in the program of *al-Islam,* the first name of that newspaper:

> "1. The principal aim of the newspaper is to struggle for the procurement of a common fate. It will encourage the Muslims living outside the Ottoman Empire to fight and get into activity for the awakening of a national consciousness and the gaining of their independent governments reminding them of their old liberties and their nationalities [*anasır-ı kadime*].
> 2. Our enemies were particularly struggling to spread [*icra*] poisonous inspirations in Syria and to make some ill-wishers [in Syria] an instrument to this vicious [*alçakça*] lies. The newspaper will demonstrate in full blast [*bütün kuvvetiyle*] their true nature and eliminate the misunderstandings.
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[411] Kurd Ali, Ibid., p. 107.

[412] Artuç, Ibid, p. 290-291; in the same place, Artuç claims that there was two separate newspapers established by Cemal in Syria called *al-Sharq* and *al-Islam*; The chief author of *al-Sharq,* Shakib Arslan refers in his memoirs only *al-Sharq* newspaper. He never mentions *al-Islam*: Arslan, Ibid., p. 169-170: another writer of *al-Sharq* Kurd Ali gives the name of the newspaper, which was intended by Oppenheim to be published as *al-Sharq.* He didn't also didn't mention *al-Islam.* Kurd Ali, Ibid., p. 149; all these remarks make it obvious that, in the beginning, the newspaper was decided to be published with the name of *al-Islam.* But later, the name was changed as *al-Sharq.*

[413] **BOA,** DH.ŞFR. 517/17, Cemal to Talat, Damascus, 9 Nisan 1332 [22 April 1916].

[414] **HHStA,** PA 38/369, Ranzi to Burian, "Gründung eines neuen arabischen Propagandablattes 'Esch Schark", Damascus, 1 May 1916.

> 4. It will struggle in full blast to rescue Egypt from the British yoke and being a part of its motherland protecting its autonomy [as in the past].
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> 5. The newspaper will not only deal with politics. But also it will reserve the large part of its pages to the scientific, economical, and ethical studies for the training of the Syrian people materially and spiritually. In summary, it will strive to awaken and strengthen the patriotism by the Syrians and its youth. Giving the details belonging to the glorious [*büyük*] civilizational past of the Muslims [*İslamların*] to the people, it will invite them not to forget their gratifications [*haz*] and personalities [nefs]… Till now, everybody looked for their personal happiness outside the country and the wealth of the country was used by the foreigners. *El-İslam* will concentrate to disseminate the idea of the usage of the wealths of the country by our subjects…"[415]

When the war circumstances were taken into consideration, the distribution of this newspaper abroad was almost impossible. Therefore, the establishment aim of the newspaper was presumably restricted inside the Ottoman realm.

As for the realization of these aims in the newspaper, according to Shakib Arslan, when the newspaper began to be published, it was comprehensive and adequate. However, following the first month of its establishment, the Governmental authorities intervened in the issues of the newspaper and prohibited the publication of some articles. Secondly, the scarcity of paper reduced the numbers of pages in the newspaper. As a result, the quality the newspaper had in the beginning was destroyed.[416] The first issues of the newspaper aren't available today. However, the last issues support the claims of Arslan. The articles in the newspaper rather concentrated on the "treason" of Sharif Hussein,[417] the liberation of Egypt from the British rule[418], the relations between the Ottoman Empire and German,[419] the news about the German Emperor and Germany.[420] The propaganda aspect

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[415] **ATASE Arşivi,** Kls. 531, Ds. 2078, Fih. 2-15, 2-29, in Umar, Ömer Osman, "Cemal Paşa'nın Suriye'de Arap Milliyetçilerine Karşı Neşrettiği El-İslam Gazetesi ve Programı", *Askeri Tarih Bülteni,* 2000/49, p. 133-134.

[416] Arslan, Ibid, p. 170.

[417] For some examples, see: *al-Sharq,* "al-Sharif Hussein", 22 Eylül 1333, Issue No: 431, p. 1;

[418] For some examples: *al-Sharq,* "al-Khadifu'l-Kazib", 17 Teşrin-i Evvel 1333, Issue No: 449, p. 1; *al-Sharq,* "Fazayih fi Mısr", 20 Teşrin-i Evvel 1333, Issue No: 450, p. 1;

[419] For some examples, see: *al-Sharq,* "Almaniya wa Uthmaniyyun-I", 11 Teşrin-i Evvel 1333, Issue No: 444, p. 1; *al-Sharq,* "Almaniya wa Uthmaniyyun-II", 15 Teşrin-i Evvel 1333, Issue No: 447, p. 1; *al-Sharq,* "Dzifu'l-Khilafe", 17 Teşrin-i Evvel 1333,

of the articles was too overt. Besides, there is much news in the newspaper praising Cemal Pasha.[421]

After the commencement of the Sharif's movement, the Ottoman Government established an Arabic Newspaper in Medina like Al-Sharq Newspaper, named "Hijaz". This enterprise was brought forward by Cemal Pasha to create consciousness [most probably Pan-Islamic consciousness] among the people. A late professor of the *Mekteb-i Sultani* in Aleppo, who stayed in Egypt for a long time, was appointed as the editor of the newspaper.[422]

While propagating about the solidarity of the Muslims on the one hand, the persecution of the Syrian Muslims on the other, shattered the impact of the Pan-Islamist propaganda. Rather than convincing a life and death struggle for the Caliphate, the Syrians inclined to think in this process that Cemal Pasha undertook to eliminate the Arab element in the empire.[423] The Pan-Islamist instruments applied to struggle against the Arabist movement became unsuccessful because of Cemal's mistreatment of the Arabists.

Issue No: 450, p. 1; *al-Sharq,* "Almaniya wa Uthmaniyyun-III", 21 Teşrin-i Evvel 1333, Issue No: 452, p. 1;

[420] For some examples, see: *al-Sharq,* "Sahafiyyun wa Almanya", 1 Teşrin-i Evvel 1333, Issue No: 436, p. 1;

[421] For some examples, see: *al-Sharq,* "Tasrihatu Hadrati Cemal Pasha", 8 Teşrin-i Evvel 1333, Issue No: 440, p. 1; *al-Sharq,* "Cevabu Sahibu'l-Hashmeti Ahidu'l-Almaniya ala Tahiyyati Dawlati Cemal Pasha", 22 Teşrin-i Evvel 1333, Issue No: 453, p. 1; *al-Sharq,* "Bahriyyatuna wa Naziruha", 27 Teşrin-i Evvel 1333, Issue No: 457, p. 1;

[422] **HHStA,** PA 38/369, Ranzi to Burian,"Die Politik der mittelarabischen Fürsten in dem Konflikt zwischen der Tuerkei und dem Emir von Mekka", Damascus,11 December 1916.

[423] **HHStA,** PA 38/370, Kwatkowski to Czernin, "Überblick über die heutige Lage Syriens und Palaestinas", Beirut, 16 March 1917.

2.6. Sharif Hussein's Revolt, British Expedition and the new Moderation in the Policy of Arabism

On 10th June 1916, the CUP Government encountered with an unexpected movement of uprising in Hijaz under the leadership of the Amir of Mecca, Sharif Hussein.[424] Although they suspected double play of th Sharif trying to satisfy both the British and Ottoman sides, the CUP leaders, Cemal Pasha in the first place, didn't expect a rebellion by Sharif Hussein.[425] Because of that conviction, in spite of its disconnectedness with the Arabist movement in Syria[426], the Sharifian movement was considered together with Cemal Pasha's atrocities, and seen as an Arab reaction to the persecutory actions of

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[424] Some studies on the Sharifian revolt, see: Teitelbaum, Ibid; Aryeh Shumuelevitz ve Asher Susser, *Hashemites in the Modern Arab World,* (London: Routledge, 1996) ; Dawn, Ibid.

[425] Cemal states about Sharif's movement that "…I could never have conceived that in a war, upon which the fate of the Khalifate depended, he would ally himself with the States which desired to thrust the Slav yoke upon the whole Mohammedan world…": Djemal Pasha, Ibid., p. 211; The German Consul in Damascus advises to the German Consul in January 1916 to take the rumors about Sharif with a grain of salt, since those rumours aimed at driving a wedge between the Ottoman rule and Sharif Hussein: **PA-AA,** Türkei 165, Bd. 38, Metternich to Bethmann Hollweg (Transmitting Consul Damascus), Constantinople, 22 January 1916; A repport of the Austrian Consul in Damascus written to the Germans in April 1915 describes Sharif as the true supporter of the Caliph: **PA-AA,** Türkei 165, Bd. 37, Ranzi to Burian, Damascus, 10 April 1915; The Austrian Consul in Damascus states that being kept Faysal in Damascus as a "hostage" provided an insurance to the Ottoman authorities about the attitude of Sharif: **HHStA,** PA 38/369, Ranzi to Burian, "Nachtrag zur Vorgeschichte des Aufstandes im Heddas", Damascus, 11 September 1916.

[426] According to Aziz Al-Azmeh, the two movements were so different that the Sharif's revolt "ought to be excised from the chronicles of Arab nationalism. It was Arab only in the narrow ethnological, pre-nationalist sense". See: Aziz Al-Azmeh, "Nationalism and the Arabs", in Derek Hopwood (ed.), *Arab Nation Arab Nationalism,* Macmillan Press, London: 2000, p. 69: for the discussion of the same argument in a detailed way, see: Dawn, Ibid.

Cemal.[427] Therefore, the revolt of Sharif Hussein signed the beginning of a turning point in the Arab policy implemented by Cemal's iron fist.

When the revolt broke out Cemal Pasha arrested the people in Damascus, who had close relations with Faysal and helped him to escape from there. All the relatives of *al-Bakri* family that entertained Faysal as their guests while he was staying in Damascus and assisted him to run away from them, and Shukri Pasha al-Ayyubi with some other Syrian notables, who were suspected to have close relations with Sharif Hussein, were arrested.[428] Afterwards Umar Rafii, an advocate, his brother Abdulghanni Rafii, and Abdul Kader Kiwan, the preacher in the Umayyad Mosque were added to them.[429]

The accusations leveled against them were to make the propaganda of the Sharif's movement in Syria. In a domiciliary visit to the house of Abdulghani Rafii, the police found a proclamation sent from Basra in the beginning of the year 1916, containing that Syria, Iraq and Hijaz would be united under the kingship and caliphate of Sharif and

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[427] In a conversation with a German official, Salih Sharif al-Senussi interpreted the revolt as a consequence of the unskillfull policy of Cemal Pasha: **PA-AA,** Türkei 177, Bd. 13, Weber to Bethmann Hollweg, Constantinople, 7 August 1916: Hüseyin Hilmi Pasha, an old *Sadrazam,* thought similar to Senussi. He expessed to a German official in Vienna that Sharif rebelled to the Ottoman Government because of the actions of Cemal Pasha towards Arabs: **PA-AA,** Türkei 165, Bd. 38, Tschirschky to Jagow, Vienna, 6 July 1916; The approaches of the German officials were not different than that. A German official in Constantinople attached Sharif's rebellion to the same reasons: **PA-AA,** Türkei 177, Bd. 14, Kühlmann to Bethmann Hollweg, Constantionple, 25 April 1917: the ex-Khedive of Egypt was not different than them: **PA-AA,** Türkei 165, Bd. 39, Jacoby to Bethmann Hollweg, Bern, 27 July 1916.

[428] The other apprehendeds were as follows: Faris al-Khoury, the deputy of Damascus, Abdulhamid Pasha, the old brigadier general and the old official for the administration of the imperial domains: **HHStA,** PA 38/369, Ranzi to Burian, "Der neue Hochverratsprozess vor dem Kriegsgerichte in Damascus", Damascus, 20 December 1916.

[429] **HHStA,** PA 38/370, Ranzi to Czernin, "Kriegsgerichtliche Urteile wegen hochverraeterischer Umtriebe", Damascus, 10 April 1917; A German official asserted that the implementation of those death penalties would increase the passive resistance of the Syrians against the decisions of the Government. The value of the paper money would decrease more. The desertions and spionage affairs to the Entente would increase. Cohabitation of the Turks and Arabs would be more difficult, and the feelings of the Syrians in the direction of seeing Sharif Hussein as their savior from the Turkish tyranny would grow stronger: **PA-AA,** Türkei 177, Bd. 14, Zimmermann to Bethmann Hollweg, Damascus, 14 February 1917.

Cemal Pasha would be hanged. A copy of the same letter was found in the house of Shukri Pasha. A praising poem written by Abdul Kader Kiwan was added to the end of the proclamation. In a letter of Umar Rafii found in the house of Shukri Pasha, it was written that the trustworthy persons should have been respected while it was a must to terminate the rule of the tyrants. The Governor of Syria, Tahsin Bey implied in his report that Cemal made a mistake by the apprehension of such large number of persons. The accusations directed to them were the business of one or two persons, who tried to include the others to the society that they undertook to establish to support Sharif.[430]

All the apprehended persons were accused of establishing a secret society to make the propaganda of the Sharif in Syria. All of them refused the accusations.[431] But, the Shukri Pasha, Rafai brothers and Abdul Kader were sentenced to death penalty. Fouzi and Nassib al-Bakri together with Faysal and Abdullah, the sons of Sharif, were sentenced to death in absentia. This time, the process was slow and the decisions were not implemented for the fear of increasing the Arabs' hate against the Ottoman Government in favor of Sharif Hussein.[432] 70 Damascene had been arrested as part of that investigation. 55 of them were acquitted including the deputy of Damascus Faris al-Khoury.[433] Quite the opposite of this policy of moderation, as part of the struggle with the Sharifian movement, in the beginning of 1917, the *mufti* of Gaza, Arif, was hanged. According to the diaries of the

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[430] **BOA,** DH.ŞFR. 534/1, Tahsin to Talat, Damascus, 18 Eylül 1332 [1 October 1916].

[431] **PA-AA,** Türkei 177, Bd. 14, Zimmermann to Bethmann Hollweg, Damascus, 14 February 1917.

[432] **HHStA,** PA 38/370, Ranzi to Czernin, "Kriegsgerichtliche Urteile wegen hochverraeterischer Umtriebe", Damascus, 10 April 1917; A German official asserted that the implementation of those death penalties would increase the passive resistance of the Syrians against the decisions of the Government. The value of the paper money would decrease more. The desertions and spionage affairs to the Entente would increase. Cohabitation of the Turks and Arabs would be more difficult, and the feelings of the Syrians in the direction of seeing Sharif Hussein as their savior from the Turkish tyranny would grow stronger: **PA-AA,** Türkei 177, Bd. 14, Zimmermann to Bethmann Hollweg, Damascus, 14 February 1917.

[433] **PA-AA,** Türkei 177, Bd. 14, Zimmermann to Bethmann Hollweg, Damascus, 14 February 1917.

Spanish consul, its social "impression wa unimaginable, since the *mufti*… had enormous influence among the Arabs, especially the Bedouins".[434]

Apart from those, Sharif Hussein's Revolt caused a considerable transformation in the policies towards the Arabists and the Arabs. In spite of the weakness of a possibility of revolt in Syria in favor of Sharif[435], the probability of the transformation of Sharif's personality to a hero, who would save the Arabs from the Turkish tyranny, compelled Cemal Pasha to moderate his Arab policy and to apply more moderate methods to struggle with Sharif in Syria by the enforcements of the Central Government.[436] Furthermore, a disturbance combined with Sharif's proclamation of himself as the Caliph would totally ruin the Ottoman general policy of War based on the idea of *Jihad* and the unity of the Muslims around the Ottoman Caliph.[437]

In this regard, following that it became apparent the impossibility of the suppress of Sharif's uprising in the short term, Cemal gave priority to the policies, which would persuade the Syrians that Sharif Hussein was a rebellious individual betraying the cause of the unity of the Muslims under the Ottoman Caliph. As a significant step in this direction, Cemal applied to take a *fatwa* from the most prominent scholars of Syria, describing the Sharif as the traitor against the Ottoman Caliph, upon the proposal of the CUP's Hauran delegate Wahji Bey Ajoubi.[438] At the end of September 1916, 14 Mufti from all the Syrian

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[434] Ballobar, Ibid, pp. 129-130.

[435] **PA-AA,** Türkei 165, Bd. 40, Mutius to Bethmann Hollweg, Beirut, 12 October 1916

[436] **PA-AA,** Türkei 177, Bd. 14, Zimmermann to Bethmann Hollweg, Damascus, 14 February 1917.

[437] A report of the Austrian Consul demonstrate that Sharif was not far from this possibility establishing an alliance with the members of the decentralization party in Egypt: **HHStA,** PA 38/369, Ranzi to Burian, "Nachtrag zur Vorgeschichte des Aufstandes im Heddas", Damascus, 11 September 1916.

[438] **PA-AA,** Türkei 165, Bd. 40, Mutius to Bethmann Hollweg (Transmitting Hoffmann), Beirut, 12 October 1916; Sharif also stroke a blow in the Ottoman propaganda in the international area. In an interview given by him to the French newspaper *Temps,* he expressed that *Jihad* that had been dictated by the Germans to the *Sheikhulislam* in Istanbul, should be directed to the Turks, who were loyal to the Germans, rather than the Entente. Therefore, he must be publicly condemned as soon as possible: **PA-AA,** Türkei 165, Bd. 40, Funkdienst [The Radio Service] Lyon, "Die Unabhangigkeit der Araber", Lyon, 30 September 1916.

provinces issued a *fatwa* loading all the Muslims with a charge to enforce the Sharif to the right behavior. The text of the *fatwa* was as follows:

> "Question: If the Muslims pay homage to a Caliph, and If an *Amir* from them make a mistake against that [Caliph], if [*Amir*] intrigues against the Caliph, in collaboration with his enemies when he was at war, and, by this way, [The *Amir*] causes the disintegration and misdirection of the Muslims, is it the responsibility [of the Muslims] to battle against him [*Amir*] until he repent?
> Answer: Yes, it is a responsibility. Because, the word of Allah [Qur'an] says that:
> 'If one of you victimizes the other, then fight against the one that victimizes until he returns to the ordinance of Allah.'[Al-Hujura, 9] and,
> 'Hold firmly to the rope of Allah all together and do not become divided' [Ali Imran 103]..."[439]

In the same way, a similar text of *fatwa* was issued by the non-official prominent ulema of Syria and Palestine. According to the Austrian Consul in Damascus, in spite of the fact that the *fatwa* was issued under the pressure of the Government, it constituted a considerable impact among the Muslims of Syria.[440]

On the other hand, a discourse was adopted emphasizing the fraternity between the Turks and Arabs. In this regard, a delegation of the prominent authors arrived in Damascus from Istanbul to propitiate the humiliated Arabs with the exiles and executions of Cemal. The delegation stayed in Syria from 26 October to 24 December 1916.[441] According to the Austrian consul in Damascus, the aim of this delegation was to demonstrate the fraternity between the Turks and Arabs as well as Cemal's desire to show his good activities to make

[439] The *fatwa* was signed by the Muftis from the various towns of Syria. They were as follows: 1. The Mufti of Jerusalem: Kamil Husseini, 2. The Mufti of Shaafiite in Jerusalem: Tahir Abu Saud, 3. The Mufti of Damascus : Abulsher Abedin, 4. The former Mufti of Damascus : Suleiman Djuhadar, 5. The Mufti of the Malekite of Damascus: Abdulbaki el-Hassani, 6. The former Mufti of Damascus: Salih Katana, 7. The Mufti of Shafiite in Damascus: Toufik al –Razzi, 8. The Mufti of Hanbalite in Damascus: Toufik Sujuthi, 9. The Mufti of Aleppo : Mohammed el Abisi, 10. The Mufti of Beirut : Mustafa Nedja, 11. The Mufti of Hamaa : Bedreddin al Kailani, 12. The Mufti of Tripolis (Syria): Abdulhamid Keram, 13. the Mufti of Akka : Abdullah el Djezzar, 14. the Mufti of Nablus: Menib Hashim.": **HHStA,** 38/369, Ranzi to Burian, "Die Fetwa der Syrischen Ulema gegen den Ex-Emir von Mekka", Damascus, 29 September 1916.

[440] **HHStA,** 38/369, Ranzi to Burian, "Die Fetwa der Syrischen Ulema gegen den Ex-Emir von Mekka", Damascus, 29 September 1916.

[441] **BA-MA,** RM 5/2321, Humann to the Chef of Admiralty of Marine, 30 January 1917.

the Syrian realm improve.[442] The delegation visited Lebanon, Beirut, Damascus, Jerusalem and the Ottoman troops in the Desert.[443] They aimed to strengthen the religious ties between Arabs and Turks emphasizing the loyalty of the two peoples to the same Caliph and Sultan. In all the meetings organized in honor of the delegation, this basic principle was strongly emphasized.[444] Although Cemal claims that this visit created a good impression in Syria,[445] The Austrian Consul states that all these festivities stayed in the Governmental layer and the common people remained totally indifferent towards this organization.[446]

The increasing danger of the British expedition in Palestine and the growing sympathy among the Syrians towards Sharif's movement as a result of Cemal's draconian actions[447] caused some concerns in the Ottoman Central Government regarding the attitude of the Syrians. In this regard, first of all, the head of the State Council [*Şura-yı Devlet*] İbrahim Bey was secretly sent to Mecca to come an agreement with Sharif Hussein towards the end of the year 1916. According to the remarks of the German Ambassador, İbrahim was one of the most intimate friends of Sharif.[448] İbrahim offered Sharif Hussein a broad autonomy in Hijaz and hereditary Sharifate to Hussein. However, the Sharif expressed that he didn't strive for his personal benefit; rather he worked for the benefit of

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[442] For a while, Cemal wanted to show the results of his activities in the direction of the development of Syria to the authors in Istanbul. For a telegram in this direction, see: **BOA,** DH.ŞFR. 515/16, Cemal to Talat, Damascus, 16 Mart 1332 [29 March 1916].

[443] **BOA,** DH.ŞFR. 538/11, Cemal to Talat, Damascus, 8 Teşrin-i Sani 1332 [21 November 1916].

[444] **HHStA,** PA 38/369, Ranzi to Burian, "Besuche der Konstantinopler Abordnung in Damascus", Damascus, 14 November 1916.

[445] **BOA,** DH.ŞFR. 538/11, Cemal to Talat, Damascus, 8 Teşrin-i Sani 1332 [21 November 1916].

[446] **HHStA,** PA 38/369, Ranzi to Burian, "Besuche der Konstantinopler Abordnung in Damascus", Damascus, 14 November 1916.

[447] For a report on the impact of Cemal's draconian actions to the evolution of the attitude of Syrians towards a sympathy to Sharif and Great Britain, see: **PA-AA,** Türkei 177, Bd. 14, Kühlmann to Bethmann Hollweg, Constantinople, 25 April 1917.

[448] **PA-AA,** Türkei 165, Bd. 41, Kühlmann to Bethmann Hollweg, Constantinople, 31 January 1917.

Islam that fell into some incapable hands. Thus, Ibrahim bey returned to İstanbul empty-handed.[449]

Immediately after the failure of that undertaking, the cabinet of Talat Pasha inclined to change its policy towards the Arabs to dispel their frustration against the Government. Talat began to think the ways to persuade Cemal to return from Syria[450] since his name was tightly associated with violence in Syria. It was thought to call him back to pay his attention to the works of the Marine Ministry.[451] However, the opposition of the army staff, including the Germans, about the military risk of the replacement of the commander general in such a critical time with political considerations prevented such a step.[452] V. Kress particularly requested from Enver during his visit to Syria not to dismiss Cemal by the abovementioned reasons.[453] Thus, this thought was abandoned on grounds of military considerations.

Although the idea of Cemal's dismissal was abandoned, during those dates, the requests of the Arab deputies began to be heeded more. According to the memoirs of Shakib Arslan, after Cemal lost his popularity, it was easy for the Arab deputies to make a decision issued to the Cabinet for the favor of the exiled Arabs.[454] In this regard, first of all, Shakib Arslan prevented the property exchange plan of the Arab exiles in agreement with Talat Pasha. At the end of 1916 the question of the return of the Arab exiles was brought to the agenda of the Cabinet. However, it was decided that as long as Cemal Pasha

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[449] **HHStA,** PA 12/210, Trauttmansdorff to Czernin, "Versuchte Verstaendigung mit dem Emir von Mekka", Constantinople, 27 January 1917; **PA-AA,** Türkei 165, Bd. 41, Kühlmann to Bethmann Hollweg, Constantinople, 31 January 1917; According to Cemal's memoirs, in the beginning of 1916, Sharif demanded the similar privileges from the Ottoman Empire. for details, see: Djemal Pasha, Ibid., p 215.

[450] **PA-AA,** Türkei 177, Bd. 14, Mühlens to Bethmann Hollweg, Constantinople, 24 February 1917.

[451] **PA-AA,** Türkei 177, Bd. 14, Kühlmann to Bethmann Hollweg, Constantinople, 20 February 1917.

[452] **PA-AA,** Türkei 165, Bd. 41, Kühlmann to Bethmann Hollweg (Transmitting v. Kress), Constantinople, 23 February 1917.

[453] **PA-AA,** Türkei 165, Bd. 41, Kühlmann to Bethmann Hollweg (Transmitting v. Kress), Constantinople, 4 March 1917.

[454] Arslan, Ibid., p. 202-205.

ruled Syria their return was impossible. Afterwards, Midhat Şükrü Bey was sent to Cemal Pasha following the second Ottoman victory in Gaza to persuade him about the return of the exiles. His undertaking was also unsuccessful.[455]

When Cemal Pasha's army was defeated in Jerusalem by the British troops, the process turned to the advantage of the Arab exiles. The Government considered presumably pleasing the Arabs, to prevent any assistance from the Syrians to the British troops. Regarding this, firstly the exiles, who were younger than 16 and older than 60 were allowed to return to their countries in Februrary 1918.[456] By March 1918, upon the request of the Governor Tahsin bey and the new army commander Mersinli Cemal Pasha, the Porte issued a decision allowing the return of all the exiles except the dragomans of the enemy states.[457] In May 1918, a general amnesty was proclaimed by the Cabinet for all the Arab exiles and allowing them to return to their countries.[458]

2.7. Negotiations with Sharif Hussein and Faysal for peace

Towards the end of the year 1917, a second attempt was made to terminate the hostility between the Ottomans and the Sharif. The process began with the desertion of Amir Abdulkadir al-Jazairi,[459] the son of the ex- vice president of the Ottoman Parliament,

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[455] Arslan, Ibid., p. 190-197.

[456] **BOA,** DH.EUM. 19/11, 28 Şubat 1334 [28 February 1918].

[457] **HHStA,** PA 38/371, Ranzi to Czernin, "Massnahmen der Regierung gegen verschiedene Bevölkerungselemende", Damascus, 15 March 1918; for some examples, see: **BOA,** İ.DUİT 105/42, 4 Mayıs 1334 [4 May 1918]; İDUİT 106/40-41-42-43-44-45-46-47-48.

[458] **BOA,** DH.EUM. 4.Şb 19/55, Talat to Tahsin, 12 Mayıs 1334 [12 May 1918].

[459] In the report of the Austrian Consul, his name was given as Abdulkadir: **HHStA,** PA 38/370, Ranzi to Czernin, "Die Mission des Emir Abdel Kader", Damascus, 26 November 1917: in a report sent by Enver Pasha while he was in Damascus, the name was given as

who was sent into exile to Smyrna by Cemal Pasha, to Sharif Hussein's side.[460] After a while, he wrote a letter to Cemal Pasha expressing that he abandoned to become a supporter to the Sharif and would like to take refuge with the Ottoman Empire to serve it on condition that his security of life would be guaranteed. According to Austrian Consul in Damascus, his conditions were accepted in a flash. When he arrived at Damascus in November 1917[461], he brought with him plenty of gold supplied to him by the British authorities to provoke a revolt among the Druzes of Hauran. He expressed that he wanted to serve the Ottoman Government in return for pardoning the exiled members of his family. In this regard, the exile of his father Ali Pasha al-Jazairi and the internment of his relative Tahir al-Jazairi were forgiven. He wanted to deliver the British gold to the Government, but he was rewarded with it. Again in the direction of the advises of the Amir Abdulkadir, a general amnesty was issued for the ones, who joined the Sharif's revolt on condition that they must be surrendered in 35 days after the announcement of the amnesty. Shukri Pasha al-Ayoubi was also pardoned in the same regard.[462]

The remarks of the Governor Tahsin Bey regarding the escape of Abdulkadir is quite conspicuous in terms of demonstrating the sentiments of the most of the exiled Arabist in regard to their allegiance to the Ottoman Empire:

> "…Abdulkadir has sent me a message from the village where he was hidden. [He] asked for a meeting. I gave quarter to him and accepted his appeal. He explained at some length

Said al-Jazairi.: **TTK Arşivi,** KO Koleksiyonu, 1/7, Enver to Talat, Damascus, 16 November 1917; However, Tahsin Bey notes the name as Abdulkadir: **BOA,** DH.ŞFR. 572/23, Tahsin to Talat, Damascus, 24 Teşrin-i Sani 1333 [24 November 1917].

[460] Before his escape to Sharif, he wrote some letters to Cemal Pasha expressing his loyalty and the loyalty of his family to the state: **TTK Arşivi,** KO Koleksiyonu 9/141, Emir Said to Cemal, 6 Nisan 1332 [18 April 1916]; Cemal answered them through Enver that as a demonstration of condescension he spared their lives and exiled them to Brussia. If they insisted in their undertakings to return, Cemal would arrest them in their place of exile and would hang them following a "judgment" at Court Martial. He stated that their relations with Syria was cut ever more: **TTK Arşivi,** KO Koleksiyonu 13/54, Cemal to Enver, 27 Nisan 1333 [27 April 1917].

[461] In Enver's report bearing the date 16 November 1917, he writes the arrival of Amir Said: **TTK Arşivi,** KO Koleksiyonu, 1/7, Enver to Talat, Damascus, 16 November 1917

[462] **HHStA,** PA 38/370, Ranzi to Czernin, "Die Mission des Emir Abdel Kader", Damascus, 26 November 1917; Most of these informations were also stated by Cemals himself: **TTK Arşivi,** 7/126, Cemal to Enver, 20 Teşrin-i Sani 1333 [20 November 1917].

> that… he was given money [by the British officials] to provoke a revolt in Damascus and its surrounding, and that his religious sentiments were grieved… He expounded weepingly that he was ready to remain at the disposal of the Government for all kinds of orders in favor of the Government.[*hükümet lehine teklif edilen her türlü emri ifaya amade olduğunu ağlayarak söyledi*]. Following that, he has met with his excellency the Commander Pasha [Cemal Pasha]. The mentioned [*müşarünileyh*] [Commander], too, approved his appeal…I observe that [he can be] trusted. In any case, I hope a benefit and service from that man by any means [*ne ölçüde olursa olsun*]… Abdulkadir is in our hands and serves us secretly…"[463]

Upon that, Cemal charged another member of al-Jazairi family Amir Said to go to Mecca on behalf of the Ottoman Government to negotiate with the Sharif and guaranteed that the Sharif and his supporters would be forgiven by the Ottoman Sultan. He also wrote letters to Sharif Hussein, Faysal and the other chiefs of the revolt emphasizing the necessity of the unity of all the Muslims against Great Britain, which had always attacked and would attack Islam.[464] The Prominent scholars of Syria Sheikh Kitani and Sheikh Bedreddin also wrote letters to Sharif Hussein.[465] After that Cemal resigned from his office in Syria and the correspondence was maintained by Mersinli Cemal Pasha, the successor of Cemal, and the Governor of Syria Tahsin Bey.

The answer to Cemal arrived from Faysal on 26th January 1918. He placed all his cards on the table openly. His demands weren't principally different from that of the Arabists, voiced by them before the War. Faysal was as if he was the spokesman of the Arabist movement, whose leadership was destroyed by Cemal's executions. First of all, he expressed the loyalty of Sharif at heart to the Caliphate and Sultanate. After that he explained that the Sharif had to rebel against the state because of the activities of Cemal. After that, he explained his demands for a peace treaty. His first condition was that "each nation [Turks and Arabs] should know their rights. None of them should intervene in the rights and issues of the other. Both [nation] should strive in a body. In this way, a true unity of Islam should be created". He added that the Arabs were afraid of the Turks and mistrusted them. If the agreement were made, then the conduct of the war would be

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[463] **BOA,** DH.ŞFR. 572/23, Tahsin to Talat, Damascus, 24 Teşrin-i Sani 1333 [24 November 1917].

[464] **TTK Arşivi,** KO Koleksiyonu, 1/7, Enver to Talat, Damascus, 16 Teşrin-i Sani 1333 [16 November 1917]

[465] **TTK Arşivi,** 7/126, Cemal to Enver, 20 Teşrin-i Sani 1333 [20 November 1917].

changed. The vendetta between the two nations would terminate and the Ottoman Empire would rule over from the West Africa to the Eastern Asia.[466] In his note to Cemal, Tahsin Bey especially requested to continue the negotiations no to chuck Syria away.[467]

The answer to Tahsin's request came from Talat allowing him to maintain the correspondence "without making any commitment". He hoped to win at least Faysal in this process.[468] However, according to the German ambassador, Talat was willing to give a certain autonomy to the Arabs. He was aware of the impossibility of the recapture of the lost Arab territories by the military means and wanted to gain them diplomatically. But a clique led by Cemal strongly opposed to this project unreasonably, and didn't give consent for even the smallest concession.[469] Presumably, due to this opposition Talat ordered Tahsin to continue the correspondence "without making any commitment.[470] But he

[466] **TTK Arşivi,** KO Arşivi 1/70, Faysal to Cemal, 26 Kanun-ı Sani 1334 [26 January 1918].

[467] **TTK Arşivi,** KO Arşivi 1/70, Tahsin to Cemal, 26 Kanun-ı Sani 1334 [26 January 1918], Examining these correspondences with the materials in the British National Archives, Eliezer Tauber concludes that at the end of this negotiations he replied to Cemal that "sword was arbiter between them" and cut the negotiations. He didn't analyze the changing trend of the Ottoman policy of Arabs beginning at the end of the year 1916: Tauber, Ibid., p. 154; However, the Ottoman correspondences revealed in this study shows that he was, indeed, quite willing to make a separate peace with the Ottoman authorities. Another reality revealed by the comparison of Tauber's informations with the Ottoman documents is that Faysal didn't keep the British officials informed about the negotiations.

[468] **TTK Arşivi,** KO Arşivi 1/70, Talat to Cemal, 1 Şubat 1334 [1 February 1918].

[469] In the same telegram, the Ambassador states that, as an indication of this intolerance, Cemal tried to prohibit an organization of the Egyptians, when he deputized in the absence of Talat to the Ministry of Interior. They wanted to celebrate the anniversary of Khedive Abbas Hilmi's accession to the Egyptian throne. Cemal strove to make them abandon from this organization, but they insisted on their programme. Furthermore, he prohibited playing the Egyptian anthem under the color that there was no Egyptian anthem, there was only the Turkish one: **PA-AA,** Türkei 165, Bd. 42, Bernstoff to AA, Constantinople, 19 January 1918.

[470] This time, Faysal notified his negotiations to the British officials. However, it seems that he conveyed his demands to them with a considerable exaggeration. Tauber evaluates these two correspondences as different attempts instead of seeing them as part of the same process. Faysal's real intention isn't reflected in Tauber's study. For details, see: Tauber, Ibid., p. 155-156.

changed his reconciliatory attitude towards the end of the war and adopted the same attitude with Cemal.[471]

In May 1918, Tahsin Bey and Mersinli Cemal sent Shukri Pasha Ayoubi to Faysal in Salt to determine a place for negotiations. They would negotiate with Faysal in full authority on condition that the latter would abandon the idea of independence.[472] However, according to the German consul in Beirut the Sharif's side didn't trust the promises of the CUP leaders.[473] On the other hand, the Ottoman authorities in Istanbul were quite reluctant to negotiate and to give some concessions to the Sharif. They were very optimistic about the consequences of the War and believed that they could appoint, sooner or later, Ali Haidar as the Amir of Mecca.[474]

In spite of these conditions, the correspondence continued till the end of the war around those issues. Faysal wanted a status for Arabia similar to the Bayern province of Germany.[475] The Germans opposed the attitude of the CUP leaders, and, towards the end of the war, repeatedly expressed the necessity of an agreement with Sharif to be able to transfer troops to the Persian front.[476] In the same direction, the prominent ideologue of the Young Turks, Ziya Gökalp, advised Talat to reorganize the Ottoman Empire similar to the

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[471] For the details of this attitude, see: **PA-AA,** Türkei 165, Bd. 43, Bernstoff to AA, Constantinople, 30 August 1918.

[472] Quite the reverse, Faysal didn't demand independence: **TTK Arşivi,** KO Koleksiyonu 13/12, Tahsin to Enver, Damascus, 11 May 1334.

[473] **PA-AA,** Türkei 165, Bd. 12, Bernstoff to Hertling (transmitting consul Beirut), Constantinople, 19 July 1918.

[474] **PA-AA,** Türkei 165, Bd. 42, Oppenheim to AA, 28 July 1918; Quite the reverse of this attitude, Tauber implies in his book that the CUP leaders were very enthusiastic to agree with Faysal. Tauber, Ibid., p. 155.

[475] **PA-AA,** Türkei 165, Bd. 43, Von Seeckt to AA, 4 September 1918.

[476] **PA-AA,** Türkei 165, Bd. 43, Hintze to AA, 13 September 1918; **PA-AA,** Türkei 165, Bd. 43, Berckheim to AA (Transmitting Ludendorf), Constantinople, 1 September 1918; **PA-AA,** Türkei 165, Bd. 43, Berckheim to AA (Transmitting Oppenheim), Constantinople, 22 August 1918; **PA-AA,** Türkei 165, Bd. 43, Bernstoff to AA, Constantinople, 30 August 1918; **TTK Arşivi,** KO Koleksiyonu 6/91, Liman von Sanders to Enver, 1 June 1918.

Austrian-Hungary Empire giving autonomy to the Arabs.[477] However, the Unionist leaders preferred to avoid "giving any promise, which would imply independence",[478] and to stall Sharif off until the absolute defeat in Syria. As a final remark, it is worth to mention that, immediately after the ceasefire agreement, the negotiations between the Turks and Arabs would restart.[479]

During his governorate in Syria, Cemal aimed with his policy towards the Arabist movement at the abolition of the interlayer between the state and its citizens in Syria as well as the elimination of the components, which were perceived as "disloyal" and could be used by the Great Powers in future as tools to create problems for the Ottoman sovereignty in Syria. However, since the reasons behind the outbreak of the Sharifian Revolt in Mecca were attributed to his draconian rule in Syria, that event created a turning point in the Arabist policies; he was prevented with the intervention of the Central Government in favor of the Arabists and Arabs. Thus, his projects, beginning at the end of 1916, were retreated following that it became apparent that the Sharifian Revolt couldn't be suppressed by the military means.

[477] **PA-AA,** Türkei 165, Bd. 43, Bernstoff to AA, Constantinople, 30 August 1918.

[478] **TTK,** KO Koleksiyonu 6/90, Enver to Mersinli Cemal, 11 Ağustos 1334 [11 August 1918]

[479] For a study on the negotiations after that time, see: Çiçek, M. Talha, "Osmanlı Hakimiyetinin Sonu ve Türk-Arap İlişkilerinde Değişim ve Süreklilik Unsurları, İstanbul: Yedirenk, 2010, pp.139-161.

CHAPTER III

ASSERTION OF THE STATE AUTHORITY ON SECONDARY, LOCAL AND AUTONOMOUS STRUCTURES

Prior to the WWI, mainly due to the influence of the protecting rights of the Great Powers stemming from the Capitulations, some *de facto* autonomous communities had been created by the different components of Ottoman society in Syria. Indeed, before the increase of the Western influence, those rights had been provided by the Ottoman *Millet* system.[480] However, in the modern era, the Western intervention played a considerable role in the protection of the privileges of non-Muslim societies. As a result of this, among those communities a certain sympathy towards those European powers emerged and the Ottoman authority was considerably weakened especially on non-Muslim societies like the Jews and the Christians. Jewish organizations motivated by Zionism, and the clergy of the Christian communities had gained considerable immunities from the state control. For that reason, the existence of such structures as bodies resistant to the effective control of the Government, created a barrier between the state and the people living under its rule preventing the diffusion and penetration of the state in Syrian society. By the outbreak of

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[480] For an analysis of the Ottoman *Millet* System, see: M. Macit Kenanoğlu, *Osmanlı Millet Sistemi: Mit ve Gerçek,* İstanbul: Klasik Yayınları, 2004.

the war, the administrative organization of the Zionist movement in Jewish society in Palestine, called by them as *yishuv*[481], and the position of the Christian clergy for the Christians, especially those of the Maronites presented such a situation.

Furthermore, the Government in Lebanon was another autonomous body, which was largely free from the Ottoman control, administratively, which was established and guaranteed by the Great Powers following the 1860 incidents.[482] That Government had its own administrative organs, gendarmerie and tax collection system, within the frontiers of the Ottoman Empire. As will be indicated below, all of these were the interlayers in the eyes of Cemal, which had to be eliminated or checked for a proper establishment of the state control in Syria, similar to Arabism. In this chapter, the analysis will be focusing on how Cemal Pasha intended to limit the authority of those autonomous bodies to increase the influence of the Ottoman Government among the different peoples living in its lands, and to what extent, he achieved the elimination of these structures.

3.1. Cemal Pasha and the Zionist Movement

Before an analysis of Cemal's policy of Zionism, an assessment of the existing literature will make the section more contextual. Historical studies on Zionism and the

[481] The name referring Jewish settlement before the establishment of Israel. Ottoman period of the Zionist organization was also called as *Yishuv* by the Zionists. For some examples, see: Bar-Tal, Daniel and Yona Teichmann, *Stereotypes and Prejudices in Conflict,* New York, Cambridge University Press, 2005, p. 103; Kark Ruth and Nadav Solomonovich, "The Young Turk Revolution of 1908 as reflected in the media of the Jewish community in Palestine", in *Late Ottoman Palestine: The Period of Young Turk Rule,* Ben-Bassat, Yuval and Eyal Ginio, London: I.B. Tauris, 2011, p. 184.

[482] For a study analyzing civil conflict in Lebanon and Damascus in 1860, see: Fawaz, Leila Tarazi, *An Occasion for War,* Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994; for a study on the order established following 1860 incidents, see: Engin Deniz Akarlı, *The Long Peace: Ottoman Lebanon, 1861-1920,* California: University of California Press, 1993.

emergence of Israel constitute an enormous amount in the existing literature. The historians of this movement have examined the particulars of its history in great detail. Today, the relations between the Zionists and the Western Great Powers are well-known.[483] Similarly, the emergenge of the movement has been examined in a detailed way together with its historical development in different eras and in different states.[484] On the other hand, the analysis of the reaction of the Ottoman authorities to the Zionist activities in Palestine as a nationalist movement aiming at the creation of a Jewish home in the Ottoman Realm is still not examined sufficiently, especially in reference with the Ottoman documents. In this sense, Fuat Dündar's study on the CUP's policy of settlement is an exception. However, as will be detailed below, his approach is hardly contextualizing Cemal's policy of Zionism to explain the aims of his existence in Syria. In addition, he doesn't seem to attribute any importance to the difference in the attitude of the CUP leaders towards the question of Zionism.[485]

In contrast to what the existing literature has concentrated on, this chapter sets out to describe how the most powerful Ottoman authority in Palestine, i.e. Cemal Pasha, reacted to the Zionists there during WWI, in the context of his general policy of the integration of Syrian provinces within the Imperial body of the Ottoman State by eliminating or checking the social interlayers. First of all, the analysis will be concentrating on Cemal's opinions on the Zionist Movement for a better understanding of the

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[483] For the relations between Great Britain and the Zionists and the struggle of the latter before the former to have a motherland in Palestine during the WWI see: Isaiah Friedmann, *The Question of Palestine, 1914-1918,* London: Routledge, 1973; for relations between Germany and the Zionists, see: Isaiah Friedmann, *Germany, Turkey, Zionism, 1897-1918,* London: Tansaction Publishers, 1998.

[484] For some examples, see: Nathan Rotenstreich, *Zionism: Past and Present,* Albany: State University of New York Press, 2007; Kedouire, Elie and Sylvia G. Haim (eds.), *Zionism and Arabism in Palestine and Israel,* London: Frank Cass, 2005; Feldestein, Ariel L., *Ben-Gurion, Zionism and American Jewry, 1948-1963,* Newyork: Routledge, 2006; Rose, John, *The Myths of Zionism,* London: Pluto Press, 2004; Halpern, Ben and Jehuda Reinharz, *Zionism and the Creation of a New Society,* New York: Oxford University Press, 1998; Gans, Chaim, *A Just Zionism: on the Morality of the Jewish State,* New York: Oxford University Press, 2008; Makovsky, Michael, *Churchill's Promised Land: Zionism and Statecraft,* New Haven: Yale University Press, 2007.

[485] For the related chapter in Dündar's study, see: Fuat Dündar, *Modern Türkiye'nin Şifresi*, İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2008, pp. 358-399.

background of his actions, and then a detailed analysis of the preventive activities of Cemal Pasha and his bureaucrats against Zionism on behalf of the integration of the imperial lands will be made.

The Zionist Movement, beginning from its foundation by Theodor Herzl with the Basel Congress, aimed at the acquisition in Palestine of a publicly-secured and legally assured home for the Jewish people.[486] Following this decision, the Zionists commenced to organize the Jewish population all over the world for immigration to Palestine. Concordantly, with the increase of the Jewish population in Palestine, the Zionist leaders started out to elevate the cultural and economic level of the immigrants and commenced the activities to create a mutual identity among them.[487] In this context, the instruction of the Hebrew language and the engagement of the Jewish immigrants in agriculture using modern techniques in Palestine can be placed on the top.[488]

On the other hand, the Ottoman Empire was struggling to assert its authority on its subjects all over the realm for a long time. Therefore, the Zionist undertakings drew attention immediately after their emergence since the aim of the movement was defined by its leaders to expand its influence on the Jews and this was seen as detrimental to the Ottoman domination. Beginning from the Hamidian era, the Ottoman Government took all the possible precautions to discourage the Jewish immigration to Palestine.[489] Following Abdülhamid II, the Young Turk leaders showed a hostile attitude towards the Zionist activities as far as they were allowed by the international power balance. It was impossible, however, for the Ottoman Government to prohibit the Jewish immigration entirely, due to the fact that the immigrants were protected by the Great Powers.[490]

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[486] For the explanation of the idea of a Jewish state by the founder of the movement, Theodor Hezl, see: Herzl, Theodor, *The Jewish State,* Boston: Wildside Press, 2008.

[487] For an analiyisis of this process, see: Halpern and Reinharz, Ibid, p. 49-90

[488] **PRO,** FO 371/2482, "England and the Jewish Settlement in Palestine", Cairo, 8 January 1915; **PA-AA,** Türkei 195, Bd.8, Öttinger to AA, 20 December 1915.

[489] For a detailed analysis of Abdulhamid's struggle with the Zionist immigration movement to Palestine see: Dündar, Ibid, pp. 358-362.

[490] Hartmann, Martin, *Reisebriefe aus Syrien,* Reimer Publication, Berlin: 1913, p. 8; Dündar, Ibid, p. 368.

The abolition of the Capitulations upon the entry of the Ottoman Empire into WWI, gave a free hand, to some extent, to the Ottoman authorities to restrict the Zionist movement in Palestine. In this regard, considerable measures were taken by Cemal Pasha to check this movement and to abolish its autonomy. This section will set out to clarify Cemal's actions to destroy the autonomy of that movement beginning with Cemal's ideas on Zionism:[491]

3.1.1. Cemal Pasha on Zionism

As indicated in the previous chapter, Cemal's aim in Syria and Palestine was to integrate these regions to the Ottoman Empire asserting the central authority, benefiting from the absence of international pressure. In this regard, he tried to eliminate or check all the threats, which would prevent the realization of this aim at that time and in the future. Therefore, Cemal Pasha was a strong opponent of the Zionist intentions like most of his predecessors, who tried to centralize the Ottoman Empire as much as possible. As a movement aiming at the establishment of a Jewish state in Palestine, and as a movement, which acquired a considerable autonomy from the Government,[492] Zionism had to be controlled like the other opposition movements and autonomous bodies in Syria and Palestine to achieve the centralization of Syria.

Fuat Dündar touches upon the aims of Cemal in his treatment of the Zionists in his controversial book on the design of the Modern Turkey, using mainly the Ottoman documents. In terms of using the Ottoman Archives he is the first to do this in the literature on this subject. However, interestingly enough, Dündar claims that Cemal's attitude

[491] Although Cemal Pasha was so harsh against the Zionists in his telegrams, in his memoires, the concepts "Zion", "Zionism" or "Zionist" are never mentioned. Similarly, he doesn't explain anything about his treatment against the Jews.

[492] The Jewish colonies in Palestine had established their own legal systems. Two collaborating Judges had been appointed in their courts, -one to interpret the Mosaic law, another to temper it with the modern jurisprudence. All Jewish disputes had been settled by these courts: Aaransohn, *With Turks in Palestine,* Cambridge: the Riverside Press, 1916, p. 3.

against the Zionists should be evaluated as a part of the CUP's ethnicity engineering, aiming at the turcification of the Ottoman realm. As will be indicated below, Cemal didn't undertake any action to exile all the Jews. His only aim was to clean the interlayers between the state and the Jews. He restricted the exile with those, who didn't accept the Ottoman citizenry or who were the leaders of Zionist organizations. The first case was considered an open challenge to the supremacy of the Ottoman Government in the region, while the second one was conceived as a block to the ottomanization of the Jews. Disregarding these realities, Dündar doesn't seem to inquire the place of the strengthening of the Ottoman domination in Palestine in Cemal's policies of Zionism by taking the aims of that movement into consideration. Yet, it is impossible to find an anti-Jewish remark that belongs to Cemal in his correspondences with the Central Government. All his concern was to block the Zionist designs regarding the separation of Palestine from the Ottoman Empire with the establishment of a Jewish state there. Cemal didn't adopt a general policy of exile against the Jews. While disagreeing about Cemal's aspirations, the only overlap of the present study with that of Dündar is that Cemal aimed at the expulsion of the Zionist Jews from Palestine.[493]

As a centralist-integrationalist, Cemal's opposition to Zionism stemmed from his adherence to the integrity of the Ottoman Empire. In Cemal's viewpoint, as a movement aiming at the establishment of a Jewish state in Palestine, Zionism had to be checked like the other opposition movements in Syria and Palestine to achieve the integration of Syrian peoples with the Ottoman Imperial system both administratively and ideologically. In this context, immediately after his arrival in Syria, Cemal made an investigation about this movement and concluded that:

> "Those [the members of the Zionist Movement] are seriously disastrous for the land of Palestine [*Arz-ı Filistin*]. …They have extended their independence over the establishment of a religious court. In my opinion, as soon as possible, there is a need for a legislation and it should include that:
> 1. From now on, none of the Jewish immigrants is going to be allowed to settle in Palestine, even if they accept Ottoman citizenship. 2. There will never be established a colony, settled exclusively by the Jews, and the existing colonies, not called as colony after that, will be named as village on condition that the appropriate names to be determined by the State. 3. The people who have foreign citizenship and their deputies will not be allowed to intervene in the issues of those villages and in the personal problems of those villagers.

[493] For further details regarding his approach see: Dündar, Ibid, pp. 358-399.

> 4. All the political, social and economic societies, which had been established on the basis of taking Jewish immigrants to Palestine and to settle them there, are abrogated. The foreigners, who are the members of those societies, will not be allowed to inhabit in Palestine, and those, who establish such a secret society will be deported from the Ottoman Realm [*Memalik-i Osmaniye*]. 5. The philanthrophic communities, which had been established to settle Jewish immigrants in the Ottoman motherland, cannot have the authorization to employ officials in Palestine. Those, who will perform this secretly, will be deported from the Ottoman motherland…"[494]

As can be understood from the quotation, Cemal Pasha was disturbed by the functions of the Zionist organization, which normally would be performed by the State. Moreover, the colonies were outside of the bureaucratic hierarchy of the state. By similar considerations, he ordered collection of all the weapons in the hands of the Jewish colonists.[495] In the same telegraph, he stated that he would deport some of the most dangerous [*azılı*] Zionist leaders, refusing their appeal for the Ottoman citizenship. If the deportation of those leaders could be achieved, then the remaining Jews would easily be amenable to the viewpoint of the Ottoman Government.[496] If Zionism was checked as he described, Cemal considered it easier the integration of the Jewish community into the Empire.

It is sufficiently clear in his draft law that Cemal's only aim with the prevention of the Jewish immigration was to forestall the realization of the Zionist aims in Syria to the disadvantage of the dissemination of the Ottoman supremacy. What is lacking in Dündar's approach is his failure to contextualize the aims of the Zionist Movement in Cemal's policy of the Jewish deportations. The text quoted before clarifies that Cemal aimed at the control of the Zionist activities rather than planning the turcification of Palestine with a motivation inspired by ethnicity engineering. There was no inconvenience for Cemal in the existence of the Jews in Palestine as long as they remained loyal to the Ottoman authority. Although Talat seemed to have agreed personally, Cemal's draft law was not approved by the Central Government on grounds that the international public would react to the Ottoman Government. However, Talat advised Cemal to struggle against the Zionist Movement with the available tools in his hands.[497]

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494 **BOA,** DH.ŞFR. 465/19, Cemal to Talat, Jerusalem, 2 Mart 1331 [15 March 1915].

495 Aaronsohn, Ibid, p. 34.

496 **BOA,** DH.ŞFR. 465/19, Ibid.

497 Dündar, Ibid, p.373.

Three months later, Cemal Pasha warned again the Central Government about the Zionist danger, and expressed that he prepared a plan to extirpate [*kökünden çözmek*] this question without giving the details of his plan. For the implementation of this plan, he demanded the appointment of the Chief Rabbi of Salonika to Jerusalem as the Chief Rabbi. In that telegraph, he also stated his irritation that any action against the Zionist movement was reflected all around the World by their propaganda means as an action inimical to Judaism.[498] Approximately one year later, he repeated his offer, again.On July 1916, the *Gatto Levedat* [?] Newspaper published an article stating that the Ottoman Empire was negotiating the establishment of a Jewish Republic in Palestine with the American Ambassador Morgenthau. The newspaper claimed that the government showed a tendency to the idea of the establishment of such a state. Cemal produced a strong refutation of the claims of the newspaper and requested again to issue a law prohibiting the Jewish immigration and their purchase of land in Palestine to show the opposition of the Ottoman Government to Zionism.[499] On 27th January 1917, he repeated his proposal to issue a law against the Zionist activities. He suggested the prohibition of the foreigners to enter into the Ottoman country if they had a Zionist affiliation, and if a Zionist had been inside the Ottoman realm, he or she should be deported. He was of the opinion that it won't be appropriate "to wait until the complete maturation of its poisonous fruits, to launch the struggle against Zionism". [*Siyonistlikle mücadeleye başlamak için onun zehirli semerelerinin muhit-i Osmaniye'de tamamıyla inkişaf etmesini intizar etmek muvafik olmayacağı kanaatindeyim.*][500]

All his requests to draft a law against the Jews were rejected by the Central Government on grounds the reaction of the international public. However, when considered that the CUP didn't pay attention to the international public in the issue of the Armenian deportations, this argument is rather weak. It seems that there was a strong lobby in İstanbul, who didn't approve the actions of Cemal against Zionism and who prevented the issuance of such a law. Dündar's thesis of ethnic engineering could be

[498] **BOA,** DH.ŞFR. 475/9, Cemal to Talat, Jerusalem, 28 Mayıs 1331[15 May 1915].

[499] **BOA,** DH.ŞFR. 529/69, Cemal to Talat, Aleppo, 10 Ağustos 1916 [24 August 1916].

[500] **BOA,** DH.ŞFR. 544/29, Cemal to Talat, 14 Kanun-ı Sani 1332 [27 January 1917].

considered weak in this respect, too. He considered the CUP as of a a single mind in its policy of the Jews. Yet, most of the actions by Cemal were blocked by the Central Government.

In spite of the refusal of his draft laws by the Central Government, Cemal didn't stop to struggle with the Zionist Movement. He increased, to a considerabl extent, the authority of the state over the Jewish colonies during his governorate in Syria:

3.1.2. Taking Action against the Zionist Movement

As a step to limit the power to the Zionist Movement and to increase the state control over the Jews in Palestine, Cemal appointed the late *Kaymakam* of Jafa, Bahaeddin Bey, as the Attache of the 4th Army for the information service. Bahaeddin had been charged with the struggle against the Zionist Movement by Cemal. Immediately after his appointment, he published an announcement in the Jewish newspaper Hacherut on 25th January 1915 warning all the Jews about staying away from the Zionist organization. He also declared that the Government decided to condemn the Zionist Movement, which aimed at the establishment of a Jewish state in the lands of the Ottoman State, and that anybody, who maintained relations with this organization secretly, would be punished. In the same announcement, it was highlighted that these governmental actions were only against Zionism, and the Jews, who were loyal to the state wouldn't be damaged in any manner.[501] However, Bahaeddin directed his measures towards the whole population. He was so harsh in his treatment of the Jewish population that he attracted the reaction of both German and American Ambassadors. As a consequence of their lobbying activities, in the beginning of February, he was recalled to İstanbul by the decision of the Cabinet to be charged in İstanbul.[502]

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[501] **PA-AA,** Türkei 195, Bd5, James Simon to AA, Berlin, 17 March 1915

[502] **PA-AA,** Türkei 195, Bd.5, Warburg to AA, 13 February 1915; Some Zionist reports claimed that Bahaeddin was appointed to a new post established in İstanbul to follow the Zionist activities. However, There is no trace in the documents that such a position was

However, the dismissal of Bahaeddin did not terminate the process. Cemal was suspicious that some Jews, who were the members of the Zionist organization, established a secret organization, which reached to a level violating the Ottoman authority.[503] For that reason, the Intelligence Branch of the 4th Army, i.e. Cemal's Army, carried out a search on Zionism in the Jewish quarter of Jaffa and found out some documents demonstrating that some services, which had to be performed by the government body such as jurisdiction, post services, policing and some municipal services, had been performed by the Jewish communities of the Jaffa district. Furthermore, they had a special flag for them. In the same investigation, the Army officials found some stamps circulated among them, indicating that the Zionist organization in Palestine gained some independence vis-à-vis the state authority. For that reason, the governor noted that the Army Commander was planning to refuse the application of the Zionist leaders for the Ottoman citizenship and to deport them. In the same way, the deportation of the Ottoman subjects who had a Zionist aspiration was among the plans of the Army Commander.[504] These telegrams indicate that Cemal Pasha's plans regarding Zionism were to remove their control over the Jewish population preventing the Ottoman Government from creating a uniform body.

All these statements and actions made by Cemal lead us to the conclusion that he didn't have a special project of ethnic engineering against the Jews in Palestine. His only opposition was directed against Zionism taking root in Palestine, which aimed at the establishment of a home for the Jews there, out of the countenance of the Ottoman authority. To realize this project, he applied a series of measures against this movement. First of all, he expelled the Jews, who didn't acquire Ottoman citizenship and then he deported the prominent Zionists from Palestine. As would be shown below in a detailed manner, Cemal applied all that was in his power to check Zionism in Palestine:

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available. For further information about these claims see: **PA-AA,** Türkei 195, Bd 5, Ephraim Cohn to Paul Nathan, Jerusalem, 18 February 1915.

[503] Cemal to Enver, 27 Eylül 1333 [27 September 1917], Damascus, in *Arşiv Belgeleriyle Ermeni Faaliyetleri,* p. 696.

[504] **BOA,** DH.ŞFR. 463/9, Midhat [The Governor of Jerusalem] to Talat, Jerusalem 4 Şubat 1330 [14 February 1915]; Cemal to Enver, 27 Eylül 1333 [27 September 1917], Damascus, in *Arşiv Belgeleriyle Ermeni Faaliyetleri,* p. 696; these remarks were also confirmed by Aaronsohn's memoirs, which conveyed above: Aaransohn, Ibid., p. 3, 34.

3.1.2.1. Expulsion of the Jewish Citizens of the Entente States

As will be expressed in Chapter 5, with the outbreak of the War, all the citizens of the enemy states were started to be deported. As a constituent of this process, the Jewish immigrants, citizens of these states, were also decided to be expulsed. As Cemal Pasha considered Zionism as a threat for the integrity of the Empire, and made use of this process as an opportunity to forestall the Zionist designs, by expelling Jews from Palestine, who immigrated there by the encouragement of the Zionists. However, it was not a special plan prepared only for the expulsion of the Jews. All the citizens of the foreign states were exposed to the same treatment.[505]

However, the Jews were treated in a privileged way in comparision to the other nationalities. This situation emergen, when the expulsion decision of the Jews from Jerusalem caused a great anger among the Zionist circles all around the world. They had a considerable international network, which could direct the international public opinion against the Ottoman Government. With that fear and with the pressure of the German and American Ambassadors, and by the impact of the pro-Zionist members of the CUP, in the beginning of January 1915, the Ottoman Government softened its decision and gave a privilege for ones who had a Jewish origin to acquire Ottoman citizenship within 10 days paying 40 francs as application fee.[506] Those who refused the Ottoman citizenship had to leave the Ottoman country.[507] It could be presumed that accepting them into Ottoman citizenship would facilitate their integration with the Empire putting them under the direct rule of the Empire by the way of naturalization.

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[505] **BOA,** DH.EUM.5.Şb 11/7, The Governor of Beirut to EUM [Emniyet-i Umumiye Müdiriyeti], Beirut, 18 Kanun-ı Evvel 1330 [31 October 1914]; **HHStA,** PA 38/366, Ranzi to Burian,"Entente-freundliche Ausstreuungen; Einstellung des Verkehrs auf den Syrischen Bahnen", Damascus, 22 June 1915.

[506] **PA-AA,** Türkei 195, Bd. 5, Wangenheim to Bethmann-Hollweg, Constantinople, 17 January 1915; **HHStA,** PA 38/367, Jerusalem Consul to Burian, “Politisches Situationsbild”, Jerusalem, 7 June 1915.

[507] **PA-AA,** Türkei 195, Bd. 5, Wangenheim to Bethmann-Hollweg, Constantinople, 6 February 1915.

Those, who didn't acquire Ottoman citizenship, were deported by Cemal during December 1914 and January 1915. 2700 Jews of the Entente states were sent to Egypt with Italian vessels.[508] The report of the Governor of Jerusalem, Midhat Bey, clarifies how the Government tried to facilitate the process of acquiring Ottoman citizenship of the non-Ottoman Jews while prosecuting the Zionist organization. With the permission of the Central Government, in the beginning of February, the Governor renewed the deadline for a second time and the application fee was abandoned to smooth the progress of the naturalization of the Jewish immigrants. The Governor informed Talat that, until the beginning of February the number of the applicants was 3.000 people.[509]

This treatment of the Zionists in Palestine was considerably exaggerated by the German Zionists before the German Government and in the international public opinion. They claimed that the Ottoman high officials in Palestine started to destroy houses and belongings of the Jews systematically and those officials invited the Arabs to capture the goods of the Jews.[510] However, quite the reverse of what the Zionist leaders claimed, both German Ambassador in İstanbul and the German Consuls in Jaffa and Jerusalem agreed that the Zionist claims were exaggerated, and many of the Ottoman implementations against Jews were not special to them, but could be applicable for all the people in the region emanating from the difficulties of the War.[511]

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[508] **PA-AA,** Türkei 1915, Bd. 5, Wangenheim to Bethmann Hollweg, Constantinople, 18 January 1915; **PA-AA,** Türkei 195, Bd. 5, Wangenheim to Bethmann-Hollweg, Constantinople, 21 January 1915.

[509] **BOA,** DH.ŞFR. 463/9, Midhat [The Governor of Jerusalem] to Talat, Jerusalem 4 Şubat 1330 [14 February 1915].

[510] **PA-AA,** Türkei 195, Bd. 5, Bernstoff to AA (Tranmitting Lucius, a Zionist leader), Stockholm, 1 February 1915; **PA-AA,** Türkei 195, Bd. 5, Warburg (a Zionist leader) to Bethmann-Hollweg, Berlin, 10 February 1915; **PA-AA,** Türkei 195, Bd.7, Lichtheim to Bethmann-Hollweg, Constantinople, 22 December 1915.

[511] **PA-AA,** Türkei 195, Bd.5, Wangenheim to Bethmann-Hollweg, Constantinople, 8 February 1915; **PA-AA,** Türkei 195, Bd.5, Wangenheim to Bethmann Hollweg (Transmitting Jerusalem and Jaffa Consuls), Constantinople, 10 February 1915; In 1917, The German Ambassador warned the local consuls that the Jewish descriptions about their issues could be exaggerated. Therefore, the Ambassador requested the Consuls to add their own opinions to the Jewish telegrammes, which was sent by the German Consulates: **PA-AA,** Türkei 195, Bd.16, Bernstoff to AA, Constantinople, 25 October 1917.

In June 1915, some of the non-Ottomans were accepted into citizenship. 970 of the applicants became the Ottoman citizens and exempt from the deportation. According to remarks of the leader of the German Zionists, Dr. Ruppin, there was no longer a possibility of deportation for the Jews in Palestine.[512] By the end of September 1915, the citizenship process for the Jews had been completed, and on 20th September, those who refused to accept Ottoman nationality, or whose applications were refused by the Ottoman Government were deported from Palestine. Their number was around 500, and the deportees had generally a Zionist affiliation. Most of them were Russian citizens, and were sent to Egypt.[513]

Taking both the process of the deportation of the Jews of the Entente and Cemal's reports on the Zionist Movement into consideration, it can be concluded that, at the beginning, Cemal Pasha wished to expulse all the Jewish population of the Entente states, who had Zionist affiliations for the sake of the facilitation of the imposition of the state authority on the Jewish communities. Moreover, at first, he thought all the Jews as part of the Zionist movement. However, according to the remarks of the German Consul in Jerusalem, in a short while, he realized the difference between Zionism and the Jewry and directed his attention towards the Zionists.[514] As a final remark, it must again be highlighted that all his actions against the Jews intended to remove the Zionist barrier, as he saw it, between the Government and the Jews, not to terminate the Jewish existence in Palestine. The naturalization of the Jews aimed at putting them under the jurisprudence of the Ottoman law. Another aspect of his anti-Zionist policy was to exile the Zionist leaders on the same considerations.

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[512] **PA-AA,** Türkei 195, Bd.6, Wangenheim to AA (Transmitting Lichtheim), 18 June 1915.

[513] **PA-AA,** Türkei 195, Bd. 5, Baumert to AA, Jaffa, 24 September 1915; **BOA,** DH.ŞFR. 485/22, Midhat to Talat, Jerusalem, 11 Eylül 1331 [24 September1915]

[514] The German Consul of Jerusalem interpreted this change as the cognizance of the Ottoman officials the difference between Zionism and the Jewry. Despite this evaluation, the Ottoman authorities were aware of this difference from the very beginning. However, they were convinced that the Zionist aspirations could only be forestalled with the expulsion of the Jewish immigrants from Palestine. For the evaluations of the German Consul regarding that change see: **PA-AA,** Türkei 195, Bd. 7, Brode to Bethmann-Hollweg, Jaffa, 26 August 1915.

3.1.2.2. Prosecution of the Zionist Leaders

For Cemal Pasha, being a Zionist leader had the same meaning with being a separatist, and hence an obstacle to his policy in Syria. For that reason, he had started his struggle against the Zionist leaders immediately after his arrival in Syria. According to Ephraim Cohn, the director of the schools of the German Jews Benevolent Society [*Hilfsverein*], Cemal Pasha regarded Zionism as a threat, while looking at the Jews with sympathy. During his short stay in Jerusalem before the first attack against Egypt, Cemal delivered a considerably sharp speech against the Zionist movement, and in that short span of time, he exiled 12 of the Zionist leaders to Galilee (Northern Palestine) on grounds that they were peace-breakers. There were prominent Zionists among them such as Yellin, Antebi, Bogratoschof and Grasowsky.[515]

Cemal's treatment of the Zionist leaders was frequently interfered in by the lobbying activities of the German Government in İstanbul. In the same way, he had to retreat some of his decisions due to the impact of the international press where the Zionists had a considerable influence. Therefore, in most cases, he had to change his method of action to put his plans into practice. In this context, in the beginnings of his governorate in Syria, Cemal had decided to expel some 49 of the prominent colonists, however, with the German intervention, he had to withdraw his decision, and gradually implemented his decision expelling those people in a piecemeal way. Some of them were expelled in February and another group was sent to Egypt and Anatolia in March.[516] In the same way, in Mid-August 1915, the prominent leaders of the Zionist colonies, Dr. Mossinsohn, Aronotiz, Rabbiner Fishmann, Ridnik, Fein and the director of the Hebrew Gymnasium in Jaffa, Dr. Bogratoschof had to leave Palestine. According to the interpretation of the Zionist representative in Berlin, with the expulsion of these people, Cemal Pasha aimed at

[515] **PA-AA,** Türkei 195, Bd. 5, Ephraim Cohn to AA, Jerusalem, 20 January 1915; **PA-AA,** Türkei 195, Bd. 7, Warburg to AA (Transmitting Lichtheim), Berlin, 25 August 1915.

[516] **PA-AA,** Türkei 195, Bd. 5, Wangenheim to AA (Transmitting Warburg), Constantinople, 8 February 1915: **PA-AA,** Türkei 195, Bd.5, Wangenheim to Bethmann-Hollweg, Constantinople, 16 March 1915.

the destruction of the Hebrew school system and the Jewish colonization system, and these results were impending for the Jewish society.[517]

Some of the expelled Zionists were those whose applications for the Ottoman nationality were refused since they were perceived as a threat for the integration and control policies of Cemal Pasha in Syria. They were deported to Egypt with Italian and American ships.[518] Some others had already acquired the Ottoman citizenship. Therefore, they were mostly arrested and taken to Damascus for the adjudication in the court martial. Some of them were released while some others were being sent into exile from Palestine to Anatolia.[519]

The most important decision made by Cemal Pasha regarding the Zionist leaders was the expulsion of Dr. Arthur Ruppin, the leader of the German Zionists in Palestine, and the most influential Zionist there. He had a German citizenship, and enjoyed a good reputation in the Jewish circles in America. Therefore, his existence in Palestine had a key importance for the continuance of the Zionist organizations in Palestine.[520]

Cemal Pasha first tried to expel Ruppin from Palestine in April 1915. He requested the German Ambassador in Istanbul via Damascus Consul the recall of the mentioned Zionist leader.[521] However, his departure was forestalled with the interference of the German Government.[522] In October 1915, he renewed his request. But, the German Ambassador opposed Ruppin's recall. As a result, Cemal accepted the German intervention and allowed Ruppin to stay on condition that he had to hand his post over to

517 **PA-AA,** Türkei 195, Bd. 7, Warburg to AA (Transmitting Lichtheim), Berlin, 25 August 1915.

518 **PA-AA,** Türkei 195, Bd.5, Wangenheim to AA (Transmitting Lichtheim), Constantinople, 22 March 1915; **PA-AA,** Türkei 195, Bd. 5, Wangenheim to Bethmann-Hollweg, Constantinople, 16 March 1915.

519 **PA-AA,** Türkei 195, Bd.6, Bernstoff to Behmann-Hollweg (Transmitting Lucius),3 April 1915; **PA-AA,** Türkei 195, Bd. 8, Lichtheim to Bethmann-Hollweg, Constantinople, 22 December 1915.

520 **PA-AA,** Türkei 195, Bd.9, Warburg and Jacobson to AA, Berlin, 4 October 1916.

521 **PA-AA,** Türkei 195, Bd.6, Wangenheim to Bethmann-Hollweg, Constantinople, 6 April.

522 **PA-AA,** Türkei 195, Bd.9, Warburg and Jacobson to AA, Berlin, 4 October 1916.

an Ottoman citizen. Hereupon, another Zionist leader Dr. Thon, who had Austrian citizenship, had to apply for the Ottoman citizenship and take over the presidency of the German Jews in Palestine.[523]

In the middle of July 1916, Cemal's anti-Zionist sentiments were triggered again with some news published in the French, English and the Neutral press. They claimed that the Ottoman Empire agreed on land sale in Palestine to the Jews upon the request of the American Ambassador. The source of the news was Morgenthau, the late American Ambassador in Constantinople. Cemal Pasha was furious with this news, and took it as an advantage to expell Ruppin from Palestine, although the claims were refuted by Morghentau himself.[524]

With regard to this, on 11st September 1916, Cemal Pasha called Dr. Ruppin to his office and requested him to leave Palestine within 10 days in a polite but certain manner. Ruppin asked the reason of his deportation. Cemal answered him that he was tired of Zionism and no longer wanted to be busy with this movement. Additionally, he advised Ruppin not to frustrate himself applying to secure some intervention for the cancellation of his decision (he meant the German intervention). Ruppin inferred from this threat that if he had applied to Germany for help, Cemal would choose persection of the Zionist institutions under the German protection his object. For that reason, not to damage the Zionist organization in Palestine, he accepted Cemal's decision without opposition and prevented any intervention in this decision with this fear. While he was leaving Cemal's office, Ruppin expressed that he never acted against the Ottoman interests and, maybe in future, they could meet again to explain Cemal Pasha this issue. Cemal answered: "maybe,

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[523] **PA-AA,** Türkei 195, Bd.7, Neurath to AA (Transmitting Lichtheim), Constantinople, 14 October 1915; **PA-AA,** Türkei 195, Bd.7, Lichtheim to Louis Brandeis, Constantinople, undated,

[524] The reportage had been published first in the semi-official newspaper of the French Government, "Gazette de Lausanne", with the tltle of "La Palestine republique Juive" on 17th July 1916. For further information see: **PA-AA,** Türkei 195, Bd.9, Jacobson and Hantke to AA, Berlin, 27 July 1916;**PA-AA,** Türkei 195, Bd.9, Radovitz to AA, 21 September 1916

but in Germany".[525] However, instead of returning to Germany, Ruppin preferred to stay in İstanbul to continue his activities there.

After getting rid of Ruppin, Cemal looked for the ways to send his successor Thon and his vice-president Yellin away from Palestine. They had taken over the responsibility of the organization of the Zionist activities in Palestine after the exile of Ruppin. On 30th January 1917, Cemal called Jellin to Damascus with his family and later on 4th February, he ordered the appearance of Thon in Damascus. But, this time, Cemal withdrew his decision and gave up the idea of expelling these two leaders from Palestine, most probably avoiding the reaction of the international public against him.[526]

With those actions, Cemal had managed to check the Zionist activities to some extent, and his concern regarding Zionism entered into a new, tranquil stage till the British military threat against Palestine appeared. After the First Battle in Gaza, Cemal decided to evacuate Gaza and Jaffa. Whether this decision was taken with military considerations or political reasons needs to be understood for Cemal's policy of Zionism.

3.1.2.3. Evacuation of Jaffa and the Attempts to Evacuate Jerusalem

The approach of the British threat of occupation for Palestine compelled Cemal Pasha to evacuate Jaffa, Jerusalem and Gaza, immediately after the First Battle of Gaza on 28th March. First, Gaza was evacuated. But, the scarcity of the Jewish population in Gaza didn't bring the issue to the international agenda. However, the concentration of the Jews in Jaffa and Jerusalem caused great anxiety at that time among the Jewish circles all around the world on the aims of the evacuations of these cities due to the impact of the

[525] **PA-AA,** Türkei 195, Bd. 9, Ruppin to AA, Constantinople, 12 October 1916; **PA-AA,** Türkei 195, Bd.9, Radowitz to AA (Transmitting Lichtheim), Constantinople, 16 October 1916.

[526] **PA-AA,** Türkei 195, Bd.11, Kühlmann to AA, Constantinople, 16 February 1917; **PA-AA,** Türkei 195, Bd.11, Warburg to AA, Berlin, undated; **PA-AA,** Türkei 195, Bd.10, Kühlmann to AA (Transmitting Lichtheim), Constantinople, 9 February 1917.

Zionist propaganda.[527] In this section, the discussion will be focused on the aims and implementation of the evacuations.

Fuat Dündar examines the evacuation of Jaffa, and concludes that, in Cemal's eyes, there was no military threat for that city at that time. He only aimed at the turcification of Jaffa and Jerusalem, and to make Jerusalem a center for Islam and Turkishness, taking the occupation threat as an opportunity. Therefore, he decided to evacuate the mentioned cities. It seems that Dündar rarely appreciates that the evacuation event emerged as a measure to defend Palestine against the British attack, although it had some political aspects. He discusses the issue as a deliberate movement planned by the CUP leaders long before, rather than as a sudden event developed as a consequence of the war circumstances. Indeed, his book doesn't take the reality of the military threat into consideration.[528] Although Cemal had political aims regarding the control of the Zionist Movement, an approaching military threat couldn't be denied. In the reports that Cemal sent to Enver, it can easily be inferred that Cemal expected a great British expedition following the First Battle in Gaza. The last chapter of this study will clarify how seriously Cemal Pasha considered the military situation in the Palestine Front following the mentioned British attack. The evacuation of Jaffa was planned as a measure to a possible naval action of the Entente. Secondly, Dündar asserts that Cemal and the Central Government in İstanbul always went along well with each other. It is a fact that Cemal and the Central Government agreed many times regarding the Zionist policy. However, the cases of conflict over the issue cannot be written away. This is especially for the case, where both Talat's request and Enver's order played a crucial role in the abandonment of Cemal's idea to evacuate Jerusalem.[529]

However, the relatively impartial observers did not deny the existence of a military danger as well as the political aims of Cemal Pasha in the evacuation. According to the

[527] For the examples of such reports see: **PRO,** FO 371/3053, Dizengoff to FO, "Appeal to the Jewish Communities in the Ottoman Empire, 4 May 1917; **PRO,** FO 371/3055, Sykes to Graham, Cairo, 28 April 1917; **PA-AA,** Türkei 195, Bd. 12, Wedel to Bethmann-Hollweg, Constantinople, 28 April 1917;

[528] Dündar, Ibid. pp. 388-396.

[529] **PA-AA,** Türkei 177, Bd. 14, Kühlmann to Bethmann-Hollweg, Constantinople, 27 April 1917,

report of the German Consul in Jerusalem, it became apparent with the First Gaza War that the evacuation was beneficial for military regards. If Gaza had not been evacuated, the British siege would cause panic among the dwellers of the city, and that would make a negative impact among the troops. Furthermore, the people in Jaffa sympathized with the British. Therefore, in case of battle, there could be an affair of espionage for the "Enemy" by the local people of the city. Finally, he added that the British danger created a pretext for Cemal for carrying out his designs to ruin the Zionist organization in Palestine. The Jerusalem Consul of Germany, in spite of his Jewish origin and his sympathy with Zionism, thought that Cemal's action of evacuation was primarily emanated from the military considerations.[530] Germany's military representative in Constantinople also emphasized that Cemal's action was suitable for military reasons.[531] Similarly, accepting the policital aspect of this action, the Spanish consul states in his diaries that "espionage must exist on a grand scale"[532].After his visit to Jerusalem, General Falkenhayn was in the same way convinced that the evacuation was carried out for military reasons. Quite the reverse of Jerusalem consul and Falkenhayn, the German Ambassador in Constantinople insisted on the opinion that the military situation had contributed to the political aspirations of Cemal Pasha, and therefore, the preliminary reason of the evacuation was political.[533] A conversation between Cemal and the Spanish consul is worth to mention here to understand the military reasons for the evacuation of Jaffa:

> "…I tried to get from His Excellency [Cemal Pasha] the order for the Spaniards to remain in Jaffa at their own risk, but he refused. I attacked the question saying to him: 'The intention of the government being to avoid the death of foreigners in case of bombing, if they renounce all rights of reclamation against the government…' But he cut me off saying, 'That is not our objective but rather to defend ourselves in the city as we have done in Gaza, and how do you want us to defend ourselves between the screams and wailing of women and children?' I had to capitulate unwillingly".[534]

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[530] **PA-AA,** Türkei 195, Bd.12, Brode to AA, Jerusalem, 5 April 1917.

[531] **PA-AA,** Türkei 195, Bd.13, Niemann to Imperial Prussian War Ministry, Constantinople, 22 May 1917.

[532] Ballobar, Ibid, p.148.

[533] **PA-AA,** Türkei 195, Bd.13, Kühlmann to AA, Constantinople, 5 June 1917.

[534] Ballobar, Ibid, p. 147.

A closer look at the process of the evacuation will clarify the reasons behind the evacuation. As will be described in the last chapter, Cemal Pasha discovered the British preparations for an extensive attack against Palestine as a consequence of the explorations of the Ottoman aviators. Therefore, the possibility of a military danger cannot be denied. However, some implementations special to the Jews made Cemal's intentions suspicious: In the beginning of the process, Cemal allowed the German citizens to stay in Jaffa, but exempted the Jews from this privilege. In addition, he had allowed the farmers, who would harvest their crops, to continue their lives in Jaffa till the end of the harvest season. As an exception, at the beginning, the Jewish farmers were not allowed to stay. The interview of the German Consul of Jerusalem made the extension of this exemption possible for the Jews as well. All in all, it seems that, in the beginning, the political aims prevailed against the military considerations, although that action cannot be deemed as a deliberate action planned by the CUP leaders independent from the war circumstances.[535] Furthermore, the suspicion that rose towards the Jews should also be taken into consideration in this action.

Soon after the beginning of the evacuation of Jaffa, the Entente and Neutral press began to use this action as a propaganda measure against Cemal Pasha and the Ottoman Government. The news of the French *Agence-Havas* was the final straw in this sense. The news was claiming that it was only the Jews, who evacuated from Jaffa and Gazza, and they were not provided with transport means and left without homes. The private belongings of the immigrants and the Christian sanctuaries were plundered.[536] Thon observed that the picture drawn by the *Agence* was very exaggerated and accusatory.[537]

Upon the mentioned news of the Entente and Neutral press, Cemal commenced counter propaganda. He invited the prominent Zionists and the religious leaders of the Christians and Jews to his office and requested them to publish proclamations in the European press refuting the claims of the news. Cemal granted some money to those

[535] **BOA,** DH.ŞFR. 551/68, Münir to Talat, Jerusalem 15 Nisan 1333 [15 April 1917]; for the exemptions implemented against the Jews see: **PA-AA,** Türkei 195, Bd. 12, Brode to AA, Jerusalem, 5 April 1917.

[536] **PA-AA,** Türkei 195, Bd.13, Lucius to Bethmann Hollweg, Stockholm, 1 June 1917; **BOA,** DH.ŞFR. 555/30, Cemal to Talat, Jerusalem, 26 Mayıs 1333 [26 May 1917].

[537] **PA-AA,** Türkei 195, Bd.12, Brode to AA (Transmitting Thon), Jerusalem, 29 May 1917.

people to perform the duties assigned by him (1.000 ltq.[lira Turk]), and to relieve the problems of the immigrants (3.000 ltq.).[538]

Immediately after the meeting, Dr. Thon, the leader of the German Zionists, sent confutation telegrams to 13 Zionist Newspapers.[539] Similarly, the Grand Rabbi of Istanbul gave an interview to the *Frankfurter Zeitung* and expressed that the Ottoman Government reserved 100.000 ltq for the provisioning of the refugees. The newspapers in Copenhagen published this reportage and the denial of the Ottoman Government regarding the claims of the mentioned press.[540] Similarly, the religious leaders of the Jewish and Christian Communities sent the telegrams to the European press refuting the abovementioned news.[541]

Although the news of the Entente press had exaggerated the conditions of the emigrants, under the impact of that press campaign, Cemal Pasha obviously changed his treatment of the emigrated Jaffans and provided better means for them.[542] According to the report of Kühlmann, the German Ambassador in İstanbul, during the evacuation of Jaffa everything continued in its routine, except some small problems occurred as a result of the war circumstances.[543] The Governor of Jerusalem informed to Talat that for the security of Jaffa, 37 guards, and 13 polices, and 33 gendarmeries were left to protect the belongings of the immigrated people.[544] Above all, contrary to his first declaration, Cemal allowed the refugees to settle anywhere in Palestine except the coastal band.[545]

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538 **PA-AA,** Türkei 195, Bd.12, Brode to AA (Transmitting Thon), Jerusalem, 29 May 1917; **PA-AA,** Türkei 195, Bd.12, Kühlmann to AA, Constantinople, 16 May 1917.

539 **PA-AA,** Türkei 195, Bd.12, Brode to AA (Transmitting Thon), Jerusalem, 29 May 1917.

540 **PA-AA,** Türkei 195, Bd. 13, Copenhagen Zionist Bureau to Zionist Bureau in Berlin, Copenhagen, 1 June 1917.

541 **BOA,** DH. ŞFR. 558/76, Cemal to Talat, Jerusalem, 24 Mayıs 1333[24 May 1917].

542 **PA-AA,** Türkei 177, Bd. 14, Kühlmann to Bethmann-Hollweg, Constantinople, 2 June 1917.

543 **PA-AA,** Türkei 195, Bd.12, Kühlmann to AA, Constantinople, 16 May 1917.

544 **BOA,** DH.ŞFR. 558/2, İzzet to Talat, Jerusalem, 26 Haziran 1333 [26 June 1917].

545 **PA-AA,** Türkei 195, Bd.13, Lucius to Bethmann-Hollweg, 1 June 1915.

It can be concluded that Cemal saw Zionism as a danger for the Ottoman domination in Palestine and for the integration of the Jewish population with the Empire, and he wanted to control and eliminate this movement like the other movements that he considered a threat for the integrity of the empire. Although he was exposed to some pressure from domestic and international politics, and from Germany, he could implement his intentions to a considerable extent; the armed guardians of the Jewish colonies were abolished at the beginning of the War[546] as well as their special courts.[547] In addition, their colonies were transformed into the Ottoman villages and the chiefs of the colonies became the Mukhtars of the newly created Ottoman-Jewish villages.[548] It is finally worth to mention that Cemal wanted to eliminate this movement only because of its aspirations in the direction of the establishment of an independent Jewish state in Palestine, not because he wanted to design the population of Palestine along with ethnic considerations.

3.2. Subjugation of the Christian Clergy

Another group, similar to the Zionists, that was exposed to Cemal's policies of suppression to provide the structural unity of the State and to check the influence of the foreign powers was the clergy of the Christian sects, who enjoyed a broad autonomy in the preceding years of the WWI under the protection rights of the Great Powers provided by the Capitulations.[549] As in the other autonomous cases, the abolition of that protection with the outburst of the Great War signified the beginning of the end of an autonomous clergy

[546] Aaronsohn, Ibid, p. 34.

[547] Aaronsohn, Ibid, p. 3.

[548] **PA-AA,** Türkei 195, Bd.17, Ruppin to Bernstoff, Constantinople, 9 November 1917.

[549] For some Articles on the situation of the Christian communities in Syria in the pre-War period, see: Braude, Benjamin and Bernard Lewis, *Christians and Jews in the Ottoman Empire, Volume II: The Arabic-Speaking Lands,* Newyork: Holmes & Meier Publishers, 1982.

for the Christians in the Ottoman Empire in general and in Syria in particular. In the pre-war period, the Christians mainly sympathized with the Europeans in the competition between the Ottoman state and those powers for the influence in the Arab provinces. The agents of the European influence were, to a large extent, the Christian clergy. Therefore, according to the Spanish consul in Jerusalem, the abolition of the Capitulations caused a tremendous panic among the Christian population since they were afraid of a Christian massacre in the Syrian towns.[550]

To eliminate the European influence on the Christian communities, Cemal attempted to Ottomanizate this clergy and thus, to assert the power of the state on the Christian population. For that purpose, during his governorate in Syria, Cemal Pasha set a premium on the subjugation of those autonomous clergy to the Ottoman Imperial authority and, thus, made a considerable effort to eliminate the foreign influence disseminated mostly by the clergy of those religious communities. As a result of that concern, the communities that were under the influence of the Entente states, especially France, were prosecuted and subjugated by Cemal to a broad measure. Possibly, he aimed, to some extent, at the secularization of the Chistian societies, and thus, the increase of the state's control over its Christian citizens.

When the WWI broke out, the vast majority of the Christian population in Syria sympathized with France and Russia ,due to the impact of their clergy, and attributed their salvation from the Ottoman "yoke", to the Entente victory in the war.[551] According to Damascus Consul of Austria, Lebanon, where Maronite Christians were a majority in the population, was "like the French part of the East".[552] In terms of the French and Russian influences, the most important sects were the Greek-Orthodox and the Maronites. Cemal Pasha resorted to annex their clergies to the Ottoman Sultan hierarchically to break the French influence on them and to show their communities the strength of the State asserting the authority of the state on their religious leaders. In that regard, firstly, he laid hands on the appointment of the Maronite Patriarch, who was not appointed by the decree of the

[550] Ballobar, Ibid, p. 28.

[551] **HHStA,** PA 38/363, Ranzi to Berchtold, Damascus, 3 September 1914.

[552] **HHStA,** PA 12/209, Ranzi to Burian,"Die Chancen der egyptischen Expedition-Deutsche Herrscht in Syrien", Damascus, 28 January 1915.

Ottoman Sultan, unlike the other Patriarchs, for about a hundred years. This difference had provided a large autonomy to the Patriarchate. In spite of the irritation of all the Maronite clergy, in the second month of his appointment as the Governor General of Syria, Cemal made the Patriarch a government official and ordered his appointment by the decree.[553] By that decree, all the Patriarchs had became the public officers of the Government.[554] According to the Austrian Consul in Beirut, it would mean that, from then on, those who were favored by the Government as the Maronite Patriarch could be appointed in contrast to the request of the Patriarchate. Under these circumstances, the Patriarch applied to the Austrian Consul for the intervention of his Government, but his endeavor was inconclusive.[555]

Maronite bishops were the most influential carriers of the French influence among their co-religionists and in Lebanon. In addition, in case of a French occupation from the sea, there was a probability for some of the mentioned bishops that they would support the hostile states, since they propagated for the dissemination of the French influence in the region. Furthermore, at the beginning of the War, the Maronite Patriarch gave an interview to the French Newspaper *Le Matin* and declared that 6.000 Maronites in Beirut were ready to join the French army.[556] Therefore, Cemal Pasha called a large group of the Maronite bishops to Jerusalem and Damascus for "consultations". Some of them, who might support France in case of a coastal occupation, were kept as hostages. The most outstanding ones among them were the bishop of Cyprus, Boulos Auwad, the bishop of Beirut, Boutros Schebli and some priests in the immediate circle of the Maronite Patriarch. They would be susceptible to arrest in a naval action of the Entente from the sea.[557]

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[553] **BOA,** BEO 4332/324896, Ministry of Interior to Ministry of Justice and Sects, 5 Kanun-ı Sani 1330 [18 January 1915]

[554] The Armenian Katogigos of Jerusalem was referring himself in his petition written to Cemal Pasha: **BOA,** DH.ŞFR. 529/3, Cemal to Talat, 3 Ağustos 1332 [17 August 1916].

[555] **HHStA,** PA 38/366, Nedwed to Burian, "Firman des Marontischen Patriarchen", Beirut, 15 January 1915.

[556] **BOA,** DH.EUM.7.ŞB 2/1, Foreign Ministry to Ministry of Interior, 7 September 1914.

[557] **PA-AA,** Türkei 177, Bd. 12, Mutius to Bethmann-Hollweg, Beirut, 19 June 1915.

The display of the assertion of the Ottoman authority over the Maronite Patriarch in public was considered necessary by Cemal Pasha to demonstrate the strength of the State to the Syrian public opinion in general and to the Maronite community in particular. By that reason, on 27th July 1915, the Patriarch paid Cemal a “visit” in his headquarters in Sofar of Lebanon by his forceful invitation. The Patriarch covered a long distance from his summer house to appear before Cemal Pasha in spite of his old age. The German Consul in Beirut interpreted the meaning of this event as “the demonstration to all over the World that the Maronite Patriarch [was] no longer the master of Lebanon, [and] he was subjugated to the representative of the Ottoman Government in Lebanon”. *Journal de Beyrouth,* The semi-official newspaper of the Government, conveyed this event as “the resurgence of deep feelings of Ottomanism”.[558]

Although the Patriarch was attached to the body of the Ottoman Empire, he was treated with distrust from the beginning, since he was a mainstay of the Frency policy before the War.[559] Therefore, the beginning of the prosecutions against the members of the Arabist Party caused the stimulation of a similar process for the Maronite Patriarch since he sent a letter to French Foreign Ministry against the Ottoman Government, and that letter was found among the documents seized within the French Consulate in the beginning of the War. As a result of that process, the Patriarch was sent into exile to Adana by reason of his French partisanship.[560]

For Cemal, another autonomous group that had to be controlled for the sake of assertion of the Ottoman dominance over the Syrian peoples was the Greek-Catholic sect, which could be considered another important constiuent of the French influence in Syria. In the beginning of Cemal’s era, like the Maronite Patriarch, the Greek-Catholic Partriarch’s rights on his community were seized and most of his suffragan bishops were heavily punished (3 of his 14 suffragan bishops were sent into exile, one was sentenced with capital punishment, and another 2 were expelled from their own diocese). In the same way, the Greek-Catholic bishop of Akka was in France when the war outburst. He

[558] **PA-AA,** Türkei 177, Bd.12, Mutius to Bethmann-Hollweg, Beirut, 28 July 1915.

[559] **PA-AA,** Türkei 177, Bd.15, Bernstoff to AA, Constantinople, 26 October 1917.

[560] **BOA,** HR. SYS. 2267/34,Talat to Foreign Ministry, 9 Temmuz 1332 [22 July 1916].

delivered a public speech and expressed the loyalty of the Christians in Syria to France. At that time, this speech was published in the French press. Following the War decision of the Ottoman Cabinet, the bishop was sentenced to death because of his speech in France. The bishop, who learned this decision in the last minute, changed his route on the way to Egypt, and could save himself from the death penalty. Similarly, The Bishop of Baalbek was judged of being an accomplice of Nahle Pasha Mutran's treason affair and sent to exile in Urfa. The Bishop of Tripoli, Joseph Dumani was exiled to Sivas with a similar condemnation. The Greek-Catholic Patriarch Kyrill VIIIth, who was supposed to stay three years in Syria and three years in Egypt, was residing in Egypt in the beginning of the War. The Ottoman Government issued a call for him to return Syria. Upon his refusal, the Government collected the bishops in Damascus and requested them to choose an acting-patriarch. In spite of the smallness of the participation, the request was performed.[561]

The story of Djerasimos Messara, the Greek-Orthodox Archbishop, does not differ much from the others narrated above. He had to resign from his post upon the request of the Chairman Officer of the Conscription Commission in Beirut. The Archbishop was a member of the mentioned Commission. The Chairman requested him to work with more enthusiasm, but he resisted this request. In addition, he opposed the extension of the military service to the members of his community during the meeting of the Commission. Because of that, he was expelled from the meeting by the Chairman. The Chairman expressed that he would be delivered to the Court Martial, but later, as a consequence of an agreement between the Government and the Church, the Archbishop retired, and the question was solved. All the Archbishop candidates were educated either in Russia or in Greece. Due to that, it became impossible to find an appropriate candidate, and Michel İbrahim Sursock, the representative of the Beirut's Greek-Orthodox community in the Parliament, was appointed as the Chairman of the local Greek-Orthodox.[562] If secularization was the limitation of the power of the religious authority over the daily life and social order, and the increase of the worldly sovereign in place of it, those

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[561] **HHStA,** PA 38/366, Ranzi to Burian, "Die Politiche Haltung der griechisch-katolischen Geistlichkeit", Damascus, 20 December 1915.

[562] **PA-AA,** Türkei 177, Bd.12, Mutius to Bethmann-Hollweg, Beirut, 8 March 1916.

implementations could be deemed as a step for the secularization the Christian communities in Syria.

Other than the abolition of the autonomy of the sectarian hierarchies annexing them to the Imperial body, Cemal Pasha applied to secure the loyalties of these clergies by the way of giving money to the Churches. The War conditions had left some of the Patriarchates to twist in the wind, and in the absence of any other position, the Greek-Orthodox Church in Jerusalem and Damascus and the Armenian Katogigos in Jerusalem had to apply to Cemal Pasha for help. He answered their requests positively in each time. Beginning from the end of 1915, he lent money to the two religious posts periodically till the end of his governorate on the condition of payment after the War.[563] According to the memoirs of Kurd Ali, he persuaded Cemal that assistance to the Patriarch of Greek-Orthodox community in Damascus would increase the sympathy for the state among both Muslims and the Christians, since the Patriarch was respected by both communities.[564]

Cemal applied all these methods to provide a unitary structure of the Ottoman Empire shedding the religious interlayers between the state and the Christians. Furthermore, removal of the authority of the clergy from the Christian societies was, indeed a kind of secularization for those societies facilitating the control of the state on them. However, the result was in contrast to what he desired in the sense of the sentiments of the local people. Those policies didn't make any contribution to the increase of the Pro-Ottoman feelings of the local Christians, but made them further hostile to the State while antagonizing the Ottoman friendly circles to the Government, and increased their sympathy to the Entente Powers, even if the control of the Government on Christian communities had increased. The operations of Cemal Pasha to subjugate all the sections of

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[563] **BOA,** DH.ŞFR. 507/112, Cemal to Talat, 21 Teşrin-i Sani 1331 [4 December 1915]; **BOA,** DH.ŞFR. 543/72, Cemal to Talat, 5 Kanun-ı Sani 1332 [18 January 1917]; **BOA,** DH.ŞFR. 577/94, Tahsin to Cemal, 13 Şubat 1334 [13 February 1918]; **BOA,** DH.ŞFR. 515/13, Cemal to Talat, 15 Mart 1332 [28 March 1916]; **BOA,** DH.ŞFR. 529/3, Cemal to Talat, 4 Ağustos 1332 [17 August 1917]; He borrowed 10.000 ltq. to the Greek Church of Jerusalem per each month on the account of the 4th Army: **TTK Arşivi,** KO Koleksiyonu 10/17, Cemal to Enver, 18 Haziran 1332 [1 July 1916].

[564] Kurd Ali, Ibid, p. 137.

society made Muslims and Christians closer to each others, which they pursued different aspirations in the preceding years of the War.[565]

Cemal did not only endeavor to remove the authority of the religious institutions and the authority of the civil society organizations, like that of the Zionists, from the Ottoman citizens, the administratively autonomous bodies were also treated in the same way. As the only example, the case of the abolishment of the autonomous Government in Lebanon is worth to analyze for further conception of the nature of Cemal's regime in Syria:

3.3. The End of "*the Long Peace*": Annexation of the Mount Lebanon's Government

On the verge of the War, the autonomous rule in Lebanon [*Mutasarrifiyya*] enjoyed of having all the basic institutions of a modern governmental apparatus. The autonomous government in Mount Lebanon was guided by constitutional regulations. In addition, the Lebanese government had centralized executive, fiscal, and judicial branches as well as municipal administrations serving in the towns. "The entire system was financed by locally raised revenue and manned by experienced native personnel."[566]

The distribution of population of Lebanon in proportion to the religious communities and their political tendencies played an essential role in the establishment of that autonomy: The Maronites enjoyed the lion's share of numbers in the population,

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[565] For the reports regarding the attitude of the Christian peoples in Syria against the Ottoman Government see: **HHStA,** PA 12/209, Ranzi to Burian, Damascus, 28 January 1915; **HHStA,** PA 38/366, Dandini to Burian, "Agitation gegen die Regierung", Aleppo, 24 June 1915; **HHStA,** PA 38/366, Damascus, 20 December 1915; **BA-MA,** RM 40/678, Busse to the Chef of the Admiralty, 7 February 1916; **PA-AA,** Türkei 177, Bd. 13, Mutius to Bethmann-Hollweg, Beirut, 26 April 1916; **PRO,** FO 371/2777, McMahon to FO (transmitting an intelligent from Syria), Cairo, 20 May 1916; **PA-AA,** Türkei 177, Bd.17, Weber to Hertling, Constantinople, 26 June 1918.

[566] Akarlı, Ibid, p. 184.

following them the members of the Greek-Orthodox church were placed in the second rank, while the Druzes were the last great religious community in Lebanon. The former were deeply influenced by France, while the Orthodox were sympathizing with Russia, and according to the statement of the Governor of Beirut, the religious ties, no matter how weak, between the Druze and the Ottoman Empire made them pro-Ottoman at heart, however, they outwardly seemed to be pro-British.[567] Their pro-Ottoman attitude throughout the whole war period confirms the assessment of the Governor.[568] Besides the French sympathy of a considerable number of the Lebanese, the French consuls had a broad authority over the issues of Lebanon. The French Consul, as conveyed by Yusuf al-Hakim, could appoint and dismiss the bureaucrats, such as *Kaimakam*s, in Lebanon without the consent of the Ottoman administration.[569]

As a result of those characteristics of Lebanese Government and People, the outbreak of the WWI sounded the death knell for this order in Lebanon. In two weeks, after the commencement of the mobilization in Syria, the high-officials in Lebanon began to send reports about the dangers posed by the existing order in Lebanon, and advised the seizure of its government by the Central Ottoman Government. Bekir Sami Bey, the Governor of Beirut, advised to Talat, the annexation of the system in Mount Lebanon to the Ottoman Empire administratively with the promulgation of its protocols guaranteed by the Great Powers. However, the Governor didn't ask the abolition of all the privileges of the Lebanese. In contrast, he proposed the continuance of the exemptions such as military

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[567] **BOA,** DH.EUM.4.Şb. 1/4, Bekir Sami to Talat, 20 Ağustos 1330 [2 September 1914]; **MAEE,** Guerre 1914-1918, 867/Turquie, Syrie et Palestine, Phoris ? to MAE, Cairo, 27 November 1914; According to the account of a French Colonel, the number of the Maronites were 300.000, the Greeks were 47.000 and the Druzes were 40.000. For further details, see: **MAEE,** Guerre 1914-1918, 867/Turquie, Syrie et Palestine, Colonel Fuet to MAE, 23 November 1914.

[568] In support of the remarks of the Governor regarding the outwadly attitude of the Druze, the British Consul in Lebanon reported that he received assurances "from all parts of the Lebanon of the faithfulness of the Druzes". These remarks demonstrate that the Druzes were pro-British in appearance: **PRO,** FO 371/2143, Cumberbatch to Mallet, Beirut, 15 September 1914; but their support to the Ottoman Empire till the last moment of the War proves the Governor right.

[569] Al-Hakim, Ibid, pp. 124-125.

service, taxes etc. under the guarantee of the Ottoman Government.[570] In his telegram, which was sent some days later, the Governor proposed to apply pressure on the Governor of Mount Lebanon for the dismissal of the pro-French officials in the service of its autonomous rule.[571] In the same way, the *Kaymakam* of Bekaa repeated the same suggestions adding to them the closure of the pro-French Newspapers, which propagated publicly in the favor of France.[572] In his subsequent proposals, The Governor of Beirut repeated that the recognition of the privileges of Lebanon by the Ottoman Government abolishing the guarantee rights of the Entente powers would destroy the distrustfulness of the Lebanese for the Ottoman Government.[573]

These advises were given due attention as a consequence of the problems caused by the commencement of the mobilization in Syria and the desire of integration of Lebanon with the Imperial body. Militarily, According to the remarks of the British Consul of Beirut, the Lebanese government gave protection to military defaulters, and opened the borders to horses and mules, which were frightened away by their owners to avoid their animals being commandeered. In the beginning of the mobilization several attempts were made by the Ottoman Gendarmes led by Army officers to cross into the Lebanon to arrest defaulters running away from them or to seize transport animals. In every case but one, when they were strong, the Lebanese frontier guards successfully resisted their attempts. Hereupon, the Governor of Beirut openly threatened to send troops to all parts of the Lebanon to seize defaulters and animals liable to be requisitioned. However, an agreement was reached between the sides.[574]

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[570] **BOA,** DH.EUM.4.Şb 1/4, Bekir Sami to Talat, Beirut, 2 Ağustos 1914 [15 August 1914].

[571] **BOA,** DH.EUM.4.Şb. 1/4, Bekir Sami to Talat, 20 Ağustos 1330 [2 September 1914].

[572] **BOA,** DH.EUM.4.Şb. 1/4, Kaymakam of Zıhle to Talat, 12 Ağustos 1330 [25 August 1914].

[573] **BOA,** DH.EUM.KLM 5/11, Bekir Sami to Talat, Beirut, 12 Teşrin-i Sani 1330 [25 November 1915].

[574] **PRO,** FO 371/2143, Cumberbatch to Mallet, Beirut, 15 September 1914.

In a few days following this agreement, the Governor of Mount Lebanon was ordered by the commander of the 8th Army Corps to disarm inhabitants of Lebanon. However, the Governor refused the request demanding the order of Grand Vizier for such an action.[575] That was presumably due to the expressions of the Maronite Patriarch, which were conveyed in the previous section, stating the support of their co-religionists to France, and asking for the victory of the mentioned country against Germany.

The attempts of the Ottoman Government to abolish the status of Lebanon directed the Lebanese to appeal to the French consulate week after week in the beginning of the War for the obtainment of guns and ammunitions to protect their government against an Ottoman invasion. However, the strivings of the Entente Governments to forestall the participation of the Ottomans in the War as an ally of Germany prevented them of the fulfillment of the demands of the Lebanese.[576] Concordantly, the Lebanese in Egypt and Sao Paolo requested on behalf of the Syrians and the Lebanese from the French Government for the invasion of Lebanon by French troops.[577] As was detailed in the first chapter, these plans couldn't be carried into execution since the British headquarters in Egypt kept a defensive policy.[578]

When Cemal Pasha was appointed as the Governor General of Syria, the administration of Mount Lebanon was composed of the following components: The head of the autonomous administration in Lebanon was the governor [*Mutasarrıf*]. This post was occupied by Ohannes Kuyumcuyan. He was the chair of the Administrative Board, which was composed of the representatives of the religious orders. Another influential figure in the Lebanese Government was the Vice-President of the Administrative Board. This place was filled by Habib Pasha Saad, who was a prominent member of the Maronite

[575] **PRO,** FO 371/2143, Mallet to Grey (Transmitting Consul Beirut), "Disarmament of Inhabitants of Lebanon", Constantinople, 2 October 1914.

[576] **MAEE,** Guerre 1914-1918, 867/Turquie, Syrie et Palestine, Picot to Defrance, Cairo, 5 November 1914.

[577] **MAEE,** Guerre 1914-1918, 867/Turquie, Syrie et Palestine, Defrance to Delcasse, Cairo, 9 November 1914; **MAEE,** Guerre 1914-1918, 867/Turquie, Syrie et Palestine, Center for Lebanese Renaissance in Sao Paolo to Delcasse, Sao Paolo, 30 December 1914.

[578] For the details of the plans see: **MAEE,** Guerre 1914-1918, 867/Turquie, Syrie et Palestine, Reffye to Defrance, Cairo, 31 December 1914.

community. According to the assessment of the German Consul of Beirut, the real power in the administration was concentrated in the hands of the Vice-President of the Administrative Board. The Consul depicted the Maronite Patriarch and the Administrative Board, i.e., Habib Pasha Saad as the real rulers of Lebanon. In the viewpoint of the mentioned Consul, the Vice-Presidency was the most influential institution of the French influence there. Due to that, Cemal Pasha dismissed him soon after his appointment as the Governor General of Syria.[579] He didn't neglect to warn the Lebanese to cut their relations with all the Great Powers. In the visit of a Lebanese delegation to him, Cemal advised them to become loyalty to the Ottoman sultan and not to look for protection except for the Ottoman Government.[580]

As a reflection of his general policy of having power over the autonomous structures, in a few days after his arrival in Syria, Cemal Pasha made out a declaration to the Lebanese, aiming at the integration of Lebanon's autonomous structure into the Imperial system. In this declaration, he announced the expansion of the martial law to Lebanon that went into operation after the commencement of the mobilization. In addition, Cemal proclaimed the continuance of the old regulations of Lebanon under the protection of the Ottoman Government. He also ordered a battalion under the command of Colonel Rıza Bey to occupy the Mount Lebanon, and this action was successfully performed by the mentioned troops. Rıza Bey was appointed as the Commander of the Lebanese Detachment, and the Commander of the Lebanese Gendarmerie was subordinated to him. Cemal Pasha ordered Rıza Bey to punish all the assaults of the soldiers on the personal rights of the Lebanese as heavy as possible, and to pay the price of all the things that were bought for the Army. All the educational institutions, which belonged to the Entente, would be seized. Some of the buildings of these institutions would be used by the troops and the others would be transferred to the Lebanese Government. Cemal notified to the Central Government that he would change the existing Governor as soon as he found a

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[579] **PA-AA,** Türkei 177, Bd.11, Mutius to Benthmann-Hollweg, 15 March 1915; **MAEE,** Guerre 1914-1918, 867/Turquie, Syrie et Palestine, Cote to MAE, Port-Said, 9 January 1915.

[580] **BOA,** DH.ŞFR.453/28,Cemal to Talat, 29 Teşrin-i Sani 1330 [12 December 1914].

new candidate.[581] According to a report sent by Cemal, by the occupation of Lebanon an obtacle was overcome preventing the unity of Syria and Palestine, and the dominance of the Government.[582]

Cemal didn't plan to make Mount Lebanon as an ordinary province of the Ottoman Empire, and to secure the obedience of the Lebanese to the regulations implemented for all Ottoman citizens. Quite the reverse, he espoused the maintaining of their concession. In his draft law regarding the status of Lebanon, he proposed the continuance of the exemptions of Lebanese from the military service, the implementation of the selection of the Lebanese Gendarmerie from the local people and the method of tax collection as it was in the past. He only wanted to make the Lebanese felt that the only authority in Lebanon was the Ottoman Government, which could give some privileges in their country.[583]

As part of the policy of the integration of the Lebanese Government with the Imperial body, Cemal removed the Governor of Lebanon, Ohannes Pasha from his post in the fourth month of his presence in Syria as the Governor General, presumably due to his Frankophile attitude.[584] The accountant Halim Bey was temporarily appointed to his post.[585] Following the dismissal of the Governor, Cemal dissolved the Administrative Board, and some of its members were dismissed while some others were invited to Cemal's Headquarters in Jerusalem for "consultations". The elections to determine the members of the Administrative Board were renewed, and the new pro-Ottoman members

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[581] **BOA,** DH.ŞFR.453/28,Cemal to Talat, 29 Teşrin-i Sani 1330 [12 December 1914]; A French ingelligent report from Lebanon confirms that the Ottoman soldiers who made an assault to the People were punishing quickly; **MAEE,** Guerre 1914-1918, 868/Turquie, Syrie et Palestine, Defrance to Delcasse, Cairo, 12 April 1915.

[582] Cemal to Enver, 27 Eylül 1333 [27 September 1917], in *Arşiv Belgeleriyle Ermeni Faaliyetleri,* ATASE Yayınları, Ankara: 2007, p. 697-698.

[583] **BOA,** DH.ŞFR.453/28, Cemal to Talat, 29 Teşrin-i Sani 1330 [12 December 1914]; **BOA,** DH.EUM. 4.Şb. 1/27, Cemal to Talat, 17 Mart 1331 [30 March 1915]; However, the first Muslim governor of Lebanon Ali Münif claims in his memoirs that Cemal wanted the abolishment of these privileges. But he prevented him of doing this: Toros, Taha, *Ali Münif Bey'in Hatıraları,* İstanbul: İSİS Press, 1996, p. 71.

[584] **PA-AA,** Türkei 177, Bd. 11, Wangenheim to Bethmann-Hollweg, Constantinople, 7 April 1915.

[585] **PA-AA,** Türkei 177, Bd.12, Mutius to Bethmann-Hollweg, Beirut, 19 June 1915.

were elected for the Board. The members were elected according to the rules of the former electoral law. However, all the lists were examined by both the civil, and the military authorities, and only those who were permitted to be a candidate could participate in the elections. Cemal had dealt a blow to the post of the Vice-Presidency as well. It was the most influential post in the preceding system, and the former Vice-President played a crucial role in the continuance of the French influence in Mount Lebanon. This post was abolished in the newly-created administration of Cemal, and any of the influential persons, who had a close relationship with the French and the British Consuls before, couldn't enter into the Administrative posts. Thus, the most important agents of the French influence in Lebanon could be ottomanized.[586]

Finding an appropriate candidate for the Governorship of Lebanon took a considerable time of Cemal Pasha. At the end, Ali Münif Bey, the undersecretary of the Ministry of the Interior, was appointed on 4th August 1915 as the Governor of Mount Lebanon.[587] He was a Muslim and his appointment was unlawful, since, according to the constitution of Lebanon, the Governor should be a Catholic Ottoman.[588] The Germans opposed to the appointment of a Muslim to this post, due to that the appointment of a Muslim to this position would increase the frustration of the Lebanese against the Ottoman Empire rather than strengthening the sympathies of the groups in Lebanon.[589]

On his accession to the post, Ali Münif Bey delivered a speech regarding the new status of Lebanon, and stated that:

> "The state of which we are subjected, have abrogated the protocols arranging both the way of the appointment and election of the Governors and the style of its administration. In addıtıon, it eliminated the obstacles preventing the Lebanese to take the advantages of the Ottoman Constitution [*Kanun-ı Esasi*], which had already been provided for the other subjects of the Ottoman Empire. After overcoming all the foreign intervention, the State will act in this province with full independence in accordance with its rights of sovereignty. However, it is a mistake to suppose that… the state would abolish the privileges and

586 **PA-AA,** Türkei 177, Bd.12, Mutius to Bethmann-Hollweg, Beirut, 14 May 1915.

587 **BOA,** MV 241/67, 22 Temmuz 1331[4 August 1915].

588 **PA-AA,** Türkei 177, Bd.12, Hohenlohe-Langenburg to Bethmann-Hollweg, Constantinople, 29 July 1915.

589 The German Ambassador in Istanbul had reported the German policy approximately 4 months before the appointment of Ali Münif Bey: **PA-AA,** Türkei 177, Bd.11, Wangenheim to Bethmann-Hollweg, Constantinople, 7 April 1915.

> allowances of Lebanon maintaining all along, and to suppose that these privileges and allowances were shaped by foreign interventıons the intervention to the issues of the Mount, and were protected by their guarantees. On the contrary, the State deemed the Lebanese worthy of these allowances from the time immemorial, when no foreign intervention and mediation was available, and now [the state] did not think to retrieve those benefactions and benevolences."[590]

He wrote to Talat that the Lebanese were satisfied with his speech. However, quite the reverse of the optimism of the Governor, the Austrian Consul of Beirut assessed that his promises didn't make any sense to the Lebanese, who had already been deprived of most of their privileges. Because of his lack of Arabic knowledge, it was not Ali Münif himself who delivered this speech, instead, the mentioned speech was only read to the Lebanese.[591]

In the viewpoint of German Consul in Beirut, it seemed difficult for Ali Münif to win the confidence of the Lebanese in his capacity as a Muslim governor. The Maronite clergy saw his appointment as a countermeasure to remove their influence from Lebanon. Only the Druze approached the new Governor without prejudice. They would support Ali Münif Bey, if he was interested in their special demands. It is worth to mention in the sense of the decreasing influence of the foreign powers that, once and for all in Lebanon, a governor didn't start with his job sending a message to the consulates regarding his appointment and did not endeavor to establish close relations with them. [592]

Immediately after his appointment, Ali Münif started reforms to assimilate Lebanon to the other provinces of the Ottoman Empire. He started with the Court organization, and reduced the number of Judges in the I. and II. Instance. Following that he appointed magistrates for the four major districts of Lebanon: Shuf, Metn, Kasrawan and Batrun. He appointed for each First Instance Court an investigation judge and a prosecutor. Thus, 24 new justice offices were created. While he was making appointments to the new

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[590] For the whole of the speech see: **BOA,** DH.ŞFR.494/90, Ali Münif to Talat, Cebel-i Lübnan,12 Teşrin-i Evvel 1331 [25 October 1915]; similar remarks were conveyed by the Austrian and the German Consuls of Beirut. For further details see: **PA-AA,** Türkei 177, Bd.12, Mutius to Bethmann-Hollweg, Beirut, 2 October 1915; **HHStA,** PA 38/366, Nedwed to Burian, "Haltung des neuen Libanongouverneurs", Beirut, 20 October 1915.

[591] **PA-AA,** Türkei 177, Bd.12, Mutius to Bethmann-Hollweg, Beirut, 2 October 1915; **HHStA,** PA 38/366, Nedwed to Burian, "Haltung des neuen Libanongouverneurs", Beirut, 20 October 1915.

[592] **PA-AA,** Türkei 177, Bd.12, Mutius to Bethmann-Hollweg, Beirut, 2 October 1915.

posts, he respected the principle of the proportional consideration of the various confessions, and chose 16 Maronites, 3 Druzes, 2 Greek-Orthodoxes, 2 Greek-Catholics and 1 Matwali, a term used for the Shiite Muslims of Lebanon. The governor didn't charge any of non-Lebanese to the newly-created posts.[593]

In the same way, Ali Münif undertook some reforms in the administration and education of Lebanon, too. He endeavored to open schools on behalf of the Ottoman Government as well as taking some steps to develop public works and the agriculture. He planned to establish boys and girls high schools in the large villages. In these schools, according to their sizes, 4, 3 or 2 teachers would be assigned who could teach in Turkish and Arabic as well as a foreign language. The Governor created an inspection of the public schools to deal with the Problems of these educational institutions.[594]

The direction of his reforms was to integrate the Lebanese system to the general Ottoman order. If we are to summarize in his own remarks, Ali Münif's aim was "to annihilate [*eser bırakmamak*] the traces of the autonomous government, and to shape the administration of this province like other *gayr-ı mülhaka* provinces operating independently or subjected to another province till the end of the year."[595] The *Gayr-ı Mülhaka* provinces were directly annexed to the Central Government because of that they were exposed to a danger of foreign occupation or influence, or that their possession were so crucial for the policies of the Ottoman Empire. Medine, Jerusalem, Bingazi were the most important examples of those provinces. However, afterwards, he preferred the second option, and prepared a plan arranging the administration of Mount Lebanon as part of the Beirut province. In the new organization, the divisions of the towns and villages weren't

[593] **BOA,** DH.ŞFR.494/90, Ali Münif to Talat, Cebel-i Lübnan,12 Teşrin-i Evvel 1331 [25 October 1915]; **PA-AA,** Türkei 177, Bd.12, Mutius to Bethmann-Hollweg, Beirut, 5 November 1915.

[594] **BOA,** DH.ŞFR.494/90, Ali Münif to Talat, Cebel-i Lübnan,12 Teşrin-i Evvel 1331 [25 October 1915]; **PA-AA,** Türkei 177, Bd.12, Mutius to Bethmann-Hollweg, Beirut, 5 November 1915.

[595] **BOA,** DH.ŞFR.494/90, Ali Münif to Talat, Cebel-i Lübnan,12 Teşrin-i Evvel 1331 [25 October 1915].

designed on the basis of the confessional separations, as it was in the old regime. The new organization would be implemented beginning from March 1917.[596]

The representation of the province in the Ottoman Parliament was considered another demonstration of the sovereignty in the Empire. However, Lebanon was not represented in the Parliament until the appointment of Ali Münif Bey. He applied to the Central Government for a new arrangement in this sense, and provided the representation of Lebanon in the Parliament with three deputies: 1 Maronite, 1 Druze and 1 Greek-Orthodox. The Government supported Habib Pasha Saad, the old vice-president, as the Maronite candidate, Ibrahim Bey Al-Suad as the Greek-Orthodox candidate and Emin Arslan as the Druze candidate.[597] However, the planned elections could be held 9 months later, at the end of 1916 with some change of the candidates. Different from the first draft, 2 of the candidates were the Maronites, Reshid Rami and Emir Hares Shebab, one was from the Druzes, Adil Arslan from the renowned Druze family.[598]

Towards the end of February 1917, Ali Münif Bey was appointed as the Minister of Public Affairs and left Lebanon, achieving, to a large extent, the integration of Lebanon to the Ottoman administrative system.[599] As for the attitude of the Lebanese to the reforms by Ali Münif, the German Consul in Beirut described their general attitude as totally lukewarm. To be more specific, the Maronites, especially the clergy, assessed all of his reforms as the actions of the Ottoman Government to destroy the special status of Lebanon. The explanations of the Governor in every turn that his mission was to integrate Lebanon into the Imperial body increased their concerns in the mentioned direction.[600]

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[596] **BOA,** DH.ŞFR. 541/49, Ali Münif to Talat, 13 Kanun-ı Evvel 1332 [26 December 1916].

[597] **PA-AA,** Türkei 177, Bd.12, Mutius to Bethmann-Hollweg, Beirut, 15 March 1916; in the interim, Habib Pasha Saad and Emin Arslan would be exiled to Asia Minor on the account of that they had Francophile sentiments; for details see: **PA-AA,** Türkei 177, Bd.11, Mutius to Bethmann-Hollweg, Beirut 26 April 1916.

[598] **BOA,** DH-İ.UM. 2-12, Ali Münif to Talat, Beirut, 17 Teşrin-i Sani 1332 [30 November 1916]; **PA-AA,** Türkei 177, Bd.13, Mutius to Bethmann-Hollweg, Beirut, 9 December 1916.

[599] **BOA,** İ.DUİT, 42/53; **PA-AA,** Türkei 177, Bd.14, Mutius to Bethmann-Hollweg, Beirut, 27 February 1917.

[600] **PA-AA,** Türkei 177, Bd.12, Mutius to Bethmann-Hollweg, Beirut, 15 March 1916.

Apart from that, the unfortunate events influencing the maintenance of the daily life such as famine, epidemics, lawlessness in the food market made him an unsuccessful governor in the eyes of the Lebanese. Nonetheless, he succeeded to integrate the Lebanese administration to the Ottoman Administration.[601]

[601] **PA-AA,** Türkei 177, Bd.14, Mutius to Bethmann-Hollweg, Beirut, 27 February 1917.

CHAPTER IV

"FROM A DANGEROUS MULTITUDE INTO A HARMLESS MINORITY": THE TREATMENT OF THE ARMENIANS IN SYRIA

While Cemal Pasha was ruling in Syria, the deportation of the Armenians in Anatolia was decided. During the process of transportation, a great number of them were sent to Syria for resettlement. Therefore, the Syrian land has a special place in the history of the Armenian deportations and a detailed analysis of the policy of Syria's *de facto* absolute ruler towards the Armenian refugees has a great importance for both to understand the nature of Cemal's rule in Syria and a better understanding of discussions on the Armenian question. There can be found some similarities in his treatment of the Armenians with the policies implemented with regard to the other communities. On the other hand, in spite of the abundance of the academic studies on the Armenian deportations, the scarcity of the studies on the Syrian part of the deportation process in comparison to the incidents took place in the Anatolian provinces will contribute to a better understanding of the subject.

As will be analyzed below, most of the academic studies on this subject either minimize the description of the process experienced in Syria, or misinterpret it due to political concerns. Therefore, before an analysis of the treatment of the Armenians in Syria by Cemal Pasha, this chapter will set out to evaluate the existing literature on the topic.

After that, the analysis will be restricted to the opinions and activities of Cemal Pasha regarding the resettlement of the Armenian refugees in Syria using mostly the dispatches of the regional Ottoman officials, the memoires and the diaries of the deportees as well as the reports of the local consuls. Meanwhile, it is worth to mention that telegraphs sent by the Ottoman officials in the region were rarely used in the studies on the Armenian deportation, probably due to the difficulty of their transcription. Differing from the available sources, this study will undertake to use these documents both to demonstrate the difference among the Ottoman bureaucrats regarding their attitude towards the Armenian deportees and to understand Cemal's policy of the Armenians.[602]

4.1. The Evaluation of the Existing Literature on the Armenian Question

The deportation project of a great amount of the Armenian population from the various parts of Anatolia to Eastern Mesopotamia fired an ever-lasting debate because of the massacres during the deportation. The mainstream of the historical studies, imitating the German Holocaust against the Jews, claimed that it was a genocide configured by the CUP long before the decision of the deportation against the Armenians of the Ottoman Empire to "purify" the population in Anatolia.[603] As summarized by Hilmar Kaiser, they

[602] The telegraphs between DH.ŞFR. 450 and 600 of BOA includes the dispatches from the governorates in the countryside. I didn't see any reference in the available studies to these documents.

[603] For some examples, see: Vahakn N. Dadrian, *The History of the Armenian Genocide. Ethnic Conflict from the Balkans to Anatolia to the Caucasus* Providence and Oxford: Berghahn Books, 1995. Vahakn N. Dadrian, 'The comparative aspects of the Armenian and Jewish cases of genocide: a sociohistorical perspective', in Alan S. Rosenbaum (ed), *Is the Holocaust Unique? Perspectives on Comparative Genocide* Boulder: Westview Press: 1996, See also Taner Akçam, *A Shameful Act. The Armenian Genocide and the Question of Turkish Responsibility,* trans. Paul Bessemer, New York: Metropolitan Books, 2006.

assume “a thoroughly organized and thoroughly executed scheme”.[604] Some others that can be deemed in the same category endeavored to demonstrate that the relocation of the Armenians was a consequence of the ethnicity engineering of the CUP. For that reason, the Unionists planned to evacuate Anatolia from the non-Turk elements to make it a motherland for the Turks.[605]

Kaiser’s assessments on the problem of these studies can be applied to both of these approaches:

> “This paradigm treats the Ottoman Empire as a single unit with a command structure under CUP control. Importantly, the command structure had supposedly two layers, one official and one more secretive including trusted party members. The latter was used to provide for a degree of deception by countermanding official orders with secret ones that effectively annulled the former. Moreover, the government engaged in a policy to destroy incriminating evidence by ordering the destruction of documents deemed dangerous. At times, the government even ordered the production of fake reports.”[606]

In addition to that, they rarely apply to the dispatches of the Ottoman officials in the periphery of the Empire, who displayed resistance in diverse ways to the policies of the Central Government. That deficiency makes their argument of the strict control by the Centre considerably doubtful. On the other hand, as will be shown below, Cemal’s distance and resistance from and to the policies implemented regarding the Armenians by Talaat demonstrates that an important cleavage was in question in the Ottoman Cabinet towards the treatments of the Armenians. Besides that, Kaiser’s debate on the first relocation movement of the Armenian population in Zeitun, seems quite convincing to understand the problem of the ethnic engineering and the prior planning theories:

> “The case of Zeitun, however, demonstrates that no prior planning existed to replace the local Armenians with Muslim settlers. Far from being part of a central government scheme, the limited settlement of Muslim refugees was the result of local initiatives. It was implemented without the prior consent of the central authorities, without budgetary allocations, and against some objections of the Ministry of Interior. The fate of the Armenian deportees from Zeitun and other places demonstrates an absence rather than the existence of preparations. Coordination and planning entered the picture in May and June

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[604] Hilmar Kaiser, “Regional resistance to central government policies: Ahmed Djemal Pasha, the Governors of Aleppo and Armenian Deportees in the spring and summer of 1915”, *Journal of Genocide Research* (2010), 12 (3–4), September–December 2010, p. 174.

[605] Dündar, Ibid, pp. 324-326.

[606] Kaiser, Ibid, p. 174.

> 1915. It was a response to the ensuing chaos along the deportation routes and in the destination areas. The incoming reports, like those from Aleppo, forced the central authorities to implement some degree of coordination while insisting on pushing through at any cost the deportation scheme, which they had now adopted." [607]

On the other hand, many "pro-Turkish" academics, who dealt with this subject, alleged that the deportation of the Armenians prevented a general uprising of the Armenians in the rear of the Ottoman Army. As demonstrated by Kaiser, those authors interconnected the local uprisings of the Armenians in Van and Zeitun as directed by a revolutionary Armenian committee. However, at least for Zeitun, "this conspiracy theory lacks support from the records of the Ottoman 4th Army. No imminent rising was anticipated; people were deported for other reasons. The rebellion thesis ignores those."[608]

As for Cemal's treatment of the Armenians, the picture seems quite ambiguous in the existing studies. To be more specific, even the most elaborate studies on the subject are predisposed to neglect Cemal's intervention in the settlement of the Armenian refugees. Raymond Kévorkian, who wrote a voluminous book (1037 p.) on the Armenian Question, dedicated only six pages for Cemal Pasha's activities. Half of it was spent to explain Cemal's alleged plans to establish an independent state in Syria under his leadership. Kévorkian attributes this peculicar position of Cemal Pasha in the Armenian deportation process to his ambitions of independence in Syria. Cemal had to take the consent of the Entente to be able to achieve that goal and, therefore, he treated the Armenians better than the others.[609] Donald Bloxham's study summarizes the same allegations in three pages.[610] However, those authors ignore the question why Cemal Pasha made many of the leading Arabs an enemy of himself with his tough policies against the Arabist opposition movement, which could be an important base to his alleged separationist policies in Syria. Cemal's calculations on his position in the post-World War Empire can probably be more operative to understand the political aspect of his treatment of the Armenians. Another problem of these studies was their overemphasis on the year

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[607] Kaiser, Ibid, p. 208.

[608] Kaiser, Ibid. p. 175.

[609] Kévorkian, Ibid, p. 683-686.

[610] Bloxham, Ibid, p. 139-143.

1915, while neglecting the settlement processes of 1916 and 1917. Moreover, the expressions in memoirs of Cemal Pasha regarding the Armenian question don't deal with these authors, at least as the study questions, which can be deemed as necessary to tackle for the academics, who investigate about the mentioned subject.

Varying from these authors, Fuat Dündar claims that Cemal had another project of ethnic planning. He interprets the distribution of the Armenians by the Pasha to the various districts of Syria as his policy of balancing Arab nationalists in Syria with the Armenian deportees. Aleppo, the new center of deportation, was depicted by Dündar as the center of the Arab nationalism, whereas the city was the weakest place in Syria regarding the development of the Arabist movement. In this context, he attributes Cemal's conflict with the CUP leaders in Istanbul to the conflict of his population designs of Syria with designs of the central government regarding the population in Anatolia.[611] However, Dündar is not able to document his claims with anything emanating from Cemal Pasha. Moreover, the number of the Armenians settled in Syria was too few to balance the Arabs there. As Cemal always repeated in his telegrams, his aim was to "transform the dangerous Armenian multitude [*külliyet*] into harmless minorities [*cüziyet*]".[612] The section in Dündar's book regarding Cemal Pasha, like the others, is very thin, only four pages.[613]

In addition to that, as will be demonstrated below, most of the Armenians were resettled in the countryside. If Cemal had intended to balance Arab nationalism with the Armenian refugees, then he would house them to the city centers instead of sending them to the villages in the first place. Apart from that, this argument contradicts with Dündar's general approach. He depicted the CUP in his book as a single body disseminated around the Ottoman realm and adopted the same policy under the leadership of Talat Pasha. While he assesses Cemal Pasha's treatment of the Armenians, however, he changes his model and begins to advocate that Cemal Pasha and Talat Pasha had different plans of ethnic designs.

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[611] Dündar, Ibid. p. 326-327; The German Consul in Damascus also expressed the same argument in his reports even if he was suspicious about its possibility of success; **PA-AA,** Türkei 177, Bd. 12, Loytvet to Bethmann Hollweg, Damascus, 7 April 1916.

[612] See, **BOA,** DH.ŞFR. 486/118, Cemal to Talat, 30 Ağustos 1331 [12 September 1915]; Cemal to Enver, 27 September 1917, *Arşiv Belgeleriyle Ermeni Faaliyetleri VII,* p. 698

[613] Dündar, Ibid, pp. 324-328.

Finally, the book has a retrospective character: throughout Dündar's book, it is implied that the CUP leaders were aware that, following the WWI, the Syrian provinces would be lost by the Ottoman Empire and Anatolia would be the motherland of the Turks.[614]

As regards to the "pro-Turkish" group, in recent years, these academics pay a special attention to Cemal Pasha's treatment of the Armenians.[615] The problem of this approach, however, lies in their effort to defend the CUP activities regarding the Armenians rather than setting out to investigate Cemal Pasha's policies and intentions. As a result, these studies transcend the boundaries of the academic language and transform into a defensive one. Although they refer to the losses of the Armenians from time to time, when one reads these works, he or she has a general idea that the deportation movement took place without harming even one Armenian. Like the "pro-Armenians", they also neglect the conflict and factionalism among the CUP leaders and their local representatives regarding the treatment of the Armenians, which would be demonstrated below in a detailed way.

4.2. Cemal Pasha, Talat Pasha and the Armenian Deportations

As emphasized above, similar to the aims of his policies of Zionism and the Christian clergy, Cemal strove for converting the Armenians to be ideal Ottomans, instead of abandoning them to their fate in desert. Therefore, in contradiction to so-called harmony with Talat regarding the measures applied for the Ottomanization of the other

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[614] For an extensive analysis of Dündar's book, see also: Ayhan Aktar and Abdülhamit Kırmızı, "Bon pour l'Orient: Fuat Dündar'ın kitabını deşifre ederken…", in *Tarih ve Toplum Yeni Yaklaşımlar,* 2009:8, pp. 157-187.

[615] For some examples, see: Artuç, Ibid, pp. 292-298; Hikmet Özdemir, *Cemal Paşa ve Ermeni Göçmenler: 4. Ordunun İnsani Yardım Faaliyetleri,* İstanbul: Remzi Kitabevi, 2009; Ahmet Tetik, "4. Ordu Bölgesi'nde Salgın Hastalıklarla Mücadele ve İnsani Yardım Çalışmaları", *Ermeni Araştırmaları Dergisi,* 2008/30, http://www.eraren.org/index.php?Lisan=tr&Page=DergiIcerik&IcerikNo=573.

communities, like Arabs, Christians and Jews, he clashed with Talat on the Armenian policy. Thus, Cemal's policy of the Armenians can't be understood in its context unless an analysis of the similarities and differences between him and Talat and the reasons behind his different treatment towards the deportees is undertaken. Indeed, Cemal and Talat represented two different cliques within the body of the CUP regarding the treatment of the Armenians during the process of the deportations. Many indications can be found about the existence of that division. Especially, the evaluations of the German officials conveyed in the following sections offer many proofs regarding this varience. Similarly, the Ottoman and German records, which will be detailed below, make it clear that the local bureaucracy in Syria was also divided as "pro-Armenians" and their opponents.[616]

Cemal's contemporary remarks in the telegrams, the remarks in his memoires regarding the issue, and the testimony of the diaries and memoires of the other actors offer enough data to understand the main principles of his policy and his difference from Talat's clique. In this sense, the most elaborate analyses were made in his memoirs. Defending the necessity of the Armenian deportations, Cemal begins his assessments analyzing the reasons of the deportation, and accuses the Great Powers, principally Russia, of driving a wedge between the Turks and the Armenians giving evidence of the good relations between the two nations throughout historical periods before the intervention of those powers in the internal issues of the Ottoman Empire.[617] Following that, he claims that he didn't know "on what grounds the Government saw itself to deport all Armenians" noting that he "neither took part in the negotiations at Constantinople" and nor was he consulted.

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[616] The liveliest description of this diversion was made by Falih Rıfkı in *Zeytindağı*, while he narrated the meeting of Halide Edib with Bahaeddin Şakir in the train:

"In a station up from Adana, the late Bahaeddin Şakir came to our compartment. I introduced him to Halide Hanım… After a long discussion Baha Şakir got off the train [to go his destination]. Halide Hanım detained me and said:

- You've made me shaken a slaughter's hand unwittedly.

Baha Şakir, whom I've said goodby down [the train], whispered in my ears [that]:

- The valuable young men, who would be trained like you must be prohibited to communicate with this woman.": Atay, Ibid., p. 78.

[617] For details, see: Djemal Pasha, Ibid, p. 241-277.

He claims that he first learned from the Government Proclamation to the *vilayets* informing "all the Armenians were provisionally to be deported to Mesopotamia, where they were to remain until the end of the War".[618] As the third man of the CUP and as a member of the acting government, it seems impossible to decide on such a crucial issue without letting Cemal to know about it. However, there is no evidence that he was informed. Presumably, before the start of decision-making, in some way they negotiated and Cemal gave his consent one way or the other to the deportation of the Armenians. Furthermore, the statements of the telegraphs sent by him, don't make sense that he was not informed about the deportations. However, he didn't approve the massacres that took place during the transport and always complained about the dreadful organization of the deportations.[619]

Cemal's attitude about the deportation from Zeytun, Dörtyol, Haçin and Adana also demonstrate his different attitude from Talat Pasha and his clique. According to the conveyance of Grigoris Balakian, who was also deported to Zor, Cemal made the following expression about the deportations from this region to the catholicos of Cilicia, Sahag II, in a train station when he was returning from Istanbul to Syria:

> "During the deliberation over this matter in the council of ministers, I tried very hard to argue that instead of deporting and exiling the entire Armenian population only the writers, intellectuals, and Armenian political party leaders –say fifteen or twenty people from each town- should be exiled. I felt that the helpless common people should be spared, but I am sorry to say that I was not able to make my voice heard".[620]

When his military concerns are taken into account, this speech seems to make some sense. Cemal's primary concern regarding the Armenian deportation was the emergence of "any interference with the line of communications" that "might have the gravest consequences for the Canal Expedition". Therefore, According to his memoires, he was opposed to the deportation of the Armenians of Anatolia into Syria, and proposed "to settle the Armenians

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[618] Djemal Pasha, Ibid, p. 277.

[619] According to the remarks of a German official in Istanbul, Cemal was among those, who ashamed what the Armenians happened to: **PA-AA,** Türkei 183, Bd.40, Wolf-Metternich to Bethmann-Hollweg, Constantinople, 9 December 1915, in Serdar Dinçer, *Türk-Alman Silah Arkadaşlığı ve Ermeniler,* CD Supplement, İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2012, p. 774.

[620] Grigoris Balakian, *Armenian Golgotha: A Memoir of the Armenian Genocide, 1915-1918,* Alfred A Knopf, Newyork: 2009, p. 51.

in the interior of the provinces of Konia, Angora, and Kastamuni than to send them to Mesopotamia". However, he claims, he couldn't oppose to an Act of Parliament.[621] His claims regarding the military concerns seem to be true, when his meticulous attitude towards the Canal Expedition and his contemporary telegrams are taken into account.[622] In the same vein, in a telegram, he urged Enver ending the deportation of the Armenians from Anatolia as fast as possible to keep the railroad open for the military transport.[623]

As for his attitude towards the deportation of the Armenians, Cemal's remarks regarding the decision-making process in his memoires demonstrate that he was not an opponent of the decision to deport the Armenians:

> "If I had been in Constantinople at the time and taken part in the discussions, knowing what was happening in the rear of the Army in East Anatolia, should I not have supported the deportations ? This question I cannot now answer. But I assume that my friends, in reaching such a drastic decision as this wholesale deportation which roused the indignation of the whole civilized world, must have been actuated by weighty reasons. I have no doubt that in the publications which are shortly to appear they will satisfy our doubts and curiosity.
> I am certainly firmly convinced that the Armenians planned insurrections which endangered the rear of our Army in the Caucasus and which might under certain circumstances have completely destroyed it. Consequently my friends held it moreexpedient to transfer the whole Armenian nation to another region where they could do no harm, than to expose the whole Ottoman Empire to a catastrophe which would have involved Russian occupation of the whole of Asia Minor."[624]

His contemporary remarks also show that he saw concentration of the Armenians dangerous in any region of the Empire. In a telegram sent by him to the Governor of Aleppo, Cemal explicitly expresses his concern about the concentration of large number of

[621] Djemal Pasha, Ibid, p. 277.

[622] In February 1916, in Adana-Aleppo line the transfer of the Armenian refugees had to be interrupted due to the intensity of the military consignment: Talat to Enver, 3 Şubat 1331 [16 February 1916], in *Arşiv Belgeleriyle Ermeni Faaliyetleri 1914-1918 Vol III,* ATASE Yayınları, Ankara: 2007, p. 554.

[623] He advised Enver to increase the number of the trains allocated to the Armenian refugees to complete the transport of the deportees as much as possible. For details, see: Cemal to Enver, Aleppo, 27 Teşrin-i Evvel 1331 [9 November 1915], in *Arşiv Belgeleriyle Ermeni Faaliyetleri Vol IIIV,* p. 475.

[624] Djemal Pasha, Ibid, p. 279-280.

Armenians in Marash.[625] He warned the governor of Marash that the first Armenian uprising against the State emerged in that province and, therefore, the accumulation of Armenians in such a great number there, would be dangerous militarily.[626]

However, Cemal was opposed to the massacres perpetrated against the Armenian convoys. According to Wolff-Metternich, a German official in Istanbul, Cemal expressed to him that the directives about the deportation of the Armenians in the beginning of the process were right, but later the implementation of them was badly organized.[627] Cemal's own statements were also in this direction. One of his telegrams regarding the transfer of the deportees from Aleppo to Zor, Cemal gave voice to the following concerns:

> "… The dispatch of the Armenians [accumulated] in Aleppo to Zor is impossible due to the provisioning and habitation concerns…if those were sent [there], a very crowded Armenian colony will be created in Rakka [Zor]…Therefore, there is no solution, but to send those Armenians to Mousul. [After that] the followıng problem will arise; the transfer of about 20.000 Armenians [located] in Aleppo to Re'sülayn by train in winter season, and to organize their transport from there to Mousul humanely [will be tough]. The needed trains for that must be reserved till Re'sülayn, and from Re'sülayn transport means, consisted of cars and pack animals [*mekkari*] must be prepared, and in between Re'sülayn and Mousul, it is a must to create places for [temporary] accommodation and to provide in those places provisioning and tents… I beg to ask [*istirham etmek*] to start the transport of the first convoys of the Armenians following [my] inspection that will convince my humble self to the completion of those preparations…"[628]

Cemal regarded the Armenians as the citizens of the Ottoman Empire.[629] As touched in the previous chapters, he ascribed great importance to create a feeling of strong state among the citizens. Therefore, his frustration can also be interpreted in terms of his concern to

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[625] The Governor of Aleppo to Talat, Damascus, 16 Nisan 1332 [29 April 1916], in *Arşiv Belgeleriyle Ermeni Faaliyetleri,* p. 558.

[626] Cemal to the Governor of Marash, Damascus, 31 Mart 1332 [13 April 1916], in *Arşiv Belgeleriyle Ermeni Faaliyetleri,* p. 557.

[627] **PA-AA,** Türkei 183, Bd. 40, Wolff-Metternich to Bethmann Hollweg, Constantinople, 7 December 1915, In Dinçer, Ibid. [CD], p. 772.

[628] **BOA,** DH.ŞFR. 541/120, Cemal to Talat, 21 Teşrin-i Sani 1332 [4 November 1916]; for similar evaluations by Cemal, see: **BOA,** DH. ŞFR, 528/38, Cemal to Talat, Aleppo, 28 Temmuz 1332 [10 August 1916]; **BOA,** DH.ŞFR. 553/115, Cemal to Talat, Jerusalem, 9 Mayıs 1333 [9 May 1917].

[629] "Every Armenian is our citizen as separate persons": Cemal to Enver, 27 September 1917, *Arşiv Belgeleriyle Ermeni Faaliyetleri VII,* p. 698

represent the state strong in the eyes of its citizens.

Quite the opposite of Cemal, Talat connived at the dispatch the Armenians to the Desert, although he knew the dangers of it. In one of his speech at the Ottoman Parliament, regarding the settlement of the Muslim refugees from the Balkans to the Ottoman territories Talat opposed the suggestion of the Aydın deputy Emanuelidis Efendi on settling these people in the "empty lands from Üsküdar to Basra". He expressed "If we had sprinkled those refugees sending them, as they [Emanuelidis] said, to the Desert, all of them would die thereabouts".[630] Judging from this speech Talat had an opinion about the destiny of the Armenians, when they were exiled to the south of Aleppo.

As for the political reasons behind Cemal's lenient treatment of the Armenian deportees, it is claimed in the studies made by Bloxam and Kevorkian that Cemal Pasha planned to establish an independent state in Syria, and he wanted to gain sympathies of the Entente states. Therefore, he treated with affection towards the Armenians. As stated above, when considered Cemal's activities to integrate the Syrian realm, this argument seems irrelevant. This claim was largely due to his way of administration in Syria. During his governorate in Syria, Cemal was quite independent from the Central Government. But his policies were somewhat concordant with those of the Center. Indeed, as the third man of the ruling party, the CUP, and as a member of the Cabinet, the Central Government did not need to check him, and supported many of his actions for the sake of the re-formation of the state in Syria. He enjoyed full confidence of the CUP leaders in İstanbul. However, it seems that, the independent character of his rule caused some debates among the Entente states on the persuasion of Cemal to a rebellion against the Ottoman Empire. Especially the documents in the British archives on this issue made some sholars think that Cemal wanted to establish an independent state in Syria rebelling against the Ottoman Empire.[631] According to these documents, the Entente states discussed to offer independence to Cemal Pasha in Syria in return for his rebellion against the Ottoman Empire.[632] There are no

[630] Dündar, Ibid, p. 257.

[631] Bloxam, Ibid, pp. 139-143; Kevorkian, Ibid, pp. 683-686.

[632] For these documents, see: **PRO,** FO 371/2492, Grey to Cabinet (Transmitting Russian Embassy in London), "Internal Situation in Turkey", London, 29 December 1915; For the British refusal of the proposal, see: **PRO,** FO 371/2492, Grey to Buchanan,

remarks or documents in the mentioned files belonging to Cemal Pasha. It is rather a discussion of the option of Cemal's rebellion. They negotiated the issue and decided that Cemal was not ideal to support for their designs in the Arab Middle East. Presumably, Cemal was not informed about those plans. The German officials were cognizant of those rumours. However, all the German officials in Syria witnessed the loyalty of Cemal Pasha to the Ottoman Central Government and to the ideals of the Turco-German alliance.[633] When the German Consul in Damascus showed the news of *le Temps* that Cemal was cooperating with the Entente Cemal interpreted that those rumours were deliberately produced to drive a wedge between the Turks and Germans and added: "should my countrymen and yours read them carefully and they open their eyes well".[634] The most reasonable explanation was made by Erden in this issue. He explained in his memoires that:

> "Cemal Pasha thought that the role of Enver Pasha would come into an end after the war. For *Sadrazam* Talat Pasha, he [always] said 'he [Talat] can best be the leader of the Party'. Thus, the most suitable one, to be Grand Vizier, was nobody, but himself."[635]

Cemal's memoires also supports this allegation. In such a way that Cemal devoted a chapter of his memoires to the Armenian Question and his activities to assist the Armenian deportees and published it at a time that the fate of the Empire was drawing to an end. He adopted a defensive language and answered the claims of Mandelstam and the American

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"Internal Situation in Turkey", London, 29 December 1915; for the refusal of the French Government the proposal of Cemal's rebellion, see: **PRO,** FO 371/2492, Buchanan to Grey, "Internal Situation in Turkey", Petrograd, 31 December 1915; some other documents for the same discussion, see: **PRO,** FO 371/2767, Grey to Buchanan, London, 30 December 1915; **PRO,** FO 371/2767, FO to Buchanan, "Internal Situation in Turkey", Petrograd, 31 December 1915; **PRO,** FO 371/2767, Buchanan to Grey, Petrograd, 2 January 1916; **PRO,** FO 371/2767, FO to Cambon, London, undated; **PRO,** FO 371/2767, Hirtzel to FO, 17 January 1916.

[633] For the remarks of Von Kress in this direction, see: **PA-AA,** Türkei 177, Bd. 12, Metternich to Bethmann-Hollweg, Constantinople, 27 November 1915; for the opinion of the German Embassy in the same way, see: **PA-AA,** Türkei 177, Bd. 12, Metternich to Bethmann-Hollweg, Constantinople, 21 January 1916.

[634] **PA-AA,** Türkei 177, Bd. 12, Löytved to Bethmann-Hollweg, Damascus , 2 January 1916; in the same telegram, the Consul states that he agrees with Cemal.

[635] Erden, Ibid., p. 285.

Ambassador Morgenthau. Although, he did not publish all the chapters of his memoires in foreign languages,[636] he had the Armenian chapter to be translated to both English and German. Taking these remarks into consideration, it can be concluded that Cemal's political ambition for future was to take over a significant role in the creation of the new Turkey. Presumably, he was quite aware during the wartime that after the conclusion of the hostilities the treatment of the Armenians would brought to the table both by the Germans and the Entente powers even if the Ottoman side won the war. Therefore, not to contaminate his name, Cemal showed an extra sensitivity towards the problems of the Armenians.

4.3. Dealing with the Deportation Process

Cemal's attempts to ameliorate the terrible conditions of the Armenians support the arguments explained above. Beginning from the arrival of the first convoys to the boundaries of Syria, he actively intervened in the process. As will be seen below, his intervention was quite accordant with his general policy of re-formation of the state in Syria converting the Armenians into "harmless" and, thus loyal, citizens of the State, like the decentralist Arabs, Zionists and pro-French Christians. Before the analysis of his actions in that sense, a short summary of the conditions of the Armenians arrived at Aleppo will contribute to understand the wider picture.

The first convoys of the Armenian deportees began to arrive at the boundary of the region that Cemal was responsible, during the course of July 1915. By the beginning of August, according to the remarks of the German Consul, there were Armenians in Aleppo

[636] The chapter that he depicted his public works in Syria and his remarks on the Druzes weren't include in the English version.

from all parts of Anatolia.[637] The deportees had reached there in extremely terrible conditions due to partly the hard conditions of their travel and partly maltreatment by the Gendarmeries and the brigands.[638] The conditions of the deportation were so terrible that they had to leave their children in the city centers under some rags[639], or had to sell them to well-to-do people of the cities not to take them to a definite misery with themselves.[640] According to the remark of a Turkish lieutenant colonel to a German engineer, there were countless children abandoned by their parents on the roads, and those children were adopted by the native families of the towns. The mentioned lieutenant and his brother had also adopted one child.[641] In the same way, the testimony of Yervant Odian, who was also a deportee, about the sale process is more than enough to understand the soul-shattering situation of the deportees:

> "I saw for the first time, the dreadful, heart-rending trade in children in the camp in Sebil. Arab, Turkish and Jewish women would come from Aleppo in carriages and start going from one tent to another, asking, "Are there any children for sale?" (*"Satlik cohjuk var me?*)
> Those parents who were wealthy would send these women away with horror, but the poor and the hungry hesitated. That hesitation was enough to begin the haggling.
> "Let's let him go" the husband would say, holding his son's hand.
> "I'll die before I'm separated from my son," the wife would cry."[642]

As a result the parents would be persuaded that they would, probably, die during the transport, and should save their children, at least, from a total destruction. The descriptions of the Ottoman telegraphs were confirming their fatal miseries, at the same time. The

[637] **PA-AA,** Türkei 183, Bd. 38, Rössler to Bethmann Hollweg, Aleppo, 7 August 1915, in Dincer, Ibid.[CD], p. 536.

[638] **PRO,** FO 371/2781, Sykes to WO, "Information from two Arab officers recently arrived in England From the Caucasus [Lieutenant Shurbaji and Lieutenant Shaikha]", 25 September 1916.

[639] **PA-AA,** Türkei 183, Bd. 37, Rössler to Bethmann Hollweg, Aleppo, 17 July 1915, in Dincer, Ibid.[CD], p. 536.

[640] **PA-AA,** Türkei 183, Bd. 38, Rössler to Bethmann Hollweg, Aleppo, 31 July 1915, in Dincer, Ibid.[CD], p. 554.

[641] **PA-AA,** Türkei 183, Bd. 38, Ernst Piper [a German Engineer] to Rössler, Aleppo, 18 July 1915, in Dincer, Ibid.[CD], p. 597.

[642] Yervant Odian, *Accursed Years: My Exile and Return from Der Zor, 1914-1919,* London: Gomidas Institute, 2009, p. 99.

Governor of Aleppo, Bekir Sami Bey, who was also one of the most important opponents of the deportation of the Armenians, described the situation of the Armenians with the following remarks:

> "Today, again, [a] convoy of the Armenians from the eastern *vilayets*, consisted only of the women and the children not older than 12 years, has arrived here. Every two days, such a convoy consisting of women and children turn up here their numbers changing between 500-1000 and 3.000… As for their settlement, how and where to settle such a great number of the destitute, consisting only of children and women?... wretchedness, starvation and disaster destroy hundreds of the children. Therefore, it is impossible to think that they would survive for a long time…"[643]

The telegram of Bekir Sami also demonstrates that the Armenians were abandoned to their own fate by the Central Government. While the convoys of the deportees were arriving one after another, as the head of the civil bureaucracy in Aleppo, the Governor didn't know how many Armenians would be settled in Aleppo, as well as the number of the ones, who would be transported to the other destinations. Being incognizant of the Armenian policy of the Central Government, Bekir Sami asked for clarification of the main principles of the deportation.[644] With the remarks of the German Consul of Aleppo in a later date, the Ottoman state officials didn't have any responsibility vis-a-vis their superiors, due to the Armenians who couldn't live, and these officials had the right to leave them to be destroyed.[645]

As a result of the deteriorating conditions of the Armenians, Cemal Pasha paid a visit to Aleppo to inspect their situation. By Cemal's words, the organization of the deportation was made badly, and the refugees had arrived at Aleppo in squalor [*sefalet içinde*].[646] Therefore, Cemal applied some precautions to make their situation better. With regard to these amelioration activities in the beginning, upon the application of the Armenian Catholicos of Aleppo, Cemal ordered 5 Metelik (20 pfennig) to be paid for the

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643 **BOA,** DH.ŞFR. 488/5, Bekir Sami to Talat, Aleppo, 28 Ağustos 1331 [9 September 1915].

644 **BOA,** DH.ŞFR. 488/5, Bekir Sami to Talat, Aleppo, 28 Ağustos 1331 [9 September 1915].

645 **PA-AA,** Türkei 183, Bd. 47, Rössler to Bethmann Hollweg, Aleppo, 16 March 1917, in Dincer, Ibid.[CD], p. 1012.

646 **BOA,** DH.ŞFR. 477/104, Cemal to Talat, 15 Ağustos 1331 (28 August 1915)

adults and 4 Metelik (16 pfennig) for the children as daily allowance.[647] He decided to resettle some families around Aleppo, in the agriculturally productive lands,[648] in consultation with the state functionary [*Eyyub Bey*], who was assigned to house the Armenian refugees; 835 of the Armenian families in Maarre district, 990 to Bab district, 2.250 to Muslimiye [Mesmiye?] district, on condition that the proportion of the refugees would not transcend 10 percent of the total population.[649] But, the Aleppo Consul of Germany reported in February 1916 that Cemal's arrangements in Bab were "torn down", and the Armenians of Bab were sent to Der Zor,[650] which was then synonymous with death for the Armenians.[651] According to Mustafa Abdulhalık Bey, the Governor of Aleppo, that relocation had to be applied because of the lack of the ownerless agricultural lands, which would be allocated to the Armenians.[652] Apart from that, Cemal also calculated the fund required for the solution of this question in a smooth way as 11.035.000 qurush and demanded the dispatch of 1/4 of it as quickly as possible. In his telegraph to Talat, Cemal also warned the Minister of Interior to prevent the attacks against the Armenians of Van and Diarbekir between Diarbekir and Aleppo.[653]

Cemal also applied some protective measures to detain the Armenians in the city centers. He employed the artisans among the deportees in the factories of the Army. He used this opportunity to prevent as many as Armenians from being sent to the desert. As a result, he conflicted with the anti-Armenian clique under his rule. In this regard, the Pasha

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[647] **PA-AA,** Türkei 183, Bd. 38, Rössler to Bethmann Hollweg, Aleppo, 27 July 1915, in Dincer, Ibid.[CD], p. 536.

[648] In a telegram of the Governor of Aleppo, these lands were mentioned as agriculturally productive areas. For details, see: **BOA,** DH.ŞFR. 521/106, Mustafa to Ministry of Interior, 21 Mayıs 1332 [3 June 1916].

[649] **BOA,** DH.ŞFR. 477/104, Cemal to Talat, 15 August 1331 (28 August 1915)

[650] **PA-AA,** Türkei 183, Bd. 41, Rössler to Bethmann Hollweg, Aleppo, 9 February 1915, in Dincer, Ibid.[CD], p. 837.

[651] For a better conception of the fatal meaning of being sent to Der Zor for the Armenians, see: Odian, Ibid, p. 99.

[652] **BOA,** DH.ŞFR. 521/106, Mustafa to Ministry of Interior, 21 Mayıs 1332 [3 June 1916].

[653] **BOA,** DH.ŞFR. 477/104, Cemal to Talat, 15 August 1331 (28 August 1915)

clashed with the *kaymakam* of Islahiye Nusret Bey about the protection of the Armenians and didn't hesitate to dismiss Nusret Bey. The dismissal turned into a crisis between Cemal and Talat in a short while exposing the conflict between Talat and Cemal on the Armenian deportation. In such a way that an officer called Abdülhamid Bey was assigned by Cemal to organize the detainment of the Armenian craftsmen in Islahiye for the employment within the body of 4th Army[654] together with the mentioned *kaymakam.* According to the report of Abdülhamid Nusret was acting quite inattentive [*gafilane*] about the Armenian deportees, Cemal ordered the governor of Adana to dismiss the *kaymakam* without giving information to Talat, the Minister of Interior and the head of the civil bureaucracy. He also didn't give any information to the Governor of Adana about the mission of Abdülhamid. Sided with the *kaymakam,* the Governor Hakkı complained about Cemal to Talat claiming that Nusret was working zealously [*gayretle*] in the transport of the Armenians. On the other hand, Cemal claimed that Nusret was dismissed because of his neglectful attitude.[655]

The telegram of Şükrü Bey, the Director for the Immigrants, who was sent by Talat to Aleppo to organize the transport of the deported Armenians in Aleppo, makes the reasons of the conflict quite clear. As the man of Talat, Şükrü first states that the *kaymakam* was conducting the works of transportation with great success [*gayet muvaffakiyetle*]. On the remarks of Şükrü Bey, the officer Abdülhamid expressed that the *kaymakam* didn't give due consideration to the issue of the deportation and didn't want to work at nights; on the other hand, the *kaymakam* stated that Cemal's officer intervened in the issues of the transportation with a boundless authority and gave directions to the *kaymakam.* He continues that the officer delayed the deportation of 8.000 Armenians from Islahiye on the pretext that they were artisans and would be employed within the body of the Army. Şükrü expressed that, with the dismissal of *kaymakam* Nusret Bey, the organization of all the works of the deportees was taken over by Cemal's officer, and the continuation of this situation couldn't be permissible. Therefore, new officials should be sent to Islahiye. Şükrü also wrote to the 4th Army requesting to be given information on

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[654] Only this information in this paragraph was taken from Şükrü Bey's telegram: **BOA,** DH.ŞFR. 498/107, Şükrü to Talat, 12 Teşrin-i Sani 1331 [25 November 1915].

[655] **BOA,** DH.498/88, Hakkı to Talat, Adana, 11 Teşrin-i Sani 1331 [24 November 1915].

how many artisans did the Army need, most probably to prevent such actions.[656] The remarks of Şükrü demonstrate the political polarization between Cemal and Talat on the Armenian deportation. The phrases in the telegraphs also clarify the difference. As can be comprehended from the mentioned telegraphs, Cemal, Şükrü and Talat understood different things from "working with an effort" on the deportation of the Armenians. It is something like a password, which had separate meanings for each side. Moreover, Şükrü's telegraph demonstrates the distrust of the sides to each other.

The testimony of the Armenian deportees indicates at the same time that, during the transportation process, Cemal protected the Armenians under the color that he needed the Armenian artisans within the body of the Army. Yervant Odian narrated his registration with 300 other Armenians as artisans of the 4th Army with the following words:

> "… The tent we were staying in belonged to a family from Bardizg. 'We're going to Syria,' said the head of the family, 'just like 300 other families.'
> 'How did you arrange that..?'
> 'Djemal Pasha issued and order for artisans to be separated and sent to Sham (Damascus). As artisans we're going there to work in government factories. They are especially looking for tailors, shoemakers, metalworkers, carpenters and weavers.'
> 'Are all the three hundred families artisans?'
> 'The majority are artisans, but there are some who've no trade at all, but who have succeeded in registering as artisans.'
> 'How…?'
> 'By bribery or deception'
> Indeed many men who had registered as tailors, sat in their tents from morning till night, learning how to thread needles and to sew from their wives."[657]

As will be detailed below, while he was settling the Armenians in the cities of Syria, Cemal would again fall into dispute with some of the civil bureaucrats, who disfavored the improvement of the conditions of the Armenians.

Besides his efforts to ameliorate the conditions of the Armenians during the transportation, Cemal also endeavored to reduce the number of the deaths from the epidemics and assault of the tribes and bands. Since the spread of the epidemics carried the

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[656] Only this information in this paragraph was taken from Şükrü Bey's telegram: **BOA,** DH.ŞFR. 498/107, Şükrü to Talat, 12 Teşrin-i Sani 1331 [25 November 1915].

[657] Odian, Ibid, p. 97.

risk of the infection of these diseases in the Army,[658] Cemal made his best to forestall the spread of the epidemics in his territory. Secondly, as stated in the previous section, he avoided staining the region of the 4th Army with the rumors of the Armenian massacres. Instead, he intended to keep the Armenians alive and to make them ideal citizens, integrating them into Syrian society. Therefore, Cemal Pasha mobilized all the possible means to stop the spread of the epidemics among the Armenians.

Upon the alarming situation of the epidemic diseases among the Armenians, he first published an Army order to the officials under his rule in Aleppo to transport the deportees to their ultimate resettlement places as quickly as possible. He also required the investigation the Armenians before sending them to their ultimate settlement places. If they were sick, they must have been detained and treated in the hospitals.[659] Two Armenian doctors, Haçik Bogosyan and Toros Ovaciyan, were assigned to this job.[660] Before the departure of the trains, the police was carrying out a search with a doctor in the cars, and those who were suspected of having an epidemic weren't allowed to travel to another place regardless of their ages.[661] During those dates, Talat also ordered the Governor of Syria to be careful about the dissemination of the epidemics. However, he urged the Governor to transport the deportees as quickly as possible to prevent the dissemination of the diseases in the cities. He didn't mention any treatment for the recovery of them.[662] The fair difference in their approaches to handle the threat of epidemics brought about by the

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[658] For the opinions of Von Kress on the danger of epidemics accompanied by the deportees, see: **BA-MA,** RM 40/678, Aleppo Consul to Etappen-Kommando in Constantinople, 28 October 1915; in the existing literature, there can be found some studies on the struggle of Cemal Pasha with the epidemic diseases particular to the Armenians. However, the writers don't make emphasis on this aspect of Cemal's action. For some examples, see: Özdemir, Ibid, p. 175-184; Tetik, Ibid.

[659] **ATASE Arşivi,** Kls. 3253, Ds. 2, Fih. 7; Ds.5A, Fih. 1-6, Cemal to Aleppo Commissariat, 20 Ağustos 1331 [2 Eylül 1915], in *Arşiv Belgeleriyle Ermeni Faaliyetleri 1914-1918, Vol. VIII* and in Tetik, Ibid.

[660] **ATASE Arşivi,** Kls. 3253, Ds. 2, Fih. 7A, The Commissariat of Aleppo to Cemal, 19 Teşrin-i Evvel 1331 [1 November 1915].

[661] Dadrian, 19 October 1915, Ibid., p. 86-87.

[662] **BOA,** DH.ŞFR. 57/71, Talat to the Governor of Syria, 4 Teşrin-i Evvel 1331 [17 Ekim 1915], see also: *Arşiv Belgelerinde Ermeniler,* BOA Yayınları, p. 105.

Armenian refugees can be interpreted as the difference between Talat and Cemal in their policies towards the Armenians.

Efforts to fight the epidemics were maintained after the settlement of the deportees, too. In this context, the Armenian deportees, who were resettled in the cities benefitted from these advantages.[663] However, the situation in the villages was extremely bad. As depicted in the diaries of Vahram Dadrian, "It has been only three months since the Armenians settled here, but our [the Armenians] cemetery is much bigger than that of the Circassians, who have lived here for half a century."[664] Almost all of these people had died from the epidemic diseases. However, It was not a deliberate action of the Governmental authorities in Syria to cause the death of all the Armenians. As will be explained in Chapter 8, with the beginning of the War, the Syrian realm experienced a scarcity of physicians since almost all of the foreign hospitals were confiscated and their physicians were deported. Therefore, there was indeed no physician available to go to the villages to treat the sick persons, and as a result, the epidemics caused the death of a great number of Armenians in the villages. According to the report of the Austrian Consul, when they were decided to be relocated in the city centers, approximately 3/4 of them had died because of the epidemics and famine.[665]

Besides the struggle with the epidemics for the protection of the Armenians from a total destruction, Cemal also inflicted severe punishments on those, who maltreated the Armenians during the transportation process. The best-known of these was the execution of the Circassian Ahmed and his friend Halil, who killed the celebrated Armenian Deputies Zohrab and Vartkes Efendis. These two deputies were arrested in Istanbul and sent to Diarbekir to be tried in the Court-Martial. However, during their travel, they were assassinated by the Circassian Gang leaders Ahmed and Halil.[666] The attacks took place in the area of 4th Army. Therefore, Cemal enthusiastically followed them. When they were

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663 For the details of the measures applied in the cities to protect the Armenians from epidemics, see: Tetik, Ibid.

664 Dadrian, 7 November 1915, Ibid. 112.

665 **HHStA,** PA 12/463, Ranzi to Burian, "Die Besserung der Lage der armenischen Zwangsauswanderer", Damascus, 28 November 1916.

666 Balakian, Ibid, p. 103-105.

caught in Karahisar, Cemal sent special officers to take them to Damascus.[667] As a result of a long process, they could be captured and brought to Damascus to be judged in the Court-Martial. The court sentenced Ahmed to death and the verdict was implemented the next day.[668] Halil was sentenced to ten years of imprisonment. But, Cemal refused the decision of the court about Halil and demanded the renewal of his trial.[669] He ended up like his friend and was executed.[670] According to Falih Rıfkı, Cemal made an effort to save the Armenian deputies from death. When they departed from İstanbul, Cemal requested Talat to send these deputies to Lebanon to make them "unharmful". However, Talat insisted that they must be tried before the court martial and, by this way, they were killed.[671]

Similarly, the robbers, who assaulted the Armenian deportees, were severely punished when their assaults were reported to Cemal. In the report of a German official, it is stated that Cemal had many robbers hanged because of their attacks against the deportes.[672] A detailed report was transmitted by the Aleppo Consul on the issue: When Cemal Pasha arrived at Aleppo, at the end of the year 1915 to examine the conditions of the Armenians, he found out that the Kurdish bands assaulted the Armenians collected in the concentration camp at Islahiye, and slaughtered children and women. Upon that, Cemal Pasha assigned 12 of his own guardsmen to capture those attackers. They energetically

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[667] **BOA,** DH.ŞFR. 488/48, Cemal to Talat, Damascus, 27 Ağustos 1331 [9 September 1915].

[668] **BOA,** DH.ŞFR. 488/48, Cemal to Talat, Damascus, 13 Eylül 1331 [26 September 1915]; the German consul in Damascus advised to the German Foreign Ministry to use the execution of Ahmed as a propaganda means for the Armenian events in the press: **PA-AA,** Türkei 183, Bd. 40, Loytwed-Hardegg to the Ambassador in Istanbul, Damascus, 17 November 1915, in Dinçer, Ibid. [CD], p. 743.

[669] **BOA,** DH.ŞFR. 488/48, Cemal to Talat, Damascus, 4 Teşrin-i Evvel 1331 [17 October 1915].

[670] Erden, Ibid. p. 227. Balakian confuses that Halil with Enver Pasha's uncle Halil Pasha and claims that those gang leaders were awarded and sent Caucasus , with the hope of exterminating the Caucasus Armenians. See: Balakian, Ibid., p. 106.

[671] Atay, Ibid, p. 81.

[672] **PA-AA,** Türkei 183, Bd. 40, Metternich to Bethmann Hollweg, 7 December 1915, Constantinople, in Dinçer, Ibid. [CD], p. 772.

pursued the bandits and, as a result, some of them were brought to Aleppo and hanged there.[673]

All in all, during the transport of the Armenian refugees Cemal wholeheartedly strove for the betterment of their conditions. However, it doesn't mean that everything was corrected after the arrival of the Armenians to the area of the 4th Army. Considerable number of the Armenians continued to die after the arrival at their constant settlement places, mostly because of the conditions prevailing in Syria brought about by famine, epidemics, lack of the physicians as analyzed in a detailed way in Chapter 8.

4.4. Settlement of the Armenian Deportees in the 4th Army Zone

Besides dealing with the tremendous problems of the deportees that they faced during the transport, Cemal focused his main concern to the resettlement of the deportees in an organized way as much as he could. In this regard, he decided to send a considerable number of the refugees from Aleppo to Damascus to resettle them in Hauran and East Jordan. He marked Damascus as the second centre of distribution for the Armenians, who would be resettled in the 4th Army zone, after Aleppo. In this section, the analysis will concentrate on Cemal's own activities of resettlement of the Armenian refugees deported to his territory. As will be detailed below, his main policy was to integrate the Armenians into Syrian society dividing them into small pieces, which then would "transform them from being a dangerous multitude [*külliyet*] into harmless minorities [*cüz'iyet*]".[674]

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[673] **PA-AA,** Türkei 183, Bd. 41, Rössler to Bethmann Hollweg, Aleppo, 3 January 1916, in Dinçer, Ibid. [CD], p. 807.

[674] **BOA,** DH.ŞFR. 486/118, Cemal to Talat, 30 Ağustos 1331 [12 September 1915]; the same remarks are repeated in a document announced publicly by Cemal: Cemal to Enver, 27 September 1917, *Arşiv Belgeleriyle Ermeni Faaliyetleri VII,* p. 698; In the same direction, Oppenheim reports that Cemal and his officers again and again explained to him that, to remove the Armenian danger, they must be transformed into harmless minorities by the way of the distribution of various places. For details, see: **PA-AA,** Türkei 183, Bd. 38,

In the context of the decision to relocate some deportees in the 4th Army region, the first two convoys reached Damascus in the third week of August 1915. According to the remarks of the Austrian Consul, among those deportees, there were Armenians from many towns of the Eastern Anatolia. While the first convoy arrived at Damascus by foot, the second was transferred there by trains. After a short stay in Damascus, they were sent to their constant settlement places, Mesmije in Hauran, Salt and Kerak in East Jordan. All of them were transferred to their new destinations by trains.[675] According to the testimony of Oppenheim, most of the Armenians, who arrived in Damascus by walking, reached there by pack animals and carriages under the guard of the Gendarmeries.[676]

The great majority of the refugees consisted of weak men, women and children. The Consul estimates that they were either separated from their families and sent to another place or massacred because of their resistance to the decision of the deportation. The police didn't allow them to communicate with the native people of Damascus. A very small number of them, however, could outsmart the police and took refugee with their co-religionists.[677] They were resettled in the villages entirely populated by the Muslims. According to the remarks of the Austrian Consul in Beirut, the children were separated from their families and islamized. The calls of the priests to forestall this situation remained inconclusive.[678] The seriousness of the conversions and its meaning in the context of the Ottoman politics will be analyzed below separately.

The arrival of the refugees to Damascus continued in September, too. According to the report of the Austrian Consul, between 1 and 15 September, 22.000 Armenian refugees arrived at Damascus from Marash, Antep, Tarsus, Alexandrette, Aleppo and Adana. Because of the lack of the appropriate places for them in Damascus, in the viewpoint of the

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Oppenheim to Bethmann Hollweg, Damascus, 29 August 1915, in Dinçer, Ibid. [CD], p. 617.

675 **HHStA,** PA 38/366, Ranzi to Burian, Damascus, 28 August 1915.

676 **PA-AA,** Türkei 183, Bd. 38, Oppenheim to Bethmann Hollweg, Damascus, 29 August 1915, in Dinçer, Ibid. [CD], p. 618.

677 **HHStA,** PA 38/366, Ranzi to Burian, Damascus, 28 August 1915.

678 **HHStA,** PA 12/463, Pallavicini to Burian (Transmitting Consul Beirut), Constantinople, 2 November 1915.

Consul, the great majority of them were settled in Salt, Kerak and Maan.[679] By January 1916, according to the figures given by the Governor of Damascus, the number of the refugees distributed through Damascus was around 60.000. 20.000 of them were settled in Hama; 27.000 refugees were housed in Hauran; 8.500 were fixed in Kerak; 1.100 in Nebk; 300 in Duma; 180 in Kunaytra; 150 in Baalbek; 25 in Vadiülacem districts. The remaining 3.000 were settled in the villages of Damascus.[680] It means that 1/3 of them could be settled in the city centers.

Again, the great majority of them consisted of children and women. The Consul states that the refugees were treated in Damascus like prisoners and nobody was allowed to communicate with them. However, most of them were able to run away to take refugee with their co-religionists.[681] The same restrictions were imposed by Cemal Pasha in the permanent resettlement places of the Armenians. They were prohibited to leave their places without permission as long as the War continued. They would be able to leave the boundaries of the *kaza*s that they were located for a determined time only on the condition that a definitive excuse happened.[682] However, in practice the situation was rather different. According to the personal accounts written by the Armenian deportees, it is clear that they could escape to Damascus, to make money for the subsistence of their families.[683]

Cemal's anti-interventionist attitude revealed itself in this subject, too. He was strongly opposed to the actions, which would gain prestige to a foreign power, being in the first place the intervention of the representatives of the foreign states in the issues of the deportees. He complained about the American Consuls in Syria to his Ambassador via

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[679] **HHStA,** PA 38/366, Ranzi to Burian, "Die armenischen Deportieren", Damascus, 24 September 1915.

[680] **BOA,** DH.ŞFR. 486/118, Azmi [The Governor of Syria] to Talat, 5 Kanun-ı Sani 1332 [18 January 1916].

[681] **HHStA,** PA 38/366, Ranzi to Burian, "Die armenischen Deportieren", Damascus, 24 September 1915.

[682] **BOA,** DH.ŞFR. 486/118, Cemal to Talat, 30 Ağustos 1331 [12 September 1915].

[683] Dadrian, 15 May 1916, Ibid, p.148; Hasan Amca also states in his memoirs that some women applied to him to migrate to Damascus to merge with their husbands, who fled to Damascus to work: Çerkes Hasan Bey, "Tehcirin İç Yüzü: Çerkes Hasan Bey'in Hatıratı", *Alemdar,* 23 Haziran 1335 [23 June 1919].

Minister of War and Minister of Foreign Affairs, since they were interfering with the internal issues of the Empire.[684] According to the remarks of Cemal, the latter subsidized the deportees secretly, interfered in the issues of the Government and provided communication to them with the Eastern Anatolia.[685] Taner Akçam maintains in his book that, the Ottoman Government didn't organize any assistance activity to relieve the Armenians, and deliberately prevented the assistance requests of the foreign states.[686] However, the motives behind the prevention of the foreign states' intervetion seem to be quite different; as expressed in the related chapters, in the war period, there was a general sensitivity in the Ottoman authorities to the activities of the foreign states including assistance activities, since those activities showed the Ottoman Government weaker in the eyes of its citizens and were seen by the Ottoman officials as the means of the establishment of the foreign influence, which was tried to be removed from the Ottoman Realm. As can be seen in Chapter 8, Cemal had also resisted the American help for Lebanon for a while. But, as will be demonstrated below, he would agree to the distribution of the American and the German assistance by the Ottoman officials.

In the same context, Cemal also intervened in the case of Armenian workers employed by the German engineers in the railway construction claiming that those workers were selected among the refugees and deliberately withheld by the mentioned engineers to protect the Armenians.[687] Afterwards, Cemal had to delay their deportations within the framework of the order of the War Ministry, to exile those workers immediately after the

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[684] **NA,** RG59/867.48/199, Morgenthau to Secretary of State, Constantinople, 29 November 1915 in Ara Sarafian, *United States Official Records on the Armenian Genocide 1915-1917,* Princeton and London: Gomidas Institute, 2004, p. 388.

[685] **BOA,** DH.ŞFR. 492/41, Bekir Sami to Talat, Aleppo, 22 Eylül 1331 [5 October 1915].

[686] Akçam, Ibid, p. 306-312.

[687] **BOA,** DH.ŞFR. 493/62, Cemal to Talat, 30 Eylül 1331 [13 October 1915]; Ali Münif also warned Talat that the 90 percent of the workers of the railway in the commissariats between Pozantı and Aleppo were the Armenians, that was a great danger militarily: **BOA,** DH.ŞFR. 488/80, Ali Münif to Talat, 28 August 1331 [10 September 1915]; the considerations of the Governor of Adana were in the same direction, too: **BOA,** DH.ŞFR. 503/11, Hakkı to Talat, 15 Kanun-ı Evvel 1331 [28 December 1915].

completion of their construction works.[688] Apart from that, many Armenian craftsmen employed in the construction works of the railway company were sent into exile within the framework of the decision for the deportation of the Armenians. Upon the slowdown of the construction works between Pozantı and Aleppo, the construction of the Amanos and Taurus Tunnels, the company reclaimed these craftsmen from the Army, and the Army gave its consent.[689] According to Von Kress, in spite of exertion all his influence in Istanbul to prevent the exile of those workers, Cemal was unable to prevent the decision in the beginning, and because of that problem, the construction of the tunnels had been delayed for six months.[690]

When the number of the deportees reached to 200.000, Cemal demanded the interception of the deportation temporarily, to overcome the problems of the settled and unsettled Armenians in Syria. He explained in his telegraph that the available deportees could hardly be resettled till Winter, and advised to place the deported Armenians temporarily in the regions, which were nearer to the railway and easy to be supplied with foodstuffs. Otherwise, it would be difficult to prevent the congestion [*izdiham*] of the refugees and to protect the Army from the epidemic diseases brought by these convoys.[691] According to the report of the German Embassy on 18th December 1915, the deportations had been suspended because of the approach of Winter.[692] For the purpose of the organization of the settlement issues of the already deported Armenians, on 11th November 1915, a meeting was held by the attendance of Cemal Pasha, Şükrü Bey, İsmail Canbulat and the Governor of Aleppo. In this meeting, it was decided to accept 5.000 Armenians, which would arrive at Pozantı for permanent settlement, and to make the other refugees spend the winter in the appropriate places temporarily. The ones, who still were not expelled from their countries, would be left temporarily there. After that, there would be no

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[688] **BOA,** DH.ŞFR. 497/19, Şükrü to Talat, 29 Teşrin-i Evvel 1331 [11 November 1915]

[689] **BOA,** DH.ŞFR. 501/42, Mustafa to Talat, 30 Teşrin-i Sani 1331 [13 December 1915]

[690] Von Kressenstein, Ibid, p. 30.

[691] **BOA,** DH.ŞFR. 493/119, Cemal to Talat, 4 Teşrin-i Evvel 1331 [17 October 1915]

[692] **PA-AA,** Türkei 183, Bd. 40, Metternich to Bethmann Hollweg, Constantinople, 18 Aralık 1915.

transfer of the deportees to the south of Aleppo.[693] Upon the instructions of the Commander of the 4th Army to settle the Armenians before winter, or to construct temporary places for them to stay during winter, the Vice-Governor of Damascus demanded 40.000 ltq from Istanbul.[694]

As for the conditions of the Armenians in Damascus and in their permanent settlement places, they were exposed to countless miseries in the beginning. According to the report of the Austrian Consul in Damascus in 7th November 1915, the refugees were depraved of everything in their permanent settlement places. Until the Ottoman Government would deliver their estates, they would remain without occupation, cattle and seeds, and under no circumstances, could they begin any work. They were unprotected and exposed to great miseries with newly started rains. The 1 qurush daily allowance for each person provided by the Government was not sufficient. Starvation and epidemics were spreading among the deportees quickly. During their stay in Damascus, 10/1000 of them were dying from the epidemics daily. The Consul expressed that the great majority of the children were given up for adoption by their families to the Muslims, and thus, were saved from starvation and epidemics at the expense of changing their religions.[695]

The reports of the Ottoman officials were also in the same direction. In a telegram, Hulusi Bey, the Governor of Syria, harshly criticized the official process [*cereyan-ı resmiyesi*] of the Armenian deportation and settlement stating "the necessity of prohibition of such movements that could [only] be seen in the middle ages" [*bu gibi kurun-ı vusta harekatının men edilmesi*]. He continues "if the settlement of the Armenians is left to its official process, humanity will not record it with appreciation since, presumably, a great majority of them [the refugees] will be devastated [if the process continue like this]". With his remarks, Hulusi Bey implicitly accused the Government of carrying out the annihilation of the Armenians. The Governor added that Cemal wanted to solve the

693 **BOA,** DH.ŞFR. 497/19, Şükrü to Talat, Aleppo, 29 Teşrin-i Evvel 1331 [11 November 1915]

694 **BOA,** DH.ŞFR. 497/45, Hakkı to Talat, Damascus, 31 Teşrin-i Evvel 1331 [13 November 1915].

695 **HHStA,** PA 12/463, Ranzi to Burian, "Die armenischen Zwangsauswanderer", Damascus, 7 November 1915.

problem of the Armenian refugees as quickly as possible, not to tarnish the region in the responsibility of the 4th Army, and to do honor to the Ottoman country. Upon the order of Cemal Pasha, Hulusi Bey planned a visit to Hauran and Kerak to see the state of the affairs and to inspect the Ottoman officials to be more attentive to their jobs. He also demanded money to organize the settlement.[696] However, approximately one and a half month later, it is clearly understood from a telegraph of the Vice-Governor of Syria that most of the refugees were in a very destitute situation; they didn't have any place –even a tent- to live and they suffered from starvation.[697] The miserable conditions of Syria in the wartime stemming from famine must be taken into consideration at the same time, while assessing the situation of the Armenians.

In spite of all these unfavorable conditions, in a short span of time, the Armenian deportees were able to restore their life standards in their permanent settlement places using the advantage of their personal skills. For example, as expressed in the diaries of Vahram Dadrian, immediately after their arrival at Jeresh in Hauran, the Armenians were able to build eight mills, created and planted fifty gardens, "forty shops where they make their livings as cobblers, gun smiths, comb-makers, felt-makers, farriers, iron-mongers, butchers etc.". In short, they converted the little village of Jeresh to a burgeoning business town.[698] The situation was similar in the cities, too. Yervant Odian described the situation in the city centre of Hama with the following remarks:

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[696] **BOA,** DH.ŞFR. 491/112, Hulusi to Talat, Damascus, 19 Eylül 1331 [2 October 1915]

[697] **BOA,** DH.ŞFR. 497/45, Hakkı to Talat, Damascus, 31 Teşrin-i Evvel 1331 [13 November 1915]; the agent reports in the British National Archives regarding the situation of the deportees in Damascus seems were exaggerated and far from the realities. At a very late date, on April 15th an agent sent to McMahon the following report: "Agent was at Damascus on April 15th and was stopping in an hotel close to the barracks. Hearing a noise of a big crowd in the Meydan he went out to see what was going on. 300 or 400 naked Armenians girls and women. There were put up for auction and the whole lot disposed of, some for 2,3 and 4 francs. Only Mohammedans were allowed to buy, The salesmen kept on exclaiming 'Rejoice, oh ye faithful in the shame of the Christians'. No Armenian men were brought to Damascus, only women.": **PRO,** FO 371/2777, McMahon to FO (transmitting and intelligent returned from Syria), Cairo, 20 May 1916.

[698] Dadrian, 6 November 1915, Ibid., p.111.

> "Almost half the shops in the market were in the hands of Armenians. The majority of the Arab shops had been forced to close due to the military call up. There were Armenians grocers, buthchers, vegetable sellers, haberdashers and cloth sellers, as well as many barbers, shoe makers, carpenters, dentists, photographers, pharmacists, bakers, tailors, metal smiths and so on. It was the Armenians who first opened photography shops in Hama. The Armenians also opened, for the very first time, two restaurants."[699]

Besides their own endeavors, a considerable betterment took place in their situations by the humanitarian intervention of Cemal Pasha. The Consul of Austria in Damascus notes in February 1916 that, the Armenians were settled in the city of Damascus and its villages as well. These processes were completed smoothly, and at least, a place of accommodation was created for the refugees. The Consul states that the refugees had the opportunity to engage in agriculture in the villages of Damascus. The daily allowance given to them was raised from 1 qurush to 2 qurush, for children to 1.5 qurush. Some of the Armenians were employed in the labor battalions assigned to construct the Egyptian Railways. –The Consul reported this as an improvement in the life conditions of the refugees-. Besides this, Cemal also announced in all the newspapers of the country that the Government was responsible for the life, honor and well-being of all the Armenians. In this regard, he executed a Gendarmerie officer, who maltreated the refugees.[700]

In a similar way, Cemal employed the Armenians in the factories of the Army to protect them. For this purpose, he established six factories in Aleppo and issued permissions [*vesika*] to its workers, upon the appeal of the Armenian artisans gathered temporarily in Aleppo to be deported to the villages or to the desert, to manufacture clothing and bedding for the Army in return for one loaf of bread and a bowl of soup a day. Thus, they would be saved from the exposure of the devastating conditions of the desert. With the remarks of the American consul, "at the end of the two months, 6.500 women, mostly widows, 3.000 girls, and 650 men and big boys were working in the factories and enjoyed all the immunities thereto belonging".[701]

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[699] Odian, Ibid, p. 106.

[700] **HHStA,** PA 12/463, Ranzi to Burian, "Die Ansiedlung von Armeniern im Wilajet Syrien", Damascus, 15 February 1916.

[701] **NA,** RG59/867, 4016/373, Jackson to the Secretary of State, "The Armenian Atrocities", Washington, 4 March 1918, in Sarafian, Ibid, p. 592; the German consul gave the number of the workers in these factories as 4.000 women: **PA-AA,** Türkei 183, Bd. 45,

In most of the Consular reports, it is stated that the Armenians were recruited and sent to the labor battalions to work in the road construction.[702] However, according to the personal accounts, the conscription of many Armenians always delayed by the orders of Cemal Pasha. When they first arrived at their ultimate settlement places, the deportees were registered as eligible to the military service. In every six months they were collected from the villages and taken to the recruitment offices. But, their conscription was delayed in each time with an order issued by Cemal Pasha. When the news of the delay reached the villages, the name of Cemal was praised with bravos "and wishes that he might live a long life."[703] Presumably, their collections in every six months was understood by the consuls as their conscription.

When the British troops started to advance from the Sinai Desert towards Syria, the treatment of the Armenians entered into a new phase. Upon the approach of the British troops, according to the Governor of Syria, many Armenians, who were not recruited in time, began to escape to the Mount-Druze and, from there, to join the British and Sharif's army. The Governor states that keeping of the Armenians inside Damascus in that delicate time was ill-advised denoting that their number inside the *vilayet* was more than 30.000. In addition, the Commander of the 4th Army, Mersinli Cemal Pasha, found it necessary the relocation of the Armenians from Damascus to the North for the military reasons. He also states that many of the Armenians repeatedly applied to return to their countries because of the provisioning question. By virtue of all these reasons, the Governor demanded to allow the Armenians to return to their native countries.[704] On 29th September 1918, the Austrian

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Rössler to Bethmann Hollweg, Aleppo, 5 November 1916; on 5th April 1917, another German report calculated this number as 10.000; **PA-AA,** Türkei 183, Bd. 47, Waldburg to Bethmann Hollweg, Constantinople, 5 April 1917.

[702] **PA-AA,** Türkei 183, Bd. 38, Nurse Laura Möhring to AA, Aleppo, 12 July 1915, in Dinçer, Ibid. [CD], p. 592; **HHStA,** PA 38/371, Ranzi to Czernin, "Massnahmen der Regierung gegen verschiedene Bevölgergselemente", Damascus, 15 March 1918; Some remarks on the recruitment of the Armenians in the Labor Battalions can be found in the telegram of the Governor of Adana: **BOA,** DH.ŞFR. 594/31, Nazım to Ministry of Interior, Adana, 2 Eylül 1918 [2 September 1918].

[703] Dadrian, 9 April 1916, Ibid, p. 144.

[704] **BOA,** DH.ŞFR. 594/75, Rıfat to Ministry of Interior, Damascus, 5 Eylül 1334 [5 September 1918].

Consul in Aleppo reported a new wave of the deportation of the Armenians due to the approach of the British troops towards Damascus. The Consul continues, however, that this time the situation was not like before. Since both the Turks and the Armenians got rid of the difficulties of the deportation, the deportation was performed reluctantly.[705]

A similar process started in Aleppo, too. According to the report of the Austrian Consul in Aleppo, the deadline for the application to return was determined as 30 September –one day before the capture of the city by the British forces-. The refugees would be able to travel freely in the trains. However, the picture drawn by the Consul about the desire of the Armenians to return to their homes seems quite different. He states that very few of the Armenian families wanted to return to their countries because of two reasons: firstly, the fear of causing the mistrust of the Government and, secondly, the unwillingness to embark on a new adventure, especially for those, who obtained relative improvement in their economic conditions in Aleppo.[706] However, according to the Austrian consul, the discovery of an arsenal in the city, which belonged to the Armenians, caused the retreat of the Government from this step in a week.[707]

4.4.1. Conversion of the Armenians to Islam and Cemal Pasha

While the settlement process was continuing, Cemal encouraged many of the Armenians to convert to Islam.[708] In the cities and villages, massive movements of enforced conversions took place. The conversion process consisted of two components:

[705] **HHStA,** PA 38/371, Frienz? to Burian, "Armenierverfolgung", Aleppo, 29 September 1918.

[706] **HHStA,** PA 38/371, Frienz? to Burian, "Heimbeförderung der Armenier", Aleppo, 19 September 1918.

[707] **HHStA,** PA 38/371, Frienz? to Burian, "Direktor Schwendtner, Verhaftung", Aleppo, 26 September 1918.

[708] For a recent study on the conversion and apostasy in the Ottoman Empire in the 19th century, see: Selim Deringil, *Conversion and Apostacy in the Ottoman Empire,* New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012.

filing a petition and adoption of a Muslim name. In the viewpoint of the German representative in Aleppo, those were only for show, and it was a dream to islamisize the Armenians by these methods.[709] The report of the Austrian consul bearing the date 4th August 1915 states that the Armenian refugees, who were dispersed around the whole Syrian country, were strongly pressed to change their religions. The Consul reports that this policy was adopted for better integration of the Armenians with the local people. He points out that, in the city centre of Hama, many incidents of conversion took place among the newly settled Armenians. Many of the deportees occupied with commerce using the advantage of being in the cities, and, in short, their life conditions became better. According to the statement of the Consul, they were threatened of being exiled to the villages if they didn't change their religions.[710]

In the same direction, the existing literature interprets this action as part of the annihilation of the Armenian nation. For example, Taner Akçam maintains that the islamization process of the Armenians was strictly controlled by the Central Government.[711] In the same direction, as will be demonstrated below, Cemal's own telegraphs also make us think that he applied a total policy of conversion towards the Armenians. However, when the implementation of this action was traced, it will be clear that the reality of the event was quite different: it was, too, a part of Cemal's struggle with Talaat's enforcements regarding the Armenians, and a means to legitimize his policy of Armenian settlement.

In his telegraph to Talat bearing the date 2nd August 1916, Cemal proudly summarizes the essentials of his policy that he applied to resettle the Armenians in the Syrian provinces:

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[709] **PA-AA,** Türkei 183, Bd. 44, Hoffmann to the Ambassador in Istanbul, Aleppo, 29 August 1916, in Dinçer, Ibid. [CD], p. 932.

[710] **HHStA,** PA 12/463, Ranzi to Burian, "Die Konversion der armenischen Auswanderer zum Islam", Damascus, 4 August 1916.

[711] Akçam, *Ermeni Meselesi Hallolunmuştur,* p. 295-300; Dündar, Ibid, p. 300-305; Although he explains the sadness of the local authorities in Hama because of the conversion incidents applying to the accounts of the deportees, Kevorkian doesn't evaluate the conversion policies as a means applied in the whole of Syria to protect Armenians from the destructive activities of Talat's party. For details, see: Kevorkian, p. 677.

> "I find it as the only solution to implement immediately the policy that I followed in Syria, to prevent the accumulation of the Armenians in Zor in a big number. I collected these Armenians transferred in a huge number to Syria in the boundaries of the desert, and provided their conversion to Islam by virtue of some persons that I have induced [*teşvik etmek*], and sprinkled [*serpmek*] at least a thousand of them to the provinces of Syria converting them to Islam. I paired off the widowed women with the Muslim men, and placed their orphans to the orphanages that I have established [to educate] them with the Muslim polish [*terbiye*]. I do not send those, who insist on their religions, to the Desert and to the eastern end of the *Vilayet,* and I do not let them anywhere to constitute a majority of the population. I regard it as a necessity to implement this policy in Zor,too…"[712]

In the same context, Cemal states in one of his telegrams to Enver that, during June 1916, in Damascus, Deraa and Hama, 5450 Armenians in 945 households [*hane*] converted to Islam and 2314 in 497 households were settled and the others were provided suitable life conditions.[713]

However, the remarks conveyed from Cemal in the memoires of Halide Edib, draw another picture and reflect it as an obligation to protect the Armenian children from destruction. His remarks were quite striking:

> "I had a conversation in the car with Djemal Pasha which was really illuminating. I said: "You have been as good to Armenians as it is possible to be in these hard days. Why do you allow Armenian children to be called by Moslem names? It looks like turning the Armenians into Moslems, and history some day will revenge it on the coming generation of Turks."
> 'You are an idealist' he answered gravely, 'and like all idealists [you] lack a sense of reality. Do you believe that by turning a few hundred Armenian boys and girls Moslem I think I benefit my race? You have seen the Armenian orphanage. This is a Moslem orphanage, and only Moslem orphans are allowed….I cannot bear to see them die in the streets'.
> 'Afterward?' I asked…
> 'After the war they will go back to their people. I hope none is too small to realize his race'"[714]

Similar remarks were conveyed by the Spanish consul in Jerusalem:

> "… The Armenian Patriarch, Ormanian, had gone to see him complaining that, in Der'a, the authorities obliged the Armenian refugees there to convert to the religion of Muhammad. The minister told him that, from the investigations made, it turned out that what happened was that some Muslim religious leaders, knowing the state of poverty of the refugees, took advantage of it by offering land, houses, or cash on condition of converting

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[712] **BOA,** DH.ŞFR. 527/19, Cemal to Talat, Damascus, 20 Temmuz 1332 [2 August 1916].

[713] **TTK Arşivi,** KO Koleksiyonu 10/15, Cemal to Enver, 5 Mayıs 1332 [18 May 1916]

[714] Halide Edib, *Memoirs*, pp. 428-429.

> to Islam. His Excellency commented that it was propaganda, identical to what the Christian missionaries do…"[715]

At this stage, the implementation of the conversion policies had to be analyzed more closely to understand which claim reflects the truth. In this context, diaries of Vahram Dadrian give valuable information about the facts behind the action of the conversions:

> "The committee in charge of converting Armenians to Islam arrived here yesterday evening. There are five of them: the Mufti of Irbit; an Armenian named Aram , who was formerly the president of the Ipranosian Company in Mersin, two government officials; and a policemen.
> They set up shop at the village hall late last night and summoned all the Armenian *moukhtars* (elders) of the village –every Armenian has a representative- and informed them of the government's decision.
> The turbaned hodja of Irbit apparently made quite a long speech, emphasizing that the government is doing us a great favor by converting us, 'because when we are all faithful children of the same religion and country, there will be no reason for hatred and resentment'.
> 'I therefore recommend that you accept the government's proposal' the *hodja* concluded. 'If you refuse, you should realize that it will be you who suffer in the end'.
> After this veiled threat from the Muslim clergymen, the Armenian member of the committee spoke, explaining that they have been visiting all the villages of the Hauran over the past two months, converting all the Armenians to Islam.
> 'The whole thing is nothing but a mere formality', he said 'Your name is changed only on paper. Just because you have accepted Islam, no one will ever force you to go to a mosque or to make your daughters marry Turks.'
> 'If that is the case' replied Sarko the butcher, 'then let us give you a list of all the Armenians in the village and you can write in an Islamic name for each of them'
> 'May you live long! After all, that's what we all wanted' exclaimed the members of the committee."[716]

The following pages of his diaries don't convey anything about the problems emanated from the conversion to Islam. As can be understood from the diaries, it seems that conversions had limited effect on the Armenians as life continued in its normal course for them. They didn't have to join any religious practice of the Muslims. The only exception was the burial of a Turkish soldier, who died from cholera. The Armenians were assigned to bury this soldier. After the funeral, Dadrian asked a policeman why they had applied to the Armenians instead of the Arabs and the Circassians to bury a Muslim. He continues: "

[715] Ballobar, Ibid, pp. 103-104.

[716] Dadrian, 21 August 1916, Ibid., p. 164-165.

‘What is the difference’ he [the policeman] asked, and shrugged. ‘Aren’t you Muslims?’ Muslims? Yes, that’s right… We had forgotten that”.[717]

His remarks, however, about the conversion policies implemented in cities is quite different. “In Deraa, there have been cases of forced marriages, and in Damascus they circumcised the boys from the orphanage and took them to a mosque”. Nevertheless, he evaluates the process as “a great kindness to the Armenians on the part of Jemal Pasha” since he saved the Armenians from a total extermination on the order of Constantinople.[718] Similarly, Yervan Odian’s testimony demonstrates the existence of two cliques regarding the treatment of Armenians in Syria, and the local resistance requested the Armenians to convert in appearance to be able to protect them. It is obvious in his memoires that the Governor of Hama, Feruzan Bey, was ashamed of making such an offer. The Governor expressed to a notable Armenian, Nersesian Effendi if the Armenians “didn’t accept Islam, he wouldn’t be able to protect [the Armenians]” and they would probably “suffer very badly”.[719]

As for the situation in Damascus, the Austrian consul gives some detail about the enforced islamizations in Damascus without touching upon the seriousness of the conversion practice. He states that the situation was comparatively better in the provincial capital, since the Ottoman officials were sensitive to the reaction of the foreign diplomatists. However, the Consul states that, in the first week of August 1916, all the refugees were arrested and those, who announced their conversion, were released; the others were exiled to the villages. These coercive measures were only applied to the Gregorians; the Catholics and the Protestants were immune to such kind of actions.[720] However, in the report of the same Consul dated 28th November 1916, it is stated that these policies of conversion were in a short span of time commendably abandoned. The Consul attaches that change to the appointment of Tahsin Bey as the Governor of Syria, and notes that it is clearly an activity of Tahsin Bey. In this context, those, who were sent to the

[717] Dadrian, 8 October 1917, Ibid. p. 213.

[718] Dadrian, 4 September 1916, p. 165-166.

[719] Odian, Ibid, p. 113.

[720] **HHStA,** PA 12/463, Ranzi to Burian, “Die Konversion der armenischen Auswanderer zum Islam”, Damascus, 4 August 1916.

villages were recalled and resettled to the city centers. As stated before, it was a systematic change on the Armenian policy.[721] Quite the reverse of what the consul states, as will be detailed below, the amelioration was to a large extent, due to the liberation of the Armenian settlement from those who tried to prevent the betterment of the conditions of the Armenians with new organization of Cemal Pasha within the body of his Army.

The report of the German Consul makes the issue clearer. The Consul expresses the conflict between Talat and Cemal on the relocation of the Armenians. According to the conveyance of the German Consul in Damascus from Hüseyin Kazım, who was appointed as the head of the Armenian relief committee established by Cemal Pasha, The Government wanted to destroy the Armenians by sending them to the desert areas. On the other hand, the consul states, Cemal wanted to protect them. However, the consul continues that Cemal couldn't resist the anti-Armenian members of the CUP and the anti-Armenian air of Istanbul.[722] Most probably, as quoted by Halide Edib, Cemal didn't believe that the conversions would change anything in the opinions of the Armenians. His measures in this direction and his telegram above were rather a pretext to prevent anti-Armenian actions of the CUP clique formed around Talat Pasha.

The fiercest impact of the conversions occurred on the young girls, who were forcibly married with Muslims. A German report in 1919 cabled from Aleppo the following remarks about the soul-shattering conditions of those girls:

> "The two thousand Armenian girls, who were detained in the Turkish *harems* during the hostilities, have been found by the American Red Cross in recent months. The young girls have lost every hope of emancipation, who lived a *harem* life for months… Most of these girls have not still reached 16 years, and they are so pitiful that they must be treated in a clinic before they are sent to their dormitories…"[723]

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[721] **HHStA,** PA 12/463, Ranzi to Burian, "Die Besserung der Lage der armenischen Zwangsauswanderer", Damascus, 28 November 1916.

[722] **PA-AA,** Türkei 183, Bd. 43, Loytved Hardegg to the Ambassador in Constantinople, Damascus, 30 May 1916, in Dinçer, Ibid. [CD], p. 902.

[723] **PA-AA,** Türkei 183, Bd. 57, Göppert to AA(Transmitted from Aleppo as a wireless intelligence), Berlin, 21 July 1919.

4.4.2. The Special Committee for the Relief of the Armenians

Due to the resistance of the anti-Armenian clique in the Syrian bureaucracy preventing Cemal from having full authority on the issues of the Armenians, in the second half of March 1916, Cemal established a special commission under the chairmanship of Hüseyin Kazim [Kadri][724], an old offended member of the CUP and the old Governor of Salonika and Aleppo, who preferred a secluded life in Beirut before the War after his dispute with the CUP leaders. The other members of the commission were two retired bureaucrats and the Vice-Governor of Damascus. The German consul states that all the members of the commission were renowned with their sound character-wise personalities.[725] As stated in the memoirs of Hasan Bey the Circassian, who was appointed as the successor of Hüseyin Kazım, the aim of the commission was to resettle the Armenians from villages of Hauran to the city centers. Since they subsisted their lives with artisanship, Cemal considered that they couldn't live in the villages, and, therefore, decided to transfer them into cities.[726] The German Consul in Damascus interpreted the distribution of the Armenians to the villages as a measure to balance the Arabs with the Armenians.[727] As explained above, Fuad Dündar has similar claims. However, the numbers of the Armenians settled in the Syrian realm was too little for balancing the Arab population. Therefore, the distribution of the Armenians to the villages as a balance against the Arabs doesn't stand to reason.

[724] Hüseyin Kazım was a former Unionist. The Unionist Newspaper *Tanin* had been established by his financial and intellectual support. He was among the founders of the Istanbul branch of the CUP. Afterwards, he was opposed to the radicalizing attitude of the CUP and migrated to Beirut. For his memoirs, see: Hüseyin Kazım Kadri, *Meşrutiyetten Cumhuriyete Hatıralarım,* [ed.] İsmail Kara, Dergah Yayınları, İstanbul, 2000.

[725] **PA-AA,** Türkei 183, Bd. 43, Loytved Hardegg to the Ambassador in Constantinople, Damascus, 30 May 1916, in Dinçer, Ibid. [CD], p. 902.

[726] Çerkes Hasan Bey, "İttihatçıların İç Yüzü: Çerkes Hasan Beyin Hatıratı", *Alemdar,* 20 Haziran 1335 [20 June 1919].

[727] **PA-AA,** Türkei 177, Bd. 12, Loytved to Bethmann Hollweg, Damascus, 7 April 1916.

Apart from that, as part of his new mission, in April 1916 Hüseyin Kazım paid a visit to Hauran and its south, where the Armenians were settled. In Der'a, first, he had bread distributed to the Armenians and made a place for bathing and cleansing of the pediculos in the Hospital. After cleansing their bodies in the hospital, the deportees were transported to the various cities that they could find job. In this way, according to the report of Damascus consul of Germany, around 700 widows and orphans were relocated to the city center of Hama. They were employed in a weaving factory there.[728]

However, the resistance of the bureaucracy compelled Hüseyin Kazim to resign in a short while. In his conversation with the Damascus consul of Germany, he stated that he became unfunctional in his job; his measures were not only paid no attention, but also the official authorities worked to ruin his ameliorations. The deportees that he transported from Der'a to Damascus in accordance with the aim of the commission had been re-sent to their old places by the governmental authorities in Damascus. Finally, the Government didn't give Hüseyin Kazım enough money for the relocation of the Armenians. He explained to the German consul that he didn't believe in the sincerity of the Ottoman government to ameliorate the conditions of the deportees. Rather, he was afraid that the authorities, most probably he meant Talat's faction, wanted to exterminate the Armenians systematically.[729] It is worth to mention here that the resistance of the bureaucrats didn't only arise from their anti-Armenian feelings, but also from the difficult conditions of life brought about by the war compelled them to oppose new settlements in their cities. As in

[728] **PA-AA,** Türkei 183, Bd. 43, Loytved Hardegg to the Ambassador in Constantinople, Damascus, 30 May 1916, in Dinçer, Ibid. [CD], p. 902.

[729] **PA-AA,** Türkei 183, Bd. 43, Loytved Hardegg to the Ambassador in Constantinople, Damascus, 30 May 1916, in Dinçer, Ibid. [CD], p. 902; In his book, Özdemir thoroughly evaluated Cemal's organization of the relief works. However, he never speaks about the conflict between Cemal and Talat, and, interestingly enough, attaches the resistance of the bureaucrats in Syria to the measures of Hüseyin Kazım to being in bad with Cemal Pasha. Özdemir also uses the memoirs of Hasan Bey, which would be tackled below. In the same way, he ignores the similar evaluations of Hasan Bey regarding the attitudes of some officials in Syria. He insistently disregards the contrast between Talat and Cemal on the Armenian Question and tries to demonstrate the Ottoman Government as a unity on this issue. For the details of Özdemir's assessments, see: Özdemir, Ibid, p. 100-115.

the case of Azmi Bey, some officials refused to accept the Armenians to their cities because of the provisioning problems emerged as a result of famine.[730]

After the resignation of Hüseyin Kazım, Cemal appointed Çerkes Hasan Bey, who was also an opponent of the CUP, in his place.[731] Hasan Bey arrived at Aleppo on 27th August 1916, and, in a few days, he started his job. In the beginning, Cemal subordinated Hasan to the CUP organization in Syria, which he created under the presidency of Neşet Bey, the CUP inspector in Syria.[732] Within the framework of the same body, Ali Kemal Bey, the prosecutor in Homs, was assigned with the same mission for Homs. The name of the organization was *Heyet-i Mahsusa* [the Special Board].[733] Neşet was also responsible for the conversion of the Armenians into Islam and the provisioning of the converts.[734] This time, the transport of the Armenian deportees was put in order: the widows and orphans were given the first priority. They would be resettled in the orphanages and widows' houses.[735]

Similar to Hüseyin Kazım, Hasan Bey entered into conflict with some civil bureaucrats of Syria and met with resistance in his implementations. Like Hüseyin Kazım, he started to visit the villages and collect the Armenians to transport to the cities. However, in short, some disagreements emerged between Hasan Bey and his superiors.[736] Hence, he complained about Neşet Bey's board to Cemal Pasha. Thereupon, Cemal Pasha dismissed

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[730] Çerkes Hasan Bey, "Tehcirin İç Yüzü: Çerkes Hasan Bey'in Hatıratı", *Alemdar,* 19 Haziran 1335 [19 June 1919].

[731] For the memoirs of his doctor with Hasan Bey, see: Ekdal, Müfid, *Eski Bir İhtilalciden Dinlediklerim,* İstanbul: Kitabevi Yayınları, 2003.

[732] Çerkes Hasan Bey, "Tehcirin İç Yüzü: Çerkes Hasan Bey'in Hatıratı", *Alemdar,* 19 Haziran 1335 [19 June 1919].

[733] Çerkes Hasan Bey, "Tehcirin İç Yüzü: Çerkes Hasan Bey'in Hatıratı", *Alemdar,* 20 Haziran 1335 [19 June 1919].

[734] **BOA,** DH.ŞFR. 532/37, Cemal to Talat, Jerusalem, 2 Eylül 1332 [15 September 1916].

[735] Çerkes Hasan Bey, "Tehcirin İç Yüzü: Çerkes Hasan Bey'in Hatıratı", *Alemdar,* 20 Haziran 1335 [19 June 1919].

[736] Çerkes Hasan Bey, "Tehcirin İç Yüzü: Çerkes Hasan Bey'in Hatıratı", *Alemdar,* 20 Haziran 1335 [20 June 1919].

Neşet, and subordinated Hasan Bey to the Governor of Syria, Tahsin Bey [Uzer].[737] However, according to the remarks of Hasan Bey, Tahsin was an anti-Armenian, too. Therefore, he subjected Hasan to Abdülkadir Bey, the Sub-Governor of Hauran. The former couldn't be in accord with Abdülkadir, and, applied to Cemal as a second time.[738] This time, Cemal directly attached him to the Army publishing the following Army order on 20th October 1916:

> "1. I regard the wealth, settlement and subsistence of the Armenian community [*millet*] as the national honor.
> 2. Hasan Bey in Hauran and Kemal Bey in Homs have been appointed for this job. Since the deportees in Hauran are artisans and since the neighborhood of Hauran doesn't suit to subsist the artisans, those [people] will be transported in closer areas to the cities, towns and *kazas* in Syria and Beirut. This transportation will be conducted in Hauran by Hasan Bey, and will be completed in three months…".[739]

Thus, the organization of the Armenian relocation was directly attached to Cemal Pasha. As a result, the following months brought about further betterment in the conditions of the Armenians. According to the report of the Austrian Consul, by the end of November 1916, a systematic change took place in the treatment of the Armenians. The refugees, who were sent to the villages in Hauran and Kerak, were transferred to the cities of Syria if they were not still settled there. The Consul states that 3/4 of the Armenians settled in Hauran and Kerak had died from starvation and epidemics. The remaining ones were at least saved from ending up the same fate. In Damascus, many houses commandeered by the Government before were allocated to the Armenian families. By the remarks of the Consul, the officials paid attention to their subsistence. In the same vein, a daily allowance was granted to them and badly needed clothes were provided to them. The adult males and the women were offered an employment opportunity and the children were provided

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[737] Çerkes Hasan Bey, "Tehcirin İç Yüzü: Çerkes Hasan Bey'in Hatıratı", *Alemdar,* 25 Haziran 1335 [25 June 1919].

[738] Çerkes Hasan Bey, "Tehcirin İç Yüzü: Çerkes Hasan Bey'in Hatıratı", *Alemdar,* 26 Haziran 1335 [26 June 1919].

[739] Çerkes Hasan Bey, "Tehcirin İç Yüzü: Çerkes Hasan Bey'in Hatıratı", *Alemdar,* 28 Haziran 1335 [28 June 1919].

opportunity to go to schools. The trustable people were deployed for the services of these works.[740]

4.4.3. Orphanages for the Deportees

As stated before, a great number of Armenian children were left orphans as a result of the atrocities, which were perpetrated by the Gendarmeries and the Kurdish and Arab tribes throughout the deportation. Therefore, the care of those children emerged as a vital question. For this purpose, Cemal established orphanages in various cities of Syria. However, most of these orphanages were founded for the Muslim children. Regarding the aims of these orphanages, Taner Akçam maintains that they were established to bring up children in compliance with the Islamic principles. Thus, the process of the annihilation of the Armenians would be completed.[741] When analyzed the process in Syria comparing it to these generalizing remarks, it will be realized that the process was rather more complex than what Akçam argues the case was.

It is clear in the Ottoman documents that both Enver and Talat attributed special attention to the Armenian children. A correspondence between Enver and Cemal on the Armenian orphans demonstrates that the former wanted the mixture of the Armenian orphans with the Muslim children. When Cemal informed him that he was about to establish orphanages in Homs and Hama for the Armenian orphans, Enver "especially requested" him that these orphanages should be mixed.[742] During those dates, Talat also ordered the *vilayets* that "the children, who weren't older than 12 years, must be distributed to our [Muslim] orphanages". If there was no place in the orphanages, then they would be given to the well-to-do people to learn the local customs. [743] Since he distributed

[740] **HHStA,** PA 12/463, Ranzi to Burian, "Die Besserung der Lage der armenischen Zwangsauswanderer", Damascus, 28 November 1916.

[741] Akçam, Ibid, p. 204.

[742] **TTK Arşivi,** KO Koleksiyonu 10/21, Cemal to Enver, 23 Mayıs 1332 [5 June 1916]; Enver to Cemal, 23 Mayıs 1332 [5 June 1916].

[743] **BOA,** DH.ŞFR. 63/137, Talat to the Governorates, 17 Nisan 1332 [30 April 1916], see also: *Osmanlı Belgelerinde Ermeniler,* p. 139.

the Armenians to the cities and villages and made them "harmless minorities", presumably, Cemal didn't attribute any meaning to the conversion of Children. The testimony of Halide Edib quoted above also indicates that Cemal didn't expect any benefit from the islamization of a few hundred Armenian children for his nation. In any case, a great many of the Armenians had died during the transportation and in its aftermath. Therefore, even if we think all the Armenians in Syria, the remaining number of them in Syria was a drop in the ocean when compared to the total population of Syria.

Beginning from the arrival of the first convoys to Aleppo, the great numbers of the orphans among the deportees made the placement of the Armenian orphans compulsory. With the remarks of the American consul in Aleppo, "Thousands of them were running in the streets, or were with relatives and friends in a half starved condition".[744] With the description of Beatrice Rohner, a Swiss Missionary assigned by Cemal to open an orphanage in Aleppo, the children and women were begging in the camp Mamouret "Hanum, [Lady] bread!, Hanum, I am hungry, we did not eat anything today and yesterday".[745] At the end of the year 1915, Cemal allowed Swiss missionaries Beatrice Rohner and Paula Schafer to open orphanages for the settlement of these Armenian Children. While Shafer was in charge of providing shelter to the orphans along the *Osmaniye-Islahiye* railway line, Rohner took over Aleppo and its surroundings.[746] These two sisters travelled to the villages and concentration camps that the Armenians were settled, and collected the orphans there.[747]

As a result of their efforts, by March 1916, 1250 children could be collected in Aleppo. An Armenian priest, Haron Shiraciyan, cared for 400 of them, while 250 children

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[744] **NA,** RG59/867, 4016/373, Jackson to the Secretary of State, "The Armenian Atrocities", Washington, 4 March 1918, in Sarafian, Ibid, p. 594.

[745] **NA,** RG59/867, 4016/260, Rohner to Morgenthaus, Aleppo, 26 November 1915, in Sarafian, Ibid., p. 435.

[746] **PA-AA,** Türkei 183, Bd. 42, Paula Schaefer to Rössler, Aleppo, 1 March 1916, in Dinçer, Ibid. [CD], p. 862.

[747] For the report of Rohner on one of his travels, see: **PA-AA,** Türkei 183, Bd. 43, Rohner to Rössler, Aleppo, 26 June 1916, in Dinçer, Ibid. [CD], p. 907-908.

were settled in the Gregorian Church. Rohner's orphanage hosted 600 of the orphans.[748] German and American Consulates also secretly contributed to the establishment and furnishing and maintenance of the orphanage in Aleppo.[749] However, Rohner's orphanage was attached by Cemal Pasha to the Ottoman Government.[750] He provided provisioning of the institution, although it was not always sufficient to supply the required amount. When the orphanage established, Cemal guaranteed that the administration of the institution would stay in the hands of Rohner.[751]

Rohner maintained her activites till March 1917. However, beginning from the middle of the year 1916, the Sublime Porte adopted a policy of the ottomanization of the foreign orphanages.[752] In August 1916, an inspector was appointed for this job in Aleppo.[753] Although her orphanage was attached to the Ottoman Government, Rohner's institution was also closed in the beginning of March 1917.[754] It is worth to mention that, even in December 1915, Mustafa Abdulhalık Bey, the Governor of Aleppo appointed by Talat to replace, Bekir Sami Bey, the prominent opponent to the Armenian deportations, reported to Talat that it was not permissible to sustain two institutions in Aleppo as the Armenian orphanage, and advised to transport these orphans to Constantinople or

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[748] **PA-AA,** Türkei 183, Bd. 43, Rohner to Rössler, Aleppo, 26 June 1916, in Dinçer, Ibid. [CD], p. 907-908.

[749] **NA,** RG59/867, 4016/373, Jackson to the Secretary of State, "The Armenian Atrocities", Washington, 4 March 1918, in Sarafian, Ibid, p. 594; for a money request of Rohner from the American officials, see: **NA,** LC/HM (Sr.)/Reel 8/005, Beatrice Rohner to Peet, Aleppo, 2 January 1916, in Sarafian, Ibid., p. 433.

[750] **NA,** LC/HM (Sr.)/Reel 8/005, Beatrice Rohner to Peet, Aleppo, 2 January 1916, in Sarafian, Ibid., p. 433.

[751] **PA-AA,** Türkei 183, Bd. 47, Rössler to Bethmann Hollweg, Aleppo, 16 March 1917, in Dinçer, Ibid. [CD], p. 1012.

[752] **PA-AA,** Türkei 183, Bd. 43, Meternich to Bethmann Hollweg, Constantinople, 10 July 1916, in Dinçer, Ibid. [CD], p. 912.

[753] **PA-AA,** Türkei 183, Bd. 44, Hoffmann to Constantinople Embassy, Aleppo, 29 August 1916, in Dinçer, Ibid. [CD], p. 931.

[754] **PA-AA,** Türkei 183, Bd. 47, Rössler to Bethmann Hollweg, Aleppo, 16 March 1917, in Dinçer, Ibid. [CD], p. 1012-1013.

Anatolia.[755] In accordance with his early proposal, the children protected in this orphanage, some of them were sent to Lebanon, while some others were transported to the various cities of Anatolia. Rohner continued to her relief works in Aleppo under the protection of Colonel *Kemal Bey,* the head of the Ottoman Commissariat in Aleppo to organize the urgent assistance issues. According to the remarks of the German representative in Aleppo, *Kemal* strove wholeheartedly to ease the miseries of the deportees, and, by the employment of Rohner, he aimed at the usage of the money in the hands of Rohner, presumably provided by the American and German Consuls, for the benefit of the Armenian women and children.[756]

As for Cemal's attitude to these implementations, his telegrams indicate that he supported the process. However, a report sent by the German Consul in Damascus clearly demonstrate that Cemal supported foreigners' assistance activities, surreptitiously. When the German Consul intended to construct a soup kitchen, an orphanage and a bathroom under the presidency of a German missioner, *Hanauer*, he went to Cemal Pasha for permission. The conversation between the two was conveyed by the Consul as follows:

> "I informed Cemal Pasha about the plan. He told me under the pledge of secrecy that, he personally wants to ease the fate of the Armenians, but he received precise orders from Constantinople requesting the prevention of every kind of American and German assistance for the Armenians… Upon my request to him to do something personally, he ordered the mayor of Damascus in my presence to hire a house and to settle the Armenian children there. Cemal Pasha stated that he is ready to accept money from me, and to distribute it by the Turkish officials, who gained my trust" [757]

The German official Metternich interpreted this decision that the Sublime Porte refused all kinds of foreign assistance regardless of their source.[758]

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[755] **BOA,** DH.ŞFR. 503/91, Mustafa to Talat, Aleppo, 4 Kanun-ı Evvel 1331 [17 December 1915].

[756] **PA-AA,** Türkei 183, Bd. 47, Rössler to Bethmann Hollweg, Aleppo, 16 March 1917, in Dinçer, Ibid. [CD], p. 1012-1013.

[757] **PA-AA,** Türkei 183, Bd. 42, Metternich to Bethmann Hollweg (Transmitting Consul Damascus), Constantinople, 29 March 1916, in Dinçer, Ibid. [CD], p. 882.

[758] **PA-AA,** Türkei 183, Bd. 42, Metternich to Bethmann Hollweg, Constantinople, 29 March 1916, in Dinçer, Ibid. [CD], p. 882.

After that Cemal undertook to establish orphanages for the Armenian children. In a telegram to Enver, he stated that he was about to complete the opening of two orphanages in Hama and Homs for the Armenians.[759] Another orphanage was commenced to service in Damascus.[760] The best-known orphanage opened by Cemal was the Ayntorah orphanage that was put under the presidency of the celebrated Halide Edib after a while of its establishment. The Armenian orphans deported to Syria and the Turkish orphans immigrated from Erzurum was housed.[761] A closer look at this institution will more or less clarify the situation at the Ottoman orphanages.

As understood from the memoirs of Halide Edib, the nature of the education in Ayntura didn't intend to give a religious consciousness to the children. The activities in the institution were quite secular. Halide Edib doesn't describe any religious ceremony acted in the orphanage. Rather, it is obvious in the memoirs that the children were aware of their own national and religious identities. She mentioned the creation of a music band, the amendment of the physical conditions of the orphanage and the treatment of the sick children among the activities performed in Ayntura. They weren't taken, for example, to the mosque, or weren't circumcised etc. The only act of islamization affecting those children was to be renamed with Muslim names. There is no evidence for, say, circumcision in the other Ottoman orphanages in Syria, either. If such an action had been undertaken, the consuls, who reported almost all the details of the treatment of the Armenians, would send reports about it. Similarly, the diaries and memoirs that were dealt with, didn't convey anything about it. The only exception of this is the rumors that came to Dadrian's ears about the cicumcision and taking to a mosque of the orphans in Damascus.[762] However, if such an action had taken place, it would presumably be reported by a consul from the provincial capital of Syria. Therefore, it is a doubtful claim that those

[759] **TTK Arşivi,** KO Koleksiyonu 10/21, Cemal to Enver, 23 Mayıs 1332 [5 June 1916].

[760] Cemal to Enver, 27 Eylül 1333 [27 September 1917], in *Arşiv Belgleriyle Ermeni Faaliyetleri VII,* p. 698.

[761] Cemal to Enver, 27 Eylül 1333 [27 September 1917], in *Arşiv Belgleriyle Ermeni Faaliyetleri VII,* p. 698.

[762] Dadrian, 4 September 1916, Ibid., p. 165.

orphanages really aimed at the conversion of the Armenian orphans to the ideal believers of Islam.

It is reasonable to conclude from all these activities that Cemal's ultimate aim regarding the Armenian deportees was to integrate them to the Syrian society dispersing them in various districts as the "harmless minorities". By this way, they would be ideal citizens of the Ottoman state and wouldn't be dangerous for the formation of a unitary and fully-authorized governmental apparatus in the Ottoman realm. During both the deportation and settlement, he actively interfered with the process and relieved the conditions of the Armenians. In this process, he conflicted with Talat Pasha, who adopted a policy of deliberate ignorance towards the Armenian refugees. Cemal opened new orphanages for the Armenian children and encouraged them to "convert" to Islam to protect them from the wrath of the "anti-Armenian" factions within the CUP.

CHAPTER V

STRUGGLING FOREIGN INFLUENCE FOR "FULL INDEPENDENCE"

As part of Cemal's policy to reinforce the Ottoman state authority on Syria, the struggle with the influence of the foreign powers created one of the most crucial aspect of his policy of Syria. As noted above, considerable cultural investments of the Great Powers there, especially those of France showed the Ottoman Government weak in the eyes of its subjects in Syria throughout the whole 19th Century. During this century, the Ottomans had to compete with those Powers for the allegiance of its Syrian citizens, because of the privileges provided by the Capitulations. Therefore, besides the struggle with the internal "threats" for the Ottoman supremacy in Syria narrated in the previous chapters, Cemal endeavored to give an end to the Ottoman-European competition replacing that of the European states with the "loyalty to Ottomanness", which would transform the Syrians to the citizens similar to ones in the modern nation-states.

The relations between the Ottomans and the Great Powers as a multidimensional issue constitute a long history. Beginning from the end of the 18th century, the Great Powers enjoyed a great influence in the Ottoman realm in general, in Syria in particular, which included political, economic and cultural aspects created with the privileges

provided by the Capitulations.[763] The dissemination of the foreign influence with the long experience of the Capitulations throughout the 19th century created a negative attitude in the minds of the Ottoman statesmen against the Great Powers, which, in their view, prevented the integration, independence and development of the Imperial realm. The resentment against the political interventions of that Powers had so increased that, at the beginning of WWI, even the German soldiers under the service of the Ottoman Army were assessed as forces of occupation by the people and the officials.[764]

In the period preceding the WWI, the Great Powers of Europe enjoyed a considerably privileged position in the Ottoman Empire within the framework of the Capitulations to intervene in the internal issues of the Ottoman Empire from politics to jurisdiction. Those who were protected by those states were almost totally exempted from the governmental and legal control of the Empire. Besides their political influence, these Powers had considerable cultural and economic influence on the Ottoman Country and its Syrian Provinces, provided by their schools, missionaries, hospitals etc.[765]

In terms of cultural penetration, as the consequence of its great investments in this area, France received the lion's share in the Syrian realm, although it was weakened by the increasing impact of Germany with the *Weltpolitik,* and by the competition of the Greek-Orthodox community acting with the support of Russia.[766] Towards the end of the 19th

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[763] For some studies on the relations between the Ottoman Empire and the Great Powers, see: For British Policy, see: Joseph Heller, *British Policy towards the Ottoman Empire, 1908-1914,* London, Frank Cass, 1983; for British Policy towards Syria and Palestine, see: Rashid Khalidi, *British Policy towards Syria and Palestine,* Oxford: Middle East Center for St. Antonius's College, 1980; A.L. Tibawi, *Anglo-Arab Relations and the Question of Palestine,* London: Luzac & Co.ltd., 1977; For French Policy in Syria, see: William I. Shorrock, *French Imperialism in the Middle East, 1900-1914,* Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1976; for a study on the German influence in the Ottoman Empire, see: İlber Ortaylı, *Osmanlı İmparatorluğunda Alman Nüfuzu,* İstanbul: İletişim, 2000; for a general study on the relations between the Great Powers and the Ottoman Empire: Kent, Ibid.

[764] **PA-AA,** Türkei 177, Bd. 13, Deutsche Palaestina Bank Beirut to von Rosenberg, "Bericht für das Jahr 1915, Beirut, 29 April 1916.

[765] For a study, examining the place of the Capitulations in the Ottoman legal system, see: Maurits H. Van den Boogert, *The Capitulations in the Ottoman Legal System,* Leiden: Brill, 2005.

[766] L. Bruce Fulton, "France and the End of the Ottoman Empire", in Kent, Ibid, p. 137.

century, there was an intense competition between Germany, Russia and France in Syria on seizing areas of influence. Economically, France was again in the first line taking the advantage of the operating rights of the many railroads and ports in Syria. As for politics, because of its influence over the various sects of the Syrian Christianity, France prevailed against the other Powers in spite of its failure to gain the sympathy of the Muslims. Altough the British had some influence over the Muslim population, it is mainly due to the inclination of the Muslims to benefit from the British tolerance in case of an imposed preference between France and Great Britain. Therefore, as will be analyzed in detail below, the largest struggle was performed against the French penetration during the governorate of Cemal Pasha. Russia's impact on some other Christian sects and the British popularity among the Muslims bestowed on them a voice in Syria following France.[767]

This situation prevented the Ottoman Empire for years from having a full authority over its lands and compelled it to a competition with the Great Powers.[768] However, the announcement of the hostility with the Entente states gave a golden opportunity to the Ottoman Government to assert their authority in the country.[769] As the Governor General of Syria, Cemal Pasha did his best in his area of administration to replace the foreign influence with that of the Ottomans both politically and culturally. On the other hand, he was struggling with the endeavors of the allies of the Ottoman Empire to replace the Entente influence with theirs. This chapter examines how Cemal Pasha struggled with all kinds of the foreign penetration in Syrian provinces during his governorate.[770]

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[767] Shorrock, Ibid, p. 7.

[768] For the analysis of the Ottoman-European competition, see: Fawaz, "Foreign Presence and the Perception of the Ottoman Rule in Beirut", pp. 93-104; Philipp, Ibid, pp. 77-92.

[769] For a study on the abolition of the Capitulations, see: Külünk, Ibid.

[770] For the details of the extensions of the penetration of the Great Powers into the Ottoman Realm see the articles in: Kent, Ibid.

5.1.Countering the French Influence

As briefly stated before, on the verge of the WWI, although it was unsuccessful to gain the sympathy of the majority of the Syrians, France enjoyed of having the greatest influence in Syria among the other great powers, both economically and culturally. The spread of the French culture and language had been tolerated, and even sometimes promoted by the Ottoman Government till the beginning of the War since it was perceived as a component of the modernization. In all the governmental high schools, there was at least one lecturer of the French, who taught the language of the Ottoman modernization. However, the outbreak of the War provoked an extensive struggle with the French influence. In this regard, Cemal Pasha had conducted one of the most influential battles, if not the most influential, against the French existence in the Syrian realm.[771]

The Ottoman Government initiated its struggle in the economic realm. In the beginning of the War, to eliminate the economic existence of France, all the railroads and ports in Syria, which had been administered and operated by that state, were confiscated, and their operating rights were delivered to the Hijaz Railroad Company, the national company of the Ottoman Empire. In that regard, Damascus, Hama, Jaffa and Jerusalem Chemin-de-fer Companies and the port administrations of Beirut were ottomanized and delivered to the Hijaz Railroad Company.[772] As will be explained below, when Cemal Pasha decided to detain the Entente citizens in Syria as hostages, the directors and the officials of the late French Railroads and Ports were not excluded from this implementation; they were paid a salary of prisoner from the funds of the Army.[773] It was

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[771] **HHStA,** PA 12/377, Brawer to Burian, "Die Förderung unseres kulturellen Einflusses in der Türkei", Constantinople, 24 March 1916: for further information about the extent of the French cultural influence before the War from an archival source see: **HHStA,** PA 12/314, "Umfang und Art der Ausübung des französischen Kultusprotektorates", The Writer and date aren't specified.

[772] **BOA,** BEO 4347/326022, Sadaret to Evkaf Ministry, 23 Mart 1331 [5 April 1915].

[773] **BOA,** BEO 4367/327519, Sadaret to Ministry of Interior, 23 Temmuz 1331 [5 August 1915]; **BOA,** BEO 4372/327845, Sadaret to Başkumandanlık, 30 Ağustos 1331 [12 September 1915].

relatively easy for the Ottoman Government to abolish the French economic existence applying the method of nationalization. However, erasing the cultural influence would not be as easy as that of the economic influence:

5.1.1. Deportation and Exile of the Agents of the French Influence from Syria

As the first part of the policy of elimination of the French influence, the citizens and religious men of that state, who made the French visible in the Syrian Provinces with their religious, cultural and educational activities, were commenced to be deported together with the citizens of the other Entente states. Most of the deportees were the priests and the sisters, who could influence the public opinion of the Syrian Christians, and who became for years the transmitters of the French cultural influence in the provinces under the study.[774]

When decided to deport the French citizens from Syria, some citizens of the Entente states were excepted for the deportation order, especially for those who could be beneficial for the Army in the war circumstances; the sisters of the French Hospital in Damascus continued their services for a while upon the request of the Commander of the 4th Army by virtue of military considerations, whereas the priests of the hospital deported.[775] In May 1916, those sisters were driven out and compelled to leave their uniforms behind and adopt native women’s dress. The hospital was occupied by the Ottoman Government.[776] Besides that, some priests in the confiscated cloisters and

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[774] **MAEE,** Guerre 1914-1918, 867/Turquie, Syrie et Palestine, Reffye to Defrance, Alexanria, 20 November 1914

[775] **BOA,** DH.EUM. 5. Şb. 5/57, Enver to Talat, 20 Teşrin-i Sani 1330 [3 December 1914].

[776] **PRO,** FO 371/2777, McMahon to FO (Transmitting an intelligent returned from Syria), Cairo, 20 May 1916.

orphanages were allowed to stay in the Ottoman country by naturalizing themselves to the Ottoman citizenship.[777]

When the deportation order was first issued, all the citizens of the Entente were contained within the scope of it. However, while the process of deportation were continuing in its normal routine, upon the death of the civil people in the bombardment of the Syrian coasts by the Entente's warships, the deportation was stopped on 12th December by the Governor in compliance with the Army Commander to keep them as hostage for threatening the Entente states in case of the repeat of the same incident; Firstly Zeki Pasha[778], the predecessor of Cemal, and later Cemal Pasha threatened the Entente states via Italian and American diplomats, and by the proclamations in the newspapers expressing that the citizens of the Entente were detained as hostages in Damascus and Jerusalem, and would be killed in groups of three for each Ottoman killed in the allied bombardment.[779] In addition, the material damages would be compensated from the income of the French and the British institutions in the Ottoman Country.[780] On 19th December that prohibition was invalidated, and the detained were allowed to exit from the country till 28th December; one day later, upon the British bombardment of Alexandretta Cemal cancelled the permission again; On 26th December, some Entente citizens, who were deemed appropriate to be deported–most of them from the clergy class from France- were driven out of the country

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[777] **HHStA,** PA 12/463, Pallavicini to Burian(Transmitting Consul Beirut), Constantinople, 7 November 1915.

[778] For Zeki Pasha's proclamation in the newspapers of Beirut see: **BOA,** DH.EUM.5.Şb. 3/22, The Governor of Syria to Ministry of Interior, 27 Teşrin-i Evvel 1330 [9 November 1914];**MAEE,** Guerre 1914-1918, 867/Turquie, Syrie et Palestine, Reffye to Defrance, Alexanria, 20 November 1914; **PRO,** FO 371/2141, Rodd to Grey, Rome, 24 November 1914.

[779] The British subject interned at Damascus were informed by Cemal Pasha that if any bombardment took place, he would be obliged, though to immediately retaliate on them: **PRO,** FO 371/2483, Chief of Staff of Sir John Jackson Oliver [Limited] to the British Gun-Boat at Alexandretta, Damascus, 20 December 1914; for a description of the situation of the Entente citizens in Jerusalem by a deported priest see: **MAEE,** Guerre 1914-1918, 868/Turquie, Syrie et Palestine, Apostolic Missionary Amédéé de Merone to Cote, 17 February 1915.

[780] **BOA,** DH.EUM. 5.Şb. 10/41, 2 Mart 1331 [15 March 1915].

till 2nd January.[781] Meanwhile, Talat warned Cemal that killing 3 three people in return for each Ottoman citizen, above all touching the clergy, would mean the proclamation of war against the whole Christian world. Cemal answered that he used that threat only as a trump to prevent further bombardment of the Syrian coasts.[782]

Although Cemal prevented the deportation of the ordinary citizens of the Entente states, he didn't suspend the process for the clergy since their deportation and exile would also be meaning the abolition of the French cultural investment in Syria and the elimination of the potential of these clerics to influence the local people.[783] In two days after Cemal's declaration of deportation, 53 priests and sisters left Beirut with an Italian vessel. Similarly two days later, 212 French, 44 Russian, 4 Belgian priests and 90 French sisters were deported.[784] According to the information given by the deportees from Jerusalem, to the French representative in Alexandria, firstly, they were interned in the barracks, and then deported by the order of Cemal Pasha. Most probably, that practice was applied to prevent the leaking of information. On the other hand, the ordinary British and French citizens were kept in the hotels and barracks as hostages.[785] However, the military authorities encouraged the sisters and some physicians of the Entente to stay in the hospitals instead of returning to their home.[786] In return for the treatment of Cemal Pasha,

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[781] **PA-AA,** Türkei 177, Bd. 11, Mutius to Bethmann-Hollweg, Beirut, 26 January 1915.

[782] **BOA,** DH.EUM. 5.Şb. 6/54, Talat to Cemal, Cemal to Talat, 8 Kanun-ı Evvel 1330 [21 December 1914].

[783] At that time, the Governor of Jerusalem was complaining about the potentials of those religious men to influence the local people; **BOA,** DH.ŞFR. 450/67, The Governor of Jerusalem to Talat, Jerusalem, 13 Teşrin-i Sani 1330 [26 November 1914]

[784] **BOA,** DH.EUM. 5.Şb. 11/7, the Governor of Beirut to Ministry of Interior, 18 Kanun-ı Evvel 1330 [30 December 1914]

[785] **MAEE,** Guerre 1914-1918, 867/Turquie, Syrie et Palestine, Reffye to Defrance, Port-Said, 6 January 1915.

[786] The head physician of the Rothschild Austrian Hospital and another physician, who had French nationality are allowed to stay there: **BOA,** DH.EUM. 5.Şb. 6/35, Ministry of Interior to The Governor of Jerusalem, 12 Kanun-ı Evvel 1330 [25 December 1914]; 900 of the pro-French religious men were deported from Jerusalem to the expressions of the French deportees. For details of their remarks see: **MAEE,** Guerre 1914-1918, 867/Turquie, Syrie et Palestine, Reffye to Defrance, Alexandria, 2 January 1915.

France considered a military operation against Syria, but due to the British opposition they had to abandon that action.[787]

All the other clerics, who were not allowed to leave the country, were exiled to Damascus and Urfa.[788] In addition, considering that the detainment of the Entente citizens in Syria, especially in the coastal regions, could induce some espionage incidents, Cemal exiled them to the interior. A German diplomat in Damascus reported the difficulty of the isolation of the Entente citizens stating that they could easily be mixing up in the daily life. The Austrian Consul of Damascus, in a similar way, agreed that the citizens of the Entente states –most of whom were of French nationality- played a considerable role in the dissemination of the pro-Entente leaflets among the people, which sometimes created panic among the local people.[789] As a result of all these factors, Cemal expelled all the French, British and Russian citizens, living in the Syrian Provinces to Asia Minor, giving a priority to those who settled in the coastal towns, unless who were ill and whose health conditions were unsuitable for travel.[790] Regarding the place of the resettlement for the exiles, a German Military official conveyed from Enver Pasha that, in the beginning, Cemal was contemplating to resettle those people in the desert. However, taking the difficulty of adaptation to the weather of the desert for them into consideration, he abandoned this idea.[791]

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[787] For an example of such considerations see: **MAEE,** Guerre 1914-1918, 867/Turquie, Syrie et Palestine, Cote to MAE, Port-Said, 9 January 1915.

[788] Ballobar, Ibid, p. 37.

[789] **HHStA,** PA 38/366, Ranzi to Burian, “Entente-freundliche Ausstreuungen; Einstellung des Verkehrs auf den Syrischen Bahnen”, Damascus, 22 June 1915; With similar regards, a few months later, the Governor of Beirut demanded the expulsion of the protestants from the coastal regions into the internal regions. For details see: **BOA,** DH.ŞFR. 489/9, Bekir Sami to Talat, 31 Ağustos 1331 [13 September 1915]

[790] **BOA,** DH.EUM. 5.Şb. 14/24, Enver to Talat [Transmitting Cemal], 9 Haziran 1331 [22 June 1915]; **BOA,** DH. EUM. 5.Şb. 11/11, The Governor of Beirut to Ministry of Interior, Beirut, 15 Mart 1331 [28 March 1915]; **PA-AA,** Türkei 177, Bd. 11, Padel to Bethmann-Hollweg, Damascus 20 February 1915; **BOA,** DH.EUM. 5.Şb. 11/16, The Governor of Aleppo to Ministry of Interior, 19 Mart 1331 [2 April 1915].

[791] **PA-AA,** Türkei 177, Bd.11, Wangenheim to Bethmann-Hollweg (Transmitting Humann), Constantinople, 18 March 1915; Quite the reverse, all the Entente citizens

Cemal Pasha followed the same policy with similar considerations towards the Muslim citizens of the Entente who had Algerian and Indian origins claiming that they were paid salaries by the French and the British Governments via the American consulate, and thus, their existence in Damascus was deemed as dangerous both militarily and politically. As a result, 49 of the Algerians and 13 of Indians, all of them Muslims, were banished to inner Anatolia with their families by Cemal's order.[792] After that, money distribution to the former Entente citizens –most of whom were the Jewish immigrants who subsisted with the foreign aids- via American Consulates had to be presented to the approval of the Governor of the related city in a list, and then paid to the persons.[793]

Besides the French citizens, the Algerian Ottomans, who immigrated in Syria after the French occupation of Algeria, were a most influenced community by France, and Cemal watched out for their actions throughout the War. A considerable number of people, who had an Algerian origin was banished to Anatolia throughout the War period within the framework of the policy adopted for the abolishment of the French influence in the Syrian provinces.[794] As analyzed in Chapter 2, some prominent Algerian leaders from al-Jazairi family were either sentenced to death penalty or exiled to Anatolia with the same reason.

Cemal Pasha also commenced a process of expulsion for ones, who were thought to become the agents of the French influence in Syria before the War, consisting mostly of

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settled at Zor were expelled to Konia by the order of Cemal Pasha: **BOA,** DH.ŞFR. 543/35, Kamil to Talat, 5 Teşrin-i Evvel 1332 [18 October 1916].

[792] **BOA,** DH.EUM. 5.Şb. 36/30, Cemal to Talat, Damascus, 4 September 1915; In another document Cemal gave the number as 64: **TTK Arşivi,** KO Koleksiyonu 3/33, Cemal to Enver, 12 Mart 1332;From a document regarding putting the Algerian Muhammed Utbe on a salary, it is stated that he was daily paid 7 gurush by the Government. It seems clear that those exiles were salaried by the Government in the place of resettlement: **BOA,** DH.EUM. 4.Şb. 7/1, Security General Directorate to the Governorate of Ankara, 19 Haziran 1332 [2 July 1916].

[793] **BOA,** DH.ŞFR. 565/91, Azmi to Talat, 16 Eylül 1333, Beirut, [16 September 1917].

[794] **BOA,** DH.ŞFR. 60/9, Talat to the Governor of Syria, 2 Kanun-ı Sani 1331 [15 January 1915]; **BOA,** DH.ŞFR. 60/93, Ministry of Interior to the Governor of Sivas, 10 Kanun-ı Sani 1331 [23 January 1915]; Some unfortunate incidents also took place in that process. For example A French citizen from Algeria, who came Damascus to go to Mecca for pilgrimage, was arrested and banished to Ankara as prisoner of war with his family consisting of 27 persons: **BOA,** DH.EUM. 4.Şb. 6/25, The Governor of Ankara to Ministry of Interior, 1 Nisan 1332 [14 April 1915].

the prominent Christian families of Beirut and Lebanon. In Cemal's viewpoint, those people were dangerous both militarily as a source of intelligence and politically as the continuance of French penetration. As a result of these considerations, Cemal commenced a process of banishment for some prominent Christian families of Beirut to Asia Minor, who became distinguished with the Francophile feelings. In the first quarter of 1916, according to Beirut Consul of Germany, he expelled a group of people with their familites, consisted mainly of the Christian merchants. Their numbers were reaching to 70 men. They were decided to be expelled by the denouncement of the confidants of the Government without any judgment process.[795]

With the same regards, a number of the outstanding Lebanese were arrested and expelled to Anatolia, who were accused with disloyalty to the state. Among them the old vice-president of the Administrative Board of the autonomous Lebanese regime, Habib Pasha Saad,[796] the old President of the Administrative Board of the autonomous Lebanon, and the most influential supporter of the French penetration in Lebanon, the old *Kaymakam* of Metn district, Faik (Faiz?) Shehab,[797] the *Kaymakam* of Shuf district, Emin Tewfik Arslan and his brother Emin Fuad Arslan, the old Commander of the autonomous Lebanese troops and the brother of the old Minister of Agriculture, Suleiman al-Bostani, Said Bey al-Bostani[798] and some other Lebanese notables.[799] Approximately one month before this decision, Emin Arslan and Habib Pasha Saad had been nominated as the deputy

[795] **PA-AA,** Türkei 177, Bd.11, Mutius to Bethmann-Hollweg, Beirut 26 April 1916; Changing their place of resettlement was dependent on the permission of the Ministry of Interior: **BOA,** DH.EUM. 5.Şb. 29/4.

[796] For his decision of expulsion to Ankara, see: **BOA,** DH.EUM. 4.Şb. 7/51, Ministry of Interior to the Governor of Syria, 12 Temmuz 1332 [25 July 1916].

[797] **BOA,** DH.ŞFR. 543/117, The Governor of Bolu to Ministry of Interior, 11 Kanun-ı Sani 1332: Faiz Şihab'ın Bolu Kıbrıscık'ta nahiye müdiri olarak bulunduğu, önde gelen dürzi eşrafından

[798] Said Bey firstly expelled to Ankara. But, to the contrary of the general policy of the prohibition of the exiles to change their locations, he was allowed to resettle in Istanbul: **BOA,** BEO 4444/333253, Ministry of Interior to War Ministry, 26 Teşrin-i Sani 1332 [9 December 1916].

[799] **BOA,** DH.EUM. 4.Şb. 7/51, Ministry of Interior to the Governor of Syria, 12 Temmuz 1332 [25 July 1916].

candidates of Lebanon by Ali Münif.[800] But later, they were abandoned and exiled.[801] As expressed in the third chapter, the Maronite Patriarch had also been banished to Adana with the same reasons. All of them were exiled without any judgment, like previous exiles. According to the German Consul of Beirut, some of them were banished since they were the adherents of the French and British propagations, but some others became victims of personal ambitions and hates of the confidants of the Government.[802]

Cemal was rather strict about the issue of the return of those exiles to their homes. Similar to his treatment of the Muslim exiles to Anatolia, he never accepted the return of them to Syria. Even the request of the American Ambassador and the mediation of Talat Pasha for the return of some people were refused by the absolute ruler of Syria. The German Consul stated that those operations of the Government make the contrast sharper between the Turkish rule and the Arabs, and caused some eyebrows to be raised even among the pro-Ottoman sections of the Syrian society.[803] However, when Cemal's long term policies were taken into consideration, he rather aimed at the transformation of the social structure than a satisfaction of the people with the moderate Ottoman policies.

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[800] **PA-AA,** Türkei 177, Bd.12, Mutius to Bethmann-Hollweg, Beirut, 15 March 1916

[801] **BOA,** DH-İ.UM. 2-12, Ali Münif to Talat, Beirut, 17 Teşrin-i Sani 1332 [30 November 1916]; **PA-AA,** Türkei 177, Bd.13, Mutius to Bethmann-Hollweg, Beirut, 9 December 1916.

[802] **PA-AA,** Türkei 177, Bd.11, Mutius to Bethmann-Hollweg, Beirut 26 April 1916; For the exile of the Maronite Patriarch due to his Francophile attitude see: **BOA,** HR.SYS. 2267/34, Ministry of Interior to Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 9 Temmuz 1332 [22 July 1916].

[803] **PA-AA,** Türkei 177, Bd.11, Mutius to Bethmann-Hollweg, Beirut 26 April 1916. Cemal Pasha's anti-French attitude caused the interpretations by the British officials describing him as Germanophile. There was almost no comment by the British and French officials interpreting Cemal's actions in Syria as the centralization of those lands: **PRO,** FO 371/2777, McMahon to FO (Transmitting an intelligent returned from Syria), Cairo, 20 May 1916; The request of the American Ambassador and the mediation of Talat Pasha to stop the banishment of the interpreter of the American Consulate and his family didn't help the return of the process: **BOA,** DH.EUM. 5.Şb. 36/30, Talat to Midhat, 1 Teşrin-i Sani 1332 [14 November 1916], Midhat to Talat, 2 Teşrin-i Sani 1332 [15 November 1916].

5.1.2. Ottomanization of the French Cultural Institutions

The commencement of the Ottoman struggle in Syria against the French institutions predates even the arrival of Cemal Pasha. It was not a policy adopted for only Syria, but a strategy of nationalization of all the French institutions was adopted all over the Ottoman country.[804] After the *ex parte* abolition of the Capitulations, the Ottoman authorities firstly commenced a process of pacification for all kinds of tools providing communication to the French cultural institutions with the abroad, and to those, which were protected by France with the regulations of the Capitulations.[805] In this sense, first of all, the wireless telegraph machines of those institutions were removed, and the post offices of the foreign states, which were beyond the Governmental control, were closed.[806] The post offices of the Allies of the Empire were not given an exception from this implementation.[807] Especially the Jesuit priests, who were corresponding intensively with the French warships patrolling around the Syrian coasts, were deprived of that communication.[808] In the same vein, with the Ottoman declaration of war against the Entente states, the buildings of the French and

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[804] For the closure of the French institutions in Brussa and the expulsion of its staff, see: **BOA,** DH.EUM. 5.Şb. 4/27, 11 Teşrin-i Sani 1330 [24 November 1914]; The same action was held in Siwas as well: **BOA,** DH.EUM. 5.Şb. 37/22A, 7 Şubat 1332 [20 February 1917]; for Samsun, see: **BOA,** DH.EUM. 5.Şb. 33/4, 17 Kanun-ı Sani 1332 [30 January 1917].

[805] For the details of the implementations applied to the institutions protected by France, see: **BOA,** DH.EUM. 5.Şb. 8/2, 27 Teşrin-i Evvel 1331 [9 November 1915].

[806] **BOA,** DH.ŞFR. 47/181, Ministry of Interior to the Governor of Syria, 13 Teşrin-i Sani 1330 [26 November 1914]; **BOA,** DH.ŞFR. 438/101, The Governor of Beirut to Ministry of Interior, Beirut, 14 Ağustos 1330 [27 August 1914]; **BOA,** DH.ŞFR. 440/76, The Governor of Beirut to Ministry of Interior, 31 Ağustos 1330 [13 August 1914]; **BOA,** DH.EUM. 5.Şb. 6/6, Macid to Ministry of Interior, Jerusalem, 30 Teşrin-i Sani 1330 [13 December 1914]; there was no telegraph machine in the Vilayet of Syria [not the Greater Syria] and Hijaz to confiscate; **BOA,** DH.ŞFR. 450/79, Hulusi to Talat, Damascus, 13 Teşrin-i Sani 1330 [26 November 1914]; **BOA,** DH.ŞFR. 456/64, Vehib to Talat, 22 Kanun-ı Evvel 1330 [4 January 1915].

[807] **BOA,** DH.EUM. 5.Şb. 5/46, 26 Teşrin-i Sani 1330 [9 December 1914].

[808] **HHStA,** PA 38/363, Ranzi to Berchtold, Damascus, 10 September 1914; for the closure of the post offices see: **PA-AA,** Türkei 177, Bd.11, Mutius to Bethmann Hollweg, Beirut, 15 October 1914.

the British consulates in Beirut, Jerusalem and Damascus were subjected to a search.[809] The Ottoman police didn't manage to seize the British documents; however, the French files in Beirut and Damascus were confiscated.[810] Afterwards, those documents would be used as evidence to punish the leaders of the Arabist Movement.

After the decision of the Ottoman Cabinet to confiscate all the Entente institutions and convert them into Ottoman ownership, a process of relentless prosecution was initiated against the French religious, sanitary and educational institutions. In this regard, all of the French institutions, -schools, hospitals, orphanages, etc.- were seized[811] and their priests and sisters were first deposed and, following that, enforced to move out of the buildings of those institutions;[812] the police carried out a search in the houses of the priests in various cities, and in the French colony of Beirut. In Damascus and Jerusalem, the buildings of the priest and sister schools, and some of the churches under the French protection were transformed into military barracks.[813] The rest was decided by the Cabinet to continue their educational activities as *Sultani* Schools or Teacher's Schools [*Darü'l-Muallimin*] under the control of the Ottoman Government.[814] The appeal of the Apostolic See to take the

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[809] For the search in Jerusalem, see: **BOA,** DH.ŞFR.452/15, The Governor of Jerusalem to Talat, Jerusalem, 22 Teşrin-i Sani 1330 [5 December 1914]; for Beirut, see: **BOA,** DH.ŞFR. 508/101, The Governor of Beirut to Talat, Beirut, 28 Kanun-ı Sani 1331 [10 February 1915]; for Damascus, see: **BOA**, DH.ŞFR. 479/4, Cemal to Talat, Damascus, 23 Haziran 1331 [6 July 1331]; also see, Arslan, Ibid, p. 133.

[810] **BOA,** DH. ŞFR, 510/88, Azmi to Ministry of Interior,10 Şubat 1331 [23 February 1915];

[811] **BOA,** MF.MKT. 1202/60, The Governor of Beirut to the Minister of Education in Beirut, 1 Teşrin-i Sani 1330 [14 November 1914].

[812] **BOA,** MF.MKT. 1202/60, The Minister of Education to the Director of Education in Beirut, 23 Nisan 1331 [6 April 1915]; For some references to the deposed priests and seized properties see: **MAEE,** Guerre 1914-1918, 867/Turquie, Syrie et Palestine, Reffye to Defrance, Alexandria, 7 January 1915.

[813] For the implementations in Lebanon and Syria see: **MAEE,** Guerre 1914-1918, 867/Turquie, Syrie et Palestine, Reffye to Defrance, Alexanria, 20 November 1914; for the events in Zahle see: **PRO,** FO 371/2480, Eliot to Grey, "Situation in the Lebanon", Athens, 31 December 1914; for Palestine see: **MAEE,** Guerre 1914-1918, 867/Turquie, Syrie et Palestine, Reffye to Defrance, Alexanria, 2 January 1914

[814] **BOA,** MF.MKT. 1202/60, The Minister of Interior to the Governor of Syria, 29 Teşrin-i Evvel 1330 [11 November 1914].

Catholic institutions under its protection remained inconclusive.[815] The German Consul in Aleppo reported six months later about the result of these actions that, with the closure of the French school and the abolition of its protection over the Catholics, the dissemination of the French culture by education was noticeably hampered.[816]

As for the Ottomanization of the French institutions, following the confiscation of them, the Ottoman Government commenced the process of transformation of them into the Ottoman institutions continuing till the middle of the War period. As was expressed above, some of them had been occupied by the Army for military use. However, some others maintained to render their services as the Ottoman educational institutions. A dispatch of the Minister of Education to the director of Education in Beirut shows the conduct of the Ottoman Government about the Ottomanization of those institutions. The former requested the change of the teaching staff, when those institutions were confiscated; otherwise, they would change only in name.[817]

In this regard, as examined earlier, some seminary rooms belonging to the St. Anna Church were transformed into a Muslim religious and law school, and called with a symbolic name: *Salahaddin-i Eyyubi Külliyesi*. *Salahaddin* was the sultan of the Ayyubids who recaptured Jerusalem from the Crusades in 1187.[818] Similarly, the Freres des Ecoles Chretiennes was occupied and transformed into an Ottoman *Sultani* School.[819] All its staff was decided to deport from the Ottoman country by reason of their potentiality to

[815] The Apostolic See was complaining about the treatment of the Ottoman Government all the institutions protected by France as the French institutions: **BOA,** DH. EUM. 5. Şb. 8/2, Ministry of Interior to Foreign Ministry, 27 Teşrin-i Sani 1330 [10 December 1914]; **PA-AA,** Türkei 177, Bd.11, Löytvet to Bethmann-Hollweg. Damascus, 18 December 1914.

[816] **PA-AA,** Türkei 177, Bd.12, Rössler to Bethmann-Hollweg, Aleppo, 8 May 1915.

[817] **BOA,** MF.MKT. 1202/60, The Minister of Interior to the Director of Education in Beirut, 23 Nisan 1331 [6 April 1915].

[818] For further information see: Martin Strohmeier, *Al-Kulliya as-Salahiya in Jerusalem: Arabismus, Osmanismus und Panislamismus im Ersten Weltkrieg,* Stutgard: Kommissionsverlag Franz Steiner, 1991, pp 2–3.

[819] **BOA,** DH.EUM. 5.Şb. 6/6, Macid to Ministry of Interior, Jerusalem, 30 Teşrin-i Sani 1330 [13 December 1914].

manipulate the local public opinion.[820] At Jubeil, Tripoli and Junie, after the Ottomanization of the French schools, the Government changed the teachers with Turkish and Arab teachers. The crosses over the doors of these religious institutions were broken down and replaced by crescents.[821]

A similar implementation was conducted by Ali Münif Bey in Lebanon in April 1916. Since Lebanon had an autonomous government before the War, the Ottomanization of the French institutions there were slower than the other districts of Syria. The Governor of Lebanon issued a declaration "to the monks, priests, brothers and sisters, who [were] in the Ottoman Lebanon and who [were] the members of foreign congregations", and requested those religious men, who had already acquired an Ottoman citizenship, to cut all their ties with the foreign congregations and religious orders. If these religious men wanted to continue their monastic lives, they had to take the approval of the heads of their local communities, Maronites, Greek-Catholics or Greek-Orthodox. With this declaration all the churches, schools and other institutions belonging to the institutions under the French protection in Lebanon before the War were confiscated. The German Consul of Beirut emphasized that the main goal of these implementation was to break the French influence, which became so effective in the Lebanon.[822]

The Ottomanization of the orphanages and the schools were paid a special attention, since the children were of vital importance in the processes of identity-building. According to the remarks of the Ottoman Minister of Education, the ultimate aim was to Islamize those institutions removing the adjective "foreign" in front of their names.[823] By

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[820] **BOA,** DH.ŞFR. 450/67, The Governor of Jerusalem to Talat, Jerusalem, 13 Teşrin-i Sani 1330 [26 November 1914]; **HHStA,** PA 38/367, The Consul of Jerusalem to Burian, "Politisches Situationsbild", Jerusalem, 7 June 1915.

[821] **PRO,** FO 371/2777, McMahon to FO (Transmitting an intelligent returned from Syria), Cairo, 20 May 1916.

[822] **PA-AA,** Türkei 177, Bd.13, Mutius to Bethmann-Hollweg, Beirut, 12 April 1916; Similar remarks are also available in a British document. However, the teller doesn't define the place and time, and some exaggerations are available: **PRO,** FO 371/2777, McMahon to FO (Transmitting an intelligent returned from Syria), Cairo, 20 May 1916.

[823] **BOA,** MF.MKT. 1202/60, The Minister of Interior to the Director of Education in Beirut, 28 Nisan 1331 [11 April 1915]; For the Ottomanization of the French Orphanage in Damascus (50 children) and the settlement of the Muslim children there, see: **BOA,**

that reason, in the French Orphanage of Beirut, after the deposition of the sisters, 151 women were needed for the maintenance of the routine of the institution. [824] In the same vein, the Christian children, who were submitted by their parents to be trained as priests and sisters, were required to be returned to their families. In the same direction, in a short span of time, the Christian trainers and officials would be changed with that of the Muslims.[825] Different from Beirut, in Damascus the care of the Christian orphans would be entrusted to the new Muslim tutoresses, instead of the dispersion of those children.[826] However, the Orphanage in Damascus was released from the confiscation with the intervention of Cemal Pasha.[827]

A closer look at the situation of an Ottomanized orphanage in Beirut with the testimony of a nurse, Felizitas Taux, working in such an orphanage in Beirut, will clarify the extent of the transformation. After the seizure of the French orphanages in Beirut, consisted of a central house used as school for the education of the Orphans and the other students (for 800 students), an orphan boy house (for 145 boys), an orphan girl house (275 girls) and a hospital, the governor of Beirut appointed a Turkish director for those institutions, named Kudret Bey. Firstly, the director appointed the German nurses of the orphanages, whose numbers were only two and worked under French protection before the War, as Cashiers in different Orphanages, instead of employment them in the care of the children. That was convenient to the order of the Central Government, allowing their stay

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MF.MKT. 1202/60, The Director of Education in Syria to Ministry of Education, Damascus, 26 Nisan 1331 [9 May 1915].

[824] **BOA,** MF.MKT. 1202/60, The Director of Education in Beirut to Ministry of Education, 26 Nisan 1331 [9 April 1915];

[825] **BOA,** MF.MKT. 1202/60, The Minister of Interior to the Director of Education in Beirut, 28 Nisan 1331 [11 April 1915]; For the Ottomanization of the French Orphanage in Damascus (50 children) and the settlement of the Muslim children there, see: **BOA,** MF.MKT. 1202/60, The Director of Education in Syria to Ministry of Education, Damascus, 26 Nisan 1331 [9 April 1915].

[826] **BOA,** MF.MKT. 1202/60, The Director of Education in Syria to Ministry of Education, Damascus, 3 Mayıs 1331 [16 May 1915].

[827] **BOA,** MF.MKT. 1202/60, The Minister of Interior to the Director of Education in Damascus, 10 Haziran 1331 [23 April 1915].

in Syria unless they worked as teachers.[828] It is worth to mention that Kudret Bey was dismissed from this office because of his lack of capability to conduct this institution.[829]

In addition, the director brought 25 Mussulman orphans to the Orphanages and ordered that, from then on, those children would be cared there. He also ordered that the Mussulman children should not be taken to the Church, and ceased all the statues of the sacred figures of the Christianity (Mother Marry, Joseph Antonius, Vincens and the Cross) in the hospital and the Orphanages, although the German nurses opposed him with a resignation threat.[830] Similarly, the Chapelle of the Jesuit School in Beirut was transformed into a conference hall removing all the [sacred] property inside the building.[831]

Another question for Cemal Pasha in Syria regarding the people employed in the French religious institutions was the issue of the German and the Austrian citizens, who were in the service of those institutions, or who were protected by France. For Cemal the toleration of their activities would mean the maintenance of the foreign influence in a different way, i.e. the replacement of the French influence with those of the Germans or Austrians, that was the most important goal followed by those states in Syria throughout

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[828] The nurse wanted to convey his letter to the Catholic Cardinal of Köln in Germany via the Austrian Consul of Beirut. However, being afraid of a diplomatic crisis between the Ottoman Empire and his Government, the Consul transmitted the letter to the Austrian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Burian. For the original of the letter and the comment of the Consul see: **HHStA,** PA 38/369, Nedwed to Burian, "Barmherzige Schwestern in Beirut Weilterleitung eines Briefes", Beirut, 8 August 1916; for the order of the Ottoman Government about the employment of the Germans and Austrians, who worked in the French institutions before the War see: **BOA,** EUM. 5.Şb. 9/55A, The Governor of Syria to Ministry of Interior, 10 Teşrin-i Sani 1330 [23 November 1914], Ministry of Interior to the Governor of Syria, 11 Teşrin-i Sani 1330 [24 November 1914].

[829] **BOA,** DH.ŞFR. 531/86, Azmi to Talat, Beirut, 28 August 1916 [10 September 1916]

[830] **HHStA,** PA 38/369, Nedwed to Burian, "Barmherzige Schwestern in Beirut Weilterleitung eines Briefes", Beirut, 8 August 1916: Some Ottoman documents also shows that the Muslim children were settled in the confiscated orphanages: **BOA,** MF. MKT. 1202/60, Ministry of Interior to the Governorates, 30 Mart 1331 [11 April 1915].

[831] **BOA,** MF.MKT. 1202/60, The Minister of Interior to the Governor of Beirut, 7 Haziran 1331 [20 June 1915]; **BOA,** MF.MKT. 1202/60, The Director of Education in Beirut to Ministry of Education, 10 Haziran 1331 [23 June 1915]

the War.[832] With these considerations, the German and Austrian Consuls made an application to the Governor of Syria requesting the maintenance of those institutions to their activities same as before. Becoming aware of their aims[833], the Ottoman Government allowed their stay in Syria on condition that they wouldn't work as teachers in the schools and monasteries.[834]

At the expense of the ruin of the structure of those institutions and scattering their human capital, Cemal Pasha and the Bureaucracy under his rule managed to a large extent the Ottomanization of the French institutions in Syria, by which the mentioned states were able to have a great influence there, and an ability to intervene the internal issues of Syria on the pretext of the problems of those institutions and colonies. By this way, Cemal made a crucial stride for the full independence of the Ottoman Empire from the interventions of the foreign powers in the Syrian realm, most probably taking the situation in the post-war period into consideration.

As for Cemal policy against Great Britain, because of the difference of the British imperial tradition and their relative indifference about Syria, they didn't have much influence in Syria, which necessitated a struggle, similar to that conducted against France. Rather, they preferred a policy aiming at the alienation of the urban and Bedouin Syrians from the Ottoman Caliph, i.e. counter-propaganda against the Ottoman Policy of Pan-Islamism. Therefore, Cemal struggled with that state by different methods. Since Cemal's policy of Pan-Islamism can't be considered a strategy in the framework of the struggle with foreign influence, this subject has been analyzed under the second chapter examining Pan-Islamism policies.

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[832] The details of those policies will be explained in the related title. However, for the examles of such intentions see: **PA-AA,** Türkei 177, Bd.12, Rössler to Bethmann-Hollweg, Aleppo, 8 May 1915; **HHStA,** PA 12/377, Brawer to Burian, "Die Förderung unseres kulturellen Einflusses in der Türkei", Constantinople, 24 March 1916.

[833] As will be explained in details below, in a report that was sent to Talat, it is obvious that the Ottoman Empire were aware of the strivings of those states and struggling with them: **BOA,** DH.EUM 5.Şb 30/38, Mehmet Ali [Inspector of Education] to Ministry of Interior, 20 Teşrin-i Evvel 1332 [2 Kasım 1916].

[834] **BOA,** EUM. 5.Şb. 9/55A, The Governor of Syria to Ministry of Interior, 10 Teşrin-i Sani 1330 [23 November 1914], Ministry of Interior to the Governor of Syria, 11 Teşrin-i Sani 1330 [24 November 1914].

5.2. Checking German and Austrian Influence in Syria

The German enterprises to have an influence in the Syrian territories predates the accession of Wilhelm II to the throne[835], and on the eve of the War, German colonization had already reached to a considerable level in Syria,[836] although it was not compatible to that of France.[837] When Cemal Pasha arrived in Syria, it was a widely known phenomenon that Germany aimed to deepen its penetration there, taking the advantage of the War.[838] In spite of its backwardness in comparison to Germany, the Austrian-Hungary Empire also undertook to assert its influence taking the advantage of the War circumstances, at least among the Catholics of the Province to fill the gap left by France.[839]

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[835] The first German colony had been established in Palaestine, in 1868, as an independent Christian colony: Arthur Ruppin, *Syrien als Wirtschaftsgebiet,* Kolonial-Wirtschaftliches Komitee Verlag, Berlin: 1917.

[836] For further knowledge about the history of the German penetration in Syria, see: Ulrich Trumpener, "Germany and the End of the Ottoman Empire", in Kent, Ibid. pp. 107-136; the population of two German colonies, Wilhelma and Sarona, which became the basis of the German influence in Syria was reaching to 3.000: **PRO,** FO 371/2482, Norman Bethwich to FO, "England and the Jewish Settlement in Palestine", undated.

[837] For some comparisons between German and French investments in Syria see: Fulton, Ibid.

[838] **HHStA,** PA 12/209, Ranzi to Burian, Damascus, 28 January 1915;

[839] For the advises of the Austrian Ambassador in this direction see: **HHStA,** PA 12/210, Pallavicini to Burian, "Deutsche kulturelle Aktion in Damascus", Constantinople, 9 December 1916; for a German report about this subject, see: **PA-AA,** Türkei 177, Bd. 16, Brode to AA, Jerusalem, 24 October 1917; for warning of the Ottoman authorities to their colleagues in Syria about the Austrian undertakings in this direction, see: **BOA,** DH.EUM 5.Şb 30/38, Mehmet Ali [Inspector of Education] to Ministry of Interior, 20 Teşrin-i Evvel 1332 [2 Kasım 1916].

As defined in the beginning of the chapter, Cemal Pasha had appeared as the Governor General of Syria to integrate those lands into the Imperial body and to assure in these provinces the independence from the foreign intervention. Therefore, he had to struggle, at the same time, with the undertakings of the allies of the Empire in Syria aiming at gaining an area of influence there as well as the elimination of the influence of the enemies of the Ottomans. However, as will be explained below, he didn't hesitate to have recourse to the German technical and scientific experience in the development of Syria, but, determined by the Germans themselves, too, in Cemal's mind, their role in this process was no more than an advisor.[840]

5.2.1. The German Activities in Syria and Reaction by the Turks and the Arabs

With the outbreak of the War, Germany had its eyes on Syria as a sphere of influence and an area of colonization. With that aim, first of all, the quality and number of the German officials in Syria was enlarged. Before the War, Germany was represented in Damascus with a Vice-Consulate; the director of the Palaestina-Bank, Mr. Karl Schiefer was acting as the consular administrator there. However, after the commencement of the War, as a consequence of the increasing importance of Syria and Arabs for Germany, Dr. Löytvet, a physician on psychology and an important diplomat, was sent to Damascus with broad authority. According to the Austrian Consul in Damascus, in a short span of time, he created a considerable influence on the Ottoman officials of Syria and Cemal Pasha.[841] Besides Dr. Löytvet, from officers to engineers, all the German officials employed in Syria worked to increase the German presence in Syria.[842] The Spanish Consul in Jerusalem

[840] **PA-AA,** Türkei 177, Bd.12, Metternich to Bethmann-Hollweg, Constantinople, 21 January 1916

[841] **HHStA,** PA 12/209, Ranzi to Burian, "Die Chancen der egyptischen Expedition- Deutsche Herrscht in Syrien", Damascus, 28 January 1915.

[842] **HHStA,** PA 38/369, Ranzi to Burian, "Die Gründung eines deutsche-ottomanischen Vereines", Damascus, 31 January 1916.

described the Germanization of Jerusalem with the following words: "For the rest, Jerusalem is rapidly Germanizing: The new military governor is a German general that they call Bach Pasha. In addition, the Chief of the Military Staff, the Military Cencor, etc. are German."[843]

First of all, Germany considered implementing a policy of Syria, which would create the infrastructure of a future colony for them in the post-war era. Some publications, which were issued in Germany throughout the War period, made those intentions clearer, which openly investigated about the value of Syria and its neighborhood as a colony for Germany.[844] In the same regard, throughout the War period, Germany made a considerable effort to obtain the operating rights of the railways, which seized from France. Moreover, some German officials considered demanding those rights from France as war indemnity at the end of the War.[845]

Besides these, the Germans also struggled for the obtainment of the administration of the Hijaz Railroad on the pretext of its maladministration by the Turks. The German officials in Syria repeatedly complained about the defects of the administration of that railway company claiming that the misrule prevented the proper organization of the military issues in Syria. After that complaint, the mentioned officials alleged that if the administration of the Hijaz Railroad were assigned to the hands of the Germans, then the

[843] Ballobar, Ibid, p. 42.

[844] For some examples of those publications see: E. Brandenburg, *Bericht über Eine Reise in Syrien und Palaestina,* Gesellschaft für Palaestina-Forschung, Berlin:1914; Emil Zimmermann, *Kann uns Mesopotamien eigene kolonien ersetzen?,* Kolonial-Wirtschaftliches Komittee Verlag, Berlin: 1917; S. Killermann, *Die Blumen des heiligen Landes:Botanische Auslese einer Frühlingsfahrt durch Syrien und Palaestina,* Hinrichs'sche Buchhandlung, Leipzig:1917.

[845] **PA-AA,** Türkei 177, Bd.12, Rössler to Bethmann-Hollweg, Aleppo, 8 May 1915.

services would be improved.[846] The acquirement of the Hijaz Railroad would also mean taking over the extraction rights of the mines given to this Railroad Company.[847]

Similarly, they planned to work out the mines in the neighborhood of the future French railways, and to establish agricultural colonies in various places of Syria.[848] For the purpose of the establishment of the agricultural colonies in Syria, the Germans strove to persuade Abd al-Rahman Pasha al-Yusuf, a pro-Ottoman notable and a senator in the Ottoman Parliament, to get his admission for the introduction of the intensive methods in his large agricultural estates (100.000 ha), spreading in various districts of Syria. Due to the negative attitude of the Ottoman Government vis-à-vis the foreign investments, they calculated to make an Ottoman company a partner of this undertaking. Thus, with mechanization of agriculture, the orders of the agricultural machines would flow into the German industry. The demonstration of what the German industry wrought would increase the similar demands in the region. All this information was conveyed to Berlin upon the visit of the Pasha there for this purpose.[849] However, the defeat of Germany in the WWI made it impossible to realize this project.

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[846] For some examples, see: **PA-AA,** Türkei 177, Bd.11, Mutius to Bethmann-Hollweg, Beirut, 1 May 1915; **PA-AA,** Türkei 177, Bd.16, Bernstoff AA; (Trasmitting Graf Schdenburg, Damascus), Constantinople, 21 November 1917; **BA-MA,** RM 40/678, Busse to Chef des Admiralstab, "Bericht des Korvettenkapitaens Busse über Küstennachrichtenwesen in Syrien", 7 February 1916; **PA-AA,** Türkei 177, Bd.12, Rössler to Bethmann Hollweg, Aleppo, 8 May 1915.

[847] For some examples of the mines under the possession of the Hijaz Railroad Company, see: **BOA,** BEO 4321/324968, Evkaf Ministry to Ministry of Commerce, 27 Teşrin-i Evvel 1330 [10 November 1914].

[848] **BA-MA,** RM 40/678, Busse to Chef des Admiralstab,"Bericht des Korvettenkapitaens Busse über Küstennachrichtenwesen in Syrien". 7 February 1916; **PA-AA,** Türkei 177, Bd. 17, Grobba to AA, "über die wirtschaftliche Lage Syriens und Palaestinas, ihre Entwickelungsmöglichkeiten und die Methode ihrer Entwicklung" Jerusalem, 23 July 1917.

[849] Short before the outbreak of the War, Abdurrahman Pasha was about to agree with a French-Belgian Company for the modernization of the agriculture in his lands, but the commencement of the War caused the failure of the project. After that, the Germans interested in his estates; **PA-AA,** Türkei 177, Bd.18, Brode to Hertling, Damascus, 12 September 1918.

The Germans competed at the same time with Austria for both mines and the agricultural lands in Syria; The German officials were disturbed with the possible exploitation of the agricultural abundance of Syria by Austria, which would be obtained in return for the German blood.[850] A similar conflict occurred in the issue of the mines. When Austria undertook to obtain the operating rights of the mines around Heraklea, The German government didn't abstain from issuing a warning to them.[851]

On the other hand, Cemal had knowledge about the German aims, and struggled as much as possible to prevent those designs. We understand from a telegram, sent by the *Sheikhulislam,* Hayri Efendi, to Cemal Pasha, it seems that the Ottoman Government had the knowledge of almost everything about the German intentions to take hold of the operation rights of the Hijaz Railway, and to work out the mines around that railway. Conveying these informations to Cemal, Hayri requested him to be careful about the German activities in this direction.[852] Cemal would guarantee to the *Sheikhulislam* that he would protect the Hijaz Railway from the German ambitions.[853] For the same purpose, the mines in the various cities of Lebanon and coal deposits in Tripoli were annexed by the Hijaz Railway Company to work out.[854]

In the reports of Austrian, American and the Ottoman officials, Cemal was cognizant about the importance of the economic independence for full realization of the Ottoman authority in Syria, and he didn't allow the Germans to go beyond an advisory role in Syria throughout his governorate there. Similarly, Most of the Turkish staff and soldiers

[850] **PA-AA,** Türkei 177, Bd.18, Brode to Hertling, Damascus, 12 September 1918.

[851] **PA-AA,** Türkei 177, Bd. 14, Graf Wedel to Bethmann-Hollweg, Vienna, 7 May 1916.

[852] Sheikhulsislam conveyed these informations from Petternich (Metternich?), the German manager of the third Chemin-de-fer branch of the Ottoman General Staff: **BOA,** DH.ŞFR. 52/10, Sheikhulislam to Cemal, 13 Nisan 1331 [26 April 1915].

[853] **BOA,** DH.ŞFR. 52/189, Sheikhulislam to Cemal, 19 Nisan 1331[1 May 1915].

[854] **BOA,** A.MTZ.CL. 7/295, Sadaret to Ministries of Commerce, Evkaf and Agriculture, 28 Mayıs 1331 [10 June 1331]

in Syria detested the Germans considering that Germany was planning to establish a protectorate in the Ottoman realm and Syria.[855]

There was an ongoing clash between the German and Turkish soldiers in Syria throughout the War, stemming mainly from the German condescending attitudes against the Turks and Arabs, and the colonizatory intentions of Germany.[856] Towards the end of the War, the frustration of the Turks employed in Syria had so increased that a German-hostile placard, which was written in Turkish, was hanged in the most central streets of Damascus. The Austrian Consul estimates that, due to the language of the placard, it was the action of the Turkish soldiers who detested the Germans. The contents of the placard makes clear the reason of the Turkish detestment of the German soldiers:

> "It must be known that we are going to save our country from the Germans, who invaded it, step-by-step. The German troops from Istanbul to Palestine consists of 3 battalions. We warn our people before this number increase more. It must be noted that in Gallipoli and Kutulamare, we conducted the War alone. Look how our soldiers are fed. The German soldiers eats three times more than our soldiers…"[857]

As for the local people, a similar reaction against the Germans could be seen in a widespread manner among the Syrians, both Christians and Muslims. According to a German military official, they blamed Germany for the disasters concomitant to the War like famine, inflation, military requisitions etc.[858] In this sense, according to the German consul in Beirut, the Syrians blamed the excessive German consumption for the increase of

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[855] **HHStA,** PA 38/366, Dandini to Burian, "Deutsche-türkische Beziehungen", Aleppo, 27 September 1915; **HHStA,** PA 38/366, Dandini to Czernin, "Abreise de Major Gravenstein", Aleppo, 9 August 1917; **PRO,** FO 371/3058, Grahame to FO, "Memorandum of Conversation with Mr. Samuel Edelman, late United States Consul at Damascus", Paris, 10 June 1917; **BOA,** DH.ŞFR. 461/84, Hulusi to Talat, Damascus, 3 Şıbat 1330 [16 February 1915]**.**

[856] **BA-MA,** RM 5/2320, Mühlens to Chef of the Admiralstab of Marine, Jerusalem, 22 June 1915; **HHStA,** PA 38/367, The Jerusalem Consul to Burian, "Politisches Situationsbild", Jerusalem, 7 June 1915; **BOA,** DH.ŞFR. 572/2, Azmi to Talat, Beirut, 22 Teşrin-i Sani 1333 [22 November 1917]; **HHStA,** PA 12/209, Dandini to Pallavicini, "Haltung der Deutschen in Aleppo", Aleppo, 3 January 1915.

[857] **HHStA,** PA 38/371, Ranzi to Burian, "Deutschefeindliche Plakate", Damascus, 25 February 1918.

[858] **BA-MA,** RM 5/2321, Humann to Marine-Attache, 29 November 1916.

the food prices.[859] Another German official in Syria conveyed that, in the minds of the Arabs, if Turkey had not entered into the War thanks to Germany, those disasters pestering the Syrians would not happen. In the same way, the atrocities implemented by Cemal Pasha, such as executions and exiles, was billed to the Germans by the Christian and Muslim Syrians, who thought that the Germans were capable to forestall those incidents as was done by the Consuls before the War.[860] Such kind of considerations paved the way for the increase of the Entente popularity among the local people,[861] and made the Muslims and the Christians closer than ever before to each other.[862]

The German attempts to create an area of influence in Syria could not succeed to win popular support because of their failure to persuade the Turks of their goodwill, and to make believe the Arabs, both Muslims and Christians, about their innocence in the disastrous incidents occurred in Syria throughout the War. In other words, they were unsuccessful to obtain the support of both the people and the elites, although the reasons were different. The popularity of the French culture among both the Turks and the Arabs could be mentioned as another reason in the German failure. As will be shown shortly, their attempts to introduce their cultural and political influence into Syria, to a large extent, would meet with the resistance of the local and central Ottoman authorities, who were *suspicious* about the German intentions:

5.2.2. Prevention of the Foreign Intervention

[859] **PA-AA,** Türkei 177, Bd. 17, Mutius to Hertling, Beirut, 15 March 1918.

[860] **BA-MA,** RM 5/2323, Grafen to the Chef of the Admiralstabs of Marine, “Militaerische und Militaerpolitische Lage in Syrien, Palaestina, Arabien und Mezopotemien”, Constantinople, 26 February 1918; **PA-AA,** Türkei 177, Bd. 17, Weber to Hertling, Constantinople, 26 June 1918;

[861] **PA-AA,** Türkei 177, Bd.13, Stotzingen to AA, 17 November 1916.

[862] **PRO,** FO 371/2777, McMahon to FO (transmitting an intelligent returned from Syria), Cairo, 20 May 1916. .

Cemal Pasha stood firm concerning the political and administrative independence of the Ottoman officials from foreign intervention. He always sided with the full authority of the Ottoman officials in their territory. Therefore, in his opinion, all the non-Ottoman interventions in the Ottoman administrative mechanisms had to be prevented as much as possible. On all occasions, he laid stress on the abolition of the Capitulations and the lack of venue for the Consuls to intervene in the activities of the Ottoman Government. As conveyed by Dr. Ruppin, the head of the German Zionist organization in Palestine, in a meeting attended by all the consuls in Jerusalem, Cemal despised them describing their places in the country as “distinguished foreigners”.[863] Similarly, the Spanish consul reported about the treatment of the consuls that “the [Ottoman] authorities treat us consuls with such indifference and animosity that it seems like we are more of an enemy than the Allies themselves”.[864] According to Ruppin, The Consuls of Germany in Haifa, Jaffa and Jerusalem did not play any role in the reconciliation of the conflicts between his community and the Government. Furthermore, the Zionist leader described Cemal Pasha as a sneaky adversary of the German influence in Syria.[865]

The German and the Austrian diplomats also agreed with Ruppin on the issue of Cemal’s sensitivity about the interference of the foreign consuls in the Governmental

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[863] **PA-AA,** Türkei 195, Bd.9, Ruppin to Zionist Central Bureau in Berlin. Constantinople, 12 October 1916; the remarks of the Spanish consuls about the treatment of Cemal to the consuls confirms Dr. Ruppin. A conversation conveyed by the consul between him and Cemal worthy to attention in terms of the new position of the consuls: “Last night the *mutasarrif* received us in ‘his house’, that is, in the former Italian consulate. In the garden there were little tables where my colleagues and I had some appetizers while waiting for the arrival of Djemal Pasha. Whe he appeared, he greeted us, had a moment with his subordinates and right away sat down at our table with Heinrich Brode –the new German consul- Kraus [the Austrian Consul], Rapael [the Greek Consul], Glazebrook [the American Consul], a German captain and me. It was my turn to bear the burden of the conversation, and Djemal announced, joking, that he had it in mind to hang me, publishing ‘compromising documents’ that he had about my conduct and that, of course, did not refer to my lack of neutrality”: Ballobar, Ibid, p. 97.

[864] Ballobar, Ibid, 133.

[865] **PA-AA,** Türkei 195, Bd.9, Ruppin to Zionist Central Bureau in Berlin. Constantinople, 12 October 1916; The intelligence report reached to the British officials gave similar informations about Cemal’s relations with Germans: **PRO,** 371/2477, The Marquess of Crewe to Bertie, 3 July 1915.

issues of the Empire.[866] The Austrian Consul of Aleppo reported that, after the abolition of the Capitulations, the whole authority in the provinces concentrated in the hands of the Governors. The natural consequence of that was the decrease of the popularity of the Consuls among the people. Before the abolition of the Capitulations, the Consuls of the Great Powers were the centers both militarily and politically. However, in the aftermath of the abrogation, as a result of some unsuccessful ventures by the German, Austrian and American Consuls to canalize the Governmental practices made their influence damaged among the local people, and even some scoffing urban legends underestimating their powers did emerge.[867] Similarly, their relations with the Arab notables were worsened in the post-Capitulations era; in the past years, according to the Aleppo consul of Austria, the local notables were both an intermediary between Government and the Consuls, and a valuable source of information for them. But, after the annulment of the rights of the Consuls, the notables who had a relation with those diplomatic missions were deemed as doubtful and prosecuted by the Government.[868] According to the diaries of the Spanish consul, "to clinch the suppression of the Capitulations", beginning from 13th February 1917, the Government would "not recognize either the functions or the name of *dragoman,* nor that of *cavas*". They would "be called secretaries and servants respectively". The consul guessed that the Ottomans would "soon suppress the *cavas* uniform".[869]

Cemal didn't hesitate to warn the consuls, when he needed, to mind their own businesses instead of being busy with the internal issues of the Empire. In October 1916,

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[866] **PA-AA,** Türkei 177, Bd.16, Bernstoff to AA (Transmitting Consul Jerusalem), Constantinople, 21 November 1917; **PA-AA,** Türkei 177, Bd.13, Deutsche Palaestina Bank Beirut to von Rosenberg, "Bericht für das Jahr 1915", Beirut, 29 April 1916.

[867] Sometimes any foreign intervention could make the situation worse. In the issue of the Zionist leader Ruppin's expulsion from Palestine, the German Ambassador requested from Berlin to avoid any intervention since it would cause more frustration of Cemal Pasha, and would make negative impact on his situation: **PA-AA,** Türkei 195, Bd.11, Kühlmann to AA, Constantinople, 16 February 1917; Similarly, Ruppin's himself repeated the same request in another issue to the Zionists in Germany: **PA-AA,** Türkei 195, Bd.8, Neurath to AA (Transmitting Lichtheim), Constantinople, 26 January 1916.

[868] **HHStA,** PA 38/369, Dandini to Burian, "Beziehungen der hiesigen Berufskonsuln zu den Lokalbehörden", Aleppo, 12 October 1916.

[869] Ballobar, Ibid, p. 133-134.

he sent a message to the consuls of commerce acting in the Syrian provinces, requesting them to be concerned with the commercial issues rather than political issues of the Empire. The Austrian Consul of Aleppo didn't find that warning surprising, since, from the beginning of the War, he and his bureaucrats were striving to abolish the influences of the foreign representatives, i.e., Cemal was struggling for the "full independence" of the Ottoman Empire from the foreign intervention.[870]

The absolute ruler of Syria was so stringent about the independence of the governmental authorities that he didn't refrain from the severest sanctions against the representatives of the foreign states, when he thought that they exceeded their authorizations. The most outstanding event in this sense was the incident that took place between Mr. Schabinger, the German Dragoman of Jaffa and the Governor of Jerusalem, Munir Bey, because of the evacuation of the German Jews from Jaffa. When Jaffa was decided to be evacuated, the citizens of the allied states had been exempted from this decision. However, as expressed in Chapter 3, this was not valid for the German Jews. Upon the requests of the Jews under his protection, Schabinger visited the Governor of Jerusalem and demanded the extension of this decision to the German Jews as well. During the discussion, the Dragoman compared the evacuation with the Jewish pogroms of Russia[871] as well as criticizing harshly Cemal Pasha's actions about the evacuation of Jaffa.[872]

Thereupon, the Governor applied to Cemal Pasha conveying the words of the Dragoman to him.[873] It was at Palm Sunday, and Cemal Pasha immediately requested the

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[870] **HHStA,** PA 38/369, Dandini to Burian, "Beziehungen der hiesigen Berufskonsuln zu den Lokalbehörden", Aleppo, 12 October 1916.

[871] A pogrom (Russian: погро́м) is a form of violent riot, a mob attack directed against a minority group, and characterized by killings and destruction of their homes and properties, businesses, and religious centres. It originally and still typically refers to 19th- and 20th-century attacks on Jews, particularly in the Russian Empire; http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pogrom

[872] **BOA,** BEO, 4463/334661, Cemal to Ministry of Interior, 22 Nisan 1333 [22 April 1917]; **PA-AA,** Türkei 177, Bd. 15, Schabinger to Bethmann-Hollweg, Jaffa, 14 May 1917.

[873] **BOA,** BEO, 4463/334661, Cemal to Ministry of Interior, 22 Nisan 1333 [22 April 1917]

Jerusalem Consul of Germany to visit himself. After narrating the incident, Cemal stated to the Consul that his representative in Jaffa made a serious mistake, and added: If Mr. Schabinger did not apologize, Cemal intended to take him to Jerusalem and deliver him to the Court Martial. Upon the answer of the Consul that it was a serious threat, Cemal stated that *"ce n'est pas une menace. Je le ferai"* [This is not a threat I will]. Moreover, in regard to that incident Cemal Pasha prevented the telegraphic cipher communication and the censor free post of the Dragoman.[874] He also repeated the same things to the Governor of Jerusalem to implement against the Consul, if the latter didn't retreat.[875]

At the end, the issue was solved with the mediation of the Jerusalem Consul. On the basis of Cemal's order, the Governor had given a deadline -in the afternoon of the next day- to Schabinger to come to the office of the Governor and to apologize due to his actions. While Schabinger was going to the Governor for apology, the Consul of Jerusalem made Cemal Pasha abandon his idea. The next day, the prohibitions of telegraphic communication and censor free postal service were removed. In the same day, Cemal visited Jaffa and the Dragoman visited him to apologize. During the conversation, Cemal interrupted him and said that "L'homme est compose de nerfs" [man is composed of nerves]. Thus the problem had been solved almost completely at Cemal's will.[876]

A similar incident happened to the Spanish Consul of Jerusalem, Graf Ballobar, towards the capture of Jerusalem by the British forces. In the beginning of the War, an Italian hospital was confiscated by the Ottoman Army. Then, a Chappel inside the building of the hospital had been protected, deemed as a cultural object. With the heat of the battles in Palestine Front, the Ottoman officials requested the Spanish Consul, in his capacity as the protector of the Italian interests, to permit the usage of the Chappel by the Army. The

[874] **PA-AA,** Türkei 177, Bd. 15, Brode to Bethmann-Hollweg, Jerusalem, 30 June 1917; for the notice of the Governor of Jerusalem in this issue, see: **PA-AA,** Türkei 177, Bd. 15, Ahmed Münir to Schabinger, Jaffa, 1 Nisan 1333 [1 April 1917].

[875] **BOA,** BEO, 4463/334661, Cemal to Ministry of Interior, 22 Nisan 1333 [22 April 1917]

[876] **PA-AA,** Türkei 177, Bd. 15, Schabinger to Bethmann-Hollweg, Jaffa, 14 May 1917; **PA-AA,** Türkei 177, Bd. 15, Brode to Bethmann-Hollweg, Jerusalem, 30 June 1917; for the notice of the Governor of Jerusalem in this issue, see: **PA-AA,** Türkei 177, Bd. 15, Ahmed Münir to Schabinger, Jaffa, 1 Nisan 1333 [1 April 1917].

Consul, who was on good terms with Cemal Pasha, requested to visit him. However, The Governor didn't issue him a travel permission to go to Damascus and put him under police surveillance. Thereupon, Count Ballobar applied to Cemal Pasha to visit him. Cemal stated that he would be happy with the Consul's visit, requesting him not to come to his headquarter to make a complaint about the Governor, since the consuls didn't have a right to complain about the Governors.[877]

The Governor and Count Ballobar confronted again, while the Christian and Jewish clergy were removed from Jerusalem on the orders of Cemal Pasha. The Spanish Consul opposed this order for the Latin patriarch demanded his stay in Jerusalem. But, the Governor rejected his request. Upon his further complaints, Cemal issued an order requesting him to leave the Ottoman country. The Governor of Jerusalem similarly applied to the Ottoman Central Government with the same request, as well as claiming that his only job was to hinder the works of the Government there. The result didn't change and the Latin Patriarch was removed from Jerusalem.[878]

Towards the end of his governorate in Syria, Cemal Pasha had an issue with the German consul of Jaffa for the second time. Shortly before the British capture of Jerusalem, The Consul visited Haifa and called the people to leave the city informing them about the arrival of the British troops, and caused a panic and fear among the people in and around Haifa. Thereupon, the Consul was raped to Damascus, and the German Ambassador was requested for his dismissal.[879]

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[877] **PA-AA,** Türkei 177, Bd. 15, Brode to Waldburg, Jerusalem, 25 August 1917. Ballobar, slightly touches upon this issue in his diaris: Ballobar, Ibid, pp. 165-166; It is probably because that he avoided to write the "dangerous" issues in his diaries. For example, while he was narrating the competition between Enver and Cemal he noted such a remark in his diaries: "I do not continue because these simple notes are becoming excessively dangerous": Ballobar, Ibid, p. 80.

[878] **TTK Arşivi,** KO Koleksiyonu 5/51, Cemal to Enver (Transmitting the Governor of Jerusalem), 23/11/1333; **BOA,** DH.ŞFR. 572/92, İzzet to Talat, Jerusalem, 2 Kanun-ı Sani [Teşrin-I Sani?] 1333 [2 January 1918]; **PA-AA,** Bernstoff to AA (Transmitting Jerusalem Consul), Jerusalem, 21 November 1917.

[879] **TTK Arşivi,** KO Koleksiyonu 1/8, Enver to Talat, Damascu, 16 Teşrin-i Sani 1333 [16 November 1917]; the same document is also available at: **BOA,** HR.SYS.2169/31, Ministry of Interior to Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 17 Teşrin-i Sani 1333 [17 November 1917].

Besides the Consuls, Cemal Pasha didn't allow any of the German officers under his command to act independent from his authority. In his treatment of the German officers, Cemal showed his mistrust to those people. On 18th April 1917, He caught Von Kress, while he was corresponding personally with the German Officer Feldman in İstanbul, in the telegraph office. Thereupon, Cemal immediately interdicted communication, and sent a telegram responsively to Feldman notifying the necessity for the officers employed in the Headquarters to call the Chief of the Admiralty to the head of the telegraph machine when they needed to be present there personally. Additionally, he sent a telegram to Enver Pasha, and requested the issuance of a decree prohibiting such kind of actions for the protection of the order.[880]

When the Ottoman and German Headquarters bypassed himself, and communicated with the German officers in his headquarters, Cemal showed an exaggerated response to them and emphasized that the only authority in Syria was himself, therefore the Headquarters had to communicate with him in the issues of the Army.[881] In a similar vein, when the German officers under his command showed a tendency to act independently, Cemal felt it necessary to make them remember that they were a member of the Ottoman Army rather than a representative of the German Army.[882]

As was shown above, in the conflicts between the Ottoman local authorities and the German officials in Syria, Cemal was always on the side of the Ottoman bureaucrats. Such a conflict took place after the US's entry to the WWI. The Germans wanted to confiscate the American Observatory (Giles?) in Beirut. However, the Governor of Beirut, didn't allow them for this operation. Thereupon, the Germans commenced to lobbying activities in Constantinople to acquire the possession of the observatory. Being informed about the German attempts, Cemal sent a telegram to Enver, and requested the forestallment of the

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[880] **TTK Arşivi,** KO Koleksiyonu 3/10, Cemal to Enver, 12/4/1333.

[881] **TTK Arşivi,** KO Koleksiyonu 9/23 Enver To Cemal, 8 Nisan 1331; **TTK Arşivi,** KO Koleksiyonu 5/47, Cemal to Enver, 29/07/1333

[882] **ATASE Arşivi,** Kls. 168, Ds. 730, Fih.110-4, Cemal to Von Kress, 6 Mayıs 1333 [6 May 1917]; Cemal also advised Enver not to allow the German Headquarter in Berlin to correspondence directly with the German Military Mission in Istanbul skipping Envers himself in his capacity as the Commander-in-Chef of the Ottoman Armies: **TTK Arşivi,** KO Koleksiyonu 9/23 Enver To Cemal, 8 Nisan 1331

endeavor on the account that: “if they become successful in the obtainment of their demands, then the Governor will feel humiliated against the local people, and they think that the German influence is prevalent over the Ottoman authority”.[883] Enver guaranteed that nothing would be done for the Observatory. If to be done, it would be in the direction of Cemal’s opinions.[884]

5.2.3. Cemal Pasha and the German and Austrian Cultural Propaganda in Syria

While Cemal was trying to assert the full independence of the Ottoman Empire in Syria on the one hand, the prevention of the German propaganda in the provinces under Cemal’s rule emerged as a crucial issue, on the other. Besides Cemal Pasha, the Ottoman officials in the district were quite aware of the German intentions regarding Syria, and acted tocounter their activities. In 1916, the Governor of Aleppo reminded the Ministry of Interior that the Germans aimed in Syria to replace the old place of France. Therefore, their undertakings to open schools and hospitals had to be checked for the integrity of the Empire, as it was done untill that time.[885]

As expressed in Chapter 2, the most important tool for this aim was the issuance of a newspaper with the title of *Al-Islam* to propagate the gathering the Muslims around the flag of the Ottoman Caliph, which was the most important aim of the *Jihad* policy and the German *Weltpolitik*. However, both Cemal Pasha and Hulusi Bey, the Governor of Syria, opposed this idea by the reason that the newspaper would contribute to the expansion of the German influence in Syria. As a result, the idea came to nothing.[886]

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[883] **TTK Arşivi,** KO Koleksiyonu 12/144, Cemal to Enver, 9 Mayıs 1333 [9 May 1917].

[884] **TTK Arşivi,** KO Koleksiyonu 12/144, Enver to Cemal, 9 Mayıs 1333 [9 May 1917].

[885] **BOA,** DH.ŞFR. 520/16, Mustafa to Talat, Aleppo, 4 Mayıs 1332 [17 May 1916].

[886] **BOA,** DH.ŞFR. 489/27, Hulusi to Talat, Damascus, 2 September 1331 [2 September 1915]: It is stated in the dispatch of Hulusi Bey that the first telegraph on this subject was sent on 10th August 1915.

Similarly, Cemal didn't approve the German enterprise to publish a German-friendly newspaper in Medina. Several attempt of the latter in this direction, remained inconclusive, and ultimately, they had to abandon this undertaking. Moreover, the person (Said Mehmed Me'mun), who would publish the newspaper in Medina, was considered by the Ottoman authorities as a German spy.[887] The same enterprise was held by Cemal Pasha after the commencement of the Sharif's movement. The Ottoman Government established an Arabic Newspaper in Medina like Al-Sharq Newspaper, named "Hijaz". This enterprise was brought forward by Cemal Pasha to create consciousness [most probably Pan-Islamic consciousness] among the people. A late professor of the *Mekteb-i Sultani* in Aleppo, who stayed in Egypt for a long time, was appointed as the editor of the newspaper.[888]

Besides the newspapers, the Germans opened saloons to disseminate German influence in the prominent cities of Syria. The aim of these saloons was to increase the interest of the people on Germany informing them about the level of the development of that state. Through the local people employed in these saloons the Germans had the opportunity to diffuse information about how the German capital and the German labor could make beneficial investments there. Similarly, they could contact with the local people. The Germans established cinematographic equipments in these saloons to display films. However, they could only show a few war films, which seemed uninteresting and weak to the people.[889] The German managers of those saloons complained about the lack of the films on nature and the German industry, which would enable them to introduce the German capability to the Syrians.[890] On the other hand, the Ottoman officials were too careful about such kind of propaganda means. In May 1916, An Austrian, called Goldsmidt, made a trip in Anatolia with the cinematographic equipments to propagate for

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[887] **PA-AA,** Türkei 165, Bd. 39, Metternich to Bethmann-Hollweg, Constantinople, 20 August 1916.

[888] **HHStA,** PA 38/369, Ranzi to Burian,"Die Politik der mittelarabischen Fürsten in dem Konflikt zwischen der Tuerkei und dem Emir von Mekka", Damascus,11 December 1916.

[889] The aim of viewing such films was to increase the patriotic feelings among the people: **HHStA,** PA 38/366, Ranzi to Burian, "Straf- und Coercitifmassregeln", Damascus, 14 November 1915.

[890] **PA-AA,** Türkei 165, Bd. 40, Neufeld to Wesendock, 23 December 1916.

the Central powers showing the War films from the Austrian Fronts. The Ottoman Central Government requested the Governors to monitor his actions[891] in every place that he visited, and when he acted somewhat doubtful, Goldshmidt was recalled to Istanbul.[892]

Another instrument of the dissemination of the influence of a Great Power in the Ottoman Empire was to teach the language of the related state in the schools. In this sense, the German Empire had to make a long struggle in Syria during Cemal's governorate. In the beginning of 1915, when the position of the French language was shaken in the curriculum of the Ottoman schools, the replacement of it with German was not achieved; instead, in Damascus, two courses were opened to teach German.[893] According to Austrian Consul of Damascus, it was impossible to take the former place of the French language by another foreign language, since the national awareness of the Turkish officials had been considerably increased.[894] Introduction of the German language as a mandatory course in the *Sultani* School of Damascus was achieved as late as 14th March 1916. The Germans had made a great effort against Cemal Pasha to arrange this change in the curriculum of the most distinguished school of Syria.[895] In spite of the intense German undertakings, Cemal prevented the opening of a German school in Syria. According to the Austrian Consul in Damascus, Although Cemal Pasha treated the Germans with kindness outwardly; in fact,

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891 **BOA,** DH.ŞFR. 61/115, Talat to the Governor of Konia, 11 Mayıs 1332 [24 May 1916]; **BOA,** DH.ŞFR. 519/9, The Governor of Syria to Talat, Damascys, 25 Nisan 1332 [8 May 1916]; **BOA,** DH.ŞFR. 519/108, The Governor of Jerusalem to Talat, Jerusalem, 2 Mayıs 1332 [15 May 1916]; **BOA,** DH.ŞFR. 522/32, The Governor of Adana to Talat, Adana, 23 Mayıs 1332 [5 June 1916];

892 **BOA,** DH.ŞFR. 63/199, Ministry of Interior to the Governor of Syria, 21 Nisan 1332 [4 May 1916]; **BOA,** DH.ŞFR. 63/210, Ministry of Interior to the Governor of Syria, 23 Nisan 1332 [6 May 1916]

893 **HHStA,** PA 38/366, Ranzi to Berchtold,"Verschickung des Libanische Notabeln", Damascus, 22 January 1915.

894 **HHStA,** PA XII/377, Brawer to Burian, "Die Förderung unseres kulturellen Einflusses in der Türkei", Constantinople, 24 March 1916; for the resistance of the Turkish officials to the teaching of German, see: **HHStA,** PA 38/370, Ranzi to Czernin,"Gründung zweier Fachschulen unter deutscher Leitung", Damascus, 18 January 1917.

895 **HHStA,** PA 38/369, Ranzi to Burian, "Einführung des deutschen Sprachunterrichtes in der hiesigen Sultanischule", Damascus, 21 March 1916.

he was struggling against the increase of the German influence.[896] However, Cemal didn't insist on Turkish education for the technical schools, which required the German knowledge for course supplements, and they were allowed to teach in German.[897] Similarly, the Austrians couldn't venture to open a hospital in Damascus that would spread the Austrian influence there for fear of the ruler of Syria; Instead, they preferred to send the Austrian sisters to the Ottoman hospitals, to transfer them into an Austrian hospital which would be opened after the War.[898]

Together with their undertakings to win the hearts of the city-dwellers, the Germans endeavored to make contact with the Bedouin Chiefs of Syria. For this purpose, some of the Germans employed in Syria visited those Chiefs and promised them some medals. Finding out the German enterprises in this direction, Enver Pasha delivered a complaint to the German Ambassador in Istanbul on the account of the fact that, after the abolition of the Capitulations, the aim of the Ottoman Government was the prevention of all the foreign powers from the assertion of their influence over the local people.[899]

Although Cemal was so distrustful about the Germans, and struggled to prevent their endeavors to create an area of influence –maybe a colony in the future-, he didn't abstain from applying the German experience in the development projects of Syria. He thought that the Germans should contribute as *supervisors* in the reorganization of the Ottoman Army and the Navy as well as the administrative, financial and education systems, and the agriculture and industry generally in the Ottoman Empire, particularly in Syria.[900] In accordance with these considerations, Cemal employed many Germans in the service of the 4th Army. The most prominent of them was the railway constructor Meissner

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[896] **HHStA,** PA 38/369, Ranzi to Burian, "Die Gründung eines deutsch-ottomanischen Vereins", Damascus, 31 January 1916.

[897] **HHStA,** PA 38/370, Ranzi to Czernin,"Gründung zweier Fachschulen unter deutscher Leitung", Damascus, 18 January 1917.

[898] **HHStA,** PA 12/210, Pallavicini to Burian, "Deutsche kulturelle Aktion in Damascus", Constantinople, 9 December 1916

[899] **BOA,** DH.ŞFR. 52/176, Talat to the Governor of Syria, 13 Nisan 1331 [26 April 1915].

[900] For a letter conveying these remarks from Cemal, see: **PA-AA,** Türkei 177, Bd. 12, Metternich to Bethmann-Hollweg, 21 January 1916.

Pasha, as described in Chapter 1, who was assigned to construct the Egyptian branch of the Hijaz Railroad for the conquest of Egypt.[901] For the development of the Syrian cities in a modern way, he recruited Prof. Zürcher as supervisor. Similarly, for the restoration of the historical monuments of Syria, he benefitted from Theodor Wiegand as superviser.[902]

Cemal's policy to employ the Germans in the development of the public works in Syria was generally misinterpreted by the Entente states, and, in their documents, belonging to that period, the Entente officials reported the activities of the German supervisors as the transformation of the Syrian lands to a German colony, and accused Cemal Pasha of being a Germanophile.[903] One of the British memorandums, written by Sir Mark Sykes, defined the Ottoman Empire as "the last colony of Germany".[904] However, As was rightfully determined by Von Kress, Cemal was neither Entente-friendly nor German-friendly, but he was a Turk, trying to establish the Ottoman authority in Syria; his Francophile attitude of the pre-war years, didn't make an impact on his actions in Syria.[905] In tandem with the elimination of the social interlayers and the struggle with the foreign influence, Cemal launched a process towards the Syrians through conscription and education, which would facilitate an Ottoman identity-building there, as part of the same policy. In the same way, he undertook some construction works in the Syrian cities to make the state's penetration easier:

[901] Pick, Ibid, p.181.

[902] For his activities in Syria, see: Wiegand, Theodor, *Halbmond im Letzten Viertel: Archaeologische Reiseberichte,* Bruckmann München, München: 1970.

[903] **PRO,** FO 371/2770, The Chairman of the War Trade Intelligence Department to FO, "German Colonisation in Syria", Switzerland, 15 September 1916.

[904] **PRO,** FO 371/2774, Sykes to FO, "The Problem of the Near East", 20 June 1916.

[905] Freiherr Von Kress, "Ahmed Djemal Pascha", *Zwischen Kaukasus and Sinai, Band 3, Jahrbuch des Bundes der Asienkaempfer,* Deutsche Orientbuchhandlung Mulzer&Cleimann, 1923, p.14; the contemporary witnesses of the German officials proves that Cemal was very careful about the German activities in Syria: **BA-MA,** RM 5/2323, Grafen to the Chef of the Admiralstabs of Marine, "Militaerische und Militaerpolitische Lage in Syrien, Palaestina, Arabien und Mezopotamien", Constantinople, 26 Febrary 1918.

CHAPTER VI

IN THE PURSUIT OF IDEAL CITIES AND CITIZENS

> "Greater social complexity brought a greater deployment of authority. People had to be 'coached', as it were, for the tasks created by the more populous society and the claims which it made on its citizens… a start was made on educating people to a discipline of work and frugality and on changing the spiritual, moral and psychological make-up of political, military and economic man".[906]

Concordant to checking or eliminating the regional intermediaries preventing the penetration of the state into the Syrian realm and besides the struggle with the foreign influence, Cemal headed towards the policies, which would produce physically and mentally ideal citizens for the Ottoman Empire. Especially his cultural and educational activities, which, from time to time, tended to protect and maintain the Arab cultural and intelectual legacy, may urge the academics, who repeatedly write about the Turkification policies of the CUP, to reconsider their arguments.[907] As will be clarified below, he

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[906] Gerhard Oestreich, *Neo-Stocism and the Early Modern State,* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983, p. 157 quoted in Gordon, Ibid, p. 13.

[907] Focusing only the Armenian policy of the CUP, Taner Akçam claimed in his last book that they pursued a turkifiation of the Ottoman Land: Taner Akçam, *The Young Turks' Crime againt Humanity*, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2012. Fuat Dündar approximately claimed the same thing with a broader perspective: Dündar, Ibid.

concentrated his main interest on the increase of the loyalties of the Syrians giving them a consciousness of Ottomanness. In the same context, he made essential interventions to the urban space to create visible modern cities, which would facilitate the surveillance of the state in the Syrian cities after the removal of the impact of the social interlayers. All of these activities can be considered some steps to increase the "legibility"[908] of state in its territories.

To be more specific, the Syrians were introduced to the state through their responsibilities towards the State and through their civil rights vis-a-vis it. In this regard, the first encounter of the Syrians with the duties of the citizenship was the further extention of the compulsory military service to the Arabs with the outbreak of the war, which would be one of the most hassling processes of that period for the Arab citizens. In parallel with ruling over their bodies, a project of the Ottomanization of the minds of the Syrians were put into practice. Almost all the foreign educational institutions were either confiscated or closed as part of this goal. It is worth to mention, however, that, from the beginning of the modernization, which can be dated back to the reign of Mahmut II, there were educational institutions aiming to create a sense of Ottomannes among the subjects of the Empire. The characteristic that makes this period special was the absence of any foreign competition. Finally, some works of constructions were undertaken to make the Syrian cities more "penetrable".[909]

Although the conscription and the educational activities are hardly explored yet, the construction works undertaken by Cemal are more or less analyzed in the existing literature. Hasan Kayalı has made a study summarizing the public works held by Cemal Pasha in Syria. He emphasizes that Cemal's activities in this sense cannot be separated from the Ottoman imperial policy in that period aiming at the integration of the Imperial

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[908] I borrow this term from James C. Scott, who describes the activities of state to know more about its territories as the increase of the legibility of state in these territories. For the details, see: James C. Scott, *Seeing Like a State,* London: Yale University Press, 1998.

[909] By this word, I mean the transformation of the cities in a way that enabling the state to make "surveillance" to the city-dwellers. According to Michel Foucault, by the transformation of the dead-end streets into the boulevards and avenues, the authority of the state over the cities and its dwellers were obtained. By this way, they would feel the existense of the state more closely. For further detail, see: Michel Foucault, *Discipline and Punish: the Birth of the Prison,* London: Penguin Books, 1991.

realm vis-a-vis the grave internal and external challenges.[910] Following this study, a discussion of the characteristics of Cemal's ideology as reflected in these public works will be made in this section. Together with the recruitment and educational and cultural policies, Cemal's works of construction enable us to understand his aim of existence in Syria.

6.1.*"Aux Armes, citoyens!"*: Conscripting the Ottomans in Syria for the Ottoman Army

> "Unfortunately, it has not still developed sufficiently in our country to lay down one's life for the peace of the fatherland [*vatan*] and to assume it an honorable duty. It cannot be denied that [this sentiment] had not progress in some part of people due to the ignorance and inaptitude [*marifetsizlik*] that they exposed to, but, sorrowfully, the majority of those, who grew up in a scholarly and trained environment, preferred to serve at the dangerless and more comfortable rear guard rather than doing virtual battle in war
> It is understood that, in our intellectual and national education, the high-feelings, like devotion to the fatherland and its love, and the necessity to forget everything for it, could not constitute the purpose of life [*gaye-i âmâl*]. "[911]

With the emergence of the modern states, defending the country against the "enemy" became one of the most important responsibility of the citizens. In this regard, beginning with Mahmud II, the Ottoman Empire obliged its citizens to do compulsory military

[910] Hasan Kayalı, "Wartime Regional and Imperial Integration of Greater Syria during World War I", in Thomas Philipp and Birgit Schaebler (eds.): *The Syrian Land: Processes of Integration and Fragmentation: Bilad al-Sham from the 18th to the 20th Century,* Franz Steiner Verlag, Stuttgart: 1998

[911] Nuri Conker, *Zabit ve Kumandan,* İstanbul, 1913, quoted in Gültekin Yıldız, *Neferin Adı Yok: Zorunlu Askerliğe Geçiş Sürecinde Osmanlı Devleti'nde Siyaset, Ordu ve Toplum (1826-1839),* İstanbul: Kitabevi Yayınları, 2009, p. 307.

service.[912] However, the Arabs of Syria were generally exempted from the conscription until the outbreak of the WWI. During the War, the Syrian realm experienced the largest scale of conscription in its history under the Ottoman Rule. According to the figures estimated by Elisabeth Thompson,

> "By late 1916 the Ottomans were conscripting men aged 17 to 55, both Muslims and Christians (except those in Mount Lebanon), in an army that recruited 2.85 million troops. About three-fourths of all adult men were mobilized. Casualties neared one million. Figuers on battlefield deaths vary between 325.000 and 600.000 men. In addition, about 240.000 soldiers died of disease, and 250.000 others were listed as missing or as enemy prisoners by war's end."[913]

In this section, the process of recruitment in Syria and its reaction by the Syrians will be analyzed as one of the most important requirement of citizenship:

6.1.1. Mobilization for the Conquest of Egypt

Immediately after the proclamation of the mobilization in the beginning of August 1914, with the drums and the shrill pipes [*Ebvak*], all of those, who were liable to the military service between 20 and 40 years old, were required to apply to the Recruitment Offices for the registration. Placards were hanged on the walls in the cities with the title of *Seferberlik* [Mobilization] announcing the martial law and the requirement of all the liable persons to register with the Recruitment Offices and threatening them that any delay would be tried in the military courts and heavily punished. The Recruitment Offices held tight the issue of registration. The soldiers were patrolling in the streets of the cities and would be warning the conscripts to take their registration certificate for the military service. Otherwise, they would be arrested after a week. The registration was tightly implemented in the villages, too. The authorities sent mounted police to the *Mukhtars* to deliver the

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[912] For some studies on the compulsory military service in the Ottoman Empire, see: Yıldız, Ibid; Tobias Heinzelmann, *Cihaddan Vatan Savunmasına: Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nda Genel Askerlik Yükümlülüğü, 1826-1856,* İstanbul: Kitap Yayınları, 2009.

[913] Elisabeth Thompson, , *Colonial Citizens,* Newyork: Columbia University Press, 2000.

mentioned placards them to meet the case. Following that, a campaign of intimidation was put into practice in the villages and cities of Syria to demonstrate the seriousness of the attitude of the Government.[914] Meanwhile, it is worth to mention that all these orders were valid for the Christians as well.[915] However, as the mistrusted citizens, they were usually employed in the labor battalions to clean the streets and undertake heavy-duty road and railroad construction.[916] The only exceptions had to be provided by Cemal Pasha for the Druzes and the Lebanese to prevent any rebellion of them against the Ottoman Government and provide their satisfaction.[917] As expressed in the chapter four, another exemption was made by Cemal for the Armenian refugees to facilitate their conditions in the following years of the war. In addition, Hijaz, Yemen and Asir, mainly populated by the Bedouin tribes, were immune to the mobilization.[918]

As a result of that process, the people applied to the Recruitment Offices in a week leaving all their works aside, to be able to show their registration documents to the soldiers patrolling everywhere to arrest the liable persons who didn't register yet. The ones between 20 and 25 were registered as regular soldier, while the others between 25 and 40, were counted as the auxiliaries. The state officials had also to be registered. However, after

[914] Darwaza, Ibid, p. 216-217; Expressing the recruitment process with similar remarks, the Austrian Consul reports that the age range of the conscription were in between 20 and 45 and gives the deadline as 8 days : **HHStA,** PA 38/363, Ranzi to Berchtold, Damascus, 10 August 1914; in his later reports he corrected that the ones over 40 years old were given discharge papers: **HHStA,** Ranzi to Berchtold, Damascus, 3 September 1914; The Governor of Jerusalem also cabled to Talat that he announced the order of the mobilization in the city center and all its administrative appendages [*mülhakat*], and all the liables and the pack animals were summoned in rapid succession:.**BOA,** DH.İ.UM.EK.71/93, Macid to Talat, 29 Temmuz 1330 [11 August 1914].

[915] **HHStA,** PA 38/363, Ranzi to Berchtold, Damascus, 10 August 1914; **MAEE,** Guerre 1914-1918, 868/Turquie, Syrie et Palestine, Töhmeh to Defrance, Cairo, 7 April 1915.

[916] Tamari, Ibid, p. 45.

[917] As a matter of fact, they rejected the demands of the Government in this direction in the beginning of the War; **HHStA,** PA 38/363, Ranzi to Berchtold, Damascus, 18 August 1914.

[918] **BOA,** DH.SYS. 123-08/13, Ministry of Interior to Ministry of War, 19 Ağustos 1330 [1 September 1914].

a week, the Central Government ordered the exemption of the employees of the post and telegraph offices, policemen, teachers and the judges.[919] The ones between 16 and 25, and older than 45, who were somewhat exempted from the military service, were registered to the labor battalions and enforced to work in the farmlands.[920] However, the sons and relatives of the ones, who were closer to the Government or who were able to influence the decision of the military authorities regarding the place of the appointment of the recruited men, were employed in their hometowns with an easier job. But later, Cemal Pasha issued an order prohibiting the soldiers of performing military service in their native countries.[921]

The recruitment process was so successful that, according to the report of the Austrian Consul in Damascus, in the eighteenth day of the mobilization, the number of the conscripted Syrians had reached to 52.000. They were distributed to the various regions of Syria, most probably as a caution to the possibility of an Entente debarkment.[922] As for the social reflections of that process, the wide extent of the conscription on the one hand, and after it became apparent that the Ottomans would enter into the War, on the other, created a panic among the people in the cities and villages.[923] According to the Austrian Consul, in the coastal regions, this fear was due to the possibility of being massacred in a bombardment by the Entente in the case of the declaration of war. The Christians were anxious about a massacre to be directed against them by the Muslims. By these concerns, many families in Beirut, both Muslims and Christians, left the city and drew back to Mount Lebanon. The local government applied some measures to prevent this mass escape and tried to control the voyages to Lebanon district.[924]

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[919] Darwaza, Ibid, p. 217; Some people in Beirut fleed to the mountains even in the beginning of the conscription not to be recruited: **MAEE,** Guerre, 1914-1918, 867/Turquie, Syrie et Palestine, Picot to Delcasse, Beirut, 7 October 1914.

[920] **BOA,** DH.EUM.MTK. 54/26, Talat to Governorates, 6 Teşrin-i Evvel 1330 [18 October 1914].

[921] Tamari, Ibid, 15 September 1915, p. 134-135.

[922] **HHStA,** PA 38/363, Ranzi to Berchtold, Damascus, 18 August 1914.

[923] Darwaza, Ibid, p. 216-218; in his memoirs, Yusuf al-Hakim repeats similar

[924] **HHStA**, PA 12/462, Nedwed to Berchtold, "Beunruhigung unter der hiesigen Bevölkerung", Beirut, 1 October 1914; Similar remarks can be found in the French repots: **MAEE,** Guerre 1914-1918, 867/Turquie, Syrie et Palestine, Defrance to Delcasee, Cairo,

It is not easy to claim that, in the beginning, the Arabs were disposed to do the compulsory military service. The disciplining character of the military life induced them to apply every means to avoid conscription since they were not acquainted with it. Alexander Aaransohn, who was conscripted together with the Arabs, described the hard conditions of the newly conscripted Syrians in the beginning of the process, making references to their alienation to be disciplined:

> "…To those wild people the protracted discipline of military training is simply a purgatory, and for weeks before the recruiting officers are due, they those themselves with powerful herbs and physics and fast, and nurse sores into being until they are in a really deplorable condition. Some of them go so far at to cut off a finger or two. The officers, however, have learned to see beyond these little tricks, and few Arabs succeeded in wriggling through their drag-net. I have watched dozens of Arabs being brought in to the recruiting office on camels or horses, so weak were they, and welcomed into the service with a severe beating –the sick and the shammers sharing the same fate. Thus it often happens that some of the new recruits die after their first day of garrison life"[925]

The situation during the training of the soldiers was not familiar and easily adaptable for the Arabs. However, once they were trained, their performance as soldiers was satisfactory. Aaransohn describes the process of training with the following remarks:

> "…From morning till night, it was drill, drill and again drill.… Whole weeks were spent in grinding into the Arabs the names of the different parts of the rifle; weeks more went to teaching them to clean it –although it must be said that, once they had mastered these technicalities, they were excellent shots. Their efficiency would have been considerably greater if there had been more target-shooting. From the very first, however, we felt that there was a scarcity of ammunition. This shortage the drill-masters, in a spirit of compensation, attempted to make up by abundant severity. The whip of soft, flexible, stinging leather, which seldom leaves the Turkish officer's hand, was never idle…"[926]

In spite of those problems, the propaganda means provided by the Egyptian Campaign facilitated the work of the Ottoman authorities and Cemal Pasha as its head both to motivate the newly conscripted soldiers and to calm the panic of the public. They applied to the propaganda that they were strong enough to overcome the Entente's threat and to conquer Egypt, to appease the fear of the people and to provide their trust towards their Government. Firstly, the Unionist papers organized a campaign aiming to "prove that

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16 October 1914; Similar remarks are repeated in the memoirs of al-Hakim for Beirut and Lebanon. For details, see: al-Hakim, Ibid, pp. 131-133.

925 Aaransohn, Ibid, p. 7.

926 Aaransohn, Ibid, p. 13.

Europe, in the past, obtained from Turkey large concessions through threats only, much more than that was got through war. They reminded the Moslems of the case of Adrianople, which they would have lost if they had listened to European threats -it is now a Turkish City."[927] For the same purpose, they circulated rumours assuring the Syrians that thousands in Egypt would join the Islamic cause as soon as the war begins. The way they caused these rumours to be circulated is this- "The Vali and Senior Officers would talk about it to some natives, who are asked to keep it as a secret. These latter circulate it at once "secretly" to reassure Mohammedans, and so on".[928] In a similar way, the fear of the Syrian public regarding a possible invasion from the coast was eliminated by Turkish officers by way of a convincing propaganda expressing the people that the Entente navy could only occupy the coasts. In the interior, the Ottomans were better prepared and better armed, and able to defeat the invaders.[929]

The great majority of the soldiers, who would participate in the Canal Expedition, consisted of the newly conscripted Arab soldiers. Aaransohn estimates that the number of the soldiers in Syria consisted of about one hundred and fifty thousand men. Of these only 20.000 were the Anatolians. The others had been recruited from Syria.[930] Therefore, it was a must for Cemal Pasha to motivate them for their new job. As for the propaganda among the soldiers, to increase their motivation to the military service and to the War, Cemal Pasha applied both the Holy War propaganda and the argument of the readiness of the Egyptians for revolt against the British Rule. He employed many Arab scholars within the body of the Army before and during the first attack against Egypt to preach the Arab soldiers on horseback. They strolled around all the camps and delivered vehement speechs to the Arab soldiers. Their orations were so influential for the common Arab soldiers that

[927] **PRO**, FO 141/802, Clayton to Grey, "Note on the Turkish Attitude in the European War and the Possibility of Arab Revolts, by an Ottoman Mohammedan", Cairo, 18 October 1914.

[928] **PRO,** FO 141/802, Clayton to Grey, Ibid.

[929] **PRO,** FO 141/802, Clayton to Grey, Ibid.

[930] Aaransohn, Ibid, p. 39.

some of them had a fit of hysterics by the excitement of preaching.[931] Furthermore, Cemal motivated soldiers by the readiness of the Egyptians to a rebellion; the remarks of the two Arab officers, who joined the Canal Expedition and later deserted to the Entente side while they were fighting at the Caucasus front, may tell something about the state of minds of the soldiers and officers who were fascinated with idea of Egyptian conquest:

> "The soldiers were cheered up by the assurance that there would be hardly any fighting in Egypt, and that as soon as they reached the Suez Canal the Egyptians would rise against the English and welcome the Turkish Army with open arms. The troops would be treated royally in Egypt, and live on the fat of the land. At that time the troops were well fed, well clothed and paid regularly, even two or three months in advance. There seemed to be plenty of gold and silver coins then."[932]

These remarks demonstrate that, pillage [*ganimet*], a traditional Ottoman means of motivation for war, was applied for the increase of the enthusiasms of the soldiers to the expedition. Cemal also applied to the prominent historical figures of Islam to motivate the Arabs into the Holy War. He distributed the patriotic leaflets singing the praises of the historical heroes like *Tarek ben Ziad.*[933]

The conscription of the Christians and Jews was also used as propaganda to gain the support of the Muslim population. After the recruitment, they mostly served in the labor battalions, and in the underserving works of the cities such as garbage collectors, road sweepers etc. Most of them were teachers, constructors, artists etc.[934] Aaronsohn depicted the purpose of this action with these remarks:

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[931] Even the German soldiers, who didn't understand Arabic were influenced by these orations: Von Kressenstein, Ibid, p. 88.

[932] **PRO**, FO 371/2781Sykes to WO. "Information from two Arab officers recently arrived in England From the Caucasus", London, 25 September 1916; Aaransohn depicted opinions of the persuaded common soldiers with these words; "The ideas of the common soldiers on this subject were amusing. Some of them declared that the Canal was to be filled up by the sandbags which had been prepared in great quantities. Others held that thousands of camels would be kept without water for many days preceding the attack; then the thirsty animals, when released, would rush into the Canal in such numbers that the troops could march to victory over the packed masses of drowned bodies.": Aaransohn, Ibid, p. 38-39.

[933] Tamari, Ibid, 28 April 1915, p. 113.

[934] **PA-AA,** Türkei 177, Bd. 13, Stotzingen to AA, 17 November 1916; The number of the Muslims in thesee battalions were very rare. Ihsan Turjman gave this number in his memoires as 20 men: Tamari, Ibid, 22 April 1915, p. 106.

> "The final blow came one morning when all the Jewish and Christian soldiers of our regiment were called out and told that henceforth they were to serve in the *taboor amlieh* (sic.), or working corps. The object of this action, plainly enough, was to conciliate and flatter the Mohammedan population, and at the same time to put the Jews and Christians, who for the most part favored the cause of the Allies, in a position where they would be least dangerous. We were disarmed; our uniforms were taken away, and we became hard-driven "gangsters". I shall never forget the humiliation of that day when we, who, after all, were the best-disciplined troops of the lot, were first herded to our work of pushing wheelbarrows and handling spades, by grinning Arabs, rifle on shoulder. We were set to building the road between Saffed and Tiberias, on the of Galilee –a link in the military highway from Damascus to the coast, which would be used for the movement of troops in case the railroad should be cut off."[935]

In the similar vein, Khalil Sakakini, the Palestinian Christian, Arab Orthodox, educator, scholar, poet and one of the prominent Arab Nationalists,[936] described in his diaries the jobs of the non-Muslims under the military service with those remarks:

> "Today a large number of Christians were recruited as garbage collectors to Bethlehem and Bait Jala. Each was given a broom, a shovel, and a bucket and they were distributed in the alleys of the town. Conscripts would shout at each home they passed, 'send us your garbage.' The women of Bethlehem looked out from their windows and wept. No doubt this is the ultimate humiliation. We have gone back to the days of bondage in Roman and Assyrian days."[937]

Especially, the older conscripts of these groups were employed in these works. A Muslim soldier Ihsan Turjman narrated the difficult job of these soldiers and his frustration against this practice as follows:

> "Rumors abounded today indicating that our military command was to form a battalion made up mainly of Christian and Jewish citizens to clean the city.11 This morning while walking to my work at the Commissariat I came across several Jewish citizens, almost all above 40 years of age, holding brooms and cleaning the streets. I was horrified by this scene. Every few minutes a conscript would stand aside breathing from fatigue. How cruel can their commanders be? Wouldn't it be better if the military had hired a number of younger cleaners through the municipal services and solved the problem of these sods?"[938]

As a result of all this propaganda, according to the Report of the British Official Clayton, with the help of the Holy War propaganda against Eygpt, "the constant association of

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[935] Aaransohn, Ibid, 23-24.

[936] http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Khalil_al-Sakakini

[937] Sakakini Khalil, Ibid, 28 March 1915, p. 158-159; see for the English translation, Tamari, Ibid, p. 45.

[938] Tamari, Ibid, 9 April 1915, p. 97.

Turkish Governors and officers with Syrian Mohammedans had a net result of gaining the sympathies of the Mohammedan Syrian public", and achieved to gain the wholehearted support of the Muslim people and soldiers associating them with the cause of saving Egypt from the yoke of the infidels prior to the first attack against Egypt.[939] The process of the persuasion of the Arabs for the Holy war was depicted by Aaransohn as follows:

> "[in the beginning of the Ottoman declaration of War against the Entente] The Arabs made many bitter remarks against Germany. 'Why didn't she help us against the Italians during the war for Tripoli?' they said. 'Now that she is in trouble she is drawing us into the fight'. Their opinions, however, soon underwent a change. In the first place, they came to realize that Turkey had taken up arms against Russia; and Russia is considered first and foremost the arch-enemy. German reports of German successes also had a powerful effect on them. They began to grow boastful, arrogant; and the sight of the plundering of Egyptian, Jews, and Christians convinced them that a very desirable regime was setting in."[940]

He also depicted the sentiments of the people in the street before the Canal Expedition with striking remarks:

> "A few weeks before the advance on Suez, I was in Jaffa, where the enthusiasm and excitement had been at feverpitch. Parades and celebrations of all kinds in anticipation of the triumphal march into Egypt were taking place, and one day a camel, a dog, and a bull, decorated respectively with the flags of Russia, France and England, were driven through the streets. The poor animals were horribly maltreated by the natives, who rained blows and flung filth upon them by way of giving concrete expression to their contempt for the Allies. "[941]

On the other hand, it can be inferred from the diaries of Khalil Sakakini that, not all the Christians were against the Ottoman Empire. As conveyed by Adel Manna, in his article on Sakakini's diaries, the latter felt himself on the Ottoman side. He feared that the Ottoman state would be defeated by the British forces in the Canal. Sakakini defines the Ottoman army in his diaries with the remarks "our army", and describes the British army as "the enemy". He was afraid of the defeat of the Ottoman armies due to tiredness, thirstiness and hungriness in the desert against Great Britain.[942]

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[939] **PRO,** FO 14/802, Clayton to Grey, Ibid.

[940] Aaransohn, Ibid, p. 23.

[941] Aaransohn, Ibid, p. 44-45.

[942] Adel Manna, "Between Jerusalem and Damascus: The End of Ottoman Rule as Seen by a Palestinian Modernist", in *Jerusalem Quarterly,* Fall and Winter 2005/22-23, p. 117.

6.1.2. Loss of Motivation, Burden of Discipline, Desertion and Banditry

In spite of gaining such a wide support in Syria to the Ottoman Army before the first attempt, the failure of the expedition against Egypt and changing direction of Cemal Pasha's policies after the first expedition and caused a loss of motivation among the soldiers.[943] Especially his despotic implementations against the Arabs from all sections of society and the hard conditions of the military service, which the Arabs were unaccustomed to, made an increasing effect on the dissatisfaction of the Arab soldiers in Cemal's Army[944] and probably made the aims of the military service declared in the beginning of the War meaningless for them. The changing attitude of the Arab soldiers after the Canal Expedition was depicted in the memoires of Aaronsohn with the following remarks:

> " Now, However, all was changed. The Arabs, who take defeat badly, turned against the authorities who had got them into such trouble. Rumors circulated that Djemal Pasha had been bought by the English and that the defeat at Suez had been planned by him, and persons keeping an ear close to the ground began to hear muttering of a general massacre of Germans. In fact, things came within an ace of a bloody outbreak. I knew some Germans in Jaffa and Haifa who firmly believed that it was all over with them…"[945]

Furthermore, the contradictory actions of the Turkish junior officers to the Islamic prohibitions, like drinking alcohol a lot, caused the questioning of the Arab soldiers to themselves how they could be led in a Holy War by these Officers who disregarded the

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943 **PRO,** FO 371/2781, Sykes to WO. "Information from two Arab officers recently arrived in England From the Caucasus" [Lieutenant Shurbaji and Lieutenant Shaikha], London, 25 September 1916; Aaransohn states that, after the first expedition against the Canal, hundreds of the soldiers were straggling in disorder, many of them on leave but many deserting. Soon after the defeat at the Canal several thousand soldiers deserted…", Aaransohn, Ibid, p. 47.

944 Tamari, Ibid, p. 32,46.

945 Aaransohn, Ibid, p. 45.

Koranic precepts.[946] According to the diaries of Ihsan Turjman, the Army Command was distributing circulars everyday "warning soldiers and officers frequenting the cafés and the beer halls [*bira-khanate*], upon threat of imprisonment and expulsion from the service".[947] Similarly, as inferred from the same source, the splendid celebrations of Cemal Pasha with alcohol caused the reaction of the Arab soldiers.[948]

The loss of the motivation, hardening of the conditions in the military barracks[949] and the Arab alienation with the discipline of the soldiership caused the maintenance of the conscription of the Arabs after the First Attack against Egypt by force. An experience of a newly recruited soldier, Ihsan Turjman, demonstrates the Arab unfamiliarity with the military discipline. One day, Turjman wanted to buy a pair of new white shoes. He so fancied with his new shoes that, with his remarks, when he went to bed and slept, he dreamed of his new shoes, and could hardly wait for sunrise so that he could put them on.[950] The next day, when he went to the Head Quarter, the reactions against his new shoes were as follows:

> "Everybody at HQ kept reminding me, "Soldiers are not allowed to wear white shoes." Before lunchtime the *aghlokomandati* [work commander] [sic.] Muhammad Nahhas Effendi said to me, "Who told you that you can wear these shoes? I had never seen a common soldier wearing a pair of white shoes until you showed up. I strongly advise you to take them off immediately. If Ruşen Bey or Nihad Bey or any other officer sees you, he will deduct it from your salary and give you a hefty fine." In the midst of the chaos we were in, I doubted that any of them would notice, even if I wore them for the rest of my miserable life. Nevertheless when I went to have lunch. I changed my shoes to put an end to this ridiculous tirade."[951]

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[946] **PRO,** FO 141/801, Storrs to FO, "Further Report on the Proposed Turkish Invasion of Egypt", Cairo, 7 January 1915; In some cases, the Turkish Officers were even dying of drinking much alcohol; **SHD**, GR 7 N 2136, Saint-Quentin to MG, Cairo, 15 August 1916.

[947] Tamari, Ibid, 25 April 1915, p. 109-110.

[948] Tamari, Ibid, 27 April 1915, p. 112.

[949] Ihsan Turjman, an Arab soldier in Jerusalem, described the situation of the soldiers as follows: "What is a soldier supposed to do? The army pays each soldier 85 piasters a month and expects him to survive on it. Even then, most soldiers have not been paid one matleek since the General Call [November 1914]."; Tamari, Ibid, p. 94.

[950] Tamari, Ibid, 13 April 1915, p. 98.

[951] Tamari, Ibid, 14 April 1915, p. 99.

The disciplining character of the military service and the lack of any other motivation paved the way for the Arabs hate of the conscription.[952] According to the remarks of a German Officer, following the operation against Egypt, both Muslims and Christians hated the military service. By that reason, they were conscripted by force. It was usual to see the enchained conscripted men taken to the military barracks in the streets of Damascus, Jerusalem and Aleppo. As a result of that, most of the Arabs saw the Army as the oppressor and the exploiter of them, and therefore, resisted the recruitment. Once they were conscripted for the military service, they would meet there with poor salary, malnutrition and bad treatment. The daily ration of a soldier in the Army was half a bread and a citron. When they stayed back because of their tiredness, they were beaten mercilessly by their Turkish Officers.[953] Because of those reasons, in a detachment subordinated to the mentioned German Officer, % 10 of the soldier had deserted during the removal from one place to another.[954]

The majority of the Arab soldiers in Syria and their dissatisfaction with the conditions of the military service concerned Cemal Pasha about the likelihood of a rebellion among the soldiers guided by the presumed pro-Entente officers. Therefore, in summer 1915, according to the remarks of the two Arab officers deserted to the British side and his Chief of staff Ali Fuad Erden, Cemal decided to send some Arab officers and troops to Gallipoli. The decision, however, was kept secret and the troops were told that orders had come from Constantinople to send them to Mount Lebanon. At Aleppo, a proclamation was read to the troops that the Sultan, informed of the brilliant deeds of those troops in the Canal fighting, was very anxious to see the troops and confer honors upon them, and that they would be charged with the defense of Constantinople. Meanwhile,

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[952] Ihsan Turjman evaluates that "Soldiery is nothing but a school for debasement and slavishness.": Tamari, Ibid, 29 April 1915, p. 114.

[953] **PA-AA,** Türkei 177, Bd. 13, Stotzingen to AA, 17 November 1916; some other cases of desertions had been occurred because of the maltreatment of the Turkish officers to the Arab soldiers. In the beginning of 1915, some 150 of the soldiers, assigned for the protection of the Tarsus coasts left their place of duty for that reason: **BOA,** DH.ŞFR. 459/35, Hulusi to Talat, Damascus, 13 Kanun-ı Sani 1330 [26 January 1915].

[954] **PA-AA,** Türkei 177, Bd. 13, Stotzingen to AA, 17 November 1916.

between Damascus and Aleppo, 20 men deserted throwing themselves out of the carriage windows of the train at night, which was going very slowly.[955]

The transfer of the soldiers from Syria to the other fronts was the most unbearable thing for them and their families. While the military trains were passing through the stations, the families of those soldiers were storming to the train stations. Halide Edib describes the view in those stations in his memoires as such:

> "A hundred voices, mostly women, called shrill and guttural, *Ya Mohammed, Ya Abdurrahman, Ya Abdullah."* Then a few men's voices joined in graver tones, *"Ya Oummi"* (O mother)…The women whose husbands and sons were in the army had come to the station because a military train was passing and there was a chance of meeting their men. They were wringing their hands and calling in inexpressible excitement to the soldiers in the cars. Some had found their men, and there was kissing and love-making going on in its naivest and warmest form."[956]

As a result, during the transportation, most of them were finding a way to escape from the trains. The conversation of Halide Edib with a Turkish sergeant, during one of her travels indicates the vastness of the deserters while they were transferring from one front to another. Halide Edib warned the sergeant due to his harsh treatment of the Arab soldiers telling him "they are as weak as women. Don't strike him." The answer of the sergeant was indicative about the results of the transfer and range of the desertion:

> "I start with two hundred, and by the time they reach the next station, they become less than forty. They have no endurance, and they give one no end of trouble. I do not like it. They are always after their women; they would rather be shot as deserters than fight; and I would rather go to the firing-line than transport Arabs."[957]

The difficulties because of the communication problems, the nature of the military life and the lack of motivation made the military life more difficult for the Arab soldiers. According to a German Officer again, the forceful conscription of the Arabs and the lack

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955 **PRO,** FO 371/2781, Sykes to WO. "Information from two Arab officers recently arrived in England From the Caucasus" [Lieutenant Shurbaji and Lieutenant Shaikha], London, 25 September 1916; Erden, however, notes that these Arab officers didn't do any reaction against the Government throughout the War. Erden, Ibid, p. 63-65.

956 Adivar, Ibid. p. 398.

957 Adivar, Halide Edib, *Memoires of Halide Edib,* London, Gorgias Press: 2005, p. 411; The Turkish translation of the passage is somewhat different than the English version. The writer subtracted the sentence beginning with "They would rather be shot…" from the text. See: Adıvar, Halide Edib, *Mor Salkımlı Ev,* İstanbul:2000, Özgür Yayınları, p. 238.

of the patriotic feelings among them made the things difficult in the Syrian Army.[958] Sometimes, the situation became so depressing for them because of the hardships of the military life that they could seriously consider committing suicide.[959] They had to be held together with the iron fist of Cemal Pasha. Furthermore, the soldiers under the command of Cemal Pasha had to understand the orders of their officers in a foreign language, i.e. Turkish. Similarly, the Turkish officers were so far from perceiving the mentality of the Arabs under their command.[960]

Taking all these reasons into consideration, the recruitment became a nightmare for the Arabs, liable to the military service. According to the report of a German official employed in Syria, The Arab conscripts explored every avenue not to perform the military service. It was impossible to find any member of the well-to-do families in the Army. They paid the exoneration tax and thus, were exempted from the military service. Many the others strove to find a job providing exemption from the military service, such as working in the railroad administration. Very few of the Arab soldiers deserted to Egypt, and some of them were hidden in Lebanon. Quite a few of the Arab soldiers joined the Sharif's troops following their approach to Syria.[961]

Besides that a considerable number of the Arab soldiers deserted into the mountainous regions of Syria. Some of them created the brigandage bands in the mountains, while some others were hidden in the Bedouin and the Druze villages. The brigands were dispersed almost all around Syria and attacked the soldiers and railway stations causing important losses. Firstly, the deserted brigands were gathered at the rocky Ledjah Highlands located above Hauran, which was almost unsettled. Although their exact

[958] **PA-AA,** Türkei 165, Bd.40, Neufeld to Wesendock, Berlin, 23 December 1916.

[959] Tamari, Ibid, 21 September 1915, p. 136; "pproximately after a year, the same soldier, Ihsan Turjman were praying for the death, although he had a desk-jop in the Commissariat at Jerusalem: "They say that July is the best month of the year, since it witnessed the liberation of nations. For me it has been the ugliest and vilest of months. I have not seen more difficult days in my life. I have thought often of taking my life. I even have begun praying to God to take me away from this world, so that I will be freed from the miserable life of soldiering.": Tamari, Ibid, 17 August 1916, p. 156.

[960] **PA-AA,** Türkei 165, Bd.40, Neufeld to Wesendock, Berlin, 23 December 1916.

[961] **PA-AA,** Türkei 177, Bd. 17, Weber to Hertling, 26 June 1918.

numbers were undefined, on September 1915, i.e. at the end of the first year of the mobilization, they reached to the proportion that would make it necessary an operation to capture them. Before the operation, Cemal Pasha's troops pretended to be parading near Ledjah, consisted of 8.000 men supported with the artillery and suddenly made an operation against the mentioned places. Because of the mountainous character of the district and the hostility of the Bedouins and the Druzes in the nearer regions this operation caused some losses for Cemal's troops.[962] However, the operation was completed at a short notice. The deserters didn't resist the troops. A small number of the Bedouins supporting them was captured with their families and brought as hostages to Damascus.[963] After the conclusion of the uprising, they were sent into exile to Sivas.[964] However, that operation was not totally able to terminate the existence of the deserters there. As explained in detail before, the deserters provided a considerable support to the rebellion of the Bedouins in Hauran, which created great disturbance there.[965]

However, the operations against the deserters didn't stop the desertion of the soldiers and give an end to their actions of banditry actions. Many telegrams can be found in the Ottoman Archives from the Governors about the abundance of the desertion cases and their authority-violating activities. The capture of them didn't solve the problem. When they were captured, the deserter could easily escape from the hands of the Army. In May 1917, the *Kaymakam* of Cizre was complaining about the negligence of the recruitment offices to prevent the soldiers from desertions.[966] Similarly, in November 1917, the Ministry of War requested the Ministry of Interior to warn the civil officials in Janin, Akka and Taberiye to follow the absentees and the deserters with more significant

[962] **HHStA,** PA 38/366, Ranzi to Burian, "Die militaerische Expedition nach dem Ledjah", Damascus, 10 September 1915.

[963] **HHStA,** PA 38/366, Ranzi to Burian, "Die militaerische Expedition nach dem Ledjah", Damascus, 18 September 1915.

[964] According to the cable of the Governor of Sivas, their number was 621. For details, see: **BOA,** DH.ŞFR. 496/23, The Governor of Sivas to Talat, Sivas, 22 Teşrin-i Evvel 1331 [5 November 1915]

[965] **BOA,** DH.ŞFR. 534/74, Tahsin to Talat, Deraa, 24 Eylül 1332[7 October 1916].

[966] **BOA,** DH.İ.UM.EK. 34/13, The *Kaymakam* of Cizre to Talat, 28 Mayıs 1333 [28 May 1917].

means emphasizing the capture of the deserters for the maintenance of discipline in the body of the Army.[967] Four months later, the Governor of Beirut expressed in his response, on behalf of the local authorities, that most of the absentees and deserters were captured as a result of the efforts of the local authorities.[968] The situation was not different in Zor district; only 87 of 2973 deserters could be captured according to the statistics sent to İstanbul in July 1917.[969]In an attack by the 14 deserters to the gendarmerie battalions of Bikaü'l-Aziz on 23rd November 1916, 2 of them were captured as wounded.[970]

There were also bands created by the political opponents in and around Baalbek. Some members of the Aseli, Shahab, Haidar and Melhame families, who were decided to be exiled by Cemal Pasha because of their relations with the Arabist Movement, created a gang in Baalbek. Most of them were also liable to the military service.[971] With the remarks of the Governor Tahsin Bey, they killed 7 soldiers and wounded 4 of them. Tahsin Bey created a Circassian voluntary unit to struggle them. He didn't prefer the Gendarmerie regiments since most of them was consisted of the native Arabs. For a more energetic intervention against these gangs, the Governor dismissed the *kaymakam* of Baalbek, and the appointment of a more active one was demanded.[972] After the negotiations, most of them abandoned brigandage, and the decision about them was removed by Cemal Pasha.[973]

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[967] **BOA,** DH.EUM.6.Şb. 28/68, Ministry of War to Ministry of Interior, 4 Teşrin-i Sani 1333 [4 November 1917].

[968] **BOA,** DH.EUM.6.Şb. 28/68, The Governor of Beirut to Ministry of Interior, Beirut 9 Şubat 1333 [9 February 1917].

[969] **BOA,** DH.EUM.6.Şb. 17/28, the Governor of Zor to Ministry of Interior, 2 Temmuz 1333 [2 July 1917].

[970] **BOA,** DH.ŞFR. 595/38, The Defterdar of Syria to Talat, Damascus, 10 Teşrin-i Sani 1332 [23 November 1916].

[971] **BOA,** DH.ŞFR. 536/112, Tahsin to Talat, Damascus, 25 Teşrin-i Evvel 1332 [7 October 1916].

[972] **BOA,** DH.ŞFR. 536/30, Tahsin to Talat, Humus, 16 Teşrin-i Evvel 1332 [29 October 1916].

[973] **BOA,** DH.ŞFR. 538/3, Tahsin to Talat, Damascus, 8 Teşrin-i Sani 1332 [21 November 1916].

In May 1918, the Brigandage incidents again increased around Baalbek. In between Bekaa and Rayak, the Matwali Gangs under the leadership of Kasım Melham started banditry.[974] Thereupon, the Army troops and the Gendarmeries in the region carried out an operation to punish these groups. According to the remarks of Tahsin Bey, for a long while, the Matwalis were disturbing the movement of the Army and causing disorder in the region. The operation was made with two artillery pieces and a great deal of the troops because of the largeness of the bandit groups.[975] The aviators made the exploration flights to define the places of the bandit groups. As a result of the operation the bandit groups were dispersed in Baalbek and Lebanon.[976]

Towards the end of the War, the incidents caused by the brigandage became frequent by the impact of the hard condition of life. In August 1918, in and around Saida, Sur and Merciun, the deserters had been organized by a machine gun officer, and were equipped with the bombs and rifles. According to the claims of the Governor of Lebanon, they provoked the opinions of the people around there against the Government. Those brigands were under the auspices of Kamil Bey el-Esad, the Beirut Deputy in the Parliament, and his brother Abdulkadir Bey el-Esad. Upon some documents found on the brigands, The Esad brothers were invited to the Governors Office for interrogation.[977]

Besides the military operations against the deserted soldiers, Cemal Pasha also applied some other measures. In the beginning, he preferred to give them heavy punishments, to dissuade the soldiers from new desertions. In this regard, at the end of March 1915, two soldiers were hanged at the Gates of Jaffa.[978] Similarly, two others were sentenced to death penalty in Damascus. The Damascene deserters were also the members

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[974]**BOA,** DH.ŞFR. 585/105, Tahsin to Ministry of Interior, Damascus, 28 Mayıs1334 [28 May 1918].

[975] **BOA,** DH.ŞFR. 585/166, Tahsin to Ministry of Interior, Damascus, 31 Mayıs 1334 [31 May 1918].

[976] **BOA,** DH.ŞFR. 586/85, Tahsin Ministry of Interior, Baalbek, 6 Haziran 1918 [6 June 1918].

[977] **BOA,** DH.ŞFR. 591/109, İsmail Hakkı to Ministry of Interior, Beirut, 8 Ağustos 1334 [8 August 1918].

[978] Tamari, Ibid, p. 94.

of the Arabist Party. Therefore, the Austrian Consul in Damascus thought that they were hanged because of their political misdemeanor.[979]

Another measure, which was taken to prevent the desertions to the Entente or Sharif's troops, was to send the family of the deserted soldier into the exile to Anatolia. When a soldier joined to the Entente or Sharif's troops all his family was expelled from Syria.[980] In addition, Cemal sent the ones who encouraged the soldiers to desert into exile.[981] He also applied to the religious instruments to persuade the soldiers to the virtues of defending the country. For that purpose, in Friday Prayers, the preachers admonished the soldiers to avoid from desertion.[982]

When the Ottoman rule came to a close in Jerusalem, one of the most rejoiced group was the Arab conscripts who had got rid of the burdens of the military service. According to the diaries of the Palestinian Musician Wasif Jawhariyeh, "Many of the Arab young men, both Muslim and Christian, the majority of whom were conscripted for the Turkish army in Jerusalem, had changed their army uniforms into civilian clothes in a funny way"[983], Although they continue to wear some parts of their Army clothes, most probably, due to the lack of civil clothes at that time. Wasif expressed his situation with these words, when he threw off the military service: "The new situation put our minds at ease and things improved for us. We had got rid of the Turks and, thank God, we were free from army service."[984]

As for the political affiliation of these deserters, although some of the soldiers took their lots with Sharif Hussein, it can hardly be demonstrated that those soldiers had nationalist aspirations. First, the great majority of the Arab conscripts were illiterate.

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[979] **HHStA,** PA 38/366, Ranzi to Burian, "Die Lokalerereignisse der letzten Woche. Hinrichtung der Brüder Zreik aus Tripolis; die Syrische Deputation nach den Dardanellen", Damascus, 1 October 1915.

[980] **BOA,** DH.EUM.4.Şb 11/23, 9 Mayıs 1333 [9 May 1917]

[981] **BOA,** DH.EUM.1.Şb 6/16, 2 Ağustos 1332 [15 August 1915].

[982] Tamari, Ibid, 14 May 1915, p. 124.

[983] Jawhariyyeh, Wasif, "My Last Days as an Ottoman Subject: Selections from Wasif Jawhariyyeh's Memoirs"*, Jerusalem Quarterly,* Summer 2000/9, p. 31.

[984] Jawhariyyeh, "My Last Days…", p. 33.

Second, they were very ignorant about both the Ottoman politics and the general World politics. Aaransohn's witnesses about their discussion on the politics reveal this reality very clearly:

> "Polititcs, of which they have amazing ideas, also came in discussion. Napoleon Bonaparte and Queen Victoria are still living figures to them; but (significantly enough) they considered the Kaiser king of all the kings of this world, with the exception of the Sultan, whom they admitted to equality."[985]

Even the most politically dissident ones, like Ihsan Turjman, mentioned the things belonging to the Ottoman Empire as "ours", although he was frustrated by the implementation of the Wartime measures.[986] The conscription of the eligible persons to the military service, however, emerged as a considerably influential factor in Syria during the War period giving a new form to the relations between the Ottoman state and its citizens in the Syrian realm. In the beginning of the War, by the impact of the Pan-Islamist propaganda, the majority of the Syrian Muslims supported the military mobilization. However, later on, the Syrians began to resist the recruitment due to the slowdown of the preparations for a second expedition, the worsening conditions of the soldiers, the alienation of the Arabs to the military life, and the increasing impact of Cemal Pasha's despotic rules over Syria. All in all, the amount of the deserted soldiers considerably increased. As defined above, they created the gangs and supported the Bedouins revolt against the military requisitions. However, when considered their knowledge about the politics, it can be hardly claimed that these soldiers had an Arab nationalist motivation, and deserted by that reason. On the other hand, when Cemal Pasha's long-term plans on Syria were taken into consideration, he did not ascribe importance to the short-term alienation of the Syrians to the Ottoman state.

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[985] Aaransohn, Ibid, p. 15; at least till April 1913, most of the Arab officers didn't have nationalist aspirations. In a letter sent by the son of Izzed al-Jundi's uncle to him, the former complained the lack of the ideal of the motherland [*Vatan*] among the Arab officers accusing them of being in a state of atrocity against their motherlands serving the brigand gangs –he meant by this the CUP-, who were striving to remove the Arab nation and language from the level of existence [*alem-i vücud*].**BOA,** DH.EUM.4.Şb. 1/51, Damascus, 7 Nisan 1329 [20 April 1913].

[986] For the examples, see, Tamari, Ibid, (our army) p. 105, (our statesmen) p. 105, (our planes) p.106, (our officers) p. 108, 112, (Cemal Pasha, our great leader) p. 110, (our Sultan) p. 112, (our ships) p. 117.

6.2.The Ottomanization of Education in Syria

Another tool used by Cemal Pasha to create the ideal citizen in Syria was the mass education. As is known, with the development of of the modern state control over its citizens, mass education became one of the most instrumental means to orientate the feelings and behaviors of the citizens towards the new rules of the modern life and towards the state within the framework of a new self-identity mainly inspired by the national characteristics of the intended community. Beginning with Mahmud II, the Ottoman Empire also applied the educational means to create a new Ottoman identity embracing all the Muslim and non-Muslim Ottomans in an equal level modeling newly emerging Western national states.[987] In this process, the Ottoman authorities had to struggle with the educational institutions of the Great Powers, who intended to create areas of influences for themselves in the territories of the Empire. As detailed in Chapter 5, especially, non-Muslim and non-Turkish provinces of the Ottoman Empire were seen by those Powers as potential colonies in the future. In this regard, Great Britain, Russia and France made educational investments in various regions of the Empire, being Syria in the first place, to increase their penetrations among the mentioned peoples. By the commencement of the War, the foreign educational institutions had reached a considerable amount in Syria. With the outbreak of the War, the Ottoman Empire confiscated all these institutions of its hostiles. With the expulsion of the staff of these institutions, most of them had to be closed. Instead of them, new enterprises to inoculate the Syrians with the Ottoman identity were

[987] For studies on the modernization of the Ottoman education in the 19th century, see: Benjamin C. Fortna, *Imperial Classroom: Islam, the state and education in the late Ottoman Empire,* New York: Oxford University Press, 2003; S. Akşin Somel, *The Modernization of public education in the Ottoman Empire: 1839-1908, Islamization, autocracy and discipline,* Leiden: Brill, 2001.

commenced by Cemal Pasha. As a continuation of Chapter 5, this section sets out to describe this efforts.

By these motivations, the Syrian provinces witnessed a mobilization for the Ottomanization of the education there in Cemal Pasha's era. The statistics of education for the beginning of the year 1915 shows these efforts. The report of the Educational Director in Jerusalem for the schooling activities of the year 1915, gives many details in this regard. In the beginning of the school year for 1915, a boarding school of Teacher's Training College for Boys [*Darülmuallimin*] started education with 29 students in Jerusalem. The director notes that, when the school started to study with full capacity the number of the students would rise to 200 boys. In the city centers of Jerusalem and Jaffa, 5 classrooms [*Dershane*] and 2 infant schools with teachers [*muallimli iki ana mektebi*] were opened. the Director continues that these institutions gained a wide popularity among the local people, and the number of their students reached 150 in a short while; 29 primary schools were established in the villages annexed administratively to Jerusalem, Halilürrahman, Gaza and Jaffa. The total number of their students changed between 100 and 150. The primary schools, which were established before, were disciplined [*intizam*] by the appointment of the new teachers. The teachers of the Turkish language were appointed to the three private schools opened by non-Muslims "with the purpose of the dissemination of the usage of the Ottoman Language". Their salaries were paid by the Governorate of Jerusalem. A model school with 10 classrooms [*Tatbikat Mekteb-i İbtidaisi*], which was commenced to be constructed in 1913, completed. A primary school was started to be constructed in the Kobab Village annexed to Jerusalem. Finally, the buildings of the Primary School of Ramleh for boys and the Primary School of Jerusalem for Girls were repaired.[988]

6.2.1. The Selahaddin-i Eyyubi Complex in Jerusalem

[988] **BOA,** DH. UMVM. 143/21, Educational Director in Jerusalem to Talat, 25 Şubat 1331 [10 March 1916].

Cemal Pasha also made activities of education aiming at training new scholars for the strengthening of the loyalties of the Syrian people towards the Caliphate, and for the propaganda of the Ottoman Caliph in the other parts of the Ottoman Empire and in the foreign countries. At that time, the allegiance to the Caliph also meant a hostility towards the “enemies of the religion”, i.e. the Entente states. For this aim, immediately after his arrival in Syria, the Pasha pioneered the establishment of a religious university in Jerusalem called *Selahaddin-i Eyyubi Külliyesi,* and the building of St. Anna Church, which was controlled by the French Jesuits, was confiscated for the *Külliye,*[989] which was symbolically very meaningful. The Church was built by the Crusades in the 12th Century during their domination in Jerusalem and now it was being turned into a Muslim religious establishment under the name of the most famous Muslim commander, who fought against the Crusades. However, the administration of the church inside the building was delivered to the Greek-Catholic Church.[990] In the beginning of 1915, Cemal commandeered some parts of this building and transformed it into a religious school. However, a small part was left as Church. According to Strohmeier, who wrote a detailed article on the *Külliye,* the denomination of the *Külliye* with the name of Muslim commander, Selahaddin-i Eyyubi demonstrates that Cemal attached himself to the tradition of the Muslim conquerors.[991]

On 28th January 1915, in the birthday of the Prophet Muhammed [*Mevlid Kandili*], the *Külliye* was opened with a brilliant ceremony in the presence of the Commander-in-Chief of the Ottoman Armies, Enver Pasha and Cemal Pasha. A large mass of the people attended to the ceremony as well as the prominent ulema and bureaucrats of the Syria and Palestine. The crowd firstly appeared in the *Aksa* Mosque for pray, and then walked to the

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[989] **BOA,** DH.ŞFR. 49/66, Şeyhülislam to the Governor of Jerusalem, 5 Kanun-ı Sani 1330 [18 January 1915].

[990] **BOA,** DH.ŞFR. 49/44, Cemal to Şeyhülislam, Jerusalem, 3 Kanun-ı Sani 1330 [16 January 1915].

[991] Strohmeier, Ibid, p. 2-5; Infact, a detailed project of the establishment of such a *Külliye* in Istanbul was proposed in a report by the Egyptians to Enver Pasha immediately before the War. The informations in their reports were very similar to the practice of the *Külliye.* For the whole of the mentioned report see: **TTK Arşivi,** EP Tasnifi 4/54, Undated.

Külliye. Before the opening ceremony all the symbols in the building, which belongs to the Christianity, had been removed.[992]

The prominent Egyptian Pan-Islamist Abdulaziz Chavish[993] was appointed as the director of the school. Indeed, Cemal Pasha was opposed to that appointment since he was acting independently. He insistently requested Talat to dismiss Chavish from this office claiming that Chavish speak about his independence from Cemal Pasha on the street [*sağda solda konuşmak*], and by this way, he violated Cemal's personal dignity and prestige in Syria.[994] However, Enver and Talat, most probably taking the Pan-Islamist aims of the establishment of the *Külliye* into consideration, supported the appointment of Chavish claiming that the action was carried out before Cemal's opposition. The sentences of the apology in Talat's telegraph were so exaggerated that, he requested Chavish's stay in his office from Cemal Pasha with the phrase "I request that [appointment] kissing your

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992 Strohmeier, Ibid, p. 6.

993 Abdulaziz Chavish was born in Alexandria in 1876. His father was from Tunusia. He graduated from al-Azhar (1892) and Dar al-Ulum (1897). During his education, he got in touch with Muhammed Abduh. For further education, he went to Great Britain. In 1901, He started to work as inspector in the Ministry of Education in Egypt. But, the same year, he returned to Great Britain and took office in Oxford University as Arabic Teacher. In 1905, he joined to the 14th Congress of the orientalists in Algeria as the member of the Egyptian delegation. In 1906, he returned to Egypt, and joined to the Movement of the *Wataniyya* [patriotism] organized by Mustafa Kamil and Muhammed Farid. In 1908, he became the chief redacteur of *el-Liva* newspaper, the newspaper of the *Wataniyya* movement. He transformed this newspaper to a platform to spread his pro-Ottoman and pan-Islamic ideas. He was also among the publishers of *El-A'lam* and *El-Sha'b,* and *El-Hidaye* Journal. With these publications, he created a considerable influence among the Egyptians. Therefore, he was expelled from Egypt with the excuse of causing tension between the Muslims and the Copts. In 1912, he settled down to Istanbul. During his stay in Istanbul, he published the newspaper *El-Hilal el-Osmani* and the journal *El-Alemü'l-Islami.* In 1915, he was accused with the organization of the suicide against the Khedive Abbas Hilmi in Istanbul, and therefore, had to live in Berlin fpr a month. At the end of the War, he went to Berlin and stayed there till 1923. At that year, he returned to Egypt and died there in 1927: Strohmeier, Ibid, p. 37.

994 **BOA,** DH.ŞFR.467/44, Cemal to Talat, Jerusalem, 26 Mart 1331 [8 April 1915]; **BOA,** DH.ŞFR. 467/46, Cemal to Talat, Jerusalem, 27 Mart 1331 [9 April 1915]; Sheikhulislam also supported Cemal in this issue: **BOA,** DH.ŞFR. 49/77, Şeyhülislam to Cemal, 6 Kanun-ı Sani 1330.

hands".[995] As a matter of fact, Chavish would leave the directorate in a short while, most probably due to his disagreement with Cemal Pasha.[996]

The principal aim of the school was to break the influence of Al-Azhar in Egypt and Aligarh College in India in the Muslim World, which were under the British influence. The Scholars, who would be trained in this University, were to propagate a Pan-Islamist union under the leadership of the Ottoman Caliph. For that aim, the most prominent scholars in Istanbul were sent to Jerusalem to be employed in this school.[997] On the other hand, as expressed on several occasions throughout this study, one aim of Cemal's existence in Syria was to obliterate the psychology of dependency of the Syrians stemming from the idea that Egypt was more improved than Syria. The *Külliye* would serve to this goal, too.

Besides the celebrated scholars of Istanbul, the members of the prominent Arab families and the well-known Arabists, who were sentenced by Cemal Pasha later, were among the professors of the *Külliye.* The diversity of the teachers employed in that *Külliye* also shows the complexity of the late Ottoman Arab society in terms of ideological affiliation. Among them Ahmed Tabbara was the founder of *İttihad-ı Osmani* [Union of the Ottomans] in 1908. Later, He worked actively in the *Cemiyyet al Islahiyya,* a decentralist Arabist society. In 1916, he was put by Cemal Pasha into death sentence.[998] Rustum Haydar, from the prominent Palestinian Family *al-Nashashibi,* was again the member of the Arabist party and was among the founders of the Arabist society *El-Fetat* in 1911. In 1909, He wrote a Ph.D dissertation in Sorbonne University praising the Mehmed Ali's period of rule in Syria. He worked as the director of the Beirut *Sultani* School. He was appointed to an important office in the *Külliye* Course Superintendant [*Ders Nazırı*],

[995] **BOA,** DH.ŞFR. 51/230, Talat to Cemal, 26 Mart 1331 [8 April 1915].

[996] A Graduate of the Law School [*Mekteb-i Hukuk*], Cemil Bey was appointed instead of him: **BOA,** DH.ŞFR. 50/130, Şeyhülislam to Cemal Pasha, 15 Şubat 1330 [28 February 1915].

[997] This aim was openly stated in the German newspaper *Nachrichtstelle für den Orient* (30.6.1915). For the quotation of this newspaper, see: Strohmeier, Ibid, p. 16.

[998] Strohmeier, Ibid, p. 29.

and delivered the lectures on history and economics there.[999] The French teacher Subhi Bey El-Hadra was an alumni of the Ottoman Military School [*Harbiye*]. Following a short employment at the *Külliye,* he participated to the Ottoman forces in the Canal, and was taken prisoner by the British troops there. Afterwards, he joined to the Sharif's troops.[1000] Rafiq al-Tamimi was also one of the founders of the *El-Fetat* Society.[1001] In summary, It will not be an exaggeration to claim that the *Külliye* had been established as a result of the alliance of the opposition groups with the Government against Great Britain.

As for the courses taught in the *Külliye,* both religious and modern sciences were included in the curriculum as well as the eastern and the western language courses. From the religious courses, Fıkıh, Tefsir, Hadis, Kelam, the History of Relgions and Tasavvuf were among the outstanding courses. Both Turkish and Arabic were in the course programme. The students were required to register at least one eastern (Persian, Urdu and Tatar), and one western (German, French, English, Russian) language. They were taught the history of Arabs, and the Ottoman and Turkish History as well as the political history of the contemporary age [*Asr-ı Hazır Tarih-i Siyasisi*]. The outstanding modern sciences taught in the *Külliye* were Geography, Economics, Law, Natural Sciences and Astronomy.[1002]

The *Külliye* was quite attractive for the Syrians; therefore, in the year 1916, only 1/4 of the applicants could be accepted as students. There was a quota of 10 persons for the

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[999] Strohmeier, Ibid, p. 39; one of his relatives, Salih Bey Haidar, ex-Mayor of Baalbek, was hanged by Cemal in 1915: **HHStA,** PA 387366, Ranzi to Burian, "Das Urteil des Kriegsgerichtes in Aleh", Damascus, 26 August 1915; After the executions of 1916, all the Haidar family was exiled to Anatolia: **BOA,** DH.ŞFR. 504/65, Cemal to Talat, 26 Kanun-ı Evvel 1331 [8 January 1916]; However, there is no special record that he was either exiled or exempted from this action.

[1000] Strohmeier, Ibid, p. 42.

[1001] Strohmeier, Ibid, p. 54; He was also the co-author of the book *Beyrut Vilayeti,* written by the request of the Governor Azmi Bey, to know better the geography and population of Beirut: al-Tamimi, Rafik and Muhammed Behcet, *Beyrut Vilayeti,* Vilayet Matbaası, Beyrut: 1333 [1916].

[1002] Strohmeier, Ibid, p. 86-87; Approximately the same curriculum had been proposed to Enver Pasha in the abovementioned project of opening a religious school in İstanbul to educate Muslim missionaries. For details, see : **TTK Arşivi,** EP Koleksiyonu, 4/54, Undated.

students, who would register to the school from abroad. It was distributed among the countries as such: Egypt: 4, Sudan and Etiopia: 2, Tripoli and Benghazi: 2, Tunisia: 1, Algeria, Morocco and South Africa: 1, Java and the Philippinnes: 3, China: 3, India: 5, Afghanistan: 2, Belucistan: 1, Iran: 2, Turkistan (Bukhara, Hiva, Tashkent, Semerkant): 5, Caucasus, Astrahan, Kazan, Crimea and Poland: 6. However, those quotas couldn't fill most probably due to the bad conditions of the War, and great majority of the Students were registered from Syria, Anatolia and Palestine: Damascus: 30, Aleppo: 25, Beirut: 25, Jerusalem: 20.[1003]

In spite of the political and economic traumas, which deeply influenced the daily life in Palestine, the *Külliye* maintained its educational activities till November 1917, one month before of the British invasion. After the invasion, it was relocated to Damascus. There is not enough information on the *Külliye* after its relocation.[1004]

A similar undertaking was attempted in Medina after the commencement of the Sharifian Revolt in Mecca. For that aim, in the beginning of the year 1917, the *Evkaf* Minister İbrahim Bey, paid a visit there. The aim of this religious school was to educate young *imams* and preachers, who would make counter propaganda to weaken the Sharif's movement. However, the problems of communication and the worsening of the military conditions caused the failure of that project.[1005]

6.2.2. Halide Edib as the Supervisor of Cemal Pasha for Education

As analyzed earlier, the Ottomans were competing with the Europeans, especially with France, on the allegiance of the Syrians. As expressed in Chapter 5, taking the war circumstances as an occasion, Cemal first ottomanized the French institutions in Syria and then endeavoured to reorganize the public education in Syria in a way that would enable

[1003] Strohmeier, Ibid, p. 23-24.

[1004] Strohmeier, Ibid, p. 68.

[1005] **HHStA,** PA 38/370, Ranzi to Czernin, "Der Besuch des Vakufministers in Medina", Damascus, 26 January 1917.

him to make the Syrians more loyal to the ideals of the Ottoman unity, and more "conscious" about the aims of the Great Powers. For those purposes, towards the end of the year 1916, Cemal wanted to regulate mass education in Syria in a more systematic way under the supervision of Halide Edib. The aims of Cemal's project were explained by Halide Edib with the following remarks:

> "After the extreme measures he had taken to put down the conspiracy in Syria[1006], he was anxious to create a good government and an efficient system of public education. He had seen the strong inclination of the Arabs toward the French, based on the educational efforts of the French, and he was desirous of copying their methods in a less religious and more liberal sense."[1007]

For that purpose, he applied to Halide Edib at the beginning of the year 1916 to come to Syria to be his supervisor for the educational issues. He sent a letter with Falih Rıfkı stating that:

> "He had been obliged to close the French schools and monasteries, which used to give education to the Arabs, on political grounds. The schools opened by the department of public instruction were not sufficient. The local governments in Syria, with the aid of the army, had decided to establish a series of schools."[1008]

After that description, Cemal invited Halide Edib to Syria to organize the school system or to send teachers there for that aim. Halide Edib's sister Nigiar went to Beirut voluntarily, and established a primary school there. In the summer of 1916, Cemal sent another letter to Halide asking to travel Syria and study the situation to draw up a plan for a larger number of schools in Damascus, Beirut and Lebanon. This time, Halide Edib accepted his request and travelled to Syria.[1009]

Following a visit of exploration, she returned to Istanbul in mid-September, 1916. However, Cemal didn't give up following her. Towards the end of the year 1916, he again requested Halide Edib to undertake the organization of the schools in Syria. In the very

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[1006] By the word "conspiracy", Halide Edib means Cemal Pasha's punishment of the Arabists.

[1007] Halide Edib, Ibid, p. 400; Falih Rıfkı assesses similarly the aims of Cemal Pasha with the opening of these schools. He also added that the Ottomanization of Syria would be succeeded by these schools: Atay,Ibid, p. 77.

[1008] Halide Edib, Ibid, p. 390-391; in his book *Zeytindağı*, Falih Rıfkı confirms these correspondences. Atay, Ibid, p. 79.

[1009] Halide Edib, Ibid, p. 391.

beginning of the year 1917, she accepted Cemal's offer and took the road for Syria with some 50 women teachers.[1010] In her letter to Cavid Bey, the Minister of Finance, that she sent a few months later, Halide Edib stated that she loved Syria and the Syrians very much and worked hard to contribute to the development of that country.[1011]

With the closure of the French institutions, the education of the girls had emerged as an urgent question for Cemal Pasha. After the confiscation of the French schools, there was only one secondary school in the whole of Syria for girls. For that reason, Halide Edib began to work for the opening of the girl schools. According to the remarks of the Austrian Consul, the teachers, who came with Halide Edib from İstanbul, would disperse around the different regions of Syria. In the places that they would serve, these teachers were to work with the Arab teachers. There were 7 Turkish and 6 Arab women teachers in the model girl school that was established in Damascus immediately after the arrival of Halide Edib.[1012] Towards the end of the year 1917, the Villa of the late Ziver Pasha [*Ziver Paşa Konağı*] in Salihiye Street were expropriated as the building of the School.[1013] Interestingly enough, this school was called as *Cemal Pasha İnas Mektebi* [Cemal Pasha Girls High School].[1014]

As a result of the intense work of Halide Edib and her retinue, in the beginning of the year 1917, three girls high schools started education in Beirut, Damascus and Lebanon with the cooperation of the Governors of those cities.[1015] Although Halide Edib did not

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[1010] Halide Edib, Ibid, p. 431-437; The Austrian Consul in Damascus gives the number of the teachers who had come with Halide Edib as 47: **HHStA,** PA 38/370, Ranzi to Czernin, "Die Gründung staatlicher Maedchenliceen in Syrien", Damascus, 19 February 1917.

[1011] Halide Edib to Cavid Bey, 1 March 1917, Beirut, in Murat Bardakçı, *Talat Paşa'nın Evrak-ı Metrukesi,* İstanbul: Everest Yayınları, 2009, p. 149-151.

[1012] **HHStA,** PA 38/370, Ranzi to Czernin, "Die Gründung staatlicher Maedchenliceen in Syrien", Damascus, 19 February 1917.

[1013] **BOA,** DH.İ.UM.EK. 43/48, Talat to Tahsin, 5 Kanun-ı Evvel 1333 []

[1014] For a reference with this name, see: **BOA,** DH.UMVM 22/4, Fuad [on behalf of the Governor of Syria] to Talat, Damascus, 22 Şubat 1334 [22 February 1918].

[1015] Halide Edib, Ibid, p. 440: In Beirut, the girls high school was established in a building confiscated by the French institutions. There was a church inside the building. In spite of the opposition of Cemal Pasha, he didn't close the Church. For further details see: Halide Edib, Ibid, p. 440; Atay, Ibid, p. 79.

mention it, a Girls School was established in Aleppo at that time.[1016] In addition, a teachers school and a primary school for girls were established in Beirut. Halide Edib was employed within the body of the 4th Army and the finance of the mentioned schools were provided by the provincial budgets.[1017] Towards the end of the War, when the governors were unable to compensate the provisioning needs of the schools, the Army supplied the necessary food for the needs of these institutions.[1018] The entrance exams were held both in Turkish and Arabic. With the remarks of Halide Edib, in the new schools, the teaching of Arabic was taken very seriously. As for the students of those schools, "Lebanon Mostly sent Christians, Beirut sent both Moslems and Christians, while the Damascus students were all Moslems".[1019] According to the report of the Austrian consul, another sub-aim of these new schools were to provide the linguistic centralization teaching the new Arab students the official language of the Ottoman Empire, i.e. Turkish.[1020] Besides the Arabs, Cemal Pasha pressed the Turkish officials in Syria to send their girls to these schools.[1021] Upon the deterioration of the military and provisional conditions in the Syrian provinces,

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[1016] **HHStA,** PA 38/370, Dandini to Czernin, "Fortschritte in der türkischen Verwaltung", Aleppo, 16 February 1917.

[1017] Cemal to Enver, 27 September 1917, *Arşiv Belgeleriyle Ermeni Faaliyetleri,* ATASE Yayınları, Ankara: 2007, p. 698.

[1018] **BOA,** DH.ŞFR. 596/5, İsmail Hakkı to Ministry of Interior, Beirut, 13 Ağustos 1334 [13 August 1918].

[1019] Halide Edib, Ibid, p. 440; Martin Strohmeier notes in his article on the *Salahiyya* that Cemal Pasha supported the education of the Christians and Muslims together, and therefore promoted a mixture of the students from both religions in the Girls School of Beirut. For details, see: Strohmeier, Ibid, p. 6.

[1020] **HHStA,** PA 38/370, Ranzi to Czernin, "Die Gründung staatlicher Maedchenliceen in Syrien", Damascus, 19 February 1917; by this aim, the language of the Imperial School in Damascus [*Şam Mekteb-i Sultanisi*] were converted from Arabic to Turkish: **HHStA,** PA 38/369, Ranzi to Burian, "Einführung des deutschen Sprachunterrichtes in der hiesigen Sultanieshule", Damascus, 21 March 1916.

[1021] Münevver Ayaşlı was one of the Turkish students who were sent to the newly opened state school in Beirut. However, he is very unsatisfied with the education in these schools. But, it seems that his evaluations were rather subjective. For his further assessments on Halide Edib and his schools see: Ayaşlı, Münevver, *İşittiklerim, Gördüklerim, Bildiklerim,* Boğaziçi Yayınları, İstanbul: 1990, p. 80-81.

most of the teachers, who came to Syria with Halide Edib, returned to Istanbul in March 1918.[1022]

The aim for the establishment of these schools is a matter of debate in the existing literature. The following remarks that Halide Edib used while describing the aim of this schools caused some discussions:

> "Arabic nationalism so far had been in Syria a political instrument in foreign hands. Nationalism used for political purposes is an ideal turned into a monstrosity. Turkey must help the Arabs to develop a national spirit and personality, teach them to love their own national culture more than any foreign one; and when the time came for the Arab to have his independence, he would geographically and economically see that he had more common ties and interests with the Turks that with the foreigners."[1023]

Interpreting these remarks, Makdisi put into words about the aim of Halide Edib in Syria the following claims:

> "Her goal was to open and run several Ottoman schools to educate Arab women, to teach them Turkish, and most important to ensure their loyalty to the Ottoman state. Despite her own best efforts to encourage a more empathetic view of the Arabs, her understanding of her own mission was startlingly revealing of the imperial dimension of Ottoman modernity: she considered Arabs a 'minority' who had to be taught to love their Turkish government and who, after a suitable period of education and uplift, would be allowed self-determination. 'Turkey' she wrote, 'must help the Arabs to develop a national spirit and personality, teach them to love her own national culture more than any foreign one [by which she meant the French]'."[1024]

When Edib's words quoted above are evaluated at its face value, Makqisi seems right. However, like Cemal Pasha, Halide Edib also classifies the Arabs, as nationalists and the others. In his view, the nationalist Arabs were "a political instrument in foreign hands", and therefore, could not be trusted. She implicitly accepts the "developedness" of the nationalist Arabs and put them in a higher category. If those nationalist Arabs teaches the common Arabs their Arabness, they would be sympathized to the foreign powers instead of their own states. Therefore, it was the Turks who would teach the Arabness to the Arabs. As for the "self-determination", it is almost impossible to claim that Halide Edib

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1022 **BOA,** DH.ŞFR. 85/86, Talat to the Director of the Health in Adana, 11 Mart 1334 [11 March 1918].

1023 Halide Edib, *Memoirs,* p. 402.

1024 Makdisi, Ibid, p. 793.

considered the "self-determination" for the Arabs during the Ottoman time. Presumably, she meant the time when the memoirs were written. By "time for independence" for the Arabs, Edib meant a date in future that the Arabs would be liberated from the French mandate. A comparison with the Turkish version will make this idea stronger.[1025]

As emphasized several times throughout the present study, Cemal intended to make the Syrians loyal Ottomans modelling the nation-state structure of Europe. Therefore, his educational activities could not be thought separate from this general aim. Makdisi is right that Cemal aimed to replace the French sympathy with that of the Ottoman. But the difference between the two states is ignored by Makdisi. While Ottomans were the legal authority, who had the right to rule Syria, France was a foreign power. Cemal demanded from the Syrians to sympathize with their own state instead of a foreign one. On the other hand, giving priority to teach Turkish was connected with his general policy of Syria. Following the elimination of the intermediaries that described in the previous chapters, Turkish was deliberated as the official language, which would provide the communication between the state and its citizens.

6.2.3. The Other Educational Undertakings for the Modernization of Syria

Besides those, Ranzi points out that Cemal opened agricultural, industrial and commercial schools to provide the improvement of the country and to break its dependency to the Great Powers.[1026] Towards the end of the year 1916, Cemal established a school of agriculture in Tanail (at the Bikaa district in the province of Damascus) under the supervision of the German experts. The land of the school had been confiscated from the Jesuits in the beginning of the War. Before the War, the Jesuits had a boarding school and a wine garden there. In the lands of schools, which reached to 5.000 decare width, Cemal established this school with an agricultural model farm to provide the practicing

[1025] Halide Edib, *Mor Salkımlı Ev,* p. 234.

[1026] **HHStA,** PA 38/370, Ranzi to Czernin, "Die Gründung staatlicher Maedchenliceen in Syrien", Damascus, 19 February 1917.

ability to the students. The students of the school were registered from all regions of Syria. Similarly, he established a technical and industrial school in Damascus under the leadership of the German expert Prof. Stöckle.[1027] This school would be concentrating on these branches: engineering, road construction and applied arts. The teaching of the German language made compulsory in these two schools, and the lectures were partly delivered in German. According to the Austrian Consul in Damascus, the resistance of the Turkish authorities against the German language was assuaged by the need of the employment of the foreign experts.[1028] In addition, according to Von Kiesling, a German expert employed by Cemal Pasha, the students in this technical school were taught the traditional Arabic handworks such as faiance painting, plaster window manufacturing, tissue knotting. By this way, the traditional arts would have been saved from getting lost.[1029] In a similar way, According to the Spanish consul, Cemal was planning to found a shool of arts and trades in Birüssebi, "having contracted specialized proferssors, trusting the direction of the school to the Military Administration of the Desert… Courses in Turkish, Arabic, music, drawing and other subjects will be imparted there…".[1030]

His endeavors to ottomanize the religious and non-religious education were also appreciated by the Germans. The replacement of the foreign domination on the education of the Arab population with that of the Ottomans would also give a free hand to Cemal Pasha to solve the Arab question in an easier way. After denoting the necessity of opening a University in Medina to eliminate the foreign influence, the German academic Franz Stuhlmann explained the importance of spread of the Ottoman schools with these words in his study:

[1027] Von Kiesling, Hans, *Damascus Altes und Neues aus Syrien,* Dieterich'siche Verlagsbuchhandlung, Leipzig: 1919, p. 80; indeed, the preparations for the establishment of a school of agriculture in Damascus had begun in May 1915. 25.000 qurush had been added to the budget of the Syrian Province for the year 1915. For details, see: **BOA,** DH.UMVM 132/35, Ministry of Interior to Sadaret,12 Temmuz 1331 [25 Temmuz 1331].

[1028] **HHStA,** PA 38/370, Ranzi to Czernin, "Die Gründung zweier Fachschulen under deutsher Leitung", Damascus, 18 January 1917.

[1029] Kiesling, Ibid. p. 79-80.

[1030] Ballobar, Ibid, p. 143.

> "'This foundation should be followed by similar foundations in Baghdad, Damascus, and the Yemen, which should not only disseminate purely Islamic knowledge, but strive to make western learning subverse their purposes. In this way it will be possible to form an educated element in the country from which efficient officials, doctors, etc. can be recruited, and as soon as education has penetrated into these lands they will be able under the Turkish Crescent to form autonomous states, a confederation of states, and so bring about a happy solution of the difficult Arabian question. A strong Turkey can afford to make concessions in the Arabian question."[1031]

Towards the end of his governorate in Syria, Cemal reached an agreement with the Orient Mission of Austria on having the Syrian young boys education in that country.[1032] According to that agreement, the students must have completed the first five years of their educations in the public schools in Syria. It means that the age range of the students would be between 12 and 15. The age average was determined as 15 years old for the applicants. The Mission would provide scholarships to the students to carry out their lives in Austria. The students would firstly stay in a boarding stay in the lower Austria dividing them into smaller groups consisted of 12 children. A professor would be assigned for each group, whose only job was to take care of these children. In the first year, the students would be placed into the preparations classes to learn the German language. After that they would continue their educations.[1033]

At the end of that year, the students would be placed to the appropriate professional schools or the industrial schools. They would be able to acquire professions there such as factory director, machine engineer, electric master, textile and metal engineers etc. Besides that the students would be able to register to schools of commerce or to schools of agriculture to master on agriculture, forestry etc. After the completion of their professional education, they would be able to continue their education at faculties like Medicine, Veterinary Medicine, Law etc.[1034]

[1031] **PRO,** FO 371/2783, Holderness to FO, "Germany, Turkey, England and Arabia, Dr. Franz Stuhlmann's recently published book", 2 November 1916.

[1032] **HHStA,** PA 38/370, Ranzi to Czernin, "Abreise der mohammedanischen Jünglinge zur Ausbildung in der Monarchie", Damascus, 22 November 1917.

[1033] **HHStA,** PA 12 462, K.K. Österreichische Orient-und Überseegesellschaft, "Normen der Schuleraktion", undated.

[1034] **HHStA,** PA 12/462, K.K. Österreichische Orient-und Überseegesellschaft, "Normen der Schuleraktion", undated.

The Secretary of the Orient Mission paid a visit to the Syrian provinces to register students to that project. The Secretary visited Aleppo, Damascus, Beirut, Haifa and Jerusalem. All the applicants were the children of the prominent families of these provinces. During the visits, Cemal Pasha and the other officials pulled out all the stops to facilitate the work of the mission.[1035] The interest of the people was considerable. From the 200 applicants, the first 15 were selected according to the success rating. Before them, a group of the Christian Orphans was sent to Austria for education. There were also the children and relatives of the prominent bureaucrats among the scholarshipped students; the nephew of the Governor of Syria, the son of the Commander of the 8th Army Corps, the sons of the Judges and other prominent bureaucrats as well as the notables of Syria. To the contrary of the agreement, the students were older than 15 years since the youngers would have problems to adapt the new conditions of a foreign country.[1036] For Austria it was a golden opportunity to increase its influence in Syria. In Cemal Pasha's words, possibly, the students would be the operating pioneers of the elimination of the foreign dependency in these lands.[1037]

Another remarkable project of Cemal Pasha in the field of education was to establish an oriental library in Damascus. In a report presented to him in French in May 1917, the aims of the establishment of this library were summarized.[1038] By this library, firstly, Cemal aimed at having "at least an institution which every enlightened man could draw its intellectual nourishment he can not find elsewhere."[1039] Secondly, the riches of the

[1035] **HHStA,** PA 12/462, The Secretary of the Orientmission to Czernin, "Ausbildung 50-60 türkischer Schüler in Konvikten", Damascus, 24 January 1918.

[1036] **HHStA,** PA 38/370, Ranzi to Czernin, "Abreise der mohammedanischen Jünglinge zur Ausbildung in der Monarchie", Damascus, 22 November 1917.

[1037] **HHStA,** PA 12/462, The Secretary of the Orientmission to Czernin, "Ausbildung 50-60 türkischer Schüler in Konvikten", Damascus, 24 January 1918.

[1038] "*Expose sur la Fondation d'une Bibliotheque Orientale Generale a Damas"* par son excellence Ahmed Djemal Pacha, Commandant de la IV., Armee et Ministre de la Marine, Damas, May 1333. From the wording of the text, it is inferred that the report was prepared by an Ottoman citizen, who can't speak Turkish, most probably by an Arab, if it was not translated to French for the use of the Germans [I found the document in the Staatsbibliothek zu Berlin, MTÇ]

[1039] *Expose,* p. 1.

East, which were spoiled by the West for centuries, had to be kept in their places. Therefore, this library must have protected the old manuscrits of their move to the western countries. By the collection of these valuable books the Eastern academics wouldn't have to visit the Western countries to study about their cultures and languages, the flow was intended to make an inversion. by this process, the East would regain its former glory and his riches, and again would be "the center of attraction for those who wanted to study and know thoroughly." [1040] Damascus was determined as the place for the library since this city was less influenced by the European culture and, in the ancient times, was a center of libraries and scholars. the right should be left to Damascus to continue to be, as in the past, the source of the Eastern spiritual life. Besides that, the youngmen should know about the wealth of ancient and modern Turkish Literature. In addition, the Library must compensate the need of the Turkish book of the school children, who were taught Turkish in the schools. by this, it will make a great patriotic service and complement the purpose of the educational implementations, which had begun at school. As a result of the realization of this project, the city Damascus would reach his fame that it once had as "the Paradise of the Orient." [1041] The report summarizes the character of the projected library as such:

> "The library must contain: 1. The Most significant works of the Arab and Muslim literature in all their branches, 2. Language works (grammars, dictionaries, language studies etc..) And classics of Semitic languages, 3. Great books about the East in general (languages, religions, history, customs, arts, geography, travel and more.,) and Arabic literature and Islam in particular, in all different languages., 4. A rich collection of ancient and modern Turkish literature, as well as new publications (books, journals, periodicals, etc..,) In that language, 5. Great books about Turkey in all different languages."[1042]

For this purpose, Cemal assigned the prominent Zionist and Orientalist Dr. Jehlin to prepare a catalog of the Islamic Library in Damascus. During this work, Dr. Jehlin determined large numbers of unknown manuscripts.[1043] Apart from that, the project couldn't put into practice, most probably, because of the difficulties arisen by the state of the War. However, the project is crucial in terms of indicating Cemal's desire to make the

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[1040] *Expose,* p. 2.

[1041] *Expose,* p. 3-4.

[1042] *Expose,* p. 4-5.

[1043] Wiegand to His Wife, 7 May 1917, Ibid, p. 248.

Ottoman realm independent intellectually from the West, and in terms of its appreciation the importance of the knowledge in the issue of independence. Secondly, the emphasis on the necessity of the old Arab intellectual culture and the references to the glories of the ancient times, i.e. the glories of the history of the Arabs, makes it problematical to identify Cemal Pasha as a Turkifier in Syria.

All in all, throughout his governorate in Syria, Cemal Pasha strove with his policy of education to make the Syrians the proper citizens loyal to the Empire. In summary, his undertakings in the field of both religious and the public educations aimed at the replacement of the foreign education institutions with their Ottoman equals, and to annex the new citizens to the ideals of the Ottomanism. In the viewpoint of the Austrian Consul in Damascus, the aim of Cemal Pasha's educational reforms was to create an alternative centre for the Arab World in Syria against *Al-Azhar* of Egypt. By this way, he tried to make the Muslim students abandon from travelling Egypt with the educational reasons. Another aim of these reforms was to raise awareness of the Syrians about how their Government was progressive. He also opened the agricultural and commercial schools to reduce the foreign-source dependency for the development of the country.[1044]

6.3.Public Works under Cemal Pasha in Syria

Besides the activities to make the bodies and minds of the Syrians suitable for being ideal citizens of the Ottoman Empire, Cemal also provided considerable alterations in the urban space of the Syrian cities as to convert them into a convenient structure for the "surveillance" of the state over its citizens as well as some undertakings to develop the Syrian district economically. "His background and the positions had held before the war

[1044] **HHStA,** PA 38/371, Ranzi to Czernin, "Der Abschied Djemal Pasha's von Syrien", Damascus, 17 February 1918: throughout the War, Cemal had to apply the foreign advisors to make the development prejects for Syria. The opening of the new schools, most probably, aimed at the break of this dependency.

particularly predisposed him to engage in such a comprehensive venture".[1045] As will be analyzed below, those activities aimed both to save Syria from the foreign dependency and to increase the penetration of the Ottoman Government in the Syrian provinces by giving them a modern and penetrable shape in the Foucaldian sense.

6.3.1. "Penetrating" the Cities of Syria

With the appointment of Cemal Pasha as the Governor General, an outstanding improvement emerged in appearance of the Syrian provinces. With the remarks of the Austrian Consul in Damascus on 23rd May 1915, many of the narrower streets there, were systematically enlarged in a short period of time. In addition, some streets were repaired and embellished. All of this was succeeded with a very small cost presumably due to the employment of the labor battalions in these works.[1046] Hulusi Bey, the first Governor of Syria under Cemal's Rule, made a special contribution to the enlargement of the streets, and having a modern appearance of the cities in Syria as an engineer, who knew these works very well. According to the Austrian Consul in Damascus, due to his contribution to the public works, when Hulusi was dismissed upon his request, "all the circles of the civil service and people agreed that he was the best general governor that was appointed in Syria for many years. His dismissal caused a sincere sorrow among the Syrian people."[1047] Besides the increase of the Governmental control over the cities, by these construction

[1045] Accoding to Hasan Kayalı, "he had a close awareness of the important uses of communications owing to the experience he had gained in his early military career (prior to the Young Turk Rovolution) as inspector of Rumelian railroads. Several years later, in the Said Halim Pasha cabinet, he had been entrusted with the portfolio of the ministry of public works". Kayalı, Hasan, Ibid, p.296.

[1046] **HHStA,** PA 38/366, Ranzi to Burian, "Die Staedtische Verwaltung waehrend des Kriegs", Damascus. 23 May 1915.

[1047] **HHStA,** PA 38/366, Ranzi to Burian, "Wechsel des hiesigen Generalgoverneurs", Damascus, 21 October 1915.

works, Cemal aimed at gaining the sympathy of the Syrians for the Ottoman Empire.[1048] According to the Austrian consul, by these works, Cemal aimed at making Syria as developed as Egypt in the eyes of th Syrians.[1049]

Throughout the year 1915, besides the enlargement of the old streets of Damascus, Cemal Pasha also opened a new great boulevard called *Cemal Pasha Boulevard* from the center of the city to provide a modern appearance there as well as constructing a public garden and again called it with his name.[1050] Some houses, shops and warehouses were expropriated and demolished to penetrate the dead end streets. A commission was established to confiscate and pull down these buildings purchasing them from their owners with a value defined by the same commission. The owners took a payment record (mazbata) from the Governorate for the payment of the price of their estates.[1051] In the same year, Cemal constructed a boulevard in Jaffa, which was 800 m. in length and 35 m. in width.[1052] Cemal reported to Enver that Birüssebi was transformed into a town with all its buildings,[1053] which was built by Abdülhamid II as an entirely modern city to control the Bedouins in the region. The name of the main park in that city was changed as *Cemal Pasha Parkı* after the arrival of the Pasha at Syria.[1054] Similarly, to set his own seal on

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[1048] According to the unpublished memoirs of an architect, Mehmet Nihat Nigisberk, who worked under Cemal in Syria, it was a government policy to gain the sympathy of the Arabs by the construction works. For details, see: Cengizkan, Ali, "Mehmet Nihat Nigisberk'in Katkıları, Evkaf İdaresi ve Mimar Kemalettin", in Cengizkan, Ali, *Mimar Kemalettin ve Çağı,* Ankara: TMMOB, 2009.

[1049] **HHStA,** PA 38/371, Ranzi to Czernin, "Der Abschied Djemal Pasha's von Syrien", Damascus, 17 February 1918.

[1050] Cemal to Enver, 27 September 1917, *Arşiv Belgeleriyle Ermeni Faaliyetleri,* ATASE Yayınları, Ankara: 2007, p. 698; **PA-AA,** Türkei 177, Bd. 13, Deutsche Palaestina Bank Beirut to von Rosenberg, "Bericht für das Jahr 1915", Beirut, 29 April 1916.

[1051] For its implementation in Beirut, see: **PA-AA,** Türkei 177, Bd. 13, Deutsche Palaestina Bank Beirut to von Rosenberg, "Bericht für das Jahr 1915", Beirut, 29 April 1916; for the reflections in the whole of the Syrian provinces, see: Ruppin, Ibid, p. 339.

[1052] Cemal Pasha, Ibid, p. 229.

[1053] Cemal to Enver, 27 September 1917, *Arşiv Belgeleriyle Ermeni Faaliyetleri,* ATASE Yayınları, Ankara: 2007, p. 698.

[1054] Luz Nimrod, "The Re-making of Beersheba: Winds of Modernization in the Late Ottoman Sultanate", in *Ottoman Reform and the Muslim Regeneration: Studies in Honor*

Syria, Cemal ordered the troops, who built fountains in the context of the preparations for the conquest of Egypt, to write that tablet: "Voyager! It is Cemal Pasha the Great and the Pious who built this fountain with the help of Allah to quench your thirst".[1055] By these enterprises, he wanted to be mentioned as the founder of the modern Syria, similar to the position of Mustafa Kemal in Turkey.

However, during the construction works some problems occurred between the Government and the owners of the expropriated buildings. The appreciated values of these properties by the commission were, indeed, far lower than their real worth. The owners were paid their money with a period of delay, reaching sometimes to one year. Because of the devaluation of the paper money, the owners had to sell off their payment records [*mazbata*] in underrated value reaching to the proportion of 20, 50 and even 55 percent. When considered the hiring incomes of these buildings, according to the report of the German Palestinian Bank in Beirut for the year 1915, their economic losses could not be easily reparable.[1056] In September 1916, Talat had to warn Azmi Bey, the Governor of Beirut, to obey the regulations of the Constitution while performing the expropriations, to pay the prices of the properties in advance.[1057] Similarly, in October 1917, the reports of the inspectors stated "the Governor of Beirut Azmi Bey made many depredations and destructions in defiance of the law of expropriation to construct streets". According to

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of Butrus Abu-Manneh, Itzchak Weissmann and Fruma Zachs (eds.), I.B. Tauris, London and Newyork: 2005, p. 196.

[1055] Von Kressenstein, Ibid, p. 109.

[1056] **PA-AA,** Türkei 177, Bd. 13, Deutsche Palaestina Bank Beirut to von Rosenberg, "Bericht für das Jahr 1915", Beirut, 29 April 1916; the Spanish consul in Jerusalem wrote these remarks in his diaries regarding the way that the construction works were conducted: "Yesterday Raphael [his dragoman] and I visited the new major of Jerusalem, Mr. Ertogrul, who showed us, with an air of triumph, the plans for a new road stretching from the Jaffa gate to el Haram al-Sharif, from the next to the walls of Mount Zion and for the asphalting of Jaffa road. The good man told us that he now has 2.000 Turkish Pounds to begin. But what idea must this man have of what it takes to do works like that? The road alone will cost more than three million Pesetas. It could be, however, that the mayor is right if the Turkish system of not paying the expropriations, nor the workers, nor anything all, continues. So if you have to knock down a house? Well, knock it down and do not pay a cent to the owners": Ballobar, Ibid, p. 70.

[1057] **BOA,** DH.İ.UM.EK. 21/39, Talat to Azmi, 12 Eylül 1332 [25 September 1916].

these reports Talat had to issue a warning to Azmi Bey, and repeated his warning about the obedience of the law during the expropriations.[1058]

The situation was not different in the other cities.[1059] In Damascus, during the works to widen the available roads in 1917, three buildings of a Damascene were deemed as one building, and paid hereunder [buna göre] by the Provincial Consul [*Vilayet Meclisi*]. However, upon the petition of the property owner,[1060] this judgement was reversed by the Council of the State [*Şura-yı Devlet*], and each building was evaluated separately.[1061] Similar cases occurred in Aleppo, too. In that city, the state officials and urban notables founded a company called *Terakkiyat-ı Nafia-yı Umraniye* [the Development of the Civilizatory Public Works] to expropriate the properties for the construction of the city in return for participating receipt. It is clearly understood from the telegram of the Governor of Aleppo that the property owners demanded from the Central Government in Istanbul to relief their victimhood emerged by these activities.[1062] Apart from that, the economic life in the town was considerably influenced in a negative way. Those expropriations also contributed to the increase of the shop rents. As a result, a series of small merchants had to clear out their shops, and transferred their goods to their houses, and thus, they had to accept a hardly acceptable economic damage.[1063]

In the beginning of the year 1916, the process of the modernization of the Syrian cities came to a more systematic state with the employment of the foreign academics, who were expert on restoration and architecture by Cemal Pasha. In this sense, firstly, he

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[1058] It is worth to mention that Azmi Bey was not unique, the Governors of many cities were punised because of their violation of the expropriation law. For details, see: **BOA,** DH.İ.UM.EK. 39/96, Talat to the Governorates, 12 Eylül 1332 [25 September 1916].

[1059] Ruppin writes that the similar situations came into question [söz konusu olmak] for the other provinces Ruppin, Ibid, p. 339.

[1060] **BOA,** ŞD. 2321/9, Ministry of Interior to Sadaret, 16 Mayıs 1332 [29 May 1916].

[1061] **BOA,** BEO. 4474/335482, Sadaret to Ministry of Interior, 10 Haziran 1333 [10 June 1917].

[1062] **BOA,** DH.ŞFR. 574/100, Bedri to Talat, Aleppo, 28 Kanun-ı Evvel 1333 [28 December 1917].

[1063] **PA-AA,** Türkei 177, Bd. 13, Deutsche Palaestina Bank Beirut to von Rosenberg, “Bericht für das Jahr 1915”, Beirut, 29 April 1916.

imported the Swiss academics Maximilian Zürcher, the old director of the German Fine Arts Academy in Rome, as The General Director of the Public Works [*İnşaat Umum Müdürü*] to the body of Cemal's Arrmy.[1064] He woud prepare elaborate plans to construct and renew the principal Syrian provinces "with the emphasis on imparting a sense of grandeur to the Ottoman precinct of Damascus".[1065]

Within the framework of his plan, a new boulevard was constructed in the Western suburb [*Vorstadt*] of Damascus, and was denominated as Cemal Pasha Boulevard. By pulling down the older buildings around the boulevard, an 800 m. long promenade was created on both sides of the pavement of this boulevard 20 m. in width for both sides, which was decorated with the central plantation, the tailored boskets, water basins.[1066] The Hijaz Railroad station was located at the west end of the boulevard. Cemal asked the German architect Wulzinger to prepare

> "a detailed design based on a sketch conceived by the Pasha for the square in front of the station: a fabulous fountain centerpiece 'which should be complete with cascades and lions, one with a paw resting on a Turkish flag'. Poor Wulzinger produced a design that failed to provide these essential details and the project was never realized."[1067]

In April 1916, in Jerusalem, the highway between Ramla and Jerusalem was excellently cared for. The edge of town was embellished with a new *Cemal Pasha avenue* and new demolitions were made in the squares, although, according to the Spanish consul, some arbitrary acts were committed in making of these improvements.[1068] In the beginning of July, Cemal mentioned to Ballobar, the Spanish consul, that he was planning to build a park on Mount Zion tearing down the houses and to make an avenue from the Franciscan School to the Damascus Gate.[1069]

[1064] Cemal Pasha, Ibid, p. 229; Erden, Ibid, p. 143; it is worth to mention that, in the English edition of his memoires, Cemal didn't write anything about activities of his public works in Syria.

[1065] Burns, Ross, *Damascus A History,* Routledge, London and Newyork:2005, p. 265.

[1066] Von Kiesling, Hans, Ibid, p. 93; for a reference to the confiscation of these buildings, see. **BOA,** DH. UMVM. 102/52, Tahsin to Talat, 5 Mayıs 1334 [5 May 1918].

[1067] Burns, Ibid, p. 265.

[1068] Ballobar, Ibid, p. 93.

[1069] Ballobar, Ibid, p. 102.

Besides the works to enhance the penetrability of the cities, Cemal dealt with the development of the countryside at the same time. He stated one of his reports to Enver that, his activities of construction in the Sinai Desert, which was explained in details in Chapter 1 on the Canal Expedition, didn't only aimed the military considerations, the public improvements of those regions were also intended and achieved.[1070] In the same vein, towards the end of the year 1916, he launched the ferry traffic across the Dead Sea, which facilitated the grain traffic from the agricultural areas in the east of the Dead Sea.[1071] The ships were carrying 100-150 tones of goods and foodstuffs daily from the east shore to the west.[1072] Meanwhile, the biggest ship on the Dead Sea was called *"Büyük Cemal"* [Cemal the Great]. In January 1917, Cemal charged a German officer to investigate about how the potential of the Dead Sea for transportation could be improved. He proposed to use the small boats in a more effective way and the construction of the convenient seaports, which would make the bigger ship transportation more productive. The boats, which would travel there, would be fabricated partly in Jaffa, Alexandretta, Haifa and Djerablus and partly in Jideida and Jerusalem. According to the remarks of this officer, with the betterment of the ship transportation on the Dead Sea, the travel between the south-east of the Dead Sea and its North would be considerably facilitated, shortening to 3.5 hours.[1073] Apart from that, Cemal also dealt with the improvement of agriculture in the region. In that regard, in February 1917, Cemal demanded hydraulic engineers from German Foreign Ministry to construct water channels for the increase of the agricultural productivity in Jordan Valley and in the fruitful plains of Bekaa.[1074]

[1070] Cemal to Enver, 27 September 1917, *Arşiv Belgeleriyle Ermeni Faaliyetleri,* ATASE Yayınları, Ankara: 2007, p. 698.

[1071] Tamari, Salim, "Jerusalem's Ottoman Modernity: The Times and Lives of Wasif Jawhariyyeh", in *Jerusalem Quarterly,* 2000/9, p. 23.

[1072] Cemal Pasha, Ibid, p. 232; Wasıf Jawhari was among the soldiers who was assigned as the Ottoman soldier to serve in grain transportation between the east and west shores of the Dead Sea. For details, see: Tamari, Salim, "Jerusalem…", p. 23.

[1073] **BA-MA,** RM 5/2322, Krumbolz to Chef des Admiralstabs der Marine, "Bericht über die Einrichtung des Wasserverkehrs auf dem Toten Meer zwischen Jideida und Ghor el-Mazra", Jerusalem, 5 February 1917.

[1074] **PA-AA,** Türkei 177, Bd. 14, Loytved to Bethmann-Hollweg, Damascus, 3 February 1917.

6.3.2. Restoration of the Historical Monuments

Another remarkable activity carried out by Cemal was the restoration of the monuments. Towards the end of the year 1916, he launched an initiative for the restoration of the monuments in Syria from the Byzantine, Islam and Turkish (pre-Ottoman and Ottoman) periods. According to Wiegand, Cemal was aiming by the undertaking to awaken an understanding of past among the people.[1075] For this purpose, he assigned Theodor Wiegand, a German Officer and an expert on the monuments, as the head of the Command for Monument Protection [*Denkmaelschutzkommando*], which was created to unearth, protect and restore the mentioned monuments.[1076] The aims of the undertaking were described by Cemal Pasha with the following words:

> "1. The creation of a reliable inspection agency for the preservation of the monuments; 2. The pull-down of the new buildings inside and around the old buildings, cleansing the ruins, and to prohibit people to use the ruins as the building materials; 3. The betterment of the access roads to the ruin sites and the creation of the suitable accommodation to facilitate the visit of the domestic and foreign [tourists]."[1077]

Wiegand made an inventory work with his team about the monuments of Syria. They prepared two albums. The first one was published in Berlin by the support of Cemal Pasha from the budget of the Army.[1078] Besides that, in 1920, another publication was made

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[1075] Wiegand, Ibid, p. 198-202; see also: Kayalı, "Wartime Regional Integration", p. 304.

[1076] Wiegand to His Wife, 1 November 1916, in Wiegand, Theodor, *Halbmond in die letzten Viertel: Archaelologische Reiseberichte,* Verlag Bruckann, München: 1970, p. 198; Von Kress didn't join in this meeting. However, according to his memoires, he persuaded Cemal suggesting him to employ the scholars like Wiegand in his retinue [*maiyet*], as was done by Napoleon during his campaign against Egypt: Von Kressenstein, Ibid, p. 198.

[1077] Ahmed Cemal Pasha, "İfade-i Meram", Teşrin-i Evvel 1333; "Vorwort", October 1917, in *Suriye ve Filistin ve Garbi Arabistan Abidat-ı Atikası / Alte Denkmaeler aus Syrien, Palastina und Westarabien,* Verlag von Georg Reimer, Berlin: 1918.

[1078] *Suriye ve Filistin ve Garbi Arabistan Abidat-ı Atikası / Alte Denkmaeler aus Syrien, Palastina und Westarabien,* Verlag von Georg Reimer, Berlin: 1918; there is no name of write on the cover page of the book. However, Cemal Pasha's name is written as the

about the activities of this command in Berlin and Leipzig with the foreword of Von Kress.[1079] These books not only include informations about the monuments, but also give some details about the geography of the region, the structure of the valleys and mountains etc. The first inventory book can be evaluated as an attempt by Cemal Pasha to increase the "legibility" of these lands that he was ruling, most probably to penetrate it in a more sophisticated way, and to prevent the illegal trafficking of the monuments to Europe.[1080]

Besides those inventory works, the Command for the Monument Protection made some restorations of the monuments from the Byzantine, Arabic and Turkish times. The interventions of Zürcher and Wiegand's team saved the ruins from the Byzantine times from a total destruction.[1081] Similarly, the measures taken by Cemal Pasha forestalled the decay of the Lodge [*Tekke*] and Mosque of Sinanie, which is an example of the harmony of the Arab and Turkish ideas of art.[1082] Selimiye Mosque in Damascus, one of the most outstanding examples of the Ottoman architecture, again mixed with the Arab style, was also restored by the initiative of Cemal Pasha.[1083] The *Vakıf* Ministry sent money for the restoration of Selimiye Mosque and Süleymaniye Almshouse [*imarethane*].[1084]

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sponsor of the book, but the study was prepared by Wiegand and his friends; Cemal Pasha; Ibid, p. 235.

[1079] Wiegand, Kressenstein, Schubart, Watzinger, Werth and Wulzinger, *Wissenschaftliche Veröffentlichungen des Deutsch-Türkischen Denkmalschutz-kommandos,* Walter de Gruyter&Co., Berlin and Leibzig: 1920.

[1080] Kiesling praises Cemal Pasha in his book that he prevented the illegal trafficking of the valuable stones belonging to the monuments of the Islamic period. For details, see: Von Kiesling, Ibid, p. 66.

[1081] Kiesling, Ibid, p. 36.

[1082] Kiesling, Ibid. p. 45; Ross Burns notes that the Mosque and Tekkie Sinanie was built by the renowned Ottoman architect Mimar Sinan, stating that many elements were borrowed from the local Syrian repertoire. For details, see: Burns, Ross, *The Monuments of Syria: A Guide,* I.B. Tauris, London and Newyork: 2009, p. 130.

[1083] Kiesling, Ibid, p. 78; Ross Burns writes in his guide that "Its style, though more distinctly Syrian, blends well with Sinan's work". See: Burns, *Monuments,* p. 131.

[1084] 6.000 ltq. was sent by the Vakuf Ministry to Cemal Pasha for the restoration of the Selimiye Mosque and Süleymaniye : **BOA,** DH.ŞFR. 63/296, Şeyhülislam to Cemal Pasha, 28 Eylül 1332 [11 October 1916].

During the wartime, a French newspaper Journal de Genéve attacked Cemal of leaving the monuments of the Islam-Arab period to ruin.[1085] However, according to Von Kiesling, who wrote a book on the restoration activities in Syria during the War, “it is a pity that the influence of Cemal Pasha didn’t reach that Islamic example of architecture, which belonged to the pre-Turkish period”. He continues that nobody cared before about the cleavages on the roof and between the Walls of the monuments belonging the pre-Turkish Islamic period. Similarly, if Cemal hadn’t intervene in these buildings, their tile decorations on the inner walls would be sold by the antiquity merchants with tremendous prices.[1086] It is understood from an Ottoman document that Cemal Pasha confiscated the buildings around the Umayyad Mosque and the Aziziye Mosque. The Vakıf Ministry sent 100.000 qurush for this work to Cemal.[1087] It was most probably to clean the surroundings of these historical buildings.

Cemal Pasha’s projects regarding the transformation of the structures of the cities and the restoration of the monuments in Syria also indicates that he didn’t make such a separation. Rather he strove to increase the existence of state in Syria with its buildings. He summarizes his plans in this sense as follows:

> “[in] Jerusalem: 1. cleaning the walls of the *Aqsa* Mosque from some outbuildings, spoiling the old magnificence of it and, removing the whitewashes covering the perfect stone walls [of the Mosque]; 2. Repairing the citadel of Jerusalem [Tower of David][1088] preservıng its authenticity [*aslına uygun olarak*] to transform as a local museum; 3. Construction of a Government building and a small palace juxtaposed to the citadel, and building of a terrace adjacent to the citadel; 4. Drying of the big puddle [*burka*] in Jerusalem polluting the air of the town and transforming of it into a perfect market hall; 5. Transforming of the squares and drains to their authentic situations.

[1085] Wiegand, *Halbmond,* p. 237.

[1086] Kiesling, Ibid, p. 66.

[1087] **BOA,** DH.ŞFR. 63/298, Şeyhülislam to Cemal Pasha, 28 Nisan 1332 [11 May 1916].

[1088] Built to strengthen a strategically weak point in the Old City's defenses, the citadel that stands today was constructed during the 2nd century BC and subsequently destroyed and rebuilt by, in succession, the Christian, Muslim, Mamluk, and Ottoman conquerors of Jerusalem. Finally, it was rebuilt by the Ottomans between 1537 and 1541 and added a minaret. The name "Tower of David" is due to Byzantine Christians who believed the site to be the palace of King David. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tower_of_David.

> [in] Damascus: 1. The protection of the citadel of Damascus[1089] of being ruined and the transformation of its inner square into a promenade, the reconstruction of its external drains; 2. The extension of the boulevard constructed by my order… to the *Circa* meadowland and the construction of a public garden.[1090]

He also made it prepared the detailed plans of the buildings, which was thought to build on this boulevard, such as a public bathroom [*hamam*], an hotel, the governmental buildings such as courthouse, post and telegraph office and municipality etc. Finally, the construction of fountains, cascades and terraces for the park.[1091]

> [in] Beirut: 1. perfect stairs to come up directly from the Beirut port to the Government Office; 2. A palace, which would be constructed in *Re's-i Beyrut*; 3. Post and Telegraph Office
> [in] Aleppo: 1. A perfect project to save the citadel[1092] of being ruined and restoration of some parts of it; 2. [the Construction of] Aleppo Government Office; 3 [and] a Post and Telegraph Office"[1093]

It can be inferred from these projects that, one of the most important aims of Cemal Pasha in Syria was to enhance the sense of the existence of the state authority among the Syrian citizens of the Empire by the way of the increase of the visibility of the Government in the urban spaces of the towns. On the other hand, looking at his restoration plans and activities, it can be concluded that Cemal Pasha endeavored to make the historical legacy visible in the cities belonging to the Byzantine, Islam-Arab and the Ottoman times, which can be interpreted as the essential parts of the identities of the Syrian peoples.

[1089] The location of the current citadel was first fortified in 1076 by the Turkman warlord Atsiz bin Uvak, although it is possible but not proven that a citadel stood on this place in the Hellenistic and Roman periods. After the assassination of Atsiz bin Uvak, the project was finished by the Seljuq ruler Tutush I. The emirs of the subsequent Burid and Zengid dynasties carried out modifications and added new structures to it. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Citadel_of_Damascus

[1090] Cemal Pasha, Ibid, p. 230.

[1091] Cemal Pasha, Ibid, p. 230-231.

[1092] It is considered to be one of the oldest and largest castles in the world. Usage of the Citadel hill dates back at least to the middle of the 3rd millennium BC. Subsequently occupied by many civilizations including the Greeks, Byzantines, Ayyubids and Mamluks, the majority of the construction as it stands today is thought to originate from the Ayyubid period. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Citadel_of_Aleppo.

[1093] Cemal Pasha, Ibid, p. 231.

The Austrian Consul in Damascus interpreted the aims of Cemal Pasha public works and restorations in the Syrian cities as an attempt to elevate these lands to the level of Egypt. He tried to demonstrate to the Syrians that their Government was as capable as that of Great Britain in terms of civilizatory respect, and the Ottoman Government was able to achieve in Syria what Great Britain did in Egypt to improve it. However, the Consul added, since his program of construction didn't continue, a deep division emerged between newly constructed parts of the cities and the old ones.[1094]

Cemal's projects for the structural embellishment of the Syrian cities and the restoration of the old buildings required huge funds and extensive demolition of the buildings. Ali Fuad Erden, his Chief of General Staff, thought that those works could only be done in times of peace, not during the War and they didn't make any contribution to the defense of the country.[1095] Similarly, a German Officer under Cemal's command thought it as his duty to report his commander's waste of expenditure for the public works under Zürcher's supervision in the middle of the War.[1096] In addition, as explained above, the owners of the demolished buildings resented Cemal. As a result, all these projects created dissatisfaction among his bureaucrats and the property owners rather than gaining sympathy.[1097]

1094 **HHStA,** PA 38/371, Ranzi to Czernin, "Der Abschied Djemal Pasha's von Syrien", Damascus, 17 February 1918.

1095 Erden, Ibid.

1096 **PA-AA,** Türkei 177, Bd. 13, Köppen to the War Ministry, Damascus, 26 September 1916.

1097 **HHStA,** PA 38/370, Ranzi to Czernin, "Zwei Reformaktionen Djemal Pashas", Damascus, 5 September 1917.

CHAPTER VII

THE *DRUZE* AND THE *BEDOUIN* UNDER CEMAL PASHA'S REGIME

Quite the reverse of the city-dwellers of Syria we analyzed in the previous chapters, unsettled and nomadic components of Syrian society enjoyed a particular freedom under the regime of Cemal Pasha. Yet, with the beginning of the *Tanzimat* reforms, the Ottoman Government had endeavored to annex the Bedouins and the Druzes to the Ottoman administration and, by the outbreak of the World War I, some improvements had been obtained in this sense, although the Bedouin and the Druze communities protected their distinctive structures to a considerable extent.[1098] However, Cemal didn't maintain this policy, feeling anxiety about their rebellion, which would put him in a difficult position

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[1098] For a detailed analysis of the Ottoman policy of centralization towards the Bedouin and the Druze of Syria in the *Tanzimat* era, see: Ma'oz, Moshe, *Ottoman Reform in Syria and Palestine, 1840-1861,* Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1968, pp. 108-150; For an analysis of the Ottoman policy of the Bedouin tribes from 1850 to the end of the Ottoman rule in the case of Transjordan, see: Rogan, Eugene L., *Frontiers of the State in the Late Ottoman Empire,1850-1921,* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999; Abdulhamid II endeavored to increase the allegiance of the Bedouin tribes by the way of Education. For that purpose, he opened a school called *Aşiret Mektebi* for them. For an analysis of this school, see: Rogan, Eugene L., "Aşiret Mektebi: Abdulhamid II's School for Tribes (1892-1907)", *IJMES* 28/1, February, 1996, p. 83-107.

militarily in the war circumstances, and thus, implemented the traditional imperial policy permitting them a large freedom of action in return for their loyalty.

Although the Ottoman tribal policy of Syria in the pre-war period is more or less analyzed[1099], the Ottoman policy of the Bedouin and the Druze during Cemal's rule in Syria is not examined deservingly. The only exception of this is some summaries in the study of Rogan regarding the policy of Cemal Pasha before and after the outbreak of the Sharif's revolt for the tribes in Transjordan. In this chapter, however, Cemal's policy toward these two significant non-urban elements of Syrian society will be analyzed in the light of the documents from the various Western and Ottoman Archives. In this regards, the reasons and consequences of Cemal's policy of the Druze will be discussed; Following that the relations between the Bedouin tribes and tribal dynasties, and the Ottoman Empire will be dealt with:

7.1.The Druze: Freedom of Action in Return for Loyalty

Being one of the biggest tribal communities in Syria, the Druze community in Syria belonged to the Shiite order of Islam, it was formed during the first half of the 5th century of Hijra, the 11th A.D. It came into existence as a result of the religious call from Cairo in the reign of the sixth Fatimid Caliph, Al-Hakim Bi-Amr Allah.[1100] From the very early

[1099] For a detailed analysis of the Ottoman policy of centralization towards the Bedouin and the Druze of Syria in the *Tanzimat* era, see: Ma'oz,Ibid; For an analysis of the Ottoman policy of the Bedouin tribes from 1850 to the end of the Ottoman rule in the case of Transjordan, see: Rogan, Eugene L., *Frontiers of the State in the Late Ottoman Empire,1850-1921*; Abdulhamid II endeavored to increase the allegiance of the Bedouin tribes by the way of Education. For that purpose, he opened a school called *Aşiret Mektebi* fort hem. For an analysis of this school, see: Rogan, Eugene L., "Aşiret Mektebi: Abdulhamid II's School for Tribes (1892-1907)", *IJMES* 28/1, February, 1996, p. 83-107.

[1100] Abu-Izzeddin, Nejla M., *The Druzes: A New Study of Their History, Faith and Society,* Leiden:Brill, 1984, p.1; for further information about the Druze religion also see:

times of their emergence, the Druzes subsisted their lives with agriculture dispersed between impenetrable mountainous areas of Palestine, Lebanon, and Syria.[1101] Their lifestyle and religion considerably differed from the Muslims of Syria. Because of their productive agriculture, during the WWI, they played a crucial role for the provisioning of both the civil population and the Army. Therefore, gaining the support of the Druze showed a crucial importance during the wartime.

As explained in Chapter 3, in the beginning of the war, especially among the Lebanese Druze, some tendencies favoring Great Britain prevailed, since their interests in the Lebanese autonomous system had been upheld by that power against the Maronite majority for half a century.[1102] However, according to the report of the Governor of Beirut, the Druze sympathy to Great Britain was rather outwardly, but at heart they were sympathizing with the Ottoman Government because of the religious ties between the two.[1103] Another factor, which probably relieved the Ottoman authorities about the Druzes, was their politically pragmatist character. According to the assessment of the representative of German Consul in Syria, the Druzes could change their loyalty easily from one authority to another when the dominant power over their lands changed, on condition that their freedom would be guaranteed.[1104] It can be inferred from this evaluation that if Cemal Pasha had restricted their freedom, the Druzes would be more open to the British propaganda throughout the War.

Hogarth, D.G. and Gertrude L. Bell, *Note on Druses,* Cairo: 1918, Government Press, pp.2-8.

[1101] Abu-Izzeddin, Ibid, p. 3; The Druzes were distributed into three isolated groups, of which the most numerous inhabits Jebel Druze, east of Jordan (about 55.000); the second, the towns of Shuf and Ment in Lebanon (about 50.000); the third, the towns of Hasbeya, Rasheya, Wadi al-Ajem, Homs, Hamadiyeh and Salimiyah in Anti-Lebanon and Hermon (about 45.000). for details see: Hogarth, D.G. and Gertrude L. Bell, *Note on Druses,* Cairo: 1918, Government Press, p. 1.

[1102] **PRO,** FO 371/2143, Cumberbatch to Mallet, Beirut. 15 September 1914.

[1103] **BOA,** DH.EUM.4.Şb. 1/4, Bekir Sami to Talat, 20 Ağustos 1330 [2 September 1914]

[1104] **PA-AA,** Türkei 177, Bd.17, Ziemke to Hertling, Damascus, 17 May 1918.

Because of the difficult character of the Druze to discipline, the Druze community had been exempted even in the preceding years of the war from many obligations of the Ottoman subjects in comparison to the other communities in the region. The outbreak of the war didn't change the situation in this sense; first of all, they were exempted from the military service in the Ottoman Army, although there were 30.000 men in the Druze Community fit to bear arms. Moreover, they didn't pay tithe from their harvests. They weren't a nomadic society, but a farmer society producing wheat, barley, lens and some summer fruits.[1105]

At this delicate time of War, the Druze societies had to be treated carefully due to the fact that they were warriors by birth in character[1106], and a rebellion organized or supported by them could put the Government militarily in a very difficult position.[1107] Therefore, throughout the whole period of war, both Cemal Pasha and his predecessors were very careful about not frustratinig the Druze community. The Governmental activities towards them focused on two points: to give them a generous freedom when compared to the other religious or tribal communities, and to benefit from their produce, like food and animals for the provisioning needs of the Army and the civil population, avoiding any action of inducement while dealing with them.

Indeed, the Government planned to recruit the Druze into the armed service in the beginning of the mobilization, both considering the warrior character of that society and planning to make them familiar with the State. However, the Druze didn't accept this request, and instead, proposed to be exempted from the military service by payment and to provide food for the provisioning of the troops. The Government considered applying some coercive measures, but their offers had to be approved for the fear of a Druze rebellion.[1108] In the same way, the leader of the Druze community in Cebel-i Druze, Yahya

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[1105] **PA-AA,** Türkei 177, Bd.17, Ziemke to Hertling, Damascus, 17 May 1918.

[1106] Arslan, Ibid, p. 141; **PA-AA,** Türkei 177, Bd.16, Oppenheim to Göppert, 12 December 1917.

[1107] **HHStA,** PA 38/363, Ranzi to Berchtold, Damascus, 10 August 1914.

[1108] **HHStA,** PA 38/363, Ranzi to Berchtold, Damascus, 18 August 1914; **PRO,** FO 371/2777, McMahon to FO (transmitting an intelligent returned from Syria), Cairo. 20 May 1916; Hogarth and Bell, Ibid, p.17-19.

Bey el-Atrash came to Damascus with his nephew Nasib to pay court to the Ottoman Government on behalf of all the Druzes.[1109] Although the Government approached their statement of loyalty with suspicion, they had to accept it as such, even if for practical reasons.[1110]

Similarly, in early September 1914, the highest governmental authorities in Syria – the Army Commander Zeki Pasha, the Governor of Syria, Hulusi Bey, The Commander of the 8th Army Corps, Mersinli Cemal Pasha, the Senator Abdurrahman Bey and Amir Ali Pasha, the Vice-President of the Ottoman Parliament, and his son from the celebrated Al-Jazairi Family- paid a visit to the Druze Sheikhs in Hauran, Deraa and Maan, where the Druzes were settled, to gain their support in case of hostility against the "infidels". The leader of the Druzes, Yahya Bey al-Atrash accompanied them throughout the journey. Zeki Pasha addressed them as children of the Sultan who would rely upon their loyalty to defend their country in case His Majesty's troops became involved in the war. In this visit, a sword of honour, a gold watch inscribed with His Majesty's name, and a robe of honour, were presented to Yahya Bey Atrash and to other Druzes, swords, medals, and robes of honours according to each Sheikh's position and importance. During the visit, Hulusi Bey announced that the Goverment were pleased with the Druzes, and they should henceforth be exempt from military service, as forming a Volunteer Corps, to come nobly forward in time of need.[1111]

In the same visit, the mentioned Governmental authorities visited the Bedouins in the neighbourhoods of the Druze and conciliated the feuds between the Druze and those Bedouins. In the viewpoint of the Austrian Consul in Damascus, in spite of this reconciliation, the Government intended to manipulate the population of the region to use them against each others, since they were suspicious about a rebellion of the Druze. Therefore, the Government were encouraging the Bedouins hovering between the south of

[1109] **BOA,** DH.EUM.EMN 91/19, Hulusi to Talat, Damascus, 12 Ağustos 1330 [25 August 1914].

[1110] **HHStA,** PA 38/363, Ranzi to Berchtold, Damascus, 3 September 1914; According to Hogarth and Bell, The Ottoman Government were prone to believe every report about the rising of the Druzes: Hogarth and Bell, Ibid, p. 21.

[1111] **PRO,** FO 195/2460, Cumberbatch to Mallet, Damascus. 10 September 1914; **HHStA,** PA 38/363, Ranzi to Berchtold, Damascus, 10 September 1914.

Syria and Inner Arabia to return to their pastures in southern Syria to use them as a counterbalance against the Druze in the event of a Druze uprising. Similarly, the consul continues that the Government calculated to balance the Christians of Lebanon with the Druzes of Hebron District in the event of their rebellion.[1112]

The policy of handling the Druzes with kid gloves didn't change with the appointment of Cemal Pasha as the Governor General of Syria. When Cemal Pasha arrived in Syria every fraction of the Muslims in Syria advised him to strike a blow to the Druzes to settle them down during the War. Nevertheles, Cemal acted differently considering that it would be a mistake to antagonize that warrior people towards the Government. Cemal evaluated his army as capable to suppres any Druze revolt in Lebanon, but a similar revolt in Hauran could result with serious damage to his military situation in Syria. Therefore, Cemal preferred to make them as free as possible from the Governmental tasks.[1113] For example, the Government made it obligatory for the other tribal and settled farmes to give 1/8 of their harvests as tithe, and to sell 2/8 of it to the Army for the needs of the army. This implementation was not expanded to the Druze. As a practice, which inherited from the times of *Ayan* in the 18th century, the Government delivered the right of tax collection to the Druze chiefs, who collected a fraction of the real amount. The Druze farmers could sell their produce to the efficient tradesmen with only gold money bidding the highest price. Besides that, Cemal Pasha disbursed plenty of gold to the Druze Sheikhs to gain their support. Like his predecessor, in early times of his governorate, Cemal Pasha tried to take military support from the Druzes. For that reason, he welcomed the fatwa of the *Babü'l-Meshihat* regarding the Druze as members of Islam. But, he abandoned this project because of their reluctance for this job.[1114]

[1112] **PRO,** FO 195/2460, Cumberbatch to Mallet, Damascus. 10 September 1914.

[1113] The English version of Cemal's memoires doesn't include a sectionon the Druzes. For further information about his evaluations on Druzes see the Turkish version: Cemal Paşa, Ibid, p.177-180.

[1114] **BOA,** DH.ŞFR. 515/14, Cemal to Talat,15 Mart 1332[28 March 1916]; **HHStA,** PA 38/366, Ransiz to Burian, Damascus, 15 February 1915; **PA-AA,** Türkei 177, Bd.17, Ziemke to Hertling, Damascus, 17 May 1918; However, Cemal Pasha denies his intention of benefaction from the Druzes militarily, and states that he never considered to use them as a military force. For further information see : Cemal Paşa, Ibid., p.177.

He tried to make the Druze community come near the state as much as possible with the smoother methods in comparison to that implemented against the urban population. For this aim, they employed the Druze volunteers in the Army. As was expounded before, in his visit to the Druze district, the Governor Hulusi Bey had requested from the Druzes to create volunteer troops. They accepted this offer, and sent a brigade of 150 men to Damascus.[1115] As a privilege provided to them, the Druzes of Hauran were the only volunteers group in Cemal Pasha's Army. In the viewpoint of the Austrian Consul, by this way, the Government aimed at the rehabilitation of the relations between the Druze and the State.[1116]

Cemal was quite tolerant to the Druze even when he found open demonstrations proving the unfaithfulness of them, which could be evaluated as the most sensitive issue for him in Syria. For example, when the documents in the French Consulates were confiscated, a proof of "treason" for the Druze leader Yahya el-Atrash had been found. That was a commitment letter, and in that document the leader of the Druzes had promised to support France in case of its occupation of Syria. Indeed, this document was prepared when El-Atrash was in Exile in Rhodes, and he had to sign the mentioned document reluctantly in return for his release from Rhodes, when Italy invaded the island. Although Cemal Pasha didn't know about the truth of the commitment letter, he didn't highlight this document, not to arise the reactions of the Druzes.[1117]

The outbreak of the Sharifian revolt made Cemal Pasha more careful about his treatment of the Druze community. His visit to the Druze region in Hauran in the middle of 1916, after the outbreak of the Sharif's revolt in Mecca, could be deemed one of the most important actions to gain the sympathy of the Druzes on behalf of the Ottoman Empire. With this visit, for first time in the history of the Empire, an Ottoman minister visited the Druzes. He was well-accepted by the Druze chiefs, and the most prominent Druze *Sheikhs* accompanied him throughout this journey.[1118] With this visit, he aimed at the prevention of

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[1115] **HHStA,** PA 38/366, Ransiz to Burian, Damascus, 6 February 1915.

[1116] **HHStA,** PA 38/366, Ransiz to Burian, Damascus, 15 February 1915.

[1117] Arslan, Ibid, p. 46.

[1118] **HHStA,** PA 38/369, Ranzi to Burian, "Der Besuch des Oberkommandierenden Djemal Pasha im Druzengebirge", Damascus, 15 August 1916.

any provocation of Great Britain and Sharif's men to incorporate the Druze into Sharif's movement. For that reason, Cemal Pasha delivered plenty of gold, decoration, honor gifts and rifles. With the remarks of Cemal, he "prevented with this visit the designs of the seditionists, who applied every means to make the Druzes revolt, for years."[1119]

In the same way, Cemal Pasha demanded the appointment of powerful and capable *kaymakams* to the Druze towns for an effective struggle with the British and Sharifian propaganda. By the same token, he requested the appointment of the prominent and trusted Syrians, who had influence over the Druzes, as the *mudirs* of the Druze *nahiyes* provided that to be dismissed after the War.[1120] It can be inferred from the telegram of the Governor of Syria, which was sent approximately one year after Cemal's application to Istanbul for the mentioned appointments, that the requested *kaymakams* weren't sent to the Druze towns yet.[1121]

Applying educational tools was another method implemented by Cemal to gain the Druze community for the Ottoman. Becoming very well aware of the transforming nature of education, Cemal Pasha sent the sons of the prominent Druze chiefs to Istanbul for education. By this way, he aimed at gaining the loyalty of the Druze community. Besides that, it was not difficult for Cemal to estimate that the graduation of the sons of the mentioned chiefs in Istanbul would make the next generation of the Druze chiefs pro-Ottoman and would contribute to the integration of the Druze with the Imperial system. In the viewpoint of the Austrian Consul of Damascus, that was the reason preventing the Druze society from cooperation with the Bedouins in the rebellion of Hauran, which was commenced in October 1916 as a reaction to the military requisitions.[1122]

After the arrival of Faysal's troops in southern Syria and the deployment of the British troops around Gaza, the situation of the Druzes became more of a crucial issue for

[1119] **BOA,** DH.ŞFR. 528/52, Cemal to Talat, 30 Temmuz 1332 [11 August 1916].

[1120] **BOA,** DH.ŞFR. 528/52, Cemal to Talat, 30 Temmuz 1332 [11 August 1916].

[1121] **BOA,** DH.ŞFR. 558/50, Tahsin to Talat, Damascus. 28 Haziran 1333 [28 June 1917].

[1122] **HHStA,** PA 38/369, From Ranzi to Burian,"Beendigung des Aufruhrs im Hauran", Damascus. 1 November 1916; **HHStA,**PA 38/371, Ranzi to Burian, "Die Haltung der Drüsen", Damascus, 6 June 1918; **BOA,** DH.ŞFR. 528/64, Cemal to Talat, 21 Temmuz 1332 [3 August 1916].

the progress of the battles in Palestine. In the middle of 1917, Sharif's men came to the Druze district to persuade their chiefs for the organization of a general rebellion with the Bedouin tribes in the region against the Ottoman Government. However, according to the report of the Governor of Damascus, Tahsin Bey, both the Druze chiefs and most of the leading tribes in the region remained loyal to the Ottoman Empire in the highest degree.[1123]

Following that, a British mission with 200 Indian cavalry came to the leader of the Druze, Selim el-Atrash, through Basra-Najaf-Djof-Kaf, and offered 200.000 Lst and 100.000 rifles provided that he rebelled against the Ottomans. The Druze chiefs held a meeting to discuss this issue. Selim el-Atrash and most of the Druze chiefs advocated that being with the Ottoman Empire would be more beneficial for the Druzes, and the other choice would deteriorate their situation. Few others championed taking side with the British, but their ideas weren't welcome among the Druze chiefs. Selim el-Atrash, son of Yahya, had informed Cemal Pasha at the same time about the event. Hereupon, Selim was invited to Damascus, and honored by Cemal Pasha with the title of Pasha.[1124]

Cemal's policy of the Druze was maintained by his successors after his departure from Syria. Especially following the British capture of Jerusalem, sustaining good relations with the Druze community giving them a large freedom appeared one of the most important objectives of the Ottoman policy of Syria since the region populated by the Druze became the frontier between the British, Sharif and the Ottomans. Therefore, each side of the Battle was aware that a Druze revolt against the Ottoman Empire could make decisive impact on the course of events in Palestine front.[1125]

The Sharif's men continued to repeat their offers to the Druze chiefs regularly to change their side and to join the rebellion. But, they were refused by the latter in every turn. In June 1918, the grand son of Sharif Hussein, Ali undertook to obtain the Druzes for their cause via the Damascene Notable Nasib el-Bakri, who offered a great amount of British gold in return for their support. His offer was refused by the leader of the Druze,

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[1123] **BOA,** DH.ŞFR. 557/92, Tahsin to Talat, Beirut, 22 Haziran 1333[22 June 1917].

[1124] **PA-AA,** Türkei 165, Bd.41, Waldburg to AA (Transmitting Consul Damascus), Constantinople, 20 July 1917.

[1125] **HHStA,** PA 38/371, Ranzi to Burian, "Die Haltung der Drüsen", Damascus, 6 June 1918.

Selim el-Atrash with a letter stating the loyalty of the Druze to the Sultan-Caliph and declaring Sharif as their enemies. Whereupon, el-Atrash was honored with the High Ottoman Medal and the German Iron Cross Medal.[1126]

Towards the end of the war in Syria, some Druze sheikhs commenced to trade with the districts in the British control and with Sharif Ali, and they applied to the British demand for food as a factor to increase the prices of the cereals that they sold. Similarly, the karawan trade between the two district continued through the Druze district. However, the Druze chiefs didn't change essentially their attitude of the loyalty to the Ottoman Government.[1127]

With the beginning of the final British attack against Damascus on 19th September, the Ottoman front was severely damaged. Therefore, the Government was afraid of a changing of the sides by the Druzes.[1128] Following the commencement of the British advance against Damascus, the Druze chiefs came there, and declared again their loyalty to the Ottoman Government. While the Ottoman troops were retreating towards Damascus, the Druzes chiefs came to Liman von Sanders and stated their allegiance to him and their readiness for war against the British forces if they were provided with guns and ammunition. Liman couldn't give a positive answer to them because of the deficiencies of the Army.[1129] All in all, they stayed loyal to the Ottoman Empire till the very end of the Ottoman Rule in Syria.[1130]

In return for their political support to the Ottoman Government, Cemal Pasha provided them a large administrative and financial autonomy. When the taxes and

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[1126] **HHStA,** PA 38/371, Ranzi to Burian, "Die Haltung der Drüsen", Damascus, 6 June 1918.

[1127] **ATASE Arşivi,** Kls. 3215, Ds. 19, Fih. 1, Cemal[Mersinli] to Cemal, 27 Aralık 1333 [27 December 1917]; **PA-AA,** Türkei 177, Bd. 18, Brode to Bernstoff, Damascus, 22 August 1918.

[1128] **BOA,** DH.ŞFR. 596/3, İsmail Hakkı to Ministry of Interior, Beirut, 21 Eylül 1334 [21 September 1918].

[1129] Liman von Sanders, Ibid, p. 363.

[1130] **BOA,** DH.ŞFR. 596/47, Rıfat to Ministry of Interior, Damascus, 24 Eylül 1334 [24 September 1918]; **BOA,** DH. ŞFR. 597/9, Tahsin to Ministry of Interior, Aleppo, 1 Teşrin-i Evvel 1334 [1 October 1918].

confiscations for the Army were estimated in the Syrian Provinces, the produciton of the Druze district was left out of the expected amount because of their immunities. However, it never meant that the Druzes didn't contribute for the provisioning of the Army. During the war period, they provided considerable amount of cereals for the troops in Syria in the critical times in spite of the deficiency of the transport means. More importantly, the Druze farmers played a crucial role in the provisioning of Damascus. Towards the end of every year in war period, the reserves of cereals in the Druze districts prevented the emergence of a famine at that city, although they acted like a bull market speculator in those critical times to provide the maximum advantage. The Government avoided to apply provocative offensive methods against them to facilitate the purchase of cereals, and that method produced satisfactory results in terms of the food supply.[1131]

Their immunity from the military service and the requisitions for the Army prevented the Druzes from having disinclination to work that the Syrian farmers suffered during the war. As would be analyzed below, the agricultural production in Syria had largely been damaged by the lack of manpower and pack animals as a consequence of the recruitment of the people and the requisitioning of the pack animals by the Army. Immunity of these two obligations provided the Druzes with a cereal surplus in every year of the War.[1132] Furthermore, the cereal surplus of the Druze farmers attracted the Syrians who escaped from the starvation and poverty as well as the deserters and those farmers who climbed out of the military requisioning. According to the information given by a British report on the Druze, Djebel-i Druze was harbouring at least 10.000 refugees.[1133] The Druze didn't avoid to feed them, strove for the betterment of the life conditions of the people, who took refuge with them. Thus, they contributed indirectly to the provisioning of Syrian society.[1134]

Besides their financial autonomy, the Druze region, to a large extent, stayed out of the Ottoman bureaucratic hierarcy. According to the remarks of a German working in

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[1131] **PA-AA,** Türkei 177, Bd.17, Ziemke to Hertling, Damascus, 17 May 1918.

[1132] **PA-AA,** Türkei 177, Bd.16, Oppenheim to Göppert, 12 December 1917; **PA-AA,** Türkei 177, Bd.17, Ziemke to Hertling, Damascus, 17 May 1918.

[1133] Hogarth and Bell, Ibid, p. 19.

[1134] **PA-AA,** Türkei 177, Bd.17, Ziemke to Hertling, Damascus, 17 May 1918.

Damascus consulate, the authority of the Ottoman government in the Druze district was next to zero. This district was annexed to Hauran administratively, and there was a *kaymakam* there. The mentioned German official stated that the role of that *Kaymakam* was no more than a diplomatic agent or a consul of the Ottoman Government in that region. In Sueyda, where mostly populated by the Druzes, there was only a group of 20 gendarmerie and was no actual state authority.[1135]

It is reasonable by all these policies to conclude that Cemal Pasha's policy of Druzes aimed at securing their loyalty giving them a broad autonomy in the war circumstances. As a result of the difficulties, which made controlling them impossible in another way, Cemal applied the mentioned policy of autonomy. At the heart of the War, it was inconceivable to implement a different method. Otherwise, he would have to struggle against the Druze with military methods, which would put him in a difficult position in his war against Great Britain in Sinai Front, and would make the Druze keen to the British policies. A similar policy was applied to the Bedouin tribes in Syria and Arabia, which produced similar results with that of the Druze.

7.2.Cemal Pasha and the Bedouins: Cooperation under the flag of the Caliph

Cemal's policy towards the Bedouin tribes was not different very much from his policy of the Druze in essence. He didn't undertake any action of the ottomanization towards the the Bedouin tribes. However, they weren't as autonomous as the Druze communities. For example, the nomadic tribes were exposed to some harsh requisitions of the Army as well as some extra taxes. The government was further free in its treatment of some Bedouin tribes till the outbreak of the Sharifian Revolt, especially for ones, who were nearer to the Ottoman administrative areas. As in the policy of the city-dwellers, Sharif's movement

[1135] **PA-AA,** Türkei 177, Bd.17, Ziemke to Hertling, Damascus, 17 May 1918.

created an extra-moderation in Cemal's tribal policy and caused some extra costs for him. On the other hand, that rebellion provided more freedom to the tribes from the control of the government. In addition, the policy of balance that those tribes applied especially towards the end of the War and Ottoman success to keep many of them, at least, neutral till the very end of the War demonstrate that the Sharif's rebellion could not be called a Pan-Arab, or all-Arab movement.

7.2.1. Cemal Pasha's Policy of Tribes to the Outbreak of the Sharifian Revolt

On the verge of the WWI, a considerable amount of the population in Syria, Palestine, and Arabia belonged to large and small Bedouin tribes. For centuries, it was difficult for the states ruled in the region to take them under governmental control because of their nomadic lifestyle. They were fond of their liberty, and an intervention in their freedom could cause a rebellion against the Government. Therefore, under the circumstances of the war, the administration of those tribes appeared as an issue for Cemal Pasha.

Although some improvements had been provided in the settlement of those tribes in the pre-war years,[1136] when it came to the commencement of the War, as would be shown below, they still had considerable autonomy and manpower to be able to resist the governmental control, or to support its military activities. As was expressed in the first Chapter, in the beginning of the mobilization, the Government requested their military and political support. Almost all the small and large tribes in Syria accepted the call of the Caliph to cooperate under his flag.[1137] But, Cemal Pasha abandoned to use the Bedouin troops in the military operations since they were irregular troops and couldn't become

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[1136] For a detailed analysis of the Ottoman activities to settle and control these tribal groups see; Rogan, Ibid.

[1137] **PRO,** FO 371/2777, McMahon to FO (transmitting an intelligent returned from Syria), Cairo, 20 May 1916.

effective against the regular armies.[1138] Instead, he employed some Bedouin and Druze volunteers in the army with political considerations, sometimes as hostages and sometimes to honor them.[1139] It was more of an issue for Cemal Pasha to gain their political support, and thus to prevent their rebellion against the Ottoman authority by the change of their sides. In addition, the tribal support showed great importance for the supply of pack animals and, in some places, for the provisioning needs of the Army.

In a speech delivered in Lebanon after the fall of Jerusalem and in his memoires, Cemal Pasha attributed his failure of the Egyptian Expedition to the lack of the support of the tribal chiefs and Sharif Hussein. In other words, if those two had supported him, he would save Egypt from the "British yoke".[1140] Similarly, the Turkish official history-writing blames the 'urban and tribal Arabs' for the Ottoman defeat in Syria.[1141] An analysis of Cemal's relations with the tribal chiefs, therefore, will clarify the truth of those claims as well. Both to examine his claims and to check the 'treason' thesis of the official Turkish history-writing regarding Arabs, that section will shed light on Cemal Pasha's policy of tribes taking more its political aspect into consideration since the tribal contribution to the mobilization movement has already been analyzed in the first chapter.

Throughout the WWI, Cemal Pasha and his predecessors struggled with Great Britain for the loyalty and support of the Bedouins dispersed between southern Palestine and the Persian Gulf. Immediately prior to and after the outbreak of war in Europe, the

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[1138] **HHStA,** PA 38/366, Ranzi to Berchtold, "Berufung des Fürsten Nuri Schalan nach Damaskus", Damascus, 6 February 1915; Arslan, Ibid, p. 140-141.

[1139] Cemal Pasha's insistent request from Sharif Hussein to send a division under the command of his son Faysal to join the Canal Expedition was because of his intention to keep Faysal as hostage in Damascus in return for Sharif's loyalty: **HHStA,** PA 38/369, Ranzi to Burian, Damascus, 10 June 1916; Similarly, After the outbreak of the Sharifian Revolt, Cemal requested Nuri Shalan to send a brigade of 300 men to the service of the Government to prevent him joining Sharif Hussein; **HHStA,** PA 38/369, Ranzi to Burian, "Die Abreise des neuen Grossscherifs nach Medina", Damascus, 7 August 1916; The Druze brigade in the army was employed to honor them and to increase their loyalty; **HHStA,** PA 38/366, Ranzi to Burian, Damascus, 6 February 1915.

[1140] **PA-AA,** Türkei 177, Bd.17, From Mutius to Hertling, Beirut. 20 December 1917.

[1141] For an analysis of the Turkish perception of the Sharif's revolt, see: Çiçek, M. Talha, "Erken Cumhuriyet Dönemi Ders Kitapları Çerçevesinde Türk-Ulus Kimliği İnşası ve 'Arap ihaneti'", *Divan,* 2012/1, cilt: 17, sayı: 32, pp. 169-188.

Ottoman authorities visited all the prominent Bedouin chiefs in Syria and Arabia, and achieved to guarantee their support in case of the emergence of any hostility between the Caliph of Islam and any other foreign power.[1142] In return for their loyalty, the Bedouin chiefs were awarded with considerable amount of gifts and decorations.[1143] Moreover, most of them were paid high salaries by Cemal Pasha.[1144] In cases, if their active assistance was not possible, the Ottoman authorities came to an agreement with those chiefs, at least on their friendly neutrality. They applied to the support of the Bedouins within the framework of a general Pan-Islamic movement.[1145]

On the other hand, the British contemplated to reconciliate the Bedouin chiefs and gain their support highlighting the issue of the Arab Caliphate. It would be counter propaganda against the Pan-Islamic policies of the Ottoman side. However, they didn't contemplate any direct intervention in the issue of the organization of an Arab rebellion around the Arab Caliph against the Ottoman Empire, not to make the Arab population think that the movement was a British design, and that would increase the credit of the Ottomans among the Arabs. Rather they preferred to develop the anti-Turkish sentiments that already existed, with the internal dynamics of the Arabs. It is worth to note that all the

[1142] **ATASE Arşivi.** Kls.159, Ds.705/23, Zeki to Başkumandanlık Ministry. Damascus, 14 September 1914 [1 Eylül 1330]. **ATASE Arşivi.** Kls.159, Ds.705, Fih. 23, Zeki to Başkumandanlık Ministry, Damascus, 14 September 1914 [1 Eylül 1330]; **MAEE**. Guerre 1914-1918, 868/Turquie, Syrie et Palestine, Maucops to MAE

[1143] **HHStA,** PA 38/363, Ranzi to Berchtold, Damascus,10 September 1914.

[1144] For example, to the tribes on the Hijaz Railway in North-Western Arabia -Huweitat, Beni Atije and El-Fukara- were paid 10.000 ltq. in gold till August 1916 in return for their loyalty. For details see: **HHStA,** PA 38/369, Ranzi to Burian, "Die Abreise des neuen Grossscherifs nach Medina", Damascus, 7 August 1916; similarly, Nuri Shalan, chief of the one of the largest tribes of the Northern Syria, was salaried with 3.000 ltq. in gold yearly; **BOA,** DH. EUM. 2. Şb. 32/27, Enver to Dahiliye, 30 Kanun-ı Sani 1332; **HHStA,** PA 38/371, Ranzi to Burian, "Der Abfall des Ruelafürsten Emir Nuri Schaalan", Damascus, 13 September 1918.

[1145] **PRO,** FO 371/2140, Chatham to Grey, "Apreciation of Situation in Arabia", Cairo, 6 September 1914.

British experts on the region accepted the convenience of the Sharif of Mecca for the post of the Arab Caliphate.[1146]

There were three tribal dynasties, which were subjected to competition between the Ottoman Empire and Great Britain for their loyalty, dispersed between Mesopotamia, Southern Syria and Inner Arabia competing for supremacy in the region, Ibn Rashid in Hail, Nuri Shalaan in Djof, and Bin Saud in Najd. As for their personalities at that time, According to the British Official Wingate, Ibn Rashid was a young man of 25, of no great force of Character. Nuri Shalaan was an old man of 70, but had a son, Nawwaf, at 40, who was an energetic and capable man. Finally, Ibn Saud was a fine type of Arab about 43 years of age, with great ambitions, and was clearly anxious to increase his resources and prestige by every means that came to his hand.[1147]

Regarding their attitude towards the Ottoman Empire and Great Britain in the beginning of the War, the picture was in favor of the Ottoman Empire, and, as will be detailed below, stayed in this manner to the end of the War. The most fragile one for the Empire among those chiefs was Ibn Saud. He was pacified with a treaty signed before the commencement of the War, in May 1914, recognizing his autonomy in Najd district and appointing him as the Ottoman Governor of Najd.[1148] After the proclamation of the War, the Government renewed its treaty with Ibn Saud and declared him as the Ottoman

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[1146] **PRO,** FO 371/2480, McMahon to FO, Paris, 31 December 1914; **PRO,** FO 371/2480, Holderness to FO, London, 15 January 1915.

[1147] **PRO,** FO 371/3389, Wingate to FO, "Position of Ibn Rashid, Emir of Hail, in his relations to Other Arab Potentates", Cairo, 17 January 1918.

[1148] This document captured by the British forces invading Basra. An English translation of this agreement is available at **PRO,** FO 371/2769, Holderness to FO, "Treaty between Bin Saud and the Turks dated 15 May 1914", Basra, 22 November 1916; for the details of the negotiations between the Ottoman Officials in the region and Ibn Saud and the Arabic version of the treaty see: **ATASE Arşivi,** Kls. 1714, Ds. 36, F. 1-72, Ömer Fevzi to War Ministry, Basra, 22 Nisan 1330 [5 May 1914]; **ATASE Arşivi,** Kls. 1714, Ds. 36, F. 1-134, Refik [Engineer in Medain Salih] to Captain Aziz Bey, Medain Salih, 11 Mayıs 1330 [24 May 1914]; **ATASE Arşivi,** Kls. 1714, Ds. 36, F. 1-103, Captain Aziz Bey to War Ministry, Medain Salih, 30 Nisan 1330 [13 May 1914]; **ATASE Arşivi,** Kls. 1714, Ds. 36, F. 1-72, Ömer Fevzi to War Ministry, Basra, 26 Kanun-ı Sani 1329 [8 February 1914]; for the Arabic version of the treaty see: **ATASE Arşivi,** Kls.1714, Ds. 36, Fih. 1-97,98, Major Ömer Fevzi to War Ministry, 28 Nisan 1330.

governor and the commander of Najd.[1149] However, as a result of the historical antagonism and sectarian differences between the two sides[1150], Bin Saud was always suspicious of the Ottoman Government[1151], and never cut all his ties with Great Britain throughout the War. As for Ibn Rashid, his policies were not different from that of Ibn Saud, although, from the very beginning, he was a loyal supporter of the Ottoman Empire. In early days of the War, he wanted to eliminate his mortal enemy Ibn Saud by the help of the Ottoman Empire, and therefore depicted himself as the representative of the Ottoman Empire, and contextualized his struggle with Ibn Saud within the framework of general policy of Jihad against Great Britain.[1152] Similarly, Nuri Shalan answered the call of the Government to support the mobilization in a good light, and notified his readiness at any moment for service with his 2.000 men.[1153] However, Due to his pro-Druze attitude in the last Druze Rebellion of 1911, Nuri was regarded as unrelaiable by the Government[1154], and the Ottoman surveillance over his actions continued throughout the whole period of War, although he didn't change definitely his side almost till the finalization of the battles in Syria.[1155]

[1149] **ATASE Arşivi,** Kls. 6, Ds. 32, Fih. 4-20, 4th Army to Enver, 5 Şubat 1330 [18 February 1915].

[1150] Bin Saud was defending a methodology that invokes the literal interpretation of religious texts, and the return to the early tradition of the pious companions of the Prophet, and defining most of the Ottoman religious implementations as *Bid'a*, which was added to the religion in the aftermath of the Prophet. Therefore, There was a tension between him and the Government. For further details see: Al-Rasheed, Madawi, *Contesting the Saudi State: New Voices from a New Generation,* Cambridge: 2007, Cambridge University Press, p. 2-3.

[1151] **PRO,** FO 371/2140, Ryan to Mallet, Cairo, 22 September 1914.

[1152] For an example of it, see: **ATASE Arşivi,** Kls.6, Ds. 32, Fih. 4-39,4-40, Ibn Rashid to Cemal, 15 Rebiülahir 1333 [2 March 1915]; in his another letter to Enver Pasha, Ibn Rashid expressed that "he and his goods belongs to the State",i.e., the Ottoman Empire: **ATASE Arşivi,** Kls. 6, Ds. 32, Fih. 8, Ibn Rashid to Enver, 25 Eylül 1330 [8 October 1914].

[1153] **ATASE Arşivi,** Kls.159, Ds. 703, Fih. 4-1, Zeki to Enver, Damascus, 10 Ağustos 1330 [24 August 1914].

[1154] **HHStA,** PA 38/366, Ranzi to Burian, "Die Besitzeergreifung Ibn Reschids von der Landschaft Djof", Damascus, 26 July 1915.

[1155] Towards the end of 1917 he started to approach Sharif Faysal. For details see: **PRO,** WO 158/634, Arbur to General Bagdad, Cairo. 1 October 1917; **ATASE Arşivi,** Kls.

As for the relations between those tribes, the picture didn't seem convenient for the policies of the Ottoman Empire. There were conflicts between Ibn Saud and Ibn Rashid, and Ibn Rashid and Nuri Shalan, preventing the implementation of the Pan-Islamic policy of the Government, which required a reconciliation and alliance of those tribes against the common enemy, at least temporarily. Therefore, both Cemal Pasha and the Ottoman Central Government tried to solve the problems among the tribal dynasties both to motivate them for Jihad policy and to prevent any approach in their attitudes to Great Britain, which could be stemmed from the problems of them with each others.[1156]

The first issue before the Ottoman Government regarding those tribal dynasties after the proclamation of Jihad to be overcome was the hostility between Ibn Saud and Ibn Rashid dating back to long before the period under study, to the birth of the Rashidis. According to the information given by Wingate, the Rashidi dynasty of Hail began as the Agents Generals [*Wakil*] of the Saudi Dynasty, towards the middle of the nineteenth century. When Muhammed Ali of Egypt's son Tosun Pasha invaded Hijaz and compelled Bin Saud to take refuge in Kuwait, the Rashid family of Hail became independent of their chiefs, and invaded their centre Riyadh. In 1902, Ibn Saud restored his power, and expelled the Rashidi Governor from Riyadh. He occupied all the South-Eastern Provinces that for 30 years had been under the control of Ibn Rashid. In that year, Ibn Saud advanced north-westward into Kassim, but was forced to retire by a Turkish force sent to co-operate with Ibn Rashid. However, in 1906 he returned to Kassim, and held that district to tribute ever since. After that, Ibn Saud aspired to the reversion of Hail which formed part of his forebear's dominions, and which only became independent in the year 1847.[1157]

3208, Ds. 18, Fih. 28, Yıldırım to Enver, 22 Ağustos 1333 [22 August 1333]; About one month before the finalization of the battles, he fixed his side in favor of Faysal; **HHStA,** PA 38/371, From Ranzi to Burian,"Der Abfall des Ruelafürsten Emir Nuri Schaalan", Damascus. 13 September 1918.

[1156] **ATASE Arşivi,** Kls. 6, Ds. 32, Fih. 3-8, War Ministry to 4th Army, 12 Teşrin-i Evvel 1330[25 October 1914]; **ATASE Arşivi,** Kls. 6, Ds. 32, Fih. 1-13, Major Aziz Bey to War Ministry, Medain Salih, 25 Eylül 1330 [8 October 1914].

[1157] **PRO,** FO 371/3389, Wingate to FO, "Position of Ibn Rashid, Emir of Hail, in his relations to Other Arab Potentates", Cairo, 17 January 1918.

In retaliation to this hostility, early in 1915 Ibn Rashid advanced into Ibn Saud's county, north-west of Riyadh, a battle was fought, in which Ibn Rashid won a striking victory. The Governor of Syria, Hulusi Bey, claimed that the reason of the fighting was the rivalry between Ibn Subhan, the vizier of Ibn Rashid, and the members of the Rashidi Family, who took refuge with Ibn Saud.[1158] Similarly, in a letter sent by Ibn Rashid to Ibn Saud, the Former blames Ibn Subhan as the reason of the fightings between them.[1159] In that battle, Ibn Saud lost a considerable number of troops, 1500 killed and 1200 wounded. The British representative with Ibn Saud, Shakespeare was captured dead by Ibn Rashid with three other British officials. Morever, According to Dr. Prüfer, a German official in Jerusalem, two sons and three relatives of Ibn Saud were killed.[1160] Ibn Rashid wanted to exhibit the heads of the British deads in a square of Damascus, but because of the treaty between the Empire and Ibn Saud, the action was not approved by the Government.[1161] At the end of this battle, Ibn Rashid recaptured the disputed district Kassim,[1162] and plundered the goods of all the villages in Kassim.[1163] The British sources claim that Ibn Rashid was spurred by the Turks.[1164] However, the Ottoman records indicate that the Ottomans left no

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[1158] In the viewpoint of the Governor, Ibn Rashid was too young to rule the Rashidi dynasty, and therefore all his administrative works was performing by his Vizier Ibn Subhan. The Vizier started to get the potential rivals of Ibn Rashid killed to consolidate his authority over the tribe. Therefore, some of the member of the Family taken refugee to Ibn Saud to save themselves. The reason of that fighting was the struggle of Ibn Subhan to secure his authority. For further details see: **BOA,** DH.ŞFR. 461/55, Hulusi to Talat, 1 Şubat 1330 [14 February 1915]

[1159] **PRO,** FO 371/3057, Ibn Rashid to Ibn Saud, Hail, 7 May 1917.

[1160] **PA-AA,** Türkei 165, Bd. 37, Prüfer to Bethmann-Hollweg, Jerusalem, 24 February 1915.

[1161] **ATASE Arşivi,** Kls. 6, Ds. 32, Fih. 4-20, 4th Army to Enver, 5 Şubat 1330 [18 February 1915].

[1162] **BOA,** DH.ŞFR. 489/29, Basri to Talat, Medine, 3 Eylül 1331 [16 September 1915].

[1163] **BOA,** DH.ŞFR, Basri to Talat, Medine, 23 Ağustos 1331 [5 September 1915].

[1164] **PRO,** FO 371/3389, Wingate to FO, "Position of Ibn Rashid, Emir of Hail, in his relations to Other Arab Potentates", Cairo, 17 January 1918; **PRO**, FO 371/3047, The Political Resident in the Persian Gulf to FO, Basra. 27 November 1916. **PRO,** FO 371/2479, General Force 'D' to General Officer Commanding, Egypt, Basra. 20 December 1915.

avenue unexplored to prevent this battle partly fearing the defeat of their loyal confederate Ibn Rashid and partly as a requirement of their reconciliatory policy of Pan-Islamism[1165], although Ibn Rashid submitted the letters of Ibn Saud offering him cooperation against the Ottoman Government.[1166]

In contrast to the British claims, soon after the battle the Ottoman Government requested the restoration of peace between the two tribes. However, the reluctance of Ibn Rashid for the negotiations[1167] made it compulsory the mediation of a delegate with the intervention of the Ottoman Government in consultation with Cemal Pasha, to finish the hostility upon the request of Ibn Saud.[1168] The mediation delegation consisted of the prominent figures of the Arabs, among them the most outstanding ones were Sharif Faysal and Salih Sharif al-Tunusi. According to the report of the Austrian Consul of Damascus, with this peace, it was aimed to secure the allegiance of all the Muslim leaders to the Caliphate, giving special reference to Ibn Saud, who was known for his Wahhabi opinions opposing the legitimacy of the Ottoman Caliph. Moreover, the Ottoman Government planned to apply the support of these two chiefs in the Mesopotamian War Theatre.[1169]

As a consequence of the pressure of the Ottoman Government, in July 1915, Ibn Rashid gave his consent to a peace with Ibn Saud. The former didn't want to contradict with his allegiance to the Ottoman Caliph preventing the establishment of peace in the region. With the treaty signed between the two chiefs, they accepted to return to the *status*

[1165] **ATASE Arşivi,** Kls. 6, Ds. 32, Fih. 3-8, War Ministry to 4th Army, 12 Teşrin-i Evvel 1330 [25 October 1914]; **ATASE Arşivi,** Kls. 6, Ds. 32, Fih.4-5, Fourth Army to Enver, 13 Teşrin-i Evvel 1330 [26 October 1914].

[1166] **PA-AA,** Türkei 165, Bd. 37, Ranzi to AA, 10 April 1915: The Austrian Consul of Damascus, Dr. Ranzi sent the referred report to the German Foreign Ministry. The Austrian Consul of Damascus claims that the Government aimed at the cooperation of these two chiefs with her against Great Britain in Mesopotamian war theatre: **HHStA,** PA38/366, Ranzi to Burian, "Eine offizielle türkische Friedensmission für Arabien", Damascus, 5 June 1915.

[1167] **BOA,** DH.ŞFR. 459/43, Basri to Talat, 14 Kanun-ı Sani 1330 [27 February 1915].

[1168] **ATASE Arşivi,** Kls. 6, Ds. 32, Fih. 4-38, Enver to Cemal, 4 Mart 1331 [17 March 1915].

[1169] **HHStA,** PA 38/366, Ranzi to Burian, "Eine offizielle türkische Friedensmission für Arabien", Damascus, 5 June 1915.

quo ante-bellum. The success of the Ottoman Government to bring about peace increased both its prestige and authority over those tribes, and the problem was solved in the direction of Cemal Pasha's policy of tribes.[1170] Another reason causing the Ottoman Empire to step in for the mediation was its concern regarding the Sharif of Mecca. Sharif Abdullah's movement from Taif with some troops towards Kasim and Najd caused a suspicion about him. Probably, the Government considered that Abdullah would establish the peace among the chiefs, and that would arise Sharif's prestige in the region.[1171]

Another problem among the tribal chiefs was that of Nuri Shalan, the leader of the Ruela Tribe, and Ibn Rashid on the ownership of Djof territory. While the Government was trying to establish peace between Ibn Rashid and Ibn Saud, to prevent the commencement of another hostility between Nuri Shalan and Ibn Rashid, Cemal Pasha entertained Nuri Shalan together with his son Nawwaf and his 40 men as his guest in Damascus for about 9 months. He was welcomed with a great military honor by the authorities. Nuri expressed to the Austrian Consul about his retention that he was departed from his land and people because of his hostility between him and the Shammar Tribe of Ibn Rashid on the possession of Djof territory. He also notified that his peace proposal was not accepted by Ibn Rashid.[1172] According to the remarks of the Austrian Consul, made 6 moths after Nuri's arrival in Damascus, when the peace was restored between Ibn Saud and Ibn Rashid, the permission would be issued for the return of the chief of the Ruela Tribe.[1173]

The return of Kassim Territory to Ibn Saud obligated the Government to compensate for the loss of its loyal supporter Ibn Rashid with another land. By that reason, he easily occupied Djof Territory in the absence of Nuri and Nawwaf with the permission

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[1170] **HHStA,** PA 38/366, Ranzi to Burian, "Friedensschluss zwischen Ibn Reschid und Ibn Saud", Damascus, 21 July 1915.

[1171] **BOA,** DH.ŞFR. 489/29, Basri to Talat, Medine, 3 Eylül 1915 [15 September 1915].

[1172] **HHStA,** PA 38/366, Ranzi to Berchtold, "Berufung des Fürsten Nuri Schalan nach Damaskus", Damascus, 6 February 1915.

[1173] **HHStA,** PA 38/366, Ranzi to Burian, "Friedensschluss zwischen Ibn Reschid und Ibn Saud", Damascus, 21 July 1915.

and the approval of the Government. With that operation the Government antagonized the Ruela Tribe to itself and that could create problems for its goals in the region.[1174]

Meanwhile, Ibn Rashid broke the peace again with Ibn Saud in the second month of its restoration, which was hardly established by the Government, occupying Kassim territory for the second time. Although he withdrew from there later, that action both damaged the peace and the Governmental authority in the region. Furthermore, Ibn Rashid captured a caravan in Kassim consisted of 900 camels, which belonged to Tawfik Siuffi who procured goods for the account of the Ottoman Army. The request of the Government for the reclamation was delayed by some excuses. All these events caused a resentment of the authorities against Ibn Rashid, while bringing about a restoration in the relations between Nuri Shalan and the Government. Thereupon, the Government allowed Nawwaf to return and recapture the Djof territory. Moreover, an official message arrived approving Nuri's appointment as the Kaymakam of Djof. According to the comment of the Austrian Consul of Damascus, with this appointment the scope of Ottoman Rule was extended to Djof, which was practically independent till then from the Governmental authority, and the Ottoman Empire gained a strong point of support in Central Arabia.[1175]

By the resolution of the disagreement between Ibn Rashid and Nuri Shalan, the tribal leaders entered into a period of tranquility accepting generally the Ottoman Government as their supreme power till the commencement of the Sharifian Revolt of Mecca in June 1916.[1176] To summarize the attitude of those chiefs in that period, Ibn Saud applied a balance policy between the two powers, the British and the Ottoman, but recognizing the Ottoman authority. He gave the impression to the British side that he was struggling against the Ottoman domination in the region, and he was filled with hatred

[1174] **HHStA,** PA 38/366, Ranzi to Burian, "Die Besitzeergreifung Ibn Reschids von der Landschaft Djof", Damascus, 26 July 1915.

[1175] **HHStA,** PA 38/366, Ranzi to Burian, "Die Ernennung des Emir Nuri Schalan zum Kaymakam des Djof", Damascus, 29 October 1915; for a reference to Nuri as the *Kaymakam* of Djof, see: **BOA,** İ.DUİT 66/48, 22 Ağustos 1332 [4 Eylül 1916]

[1176] Although some small events of cooperation between Ibn Saud and Great Britain took place, it never turned into an open hostility and rebellion against the Ottoman Government. When his suspicious actions were informed, the Ottoman authorities sent him money and decoration to keep him loyal in the Ottoman side: **PA-AA,** Türkei 165, Hesse to Bethmann-Hollweg, Baghdad, 21 June 1916.

against them.[1177] On the other hand, He appeared to the Ottoman officials that he had to take the British policy into consideration in his cooperation with the Ottoman Government since they were very close to his area of domination. But in reality he didn't give his loyalty to any of the sides unconditionally, and didn't manifest his side till the British supremacy in his region became certain.[1178] It is known that Ibn Rashid was a loyal supporter of the Ottoman cause and didn't change his attitude till the very end of the War. Different from the other two chiefs, he actively helped the Ottomans in their struggle in the Mesopotamian War Theatre and later in the struggle against the Sharif Hussein of Mecca, which will be detailed in the next section.[1179] Nuri Shalan would change his side towards the end of the War in favor of the British side.

Besides those three chiefs, the Ottoman Empire invited the Imam Yahya of Yemen, Sheikh Ahmet Sharif al-Senussi, Sayyid Idrissi of Asir and Mubarak of Kuwait for cooperation under the flag of the Caliph.[1180] While keeping their ties with Great Britain, Idrissi and Mubarak didn't enter into any considerable hostility with the Ottoman Empire

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[1177] **PRO,** FO 371/2140, Ryan to Mallet, Cairo 22 September 1914. When the British reports are surveyed on Ibn Saud's relations with the Ottomans, such an impression will be inferred that he was a loyal supporter of the British policies in the region, and filled with great hatred against the Ottoman authority. However, when the Ottoman documents are studied the picture changes, and it become clear that his expressions to the British authorities were a part of his balance policy. For an example of such documents see: **PRO**, FO 371/3047, Political Resident in the Persian Gulf to FO, Basra. 27 November 1916; for an example of his efforts to approach the Ottoman Government see: **ATASE Arşivi,** Kls. 3215, Ds. 42, Fih. 3, Abdülhamid to Cemal, 9 December 1917.

[1178] Even after the fall of Jerusalem, with the fear of a defeat by Ibn Rashid by the support of the Ottoman Government, Ibn Suud planned to approach the Government permitting the introduction of the foodstuff to Damascus via El-Usaym. See: **ATASE Arşivi,** Kls. 3215, Ds. 42, Fih. 3, Abdülhamid to Cemal, 9 December 1917.

[1179] **HHStA,** PA 38/369, From Ranzi to Burian,"Die Politik der mittelarabischen Fürsten in dem Konflikt zwischen der Tuerei und dem Emir von Mekka", Damascus. 11 December 1916.

[1180] **ATASE Arşivi,** Kls. 159, Ds. 705, Fih. 7-2, Enver to the Yemen Governorate, 7 Ağustos 1330 [20 August 1914]; **ATASE Arşivi,** Kls. 1793, Ds. 287, Fih. 1-47, Enver Pasha to Idrisi, undated; **ATASE Arşivi,** Kls. 1793, Ds. 287, Fih. 1-47, Enver Pasha to Idrisi, undated.

throughout the War protecting a certain neutrality.[1181] Senussi and the Imam actively cooperated with the Ottoman Empire in its struggle against Great Britain.[1182] Apart from the great tribal dynasties, plenty of the smaller tribes in Syria, Arabia and Yemen remained pro-Ottoman throughout the War.[1183]As a final remark, it is worth to mention that all these policies and negotiations were made in consultation with Cemal Pasha, and his approval and advises were always taken into consideration by the policy makers in Istanbul.

The outbreak of the Sharif's rebellion against the Caliph with the support of the tribes around Mecca created a change in the Ottoman policy towards the Bedouin tribes. However, Sharif's proclamation of rebellion didn't cause an essential turn in the attitude of those tribes against the Ottoman authority; while the attitude of the great tribal dynasties remained principally unchanged until the last months of the War period, some small tribes were gained by the British gold towards the end of the War. Some others, however, remained loyal to the Ottoman government.

7.2.2. Transformation of the Tribal Policy after the Sharifian Revolt

The commencement of Sharif Hussein's movement in Mecca signified a new period in Ottoman tribal policy in Syria and Arabia, and gave a new legitimizing tool for

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[1181] Mubarak al-Sabah desired more or less the protection of the British Government, most probably with fear of the destructive effect of the Ottoman centralization policies on the tribal structures: **PRO,** FO 371/2483, Grey to The Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, "Arabs and Turkey", 6 January 1915.

[1182] **PRO,** FO 371/2486, Grey to India Office,Negotiations with Grand Shareef. 8 November 1915.

[1183] **ATASE Arşivi,** Kls. 159, Ds. 705, Fih. 30-5, The Chief of Veled-i Ali Tribe to Ministry of Interior, 10 Zilkade 1330[133?] [30 Eylül 1914]. Most of the tribes between Akaba and Mecca were loyal to the Imperial authority: **PA-AA,** Türkei 165, Bd. 37, Moritz to AA, Damascus, 16 January 1915; In the beginning of the War, Mahmut Nedim Bey, The Governor of Yemen, achieved to obtain the support of many of the tribes for the Ottoman cause, and complained about the lack of money to make all Yemen loyal to the Government: **BOA,** DH.ŞFR. 462/27, Mahmut Nedim to Talat, 7 Şubat 1330 [20 February 1915].

the British endeavors to increase their influence among the tribes. On the other hand, as will be detailed below, it meant more disbursement of money and cereals for Cemal Pasha to maintain the support of the large and small tribes. In the existing literature, the British-Sharifian policy, which was tracked to gain the support of the Arab tribes properly examined in detail.[1184] However, Cemal Pasha's struggle with them was not yet studied thoroughly. One last thing about the sources of the subject, since ultimately, the source of all the archival and non-archival resources was the tribes themselves, and they could exaggerate the real situation, the present study tries to be as comparative as the limits have permitted.

Besides the military measures to prevent the increase of the Sharif's movement into Syria and Arabia, Cemal Pasha attempted to refresh the loyalty of the larger and smaller tribes, as a counter measure to the British policies of gathering all the Arab leaders under the Sharif's Caliphate.[1185] In addition, most of the smaller and larger tribes were supplied with great amount of cereals by Cemal Pasha in return for their allegiance. That supply would be among one of the most important causes of a profound shortage of food in Syria.[1186] Besides that, throughout the remainder of the War, Cemal Pasha distributed

[1184] For an analysis of the process of forming alliances by Sharif with tribal groups see: Teitelbaum, Ibid, p.76-115; Kostiner, Joseph, "The Hashemite 'Tribal Confederacy' of the Arab Revolt, 1916-1917", in Evdard Ingram (ed.), *National and International Politics in the Middle East: Essays in Honor of Elie Kedouire,* London: Cass, 1986, pp. 126-143.

[1185] For further information about the British attempts in that direction see: **PRO,** FO 371/2480, Clayton to Grey, "Military Operations against Turkey", Cairo, 3 January 1915; for the discussions of the British officials regarding the issue of the Arab Caliphate, see: **PRO,** FO 371/2482, Grey to McMahon, "Moslems and the Caliphate", London, 14 April 1915; **PRO,** FO 371/2480, Holderness to FO, "Possible Measures for Influencing Moslem Opinion", London, 15 January 1915.

[1186] **HHStA,** PA 38/369, From Ranzi to Burian,"Die Getreideversorgung Syriens", Damascus. 25 September 1916; **PA-AA,** Türkei 177, Bd.17, From Grobba to AA, "Über die wirtschaftliche Lage Syriens und Palaestinas, ihre Entwickelungsmöglichkeiten und die Methode ihrer Entwicklung", Jerusalem. 23 July 1917; **HHStA,** PA 38/370, From Ranzi to Czernin,"Die diesjaehrige Getreideernte im Vilayet Syrien un die Frage der Brotversorgung", Damascus. 22 August 1917.

medals and decorations to most of the tribal leaders in Syria and Northern Arabia so that they didn't change their sides, or break their neutrality.[1187]

As for the tribal dynasties of Northern and Inner Arabia, it wouldn't be an exaggeration to express that Ibn Rashid again stayed as the most loyal supporter of the Ottoman struggle with Sharif Hussein. The Ottoman Government intended to encourage the Shammar Tribe against the Sharif, sponsoring Ibn Rashid with abundant gold.[1188] During those dates, the Ottoman Government also dispatched some artillery to Ibn Rashid.[1189] However, according to the Austrian Consul of Damascus, Ibn Rashid didn't draw close to this project since he didn't want to invite the hostilities of Great Britain and other local powers in the region. On the other hand, the Consul neglected the point that the Ottoman Government's final goal in the region was to assert its own authority instead of those local chiefs. Therefore, Enver Pasha was reluctant for this action with the concern not to "cosset one Amir, while trying to abolish another one".[1190] As will be expressed in the last chapter, with the Ottoman's abandonment of making an operation against Hijaz this option fell off the agenda.

The British capture of Baghdad signified the beginning of the hard times for Ibn Rashid. The Shammar Tribe provided all its needs from Baghdad. The prevention of this

[1187] **BOA,** DH.ŞFR. 559/86, Tahsin to Talat, Damascus, 16 Temmuz 1333 [16 July 1917]; **BOA,** DH.ŞFR. 565/88, Azmi to Talat, 16 Eylül 1333 [16 September 1917];**BOA,** DH. EUM. 4.Şb. 7/39, Azmi to Talat, 20 Temmuz 1332 [2 August 1916].

[1188] **HHStA,** PA 38/369, Ranzi to Burian,"Die Politik der mittelarabischen Fürsten in dem Konflikt zwischen der Tuerkei und dem Emir von Mekka", Damascus,11 December 1916; Enver sent 20.000 ltq. gold to Ibn Rashid. But in the document, it is not expressed whether this money was sent for an operation against Sharif. It is equally possible that this sum was dispatched in return for Ibn Rashid's loyalty: **TTK Arşivi,** KO Koleksiyonu 11/149, Enver to Cemal, 16 Temmuz 1916 [29 July 1916].

[1189] However, the document doesn't explain why those batteries were sent. They could be for the self-defense of Ibn Rashid; **TTK Arşivi,** KO Koleksiyonu, Enver to Cemal, 12/143, 18 Haziran 1332 [1 July 1916]

[1190] **TTK Arşivi,** KO Koleksiyonu 11/132, Enver to Cemal, 30 Mayıs 1332 [11 Haziran 1916]; **HHStA,** PA 38/369, Ranzi to Burian,"Die Politik der mittelarabischen Fürsten in dem Konflikt zwischen der Tuerkei und dem Emir von Mekka", Damascus,11 December 1916

linkage caused a starvation in Hail.[1191] His townsfolk and tribesmen complained about his pro-Ottoman policy from which they themselves derived no profit.[1192] It was also difficult for Cemal Pasha to send them food because of the famine prevailing in Syria. Ibn Rashid's authority among his people received wounds because of that situation.[1193] On top of it, the Shammar Tribe was to be driven into a blockade by the British Government expelling its caravans from Kuwait by force.[1194] Nevertheless, the British officials would be unsuccessful to win him over their side.

The intensification of the Sharif's impact on the tribes along the Hijaz Railway around Medina intersected again the Ottoman's way with Ibn Rashid. As a counter measure to Sharif's actions, the Ottoman Government persuaded Ibn Rashid to resettle in Medain Salih, a Hijaz Railway station 350 km. north of Medina. He was resettled there with two aims: to frighten the tribes who were disloyal to the Government and to strengthen the sense of allegiance among the loyal tribes. According to the statements of the Austrian Consul, as a result of his action, the Fukara Tribe abandoned attacking the Hijaz Railway, and some branches of the Beni Atije and Beni Sakhr were persuaded to protect the Railway. Cemal Pasha offered Talat to award him with the honorific title of *Rumeli Beylerbeyliği* in return for his service in Medain Salih. However, Talat and Enver were opposed to this proposal on account of the fact that his rival Ibn Saud was awarded as *Vizier,* and proposed to award him with the same title. In addition The Government sent a delegate to Medain Salih to appreciate Ibn Rashid's actions there.[1195]

The resettlement in Medain Salih caused the increase of the problems between Ibn Rashid and his tribe. His connection with his people was interrupted since the longevity of distance between Hail and Medain Salih. A combination of the problem of provisioning

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[1191] **PA-AA,** Türkei 165, Bd. 42, Greenberg ? to Michaelis, Damascus, 20 October 1917

[1192] **PRO,** FO 371/3057, Cox to FO, Basra, 13 June 1917.

[1193] **PA-AA,** Türkei 165, Bd. 42, Greenberg ? to Michaelis, Damascus, 20 October 1917

[1194] **PRO,** FO 371/3059, Fahaid al Rashid to Chief Political Officer in Baghdad, Baghdad, 23 June 1917.

[1195] **HHStA,** PA 38/370, Ranzi to Czernin, "Der Aufenthaltdes Emir Ibn Reschid in Medain Salih", Damascus, 9 October 1917; **BOA,** DH.KMS. 44-1/20, Cemal to Talat, undated; Talat to Cemal, 5 Eylül 1333 [5 September 1917].

and distance made his authority among his people weakened. Ibn Rashid could solve these problems with the Ottoman gold, which was the only solution for the tribal dissatisfactions in the region at that time.[1196]

In the middle of July 1918, Ibn Rashid returned to Hail. According to the Austrian Consul of Damascus, He was sent to Medain Salih to struggle with the tribes sided with Sharif Hussein. However, after a while the Ottoman Government began to get suspicious about the establishment of an alliance between Ibn Rashid and Great Britain. Therefore, the Government didn't send guns and ammunitions to Medain Salih, which was necessary for the maintenance of the struggle by Ibn Rashid. When he insisted on staying in Medain Salih, he became more suspicious in the eyes of the Government. The Ottoman officials in Damascus, applied to the drastic means to enforce him return to Hail, and starved him in Medain Salih, preventing the transfer of foodstuffs to him. As a result of that, he had to return to Hail.[1197]

When being in bad terms with the Ottoman Government, at about the same time, Ibn Rashid approached the Germans while keeping his ties with the Ottoman Empire. In June 1918, he requested the German officials in Syria whether they could help him to establish a wireless station in Hail keeping it in secret from the Ottoman authorities. He made this request to take more trustful information from the German sources regarding the course of the War by-passing the Ottoman censure.[1198] The German local officials viewed that request positively since, by this means, they would be able to informed about the events of the region. On the other hand, asserting the German influence over Ibn Rashid would make a considerable contribution to the German policies against the British

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[1196] **PA-AA,** Türkei 165, Bd. 42, Greenberg ? to Hertling, Damascus, 31 January 1918.

[1197] **HHStA,** PA 38/371, Ranzi to Burian, "Die erzwungene Rückkehr Ibn Reschids nach Hail", Damascus, 16 July 1918; When Baghdad fell into the British hands some parts of his tribes had been reported to incline to their side: **BOA,** DH.ŞFR. 74/280, Talat to Halil, 28 Mart 1333 [28 March 1917]; When Ibn Rashid arrived at Medain Salih, he sent telegrams to Enver, Talat and Cemal via Ali Haidar from Medina. the answer was diverting for him: **BOA,** DH.ŞFR. 79/227, Ali Haidar to Talat, 22 Ağustos 1333 [22 August 1917].

[1198] **PA-AA,** Türkei 165, Bd. 42, Schröder to AA, 14 June 1918.

designs.[1199] However the German Central Government found the proposal of the German officials in Syria “fantastic”, and refused it with the reason that it would cause unrepairable frictions between the two Empires.[1200]

By the same token, Ibn Rashid, via his representative general Reshid Pasha, invited Emile Sprotte, who was working as the German head teacher at Sultani Gymnasium in Damascus, to take service with him to teach the European science to his sons and the prominent notables of his tribes in Hail. Emil Sprotte was prone to accept this offer with consideration of that his prospective students would spread the German influence by learning the German language and being acquainted with Germany. In a similar way, Ibn Rashid had taken another German (Fritz Görner) to his service working in the Damascus tramway operation as a technical employee, to establish an electrical lightning equipment in Hail. The Ottoman authorities had knowledge of the project, however, the point that was hidden to them was that the one who took care of the business was a German.[1201]

Berlin had a positive attitude about the education project considering that Emile Sprotte could function there as a German agent providing direct information to them about Ibn Rashid and the tribes in the region.[1202] However, upon the reports of the local German officials warning the officials in the Capital that Emile Sprotte’s character was not appropriate to perform this work. It was stated that Sprotte couldn’t send reports giving exact information about the regions because of his character. Thus, this project was also abandoned.[1203] Shortage of time didn’t permit any other project to be contemplated. As a

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[1199] **PA-AA,** Türkei 165, Bd. 42, Neufeld to AA, Damascus, 15 June 1918.

[1200] **PA-AA,** Türkei 165, Bd. 42, Political Section of the General Staff in Berlin to the Ambassador in Constantinople, Berlin, 15 July 1918.

[1201] **PA-AA,** Türkei 165, Bd. 42, Schröder to AA, 14 June 1918.

[1202] **PA-AA,** Türkei 165, Bd. 42, Political Section of the General Staff in Berlin to the Ambassador in Constantinople, Berlin, 15 July 1918.

[1203] **PA-AA,** Türkei 165, Bd. 43, Prüfer to German Ambassador in Pera, Constantinople, 15 July 1918.

result, Ibn Rashid strictly remained loyal to the Ottoman Government till the very end of the war, which would later cause sounding the death knell for him.[1204]

Immediately after the Sharifian Revolt, upon the rumours that Nuri Shalan and his son sided with the Sharif, the leader of the Ruela Tribe sent a letter to Cemal Pasha declaring the Sharif as his enemy as well as renewing his oath of allegiance to the Caliph.[1205] After that, Nuri visited Cemal Pasha in Damascus with his son upon the request of the latter, and delivered a letter of Sharif Hussein inviting him to struggle against the Ottoman Empire. Thereupon, Cemal Pasha granted plenty of gold and decorations to Nuri and Nauwaf[1206], and requested a brigade consisted of 300 men under his command or his son to be employed in the service of the Government. By this way, he aimed to secure the loyalty of the Ruela Tribe keeping its leader or its leader's son in Damascus as "hostage". With the same regard, Nuri himself was appointed as an Ottoman officer.[1207]

After his return, although he sometimes got in contact with the Sharifians and the British,[1208] Nuri maintained his pro-Ottoman attitude. During his stay in Damascus, his son Nauwaf was assigned by Cemal Pasha to protect and clear the part of Hijaz Railway in the south of Maan from the disturbing tribes, as a result of the increasing raids of pro-Sharif Bedouins to interrupt the Railway communication with Medina. If he achieved to perform this task, both he and his son were promised to be honored with Pasha title.[1209]

[1204] His city Hail would be captured by Ibn Saud with the British permission. For details see: Al-Rasheed, Madavi, *Politics in an Arabian Oasis: The Rashidis of Sauida Arabia,* London: 1991, I.B. Tauris.

[1205] **PA-AA,** Türkei 165, Bd. 39, Metternich to Bethmann-Hollweg (Transmitting Consul Damascus), Constantinople, 2 August 1916.

[1206] He and his son were awarded with 4th degree Ottoman Medal [Dördüncü Rütbe Osman]: **BOA,** DH.KMS. 41/43, Talat to Said Halim, 18 Ağustos 1332 [31 August 1916].

[1207] **HHStA,** PA 38/369, Ranzi to Burian, "Die Abreise des neuen Grossscherifs nach Medina", Damascus, 7 August 1916; **BOA,** DH.ŞFR. 557/38, Tahsin to Talat, 16 Haziran 1333 [16 June 1917].

[1208] **BOA,** DH.ŞFR. 557/92, Tahsin to Talat, 22 Haziran 1333 [22 June 1917].

[1209] **HHStA,** PA 38/370, Ranzi to Czernin, "Eine Mission des Ruelafürsten Nuri Schalan", Damascus, 23 June 1917; **BOA,** DH.ŞFR. 557/38, Tahsin to Talat, 2 Temmuz 1333 [2 July 1917].Cemal Pasha wrote to Enver on 20 November that he assigned Nauwaf Shalan for the protection of Hijaz Railway. It could be inferred that Nauwaf's task had

Approximately two weeks before the fall of Damascus, it became certain for the Ottoman Government that Nuri Shalan changed his side and threw in his lot with the Sharif, although he didn't give any active support to him. The reason behind his manner change was rather economic. According to the Austrian Consul of Damascus towards the end of 1917, he applied to the Ottoman Government for the dispatch of cereals amounted to 10.000 Chift [350.000 kg.] and demanded the increase of his subvention from 3.000[1210] ltq. gold to 6.000. The Government skirted his demands, and therefore, he returned to Great Britain for help. In the process of negotiations, the latter paid Nuri 70.000 sterling gold and 3.000 rifles recognizing his independence in Djof. In return, Nuri was won over for the British side.[1211] The worsening situation of the Ottoman Front in Palestine and Iraq must be added as another factor for Nuri's change of attitude. Because, after the capture of Baghdad, it became difficult for the Ruela Tribe to provide food using the Mesopotamian line for their Caravans, and probably the capture of Palestine put him a more difficult situation in that regard.[1212]

Another critical figure in Arabia was Ibn Saud. In a recent study on the abolition of the Caliphate by *Nurullah Ardıç,* it is claimed that Ibn Saud was "the greatest ally of" Great Britain.[1213] However, a comparison of the Ottoman documents with that of the British will make it clear that, rather than a loyal supporter of the British policies, Ibn Saud implemented a policy of balance between the Ottomans and the British. Following the

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been renewed at that time.**TTK Arşivi,** KO Koleksiyonu 7/126, Cemal to Enver, 20 Teşrin-i Sani 1333 [20 November 1917].

[1210] For the payment of his salary as 3.000 ltq. for 1917, see: **BOA,** DH.EUM. 2. Şb. 32/27, Enver to Dahiliye, 30 Kanun-ı Sani 1332 [13 March 1917]; for the decision to pay Nuri a salary in the beginning of the War, see: **BOA,** DH.İ.UM 6/E-5, Ministry of Interior to the Governor of Syria, 15 Teşrin-i Sani 1330 [28 November 1914].

[1211] **HHStA,** PA 38/371, Ranzi to Burian, "Der Abfall des Ruelafürsten Emir Nuri Schalan", Damascus 13 September 1918; In February 1918, His salary was paid by the Ottoman Government; **BOA,** DH.ŞFR. 84/104, War Ministry to the Governor of Syria, 19 Şubat 1334 [19 February 1918]; On 2nd July 1918, the Ottoman Government paid 1.000 ltq. to Nuri. That shows that he was loyal to the Ottomans till that date; **BOA,** DH. ŞFR. 89/18, War Ministry to the Governor of Syria, 2 Temmuz 1334 [2 July 1918].

[1212] **PRO,** WO 158/634, Arbur to General Bagdad, Cairo, 1 October 1917.

[1213] Ardıç, Ibid, p. 200.

Sharifian Revolt, Ibn Saud continued his neutral attitude. Immediately after the outbreak of the Sharifian Revolt, he sent one of his relatives to Cemal Pasha to express his loyalty.[1214] Following that, according to the British reports, he gave an ocular proof of hostility to the Ottoman Empire by arresting their emissary and handing over 700 camels bought by himself to the British Agent.[1215] Immediately after that event, Ibn Saud sent one of his close relatives, called Sheikh Abbas [al-Falaji], to Damascus to express to Cemal Pasha that his leader didn't have any treaty with Great Britain, and didn't contemplate to be an ally of Britain.[1216] Quite the reverse, he conveyed the event to the British officials so different that he had to escape from Damascus because of flying about the news of the capture of the mentioned Caravans.[1217] On the other hand, the German and Austrian Consuls of Damascus reported that Sheikh Abbas was seen off by Cemal Pasha with great honor.[1218] In situations like this, Ibn Saud explained to the Ottoman officials that such kind of treatment happened as a result of the misconduct of some members of his people and with the enforcement of the British officials, and restored the Ottoman trust.[1219] Presumably, that action was a demonstration to prove the British Government that Ibn Saud sided with them in the War to prevent any British endeavor in the region to his detriment favoring Sharif, when the negotiations between Sharif, Great Britain and Ibn

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[1214] **HHStA,** PA 38/369, Ranzi to Burian,"Die Politik der mittelarabischen Fürsten in dem Konflikt zwischen der Tuerkei und dem Emir von Mekka", Damascus,11 December 1916

[1215] **PRO,** FO 371/3047, The Political Resident in the Persian Gulf to FO, Basra, 16 November 1916.

[1216] **HHStA,** PA 38/369, Ranzi to Burian,"Die Politik der mittelarabischen Fürsten in dem Konflikt zwischen der Tuerkei und dem Emir von Mekka", Damascus,11 December 1916; **PA-AA,** Türkei 165, Bd. 41, Loytved to Bethmann-Hollweg, Damascus, 5 January 1917.

[1217] **PRO,** FO 371/3055, Cox to FO, “Letters from Ibn Saud and Muhammad Hajuri”, Basra, ? March 1917.

[1218] **HHStA,** PA 38/369, Ranzi to Burian,"Die Politik der mittelarabischen Fürsten in dem Konflikt zwischen der Tuerkei und dem Emir von Mekka", Damascus,11 December 1916; **PA-AA,** Türkei 165, Bd. 41, Loytved to Bethmann-Hollweg, Damascus, 5 January 1917.

[1219] **PA-AA,** Türkei 165, Bd. 38, Hesse to Bethmann-Hollweg, Baghdad, 21 June 1916.

Saud was taken into consideration. Similarly, he facilitated the pass of the Ottoman Caravans from his region with the consideration that an Ottoman attitude favoring Ibn Rashid would put the ruler of Najd in a difficult situation in his struggle with the ruler of Hail.[1220] The statements of the British officials also show that they were in doubt about the real attitude of Ibn Saud. They conveyed the remarks of Ibn Saud as 'alleged', regarding the latter's correspondence with Ibn Rashid on the restoration of the peace between them conditioning Ibn Rashid to change his side.[1221]

After the failure of the British project regarding the reconciliation of all the tribal dynasties, including the Rashidis, around Sharif Hussein against the Ottoman Caliphate,[1222] the British Government made a great effort to make him attack Hail, the capital of Ibn Rashid, since the latter, according to the British reports, had moved towards Medina to operate againstthe Sharif's troops.[1223] For that aim, in October 1917, the British Official Ronald Storrs was sent to Ibn Saud with a military mission.[1224]

In this issue, Ibn Saud was on the horns of a dilemma between the danger for him becoming a vassal of the Sharif by losing the British support[1225] and an active aggression against the Ottoman Government that he always avoided throughout the War. He opposed the British request claiming that "to capture Hail by coup-de-main, weak though Ibn Rashid is, because one suburb of Hail has been strongly fortified and garrisoned by

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[1220] **ATASE Arşivi,** Kls. 3215, Ds. 42, Fih. 3, Abdülhamid to Cemal, 9 December 1917.

[1221] **PRO,** FO 371/3055, Cox to FO, "Letters from Ibn Saud and Muhammad Hajuri", Basra, ? March 1917; three months later, Sir Percy Cox, the British representative in Basra, was complaining about the contradicting reports of the Arab leaders: **PRO,** FO 371/3057, Cox to FO, Basra, 5 June 1917.

[1222] For the details of the suggestions see: **PRO,** FO 371/3057, General, Basra to FO, Basra, 9 July 1916; for details of the reasons of the disagreement between the two chiefs: **PRO,** FO 371/3057, Cox to FO, Basra, 5 June 1917.

[1223] **PRO,** FO 371/3383, Cox to FO, "Bin Saud", Basra, 28 December 1917.

[1224] **PRO,** FO 371/3061, Wingate to FO, "Bin Saud and King Hussein", Cairo, 2 November 1917.

[1225] **PRO,** FO 371/3061, Cox to FO, "Bin Saud and Sherif", Baghdad, 15 December 1917.

Turks".[1226] Later on, the British officials would be informed that there were no Turkish troops at Hail.[1227] His good fortune would help him in that issue again. The British government had abandoned the project of the capture of Hail considering the power balance in Arabia between Ibn Saud and Sharif Hussein.[1228]

Ibn Saud didn't totally cut his relations with the Ottoman Government even towards the very end of the War. Immediately after the fall of Jerusalem, at 16th December 1917, Tahsin Bey, the Governor of Syria reported that Ibn Saud was maintaining his service to the Ottoman Empire.[1229] Similarly, in May 1918, the Government came to an agreement with Ibn Saud with a view to establish communications between Sanaa and Medina via Nejd and channel for the receipt from Constantinople of large remittances. The Ottoman Government had also ratified the treaty.[1230] After that no ocular hostility emerged between the Ottoman Government and the Governor of Najd as a result of skillful balance policy of the Amir of Najd. Thus, the Ottoman era in Arabia had been closed without any serious hostility between the Ottoman Empire and their Governor and the Commander of Najd.

Another strategic group of the Bedouin tribes was those who were distributed along with the Hijaz Railroad, and the Bedouins of Hauran. In that regard, Cemal Pasha called the chiefs of the Huweitat, Beni Atije and El-Fukara, who were salaried by the Ottoman Government, to Damascus, and gave them gifts and gold in return for the refreshment of their loyalties. In addition, they were assigned to the protection of the Railways.[1231]

[1226] **PRO,** FO 371/3057, Cox to FO, Basra, 12 November 1917.

[1227] **PRO,** FO 371/3383, Basset to Arbur, Jeddah, 4 February 1918.

[1228] **PRO,** FO 371/3389, FO to Viceroy, 14 January 1918; **PRO,** FO 371/3389, Wingate to FO, "Activities of Bin Rashid and Bin Saud", Cairo, 7 January 1918.

[1229] **BOA,** DH.ŞFR. 573/117, Tahsin to Ministry of Interior, Damascus, 16 Kanun-ı Evvel 1333 [16 December 1917].

[1230] **PRO,** FO 371/3389, G.O.C. Aden to Wingate, "Bin Saud and Turks", Aden, 21 May 1918.

[1231] **HHStA,** PA 38/369, Ranzi to Burian, "Die Abreise des neuen Grossscherifs nach Medina", Damascus, 7 August 1916; The British reports also confirm the loyalty of those tribes to the Ottoman Government. For further informations see: **PRO,** WO 158/626, Clayton to FO, 11 November 1916; **PRO,** WO 158/626, Graves to WO, "Tribes on Gulf of

With the advance of Faysal's troops towards north, in the middle of 1917, the attitude of those tribes became "worthy of anxiety" for the Ottoman authorities.[1232] The Huweitat and Beli Tribes in the mentioned regions went into divisions in themselves regarding their sides in the battle between the Ottoman Government and the Sharif's troops. While Abu Taje, the chief of the former, was supporting the Sharif, his rival inside the tribe Ibn Djazi stayed loyal to the Government. Similarly, Suleiman Pasha, the leader of Beli Tribe, kept faith with the Ottoman side, while his son had changed his side with the majority of the Tribe.[1233] On the other hand, the Druzes, the most important local power in the region, Beni Sakhr and Beni Sarwiye tribes stayed in the Ottoman side.[1234]

The increase of the propaganda activities of the Sharif's men, Sharif Nasir and Aude Abu Taye, the leader of Huweitat Tribe, compelled the Government to take military precautions for the prevention of their further penetration. In this regard, the Ottoman authorities kept an *ester-süvar* division in Amman as well as dispatching some troops to the center of Hauran and increased the number of the Circassian volunteers serving in the region.[1235] However, these measures didn't suffice for the obviation of Sharif's influence among the Bedouins. Those tribes were continuously attacking the Hijaz Railway to cut the connection with Medina.[1236] Thereupon, Mehmed Cemal Pasha, the Commander of 8th

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Akaba East Shore and South to Wejh", 21 November 1916; for the medals given to the tribal chiefs see: **BOA,** DH.KMS. 41/46, Talat to Said Halim, 27 Eylül 1916. In May 1917, some tribal chiefs were also awarded awarde with various medals due to their allegiance and active support to the Ottoman Government: **BOA,** DH.KMS. 44-2/19, Talat to Said Halim, 12 Mayıs 1333 [12 May 1917].

[1232] **BOA,** DH.ŞFR. 557/92, Tahsin to Talat, 22 Haziran 1333 [22 June 1917].

[1233] **HHStA,** PA 38/370, Ranzi to Czernin, "Nachhang zu h.a. Berichte 23 Juli", Damascus, 2 August 1917.

[1234] **BOA,** DH.ŞFR. 557/92, Tahsin to Talat, 22 Haziran 1333 [22 June 1917].

[1235] **BOA,** DH.ŞFR. 557/92, Tahsin to Talat, 22 Haziran 1333 [22 June 1917].

[1236] In four week between the middle of September and October, the pro-British Bedouins were able to destroy best of 3 Ottoman locomotives with these attacks: **PA-AA,** Türkei 165, Bd. 42, Greenberg ? to Michaelis, Damascus, 20 October 1917; Once, they had derailed the train of Cemal Pasha, the Commander of 8th Army Corps. For details see: **BOA,** DH.ŞFR. 572/70, Tahsin to Talat. Damascus, 29 Teşrin-i Sani 1333 [29 November 1917].

Army Corps, was instructed to struggle those tribes. He would create railway protection squadrons from the pro-Ottoman tribes in the region. In addition, to support his position, the Army Commander Cemal Pasha demanded extra troops from Enver Pasha.[1237]

Cemal Pasha made a successful military struggle with the Sharif's troops, which will be detailed in the last chapter. However, both the worsening situation of the Ottoman economy in Syria due to the famine and the advance of the British troops in Sinai and Iraq changed the picture, to some extent, to the detriment of the Ottoman side. Moreover, the smaller Bedouin tribes were more dissatisfied with the Governmental policy of conscription and requisition while the larger ones were able to refuse them.[1238] Nevertheless, till the very last moment many smaller tribes remained loyal to the Ottoman rule fighting actively with the Ottoman troops.[1239] By September 1918, parallel to the weakening authority of the Ottoman state, many of the smaller tribes in the east and south of the Dead Sea had been won over by the Sharif with the military and financial help of Great Britain.[1240] It is reasonable from all these to conclude that, in the hostility between the British and the Ottoman troops in the southern Palestine the tribes were divided into two parts between the sides. While the support to the British were increasing corresponding to their military success, the loyalty to the Ottoman rule was not abandoned till the last moment.

[1237] **BOA,** DH.ŞFR. 558/48, Tahsin to Talat, Damascus, 2 Temmuz 1333 [2 July 1917].

[1238] **PRO,** FO 371/2777, McMahon to FO (Transmitting an intelligent returned from Syria), Cairo, 20 May 1916.

[1239] Rogan, Ibid, p. 238-240.

[1240] **TTK Arşivi,** KO Koleksiyonu 7/49, Fahreddin to Enver, 29 Ağustos 1334 [29 August 1918]; **HHStA,** PA 38/371, Ranzi to Burian, "Der Abfall des Ruelafürsten Emir Nuri Schalan", Damascus 13 September 1918.

CHAPTER VIII

WAR, FAMİNE AND EPIDEMİCS

Famine was the most staggering incident in the WWI for the Syrian peoples, who lost hundreds of thousands of their members as a result of that calamity, and the other social disasters emanated from the famine, like epidemics, inflation and devaluation of paper money had that impact. Neither Cemal Pasha's rule of terror nor the rigors of the battles that took place in the Sinai Front became as influential in the change of the attitude of the Syrians against the Ottoman Empire as that of famine and its consequences. The impact of the starvation was so devastating in that region that, by the end of the War, total mortality from both starvation and epidemics reached 500.000.[1241]

In his acclaimed study on the development of Arab nationalism, like many Arabs, George Antonius accused the Ottomans of trading grains at high prices on the black market. In his viewpoint, the Lebanese was deliberately starved due to their sympathies to France.[1242] Quite the reverse of him, *Linda Schatkowski Schilcher* demonstrated in her article, titled *The Famine of 1915-1918 in Greater Syria* the Entente's responsibility. She deservedly examined the role of the Entente's blockade in the death of the people from

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[1241] Schlicher, Schatkowski L., "The Famine of 1915-1918 in Greater Syria", in *Problems of the Modern Middle East in Historical Perspective: Essays in Honor of Albert Hourani,* John Spangolo (Ed.), Ithaca Press, Oxford: 1992, p. 229.

[1242] Antonius, Ibid, p. 241.

starvation in Syria as well as the inaptitude of the Ottoman officials, who couldn't prevent misuse of the War circumstances, or sometimes profited by the mentioned circumstances. The present study aims at widening the analyses of Schichler applying mostly the Ottoman, Austrian and the German documents regarding the subject under the study as well as attempting an analysis of the changing aspects of the Ottoman government in Syria under Cemal Pasha taking famine as a case study. In this context, this study will try to demonstrate how the struggle with the famine and its consequences contributed to the process of making the Syrians ideal citizens. In such a way that some techniques used by Cemal to eliminate the reasons and consequences of the famine also demonstrate the changing character of the Ottoman Rule in Syria with Cemal's appointment. Similarly, while struggling with the removal of the destructive impact of famine, such as epidemics, the process also paved the way for the consolidation of the government's control on the bodies of the people. All in all, apart from its destructive impact on the different peoples of Syria, the famine is an ideal case study to see the nature of the new rule established in Syria with the beginning of the war.

8.1. Reasons behind the Famine

The reasons behind the starvation, which ruled over the Greater Syria throughout the War period, and implicitly, those who were responsible for the death of the tremendous members of people as a result of these disasters, are still a matter of debate in the existing literature. In his memoires, Cemal Pasha accuses the Sharifian Revolt as the main factor preventing the provisioning in Syria. Cemal claims that, in spite of the destructive impact of the locust plague on the harvest in 1915, he had secured the needs of the Syrian provinces for food before the outbreak of the Revolt. But, with the start of the Sharif's movement, Cemal had to dispatch the grain of Syria to the Bedouin tribes to guarantee their allegiance to the Imperial authority. Therefore, a catastrophic starvation captured the

daily life in Syria. In addition, he mentions the Entente's blockade as another reason.[1243] On the other hand, the Entente states and some academic studies accused Cemal Pasha of punishing the pro-Entente components of the Syrian society as in the case of Lebanon. They claimed that Cemal Pasha deliberately starved Lebanon because of the pro-French tendencies prevailed among the local people.[1244]

Schicher's study, however, convincingly indicates the mutual responsibility of the sides –Entente, Ottomans and the Sharif- in the event of the famine in Syria. She analyzed in a detailed way both the impact of the Entente's blockade and the problems of the Ottoman rule to handle the issue. Therefore, that section will only give a summary of the reasons behind the famine to complete the picture, and some factors neglected in the mentioned study will be pointed out, especially regarding the reasons behind the attitude of the Ottoman authorities in connection with the new ideology of the state.

In this sense, the endless requisitions of the agricultural products and the pack animals for the preparations of the expedition against Egypt can be mentioned as the first reason behind the scarcity of foodstuff in Syria. In the pre-war years, the collection rights of the tithe were given out to the tax contractors by contract. In the War period, however, this work was taken over directly by the Army. Presumably, the contractors paid regard to the balance between the needs of the civil people and the needs of the state. As far as inferred from all the available sources, it is impossible to claim the same thing for the Army. Additionally, the Army made further purchases from the market for its needs, sometimes forcefully with paper money and sometimes by the consent of the peasants with hard coin. All these reasons caused a deep scarcity of food in Syria beginning in the second year of the War.[1245]

[1243] Cemal Pasha, Ibid, p. 216, 219.

[1244] For an archival document claiming the same thing, see: **PRO,** FO 371/2779, Sykes to FO, "Arabian Report", Cairo, 15 July 1916; Upon the news, Cemal would send 20.000 ltq. to Lebanon to buy grains, and would demand the dissemination of the news of this assistance in the press: **BOA,** DH.ŞFR. 532/57, Cemal to Talat, Jerusalem, 5 Temmuz 1332 [18 July 1916]; for an academic evaluation regarding the intentional starvation of Lebanon by Cemal Pasha, see: Kévorkian, Raymond, Ibid, p. 681.

[1245] **HHStA,** PA38/366, Ranzi to Burian, "Die Lebensmittelversorgung von Syrien", Damascus, 15 December 1915.

Schicher deservedly analyzed these factors. However, she neglects the expedition against Egypt. All these thoughtless requisitions were largely due to the cruciality of the Egyptian expedition for Cemal in the beginning of the War. As demonstrated in the first chapter, the Ottoman Central Government and their Governor General in Syria, Cemal Pasha, attributed vital importance to the conquest of Egypt, and therefore, all the human and material sources of Syria were mobilized for the realization of this goal with the beginning of the War in the European Theatres. Secondly, the Ottoman authorities thought that the War would come to an end in a short span of time with the success of the Central Powers. Therefore, at that time, mobilization was conducted so thoughtlessly that, in the remarks of the British Consul in Aleppo:

> "The country has been stripped of horses, mules, carts and, in a great measure, of food stores, and great mismanagement and was to have marked the ruthless and despotic requisition. More horses have been seized than could be fed, nor does there seem any probability of the great food supplies collected being so handled as to suffice for the needs of the regular troops for any length of time, not to speak of the Reserves. The reservists at Aleppo are left to find food for themselves. The country may be said to be so denuded of men and of cereals as to leave little prospect of the land being sown this autumn."[1246]

As a response to this, in the beginning of the mobilization, people shifted their requisionable properties to Lebanon, which was then out of effective government control. The way leading to ending the autonomy of Lebanon started with these events; upon the repeated cables of the governors of Syria and Beirut, The Central Government began to think a change in the status of Lebanon.[1247]

[1246] **PRO,** FO 195/2460, Aleppo Consul to Louis Mallet, Aleppo, 31 August 1914; The situation was not different in other towns of Syria. In May 1915, the German Consul in Beirut reported that there wasn't any other city in Syria that the requisitions were implemented in a harder way. He also added that the Government requisitioned the cereals of the inland cities of Syria as well; **PA-AA,** Türkei 177, Bd.11, Mutius to Bethmann-Hollweg, Beirut, 1 May 1915; The Ottoman Government applied the same rules of the requisitions to the citizens of the foreign states. The Ministry of Interior instructed the Governor of Jerusalem that, when the pack animals of the foreigners inside his house were decided to commandeer, the consul of the mentioned state should have been invited before entering into the house. If the consul didn't arrive in 24 hours, then the state officials were authorized to seize the pack animal. If the pack animals were seen outside, the Government officials were certified to capture it recording the breed of the animal: **BOA,** DH.ŞFR. 44/97, Ministry of Interior to the Governor of Jerusalem, Ağustos 1330 [26 August 1914].

[1247] For some examples, see: **BOA,** DH.EUM.4.Şb. 1/2, 28 Ağustos 1330 [10 September 1914].

Since the conquest of Egypt kept its place in Cemal's agenda as the first priority in the first year of the War, this picture remained mainly unchanged during 1915, pushing the planning of the alimentation of the civil people into the background. All the trains were put under the Army's order to satisfy the foodstuff needs of the troops. Without thinking of the civil people, most of the cereals were sent to the Army stores. The Governors of some cities even requested additional Gendarmeries to be able to seize the harvest from the peasants.[1248] In Beirut, the implementation of requisition was so exaggerated that, in the first quarter of 1915, the city-dwellers were devoid of bread for days.[1249] Similarly, in some provinces, there would be no seed for the year 1916.[1250] However, the good-harvest of most provinces in 1915, excluding Palestine, which was damaged by the locust plague, mainly forestalled a disaster for that year.[1251]

In the following years of the War, the deterioration of the provisioning situation with the impact of the natural disasters like locust plague, the east winds and spread of the grain speculation resulted with the increasing weight of Cemal's iron fist over the peasants to seize their products for the military use and to sell their cereals for paper money. Those policies made a motivation-breaking effect on the peasants with the thought that they would, at all events, be deprived of selling their grains in the free market by their own will.[1252]

In addition, the recruitment of the agricultural labor and the requisitioning of the pack animals, which constituted the entire workforce for agriculture in Syria, contributed

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[1248] **BOA,** DH.ŞFR. 487/10, Bekir Sami to Talat, Beirut, 21 August 1331 [3 September 1915]

[1249] **PA-AA,** Türkei 177, Bd.11, Mutius to Bethmann-Hollweg, Beirut, 1 May 1915.

[1250] For the seed request of the Governor of Jerusalem, see: **BOA,** DH.ŞFR. 501/123, Midhat to Talat, Jerusalem, 6 Kanun-ı Evvel 1331 [19 December 1915]; for the request of the Governor of Syria, see: **BOA,** DH.ŞFR. 502/91, Azmi to Talat, Damascus, 13 Kanun-ı Evvel 1915 [26 December 1915].

[1251] **HHStA,** PA 38/366, Ranzi to Burian, "Die Lebensmittelversorgung von Syrien", Damascus, 15 December 1915; **BOA,** DH.ŞFR. 469/45, Celal to Talat, Aleppo, 19 Nisan 1331 [2 May 1915].

[1252] **PRO,** FO371/2783, WO to FO, "Report of an Inhabitant of Athlit, Mount Carmel", 3 November 1916; **PA-AA,** Türkei 177, Bd. 13, Stotzingen to AA, 17 November 1916.

to the decrease of the production. The impact of that factor was so frightful that, in September 1915, the Government had to send a telegraph to the Governorates requiring them to create labor battalions to do agriculture in the villages.[1253] Cemal Pasha immediately implemented this measure. According to the remarks of the Austrian Consul in Aleppo, these battalions were employed in agriculture and using these battalions, the fallow lands were opened to agriculture.[1254] However, that was not enough to produce sufficient grain for Syria, and even for the Army in the following years.

Besides that, most of the teachers of agriculture, who were appointed to the towns to train the farmers about farming, were recruited to do their "civic duties" in the army. After a short description of the negative impact of the conscription on the agricultural production, the director for the agricultural issues of the province of Syria [*Suriye Vilayeti Ziraat Müdiri*] complained at the end of 1916 that it was impossible, because of the conscription, to find people, who had been graduated from the school of agriculture, to employ for the development of agriculture.[1255] As a result, most of the agricultural producers had to abandon to cultivate their lands.[1256] The only exception was the Druzes of Hauran, who became immune to all the suppressive measures of the Government.[1257] In addition, the fear of the Bedouins of being recruited caused a considerable reduction in the amount of the agricultural production. Following the proclamation of the mobilization,

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[1253] **BOA,** DH.İ.UM.EK. 95/59, Talat to the Governorates, 10 Eylül 1331 [23 September 1915].

[1254] **HHStA,** PA 38/370, Dandini to Czernin,"Fortschritte in der tuerkischen Verwaltung", Aleppo, 16 February 1917.

[1255] **BOA,** DH.UMVM. 137/22, The Director of the Agricultural Issues to Talat, Damascus, 22 Kanun-ı Evvel 1332 [5 December 1916].

[1256] **PRO,** FO371/2783, WO to FO, "Report of an Inhabitant of Athlit, Mount Carmel", 3 November 1916; **PA-AA,** Türkei 177, Bd. 13, Stotzingen to AA, 17 November 1916; **PA-AA,** Türkei 177, Bd.13, Ruppin to Abraham Elkus, Constantinople, 13 December 1916; Similar complaints can be found in the reports of the Governor of Syria. Immediately after his appointment as Governor, he grumbled about the limitless violence while collecting the product of the peasants. For details, see: **BOA,** DH.ŞFR. 533/63, Tahsin to Talat, Damascus, 13 Eylül 1332 [26 September 1916].

[1257] For the details of the privileges of the Druzes, see the Chapter 7

especially the smaller tribes dispersed in the inaccessible deserts leaving their agricultural lands to escape from the recruitment.[1258]

The deteriorating impact of the requisitions and natural disasters over the agricultural production was accompanied by a deficiency in the transportation means, which prevented a proper organization of the food distribution. First, the requisitioning of all kinds of pack animals, such as the draught animals, camels, horses, mules and oxen, for the army use made it almost impossible to transport grains from the agriculturally productive lands to the destitute regions. Secondly, the problems of the railway transportation emanating from the lack of coal prevented the transfer of food supply among the provinces.[1259] The Syrian Railways were operating before the War with the imported coal. Following the commencement of the hostilities, the naval blockade of the Entente prevented the coal imports, and therefore, the coal reserves in Syria were exhausted in a short span of time. Due to that, shortly after the entrance into the War, the train services, which had been performed two times in a day, had to be reduced to two times in a week.[1260] The undertakings to mine coal from Lebanon remained inconclusive.[1261] Because of the lack of coal, in June 1915, railroad transportation had to be interrupted for a month

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[1258] **BOA,** DH.ŞFR. 568/10, Abdülkadir to Talat, Zor, 8 Teşrin-i Sani 1333 [8 November 1917].

[1259] **PA-AA,** Türkei 195, Bd.10, Warburg and Jakobson to AA, 3 November 1916; According to the Austrian Consul in Damascus, the only reason for the starvation was not the lack of food, but also the problems of the transportation means and the organization skills. **HHStA,** PA 38/366, Ranzi to Burian, "Entente-freundliche Ausstreuungen: Einstellung des Verkehrs auf den Syrischen Bahnen", Damascus, 22 June 1915; Furthermore, the Ottoman accounts confirms their evaluations; in a report of the Governor of Aleppo on the season of 1914, he described how the harvest was abundant there stating that it was rarely happened in last twenty-thirty years such a plenty of cereals. The amount of grains in and around Aleppo was so great that besides its own needs, the production of the province sufficed to compensate the needs of the 4th Army and, in addition, a considerable amount of cereals had been sent to Istanbul. However, the Governor complained about the lack of the transportation means inside Syria to transport the needs of foods in Beirut and Lebanon. **BOA,** DH.ŞFR. 469/45, Celal to Talat, Aleppo, 19 Nisan 1331 [2 May 1915]

[1260] **PA-AA,** Türkei 177, Bd.11, Mutius to Bethmann-Hollweg, Beirut, 1 May 1915.

[1261] **HHStA,** PA 38/366, Ranzi to Burian, "Entente-freundliche Ausstreuungen: Einstellung des Verkehrs auf den Syrischen Bahnen", Damascus, 22 June 1915.

in Syria. Afterwards, the services could be maintained by the usage of wood as fuel in the trains.[1262] However, the number of the services and the carrying capacity of the trains were considerably reduced. The available trains, too, were employed to provide the needs of the Army.[1263] Therefore, throughout the War period, food supply to the starving people presented an insurmountable question for the Government.[1264] The result was the creation of the appropriate conditions for the speculation on the cereals, and thus, the tremendous increase of the food prices in Greater Syria.

In addition to requisition, in April 1915, a locust plague, which appeared in Palestine and in the Hauran plateau, took a great tool to the food conditions in Syria. As a result of that disaster, great amount of the immaturated harvest and fruits in these places were destroyed.[1265] With the remarks of Von Kress, the locusts had rained like a shower. When anybody stayed among the locust flocks flying in the air, he or she felt that the sky got dark. Their impact was so terrible that even a leaf did not remain on the trees. The plague had changed a green country into a desert in a few hours.[1266] According to the statement of Cemal Pasha, at that year, the harvest hardly passed the half of the previous years.[1267]

In the sense of the natural disasters, towards the end of 1916, the eastwinds made a great damage on the harvest of Hauran, which could be deemed as the grain basket of Syria. The winds destroyed 1/4 of the cereals there. As a result, in the view of the Austrian Consul, the remaining grain wouldn't suffice even for the needs of the Army. Moreover, as

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[1262] The trains on the railway between Damascus and Birüssebi were consuming 150 tons of wood daily: **PRO,** FO 371/2783, WO to FO, "Report of an Inhabitant of Athlit, Mount Carmel", 3 November 1916.

[1263] **HHStA,** PA 38/366, Ranzi to Burian, "Wiederaufnahme des Verkehrs der Syrischen Bahnen", Damascus, 31 July 1915.

[1264] At the end of the War, the scarcity of rolling stock was so increased that, the Governor of Aleppo had to demand coal for the transfer of the Ottoman officials from Syria: **BOA,** DH.ŞFR. Abdülhalık to Ministry of Interior, Aleppo 4 Teşrin-i Evvel 1334 [4 October 1918].

[1265] **PA-AA,** Türkei 177, Bd. 11, Löytvet to Bethmann-Hollweg, Haifa, 14 April 1915.

[1266] Von Kressenstein, Ibid, p. 119-120.

[1267] Cemal Pasha, Ibid, p. 214.

rightly determined by Cemal above, the commencement of the Sharifian Revolt at that year made a fatal impact on the grain conditions of Syria; in such a way that, in return for their loyalties, Cemal Pasha had to dispatch to the tribes plenty of food. Worst of all, the Government didn't achieve to take the harvest of the Druzes meaning that a loss of 20.000 tones of cereals occurred. Afterwards, they would sell their crops like a speculator. Besides that, since the military requisitions didn't leave to the peasants even their seeds, they resorted to hide their harvests.[1268]

Last, but not the least, a factor that might be mentioned as the reason of the Famine stemming from the problems of the Ottoman Government in the food crisis of Syria was the ambiguous situation of paper money. The paper money was introduced into Syria after the beginning of the War. In the preceding years of the War, the Ottoman Government had been circulating the nickel hard coin and the gold in the Syrian market. Similarly, the notes, which were published by the Ottoman Bank and accepted willingly in the other regions of the Empire, were off the beaten track in the Syrian district in the previous period of the War.[1269]

Apart from its usage in Syria, the paper money represents the prestige of the state among its citizens. If the paper money is not accepted by them as a medium of exchange, it means that they don't trust their state. As a governor, who made a ceaseless effort to assert the Ottoman authority over Syria, Cemal didn't refrain from applying the heaviest enforcements to make the paper money widely used. Although the reactions of the local people didn't stem from mistrust against the state, Cemal's endeavors to disseminate the circulation of the paper money, should be evaluated in the category of his activities to fortify the state's authority in Syria

With the start of the War, the Ottoman Government made that crucial decision for the economy of the region, and put the paper money into circulation for the daily use signing a Guarantee-contract with Germany. However, despite the severe measures of

[1268] **HHStA,** PA 38/369, Ranzi to Burian, "Getreideversorgung Syriens", Damascus, 25 September 1916.

[1269] **HHStA,** PA 38/370, Kiatkowski to Czernin, "Massnahmen gegen die zunehmende Entwertung des Papiergeldes", Beirut, 4 May 1917; **PA-AA,** Türkei 177, Bd. 13, Deutsche Palaestina Bank Jaffa to Von Rosenberg, Jaffa, 4 March 1916.

Cemal Pasha, to be dealt below, this implementation didn't meet with kind reception by the local people who were not used to paper money practice. In the second year of getting into circulation of the paper money, the sellers either didn't accept to determine a price with that money to their goods, or they demanded extra payment when the customers offered paper money.[1270] The failure of the paper money was more striking among the Bedouins and the Druzes in Hauran, who provided great amount of the provisioning of the region. They accepted to deliver their grains for nothing other than the gold money.[1271] There was even a difference between the hard coins; the coins issued in 1916 were called "*çürük*" [corrupt] and devalued because of the smallness of the proportion of silver.[1272] Even State's officials contributed to the process collecting half of the taxes with hard coin.[1273] Therefore, the paper money was depreciated throughout the War period.

As for the Entente responsibility behind the death of hundreds and thousands of people from starvation, the blockade implemented by those in the Syrian coasts from the beginning of the war should be mentioned in the first place. Especially the coastal cities, being Lebanon in the first place, were deeply damaged by the blockade. The reasons behind this profound influence by the blockade were mainly because the way of the subsistence of the Lebanese. Those cities, to a large extent, subsisted on silkworm-breeding and its commerce with abroad, especially with Europe.[1274] Furthermore, all the transportation from the Imperial Centre to the mentioned cities was made by way of the

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[1270] For example, when a customer wanted to pay paper money to 23 kg. of wheat, he/she had to pay 120 ltq. instead of 50 ltq. in gold: **PA-AA,** Türkei 177, Bd. 13, Deutsche Palaestina Bank Jerusalem to the Director of the Deutschen Orientbank Constantinople, Jerusalem, 13 October 1916.

[1271] **PA-AA,** Türkei 177, Bd.13, Deutsche Palaestina Bank Beirut to Von Rosenberg, "Bericht für das Jahr 1915", Beirut, 29 April 1916.

[1272] **PA-AA,** Türkei 177, Bd. 17, Weber to Hertling, Constantinople, 26 June 1918; in the other regions of the Empire, -in Anatolia and at Constantinople- the Ottoman paper money is generally accepted and supplies can be purchased with paper money: **PRO,** FO 371/3050, William Yale to British Ambassador in Washington, "Palestine and Syria Situation", Washington, 13 July 1917.

[1273] **PA-AA,** Türkei 177, Bd.13, Stotzingen to AA, 17 April 1916.

[1274] Von Kiesling, Hans, *Rund um den Libanon: Friedliche Wanderungen waehrend des Weltkrieges,* Leipzig, Dieterich'sche Verlagbuchhandlung: 1920, p. 30.

sea. However, the start of the Entente blockade in the Syrian coasts immediately after the proclamation of the hostility with these states terminated both the commerce in the mentioned cities and prevented any entrance of food by sea.[1275] The British and French deliberately used the famine as a weapon of war. Based on the British and French Archives, Elisabeth Thompson demonstrated that:

> "In May 1916, Maronite Archbishop Joseph Darien protested the use of famine for political ends, urging the French consul in Cairo to demand an immediate Entente invasion to save lives. Althoug the French had by then received reports of up to 800.000 deaths, Foreign Minister Aristide Briand spurned the consul's pleas to invade, arguing that it would only provoke a general massacre. The consul then urged that France break the blockade and ship food to Lebanon. A June 2 British memo to the foreign ministry, however, flatly rejected the proposal to feed starving civilians: 'His Majesty's Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs expresses his earnest hope that the French Government will not encourage any such scheme… the Entente Allies are simply being blackmailed to remedy the shortage of supplies which it is the very intention of the blockade to produce.' The British 'consider the famine as an agent that will lead the Arabs to revolt' a June 4 internal French foreign ministry memo."[1276]

Towards the end of the year 1916, the situation in Lebanon was so severe that, according to the calculations of Ali Münif Bey, the Governor of Lebanon, the food subsidy of the Government for Lebanon in 1916 corresponded to 4 kg. cereals per person monthly. He estimated at the end of 1916 that if the situation remained as such, half of the population would die from the starvation.[1277] To solve the question to a certain extent, the Ottoman Government suggested the Lebanese to grow cereals in their gardens instead of silk-worm breeding. However, this was not accepted by the latter. On the other hand, the interruption of the Railway transportation with Lebanon due to the lack of coal, and the mountainous nature of its geography prevented any Governmental intervention in the starvation in Lebanon. The Government made some attempts to supply grains to Lebanon. But, these endeavors also failed due to the impact of speculation; the people had to buy cereals for a

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[1275] **PA-AA,** Türkei 177, Bd. 11, Mutius to Bethmann-Hollweg, Beirut, 1 May 1915; **PA-AA,** Türkei 177, Bd. 13, Ruppin to Abraham Elkus, Constantinople, 13 December 1916; According to a British report on Lebanon, it is stated that the yearly loss of Beirut from the silk trade was 800.000 pounds: **PRO,** FO371/2783, WO to FO, "Report of an Inhabitant of Athlit, Mount Carmel", 3 November 1916; Von Kressenstein, Ibid, p. 30.

[1276] Thompson, *Colonial Citizens,* p. 22.

[1277] **BOA,** DH.ŞFR. 540/105, Ali Münif to Talat, Beirut, 7 Kanun-ı Evvel 1332 [20 December 1916].

very high price.[1278] In addition, in winter of 1915-1916, "a heavy snow blocked travel to Mount Lebanon".[1279]

Besides their naval blockade, towards the end of the War, Great Britain blockaded the interior sections of Syria preventing the flow of grain from Baghdad and the Persian Gulf following the fall of the former in March 1917. Before the capture of Baghdad, there was a trade route between Baghdad and Damascus passing from the desert. However, shortly after the British invasion, that route was closed. Thereupon, the merchants agreed with the *Shaikh* of Kuwait, and commenced to purchase goods via Kuwait. All the same, considering the things to come when the British officials were informed about that trade, the *Shaikh* himself closed this route. The possibility of a trade with Anatolia had already finished from the beginning of the War. Thus, almost all the trade routes were blocked between the exterior and Syria by Great Britain, before its capture.[1280]

As for the shares of the Austrian and German officials posted in Syria and the Sharif, the remarks of *Schicher* seem quite convincing:

> "The German and Austrİan offcials posted in greater Syria were also culpable because they were ineffective in remedying a situation for which they were, at least partially, responsible. They reacted far too late, gave lame excuses about the likely misinterpretation of political interference, refused to commit the necessary funds, and sustained the evil in fear of being blamed for its initiation.
> The Arab rebels themselves also share, at least indirectly, some of the responsibility. The Hashimits appear to have manipulated tribal allegiances through the food supply and to have condoned the Entente blockade of the parts of greater Syria which were still under Ottoman control. It was the diversion of grain southwards and the spread of British gold through the rebels which contributed to shortages and inflation in 1917 and 1918."[1281]

[1278] **HHStA,** PA 38/369, Nedwed to Burian, "Die Teuerung und Hungersnot, Ihre Ursachen und Folgen", Beirut, 26 October 1916; similar informations can be found at: **PA-AA,** Türkei 177, Bd. 13, Ruppin to Abraham Elkus, Constantinople, 13 December 1916.

[1279] Thompson, *Colonial Citizens*, p. 19.

[1280] **HHStA,** PA 38/371, Ranzi to Czernin, "Die Eröffnung neuer Handelswege zur Verprovianterung von Syrien", Damascus, 26 January 1918.

[1281] Schicher, Ibid, p. 254.

8.2. The Measures of the Ottoman Administration against Starvation

As emphasized in the preceding chapter, the increase of the prestige of the Ottoman State was one of the most outstanding concerns of Cemal Pasha in Syria. As would be clarified below by the remarks of the Ottoman officials under Cemal's rule in Syria, the inadequacy of the Ottoman State to nourish its citizens created a significant threat for its prestige in the eyes of the Syrian Ottomans. By that reason, Cemal Pasha and his bureaucrats applied all the means to remove this danger, and put heavy punishments for ones who didn't obey his regulations. In that sense, in the beginning of 1916, Cemal Pasha took precautions to solve the problem, upon the alarming situation of the food supply in Syria. First of all, he determined a maximum price for the cereals, and decided to deliver a quantity of cereals *per diem* to the provincial capitals from the Army stores as well as ordering the transportation of them under any circumstances with train or the other means. He decided to inflict heavy punishments for those, who transcended the maximum prices, and who stockpiled cereals. Furthermore, he invited the Governors of Beirut, Aleppo, Lebanon, Jerusalem and Damascus to deliberate about the results of starvation. According to the Austrian Consul in Damascus, the energetic intervention of Cemal Pasha made a calming effect on people.[1282]

As expressed before, the lack of the transportation means and the devaluation of money paved the way for a speculation of the grain, which created further disorder in the economic life in Syria. At the end of the year 1915, Cemal Pasha abolished the prohibition of trade in cereals between the provinces with the aim of stopping further speculation, this entered into force in the beginning of the same year, to prevent any speculation of grain and any move of cereals to the Entente fleet, which was active in the Eastern Mediterranean. That was a usual measure applied by the Ottoman authorities in times of crisis to stop speculation.[1283] However, during the war time, this measure contributed more

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[1282] **HHStA,** PA 38/369, Ranzi to Burian, "Hungerkrawall in Damaskus", Damascus, 11 January 1916.

[1283] Schicher, Ibid, p. 236.

to the speculation of the cereals as a result of the termination of the food supply from the grain-wealthy districts to the starving regions.[1284] That result enforced Cemal Pasha to cancel his decision of export ban, and allowed the free trade of grains between the provinces. He delivered this right to the private entrepreneurs and required the transfer of the grains with their means, because the railway transportation used for the Army needs.[1285] However, liberalizing the trade in grains, in Damascus, the people suffered from the lack of bread for a few days. As a result, Cemal had to retreat from his decision, and found a by-way. He assigned the grain trade to some confidential people of the Government. Thus, he would arrange the flow of the cereals to the cities. He also limited the consumption of the purchased bread with the bread cards distributed to the people. Cemal also prohibited the production of fine quality flour.[1286]

At that year, for the sake of the prevention of the speculation, firstly, the Government aimed at the control of the merchandizing process of the cereals and prohibited the private purchase of the grains from the producers. This job was delivered to some concessionaires. They would buy the cereals and hand over to the Government with 6-10 % profit.[1287] The peasants were forbidden to sell their products separately. But a few months later, the prohibitions had to be retreated. All the restrictions on the price of the cereals were removed, except that of the transportation. The merchants had to transfer their goods with their own means. That well-intended attempt, however, totally failed and caused an unscrupulous speculation. The merchants bought the grain from the peasants and sold it to the people with the hard coin. That directed the people to change the paper money in their hands with hard coin. As a result, the paper money was depreciated half in

[1284] **HHStA,** PA38/366, Ranzi to Burian, “Die Lebensmittelversorgung von Syrien”, Damascus, 15 December 1915.

[1285] For example, the comparative highness of the grain prices in Beirut and Lebanon caused the change of the direction of the transportation to these cities from Hauran. The merhants started to transfer the grains to the cities where the prices were higher: **HHStA,** PA38/366, Ranzi to Burian, “Die Lebensmittelversorgung von Syrien”, Damascus, 15 December 1915.

[1286] **HHStA,** PA38/369, Ranzi to Burian, “Getreidenot in Syrien”, Damascus, 3 March 1916.

[1287] **HHStA,** PA38/369, Ranzi to Burian, “Getreideversorgung Syriens”, Damascus, 25 September 1916.

value, while a scarcity of hard coin had emerged.[1288] The Government again had to return to the first practice. That change of system was billed at % 50 increase in the price of the cereals, and the maintenance of the requisitioning system caused the peasants to withhold their productions.[1289]

Upon the inadequacy of the measures to forestall the grain speculation and the devaluation of the paper money and to give an order to the economic life, Cemal decided to implement his most radical action that was taken in this regard. After a meeting with the governors of the Syrian provinces on 24th April 1917, Cemal announced to Al-Sharq Newspaper that, beginning from 15 May 1917, the value of the paper money would be made equal to the value of the gold coin, and thus, the difference of currency between the hard money and the paper money would be resolved.[1290] If the exchange difference continued, Cemal would choose among the administrators of the Ottoman and Deutsche Bank, the great merchants, cambists and the notables of the lands by lot to send 1/10 of them to exile into Anatolia. Till the normalization of the currency, he would apply this measure at the end of every sixth week. He expressed in the announcement that he applied that measure to protect the poor people.[1291]

With the maintenance of the currency difference, as he promised in his declaration, Cemal chose randomly 21 of notables and merchants of the town to expel. He prorated the

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[1288] Upon the scarcity of the hard coin the Municipality of Damascus published the following proclamation in *Al-Muqtabas* Newspaper: “All the small vendors, bakers, butchers, bathkeepers, vegtable dealers, cookshops, cafekeepers, barbers, and grocers et. of all sorts, who receive small change should bring half of the money they receive to the municipality, for which they will be given paper money in exchange.”; **PRO,** FO 371/2768, Extract from al-Muqtabas of Damascus, “Retail vendors and small change”, Dateless.

[1289] **HHStA,** PA38/369, Ranzi to Burian, “Getreidenot in Syrien”, Damascus, 20 October 1916; The Vice-Governor of Syria had opposed to the free trade of grain with the reason that the release of the free trade would both increase the prices of the cereals and push the villagers to the hands of starvation. Because, they would sell all grain in their hands due to the increase of the prices: **BOA,** DH.ŞFR. 517/47, Ahmed to Talat, Damascus, 10 Nisan 1332 [23 April 1916].

[1290] **HHStA,** PA 38/370, Kiatkowski to Czernin, “Massnahmen gegen die zunehmende Entwertung des Papiergeldes”, Beirut, 4 May 1917

[1291] For a German translation of the announcement, see: **HHStA,** PA 38/370, Ranzi to Czernin, “Eine Verordnung gegen die Papiergeldentwertung”, Damascus, 24 April 1917.

exiles according to their religions: 7 Muslims, 7 Christians, and 7 Jews.[1292] They were sent to Adana for exile. However, that measure didn't make any contribution to the increase of the value of the paper money. Six months later, the implementation was abandoned, and all those who were expelled from their countries because of the paper money issue were allowed to return their home.[1293] It is worth to mention that Cemal's decision met with opposition among the local bureaucrats. According to the report of the German Consul in Jerusalem, the Governor and his office chief went suddenly on a holiday not to be an instrument of "that crazy policy of exile". Similarly, the Chief of the Police became worried about "the countless contradictory decisions of exile".[1294] The Governor of Beirut, Azmi Bey, also reported his opposition to the Grand Vizier Talat Pasha against this decision.[1295]

As an answer to the question of the provisioning, Cemal Pasha also demanded foodstuff instead of money from those liable to military service as the exoneration tax of their service [*Bedel-i Askeri*] in the Army.[1296] Those responsible were required to pay

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[1292] The names and the engagements of the merchants were as follows: *Muslims*: Said Kabbani (great trader in colonial produce), Toufik Noulati (the same), Selim Nachlawi (the same), Abdel Wahab Smadi (Manufacturer), Shefik Hashim (the same), Muhammad Nadar (Miller), Lutfi Hafiz (Chemist), *Christians:* Khalil Kahla (great cloth trader), Khalil Warde (Nouveautes), İskender Kabawat, (Mercerized Goods), Khalil Karduss (Trader in Domestic Products), Georges İstifan (the same), Khalil Maatuk (Tombac), Georges Maatuk (the same), *Jews*: Toufik Legnado (Banquier), Arslan Totah (the same), Harun Yedid (commissioner), Josef Abade (Cloth Trader), Nathan Katran (the same), Ezra Esetek (Money Changer), Benjamin Shamaja (the same), **HHStA,** Ranzi to Czernin, "Die Exilierung von hiesigen Kaufleuten wegen der Papiergelentvertung", Damascus, 1 June 1917; The German figures are different than this. The Ambassador reported that 9 Jews, 6 Christian and 3 Muslims were selected randomly: **PA-AA,** Türkei 177, Bd. 14, Kühlmann to Bethmann-Hollweg, Constantinople, 23 May 1917.

[1293] **HHStA,** PA 38/370, Ranzi to Czernin, "Strafnachlaesse und Begnadigung", Damascus, 24 October 1917; **BOA,** DH.ŞFR. 572/52, Cemal to Talat, Damascus, 27 Teşrin-i Sani 1333 [27 November 1917].

[1294] **PA-AA,** Türkei 177, Bd. 14, Kühlmann to Bethmann-Hollweg, Constantinople, 23 May 1917.

[1295] **BOA,** DH.ŞFR. 557/56, Azmi to Talat, Beirut, 18 Haziran 1333 [18 June 1917].

[1296] In the Ottoman Empire, the ones who were liable to the military service could be exempted from their services paying a sum of money.

4.000 kg. wheat or 4250 kg. barley, or appropriate amounts of potato, corn, lense, pea or millet.[1297] They also had to transport those products to the predetermined places. That implementation paved the way for the rapid growth of the demand to those agricultural products, and therefore, their prices were tremendously increased; a Djift (33 kg.) of the wheat, for example, rose from 105 piaster to 140 piaster in a week, and the prices of the bread reached to a point that was unaffordable for the poor –from 20 piaster to 32 piaster per *okka*-. However, with this measure, the foodstuff needs of the country had been guaranteed for a month.[1298]

The deterioration of the food supply system enforced the Government to take more radical measures. In that sense, upon the closure of the bakeries in Damascus because of the lack of flour, the Ottoman authorities decided to partially evacuate Damascus. For that purpose, the military and civil officials started to send their families from the city that was fed by the daily assistance of bread by the Government. To take the lead in this process, the Governor sent his family from the city. Following him many officials sent their families to different places of Anatolia, being Constantinople in the first place. The Government also planned to send all the non-Damascene residents of the provincial capital, which amounted to 60.000, to relieve the food conditions. As a last resort, the government decided to distribute the cereals, brought from Anatolia for the needs of the Army.[1299]

The Government levied a tax called as the "Voluntary Poverty Tax" [*Freiwillige Armensteuer*] on the well-to-do people of the city to assist the poor people of Damascus.

[1297] **HHStA,** PA 38/370, Ranzi to Czernin, "Die Dritte Militaerbefreiungssteuer", Damascus, 2 March 1917; The Government's announcement published in Journale de Beyrouth was as follows: "All those who have been exempted from military service by the payment of the exoneration tax may be exempted for another year if they offer, within one month from this date, to the military authorities either of the following articles: -4000 kilograms of wheat, 4550 kgs of barley, 4000 kgs of potato, 5150 kgs of lentils, 3200 kgs of dry peas, 3320 kg of Burghul (crushed wheat), 4300 kg of durrha, 8000 kg of berseem": **PA-AA,** Türkei 177, Bd.15, The Near East, Cairo, 18 May 1917.

[1298] **HHStA,** PA 38/370, Ranzi to Czernin, "Die Dritte Militaerbefreiungssteuer", Damascus, 2 March 1917.

[1299] **HHStA,** PA 38/371, Ranzi to Czernin, "Die Teilweise Raeumung der Stadt Damascus von der Zivilbevölkerung", Damascus, 16 April 1918.

The implementation of that law was initiated without the approval of the Parliament although it was contrary to the legislation. According to the statement of the German Consul of Damascus, in the distribution of the taxes, some partisanships took place; while the wealthiest of Syria, the Senator Abdurrahman Pasha el-Yusuf was paying 3.500 ltq., the Christian merchant, who worked as the old honorary dragoman of Germany, had to pay 5.000 ltq, reminding one of the inequities of the so-called Wealth Tax [*Varlık Vergisi*] during the Republican Times.[1300] The obligated people had to pay it willy-nilly with the fear of the Government.[1301] Similarly, the Government sold some stock certificates to supply food for the poor people of Damascus, Beirut and Aleppo.[1302]

One of the most interesting events of the WWI is the process of the foreign assistance to the starving people of Lebanon by way of the sea. Upon the deterioration of the situation in Lebanon, the Apostolic See[1303] and the American Government applied to the Ottoman Government to help the starving Lebanese. The evaluations of the Ottoman authorities in the region and that of Cemal Pasha as their superiors, regarding the issue of the foreign assistance to Lebanon makes it clear the mindset of the Ottoman administration during WWI. In the beginning, the Ottoman Government refused the aid offer of the American Government on the grounds that the organization of the humanitarian assistance would cause the reintroduction of the American missionaries to the Ottoman realm, and also would pave the way for the American Propaganda.[1304] The mediation proposals of the neutral states were also refused with the same reason. But later, the worsening situation of Lebanon enforced them to accept the proposals.[1305]

[1300] For a study on the Wealth Tax, see: Ayhan Aktar, *Varlık Vergisi ve Türkleştirme Politikaları,* İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2000.

[1301] **PA-AA,** Türkei 177, Bd. 17, Ziemke to Hertling, Damascus, 12 April 1918.

[1302] **BOA,** DH.ŞFR. 580/51, Tahsin to Talat, Damascus, 21 Mart 1334 [21 March 1918].

[1303] **PA-AA,** Türkei 177, Bd.14, Bernstoff to Bethmann-Hollweg, 15 February 1917.

[1304] **BOA,** DH.ŞFR. 540/105, Ali Münif to Talat, Beirut, 7 Kanun-ı Evvel 1332 [20 December 1916]

[1305] **PA-AA,** Türkei 177, Bd. 13, Ratibor to Bethmann-Hollweg, Madrid, 5 August 1916.

After that, according to the testimony of the Ottoman documents, it seems that all the Ottoman officials in the region supported the American assistance to save the Lebanese from starvation.[1306] However, the distribution of the grain led to disagreement among the Ottoman officials. The officials in Syria under Cemal's rule were concerned that the organization of the American assistance would be transformed into a propaganda activity of the American missionaries, which was checked to a considerable extent after the outbreak of the War. In this regard, both Azmi Bey, the Governor of Beirut, and Ali Münif Bey, his counterpart in Lebanon, agreed that the Ottoman Government should purchase the cereals sent by the American Government. If necessary, the process of distribution of the grain could be supervised by a mutual commission consisted of the Turks and the Americans.[1307] If the Americans didn't accept the participation of the Turkish officials, it meant that, in the viewpoint of Azmi Bey, they aimed at the restoration of their influence in Lebanon, and therefore, their request must be refused.[1308] Ali Münif Bey, too, agreed with him in this issue, and inclined not to accept the American assistance for fear of the American propaganda there.[1309] However, Azmi Bey was strongly opposed to this idea on the grounds that giving permission to the Americans to distribute food in Lebanon would make the Lebanese feel that the Ottoman state was not sufficiently capable to compensate for the needs of its citizens, and on the other hand, it would increase the American impact among the people. Therefore, at all hazards, the American assistance should not be accepted, and the formidable task of provisioning Lebanon should be solved by the purchase of more grain from Hama.[1310]

[1306] For a summary of the views of the Ottoman authorities on the issue, see: **BOA,** DH.ŞFR. 538/29, Azmi to Talat, Nazareth, 10 Teşrin-i Sani 1332 [24 November 1916]

[1307] **BOA,** DH.ŞFR. 538/29, Azmi to Talat, Der'a, 5 Teşrin-i Sani 1332 [19 November 1916]; **BOA,** DH.ŞFR. 540/105, Ali Münff to Talat, Beirut, 7 Kanun-ı Evvel 1332 [20 December 1916]

[1308] **BOA,** DH.ŞFR. 538/29, Azmi to Talat, Der'a, 5 Teşrin-i Sani 1332 [19 November 1916]

[1309] **BOA,** DH.ŞFR. 540/105, Ali Münif to Talat, Beirut, 7 Kanun-ı Evvel 1332 [20 December 1916]; **BOA,** DH.ŞFR. 542/3, Azmi to Talat, Beirut, 20 Kanun-ı Evvel 1332 [2 January 1917].

[1310] **BOA,** DH.ŞFR. 542/3, Azmi to Talat, Beirut, 20 Kanun-ı Evvel 1332 [2 January 1917].

Quite the reverse of what they desired, as he expresses in his memoires, Cemal Pasha sent a letter to the American Ambassador in İstanbul via Enver Pasha stating his readiness to accept the American assistance unconditionally. However, the failure to obtain the consent of the Entente fleet in the coasts of Syria caused these undertakings to fail in the end.[1311]

8.3. The Social Impact of the Famine in Syria and the Reaction of People

> "In every place that I have visited, they cry showing me absolute misery scenes. Following a trip in the old and narrow streets of Damascus, in a place men and women repeatedly complained [about their situations], and a man, who appears calm, began to bawl putting his head between his hands. [The situation here is] always like that!"[1312]

The social impact of the Famine in Syria indicates at the same time the reasons behind the changing attitude of the Syrians towards the Ottoman Government at the end of the Ottoman Rule. On the other hand, the nature of the new rule imposed by Cemal's drastic means can better be observed when we analyze the results of the Famine and its by-products, such as epidemics and inflation. In this context, this section first concentrates on the reaction of the city dwellers to the Famine. Following that, the situation of the producers and their reactions against the pressures and impositions of Cemal Pasha will be analyzed. Finally, the most crucial by-product of the Famine, i.e. the epidemic diseases, will be set out to depict.

As stated above, the impact of the Famine became insufferable at the beginning of 1916. At that time, the starvation reached to such an irresistible point that, in Damascus,

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[1311] Cemal Pasha, Ibid, p. 219.

[1312] Halide Edib to Cavid Bey, Beirut, 1 March 1917, in Murat Bardakçı (ed.), Ibid, p. 151.

Women with the children made a demonstration in front of the headquarters of Cemal Pasha, the most fearsome man in Syria, shouting "give us bread, we starve". The Austrian Consul accorded the responsibility for the starvation to the speculation of the cereals by the Mayor, who was immediately dismissed by Cemal Pasha after the demonstration of the Damascene Women.[1313] The situation was not different in other provinces. In March 1916, in Aleppo, the most abundant region in the beginning of the War in terms of agricultural production, the Governor Mustafa Abdulhalık Bey complained that all the *kaza*s of the province were screaming because of the starvation, and added that, if the provisioning of the province didn't suffice in any way, he would have to distribute the collected tithe in the stores to the people to save them from dying of starvation.[1314] In July 1916, the American consul in Beirut reported about the situation of the city's streets that it was "filled with starving women and children…In my early evening walks I frequently see people lying dead in the gutter". The police chief of Damascus told a protestan pastor from Minneapolis in the winter of 1916-1917 that he received 70 dead daily, "while the mayor claimed that one-quarter of the city's population had disappeared since the start of the war". Similarly, the American consul in Damascus reported that "starvation and famine [are] everywhere; the men either in military service or in hiding, and the women and children reduced to beggary".[1315]

The situation of people towards the end of the War had tremendously deteriorated. According to Humann, a German military official in Syria, the view of the streets of Syria was so miserable that seeing the corpses of the children and beggars in Damascus, Tripoli, Beirut and Aleppo became an ordinary event, which was taking place every day.[1316] In the first quarter of 1918, as the consequence of the terrible starvation, the people started to cannibalize. In February of the same year, in Tripoli of Syria, some children at the ages changing between 5 and 8 started to disappear. Their parents were unsuccessful to find the

[1313] **HHStA,** PA 38/369, Ranzi to Burian, "Hungerkrawall in Damaskus", Damascus, 11 January 1916.

[1314] **BOA,** DH.ŞFR. 514/80, Mustafa to Talat, Aleppo, 13 Mart 1332 [26 March 1916].

[1315] Thompson, Ibid, p. 20.

[1316] **BA-MA,** RM 5/2323, Humann to Chef of the Admiralstabs of Marine, Aleppo, 22 April 1918.

children. Upon the discovery of the jacket of a lost child on another one, police managed to solve the mystery of the lost children. The cooked bones and heads of the lost children were found in a well in the house of two Maronite women from Lebanon. The women had killed, cooked and eaten the children due to the impact of the extreme starvation. The head of a child was still in the kitchen when the women were caught.[1317]

According to Hoffman, a German official in Tripoli, who saw the corpses of the children with his own eyes, the women declared to the police that they ate this cannibal's meal due to the starvation, and their body language were proving what they claimed. The dimensions of the starvation were so inconceivable that the people also started to eat the dead street dogs. Allegedly, in a village called Kalmoun, 4 km. distance from Tripoli, a woman cooked and ate her dead children.[1318] Thereupon, the Governor of Beirut, Azmi Bey, sent 5.000 ltq. to Tripoli for the distribution of food to the starving people.[1319] With the same goal, the German Government dispatched 10.000 Mark from the propaganda fund to be spent for the starving people.[1320]

The poverty of the people also increased prostitution in the cities. According to the remarks of Ihsan Turjman, An Ottoman soldier in Palestine, most of the prostitutes had to engage in prostitution to survive and they wouldn't practice their jobs except for their financial needs.[1321]

The ruthless treatment by the Ottoman authorities to seize the grains for thearmy needs made a considerably negative impact on the attitude of the city-dwellers and the Bedouin tribes to the Government. Even in the first months of the War, in the viewpoint of the Austrian Consul of Jerusalem, the requisitioning policy of the Ottoman Government

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[1317] **PA-AA,** Türkei 177, Bd. 17, AA to German Ambassador in Istanbul, 2 March 1918.

[1318] **PA-AA,** Türkei 177, Bd.17, Hoffmann to the German Consulate in Beirut, Tripoli of Syria, 19 February 1918; Another German official from Aleppo, Humann, made similar expressions confirming the report of Hoffmann. For details, see: **BA-MA,** RM 5/2323, Humann to Chef of the Admiralstabs of Marine, Aleppo, 22 April 1918.

[1319] **PA-AA,** Türkei 177, Bd. 17, Mutius to Hertling, Beirut, 1 March 1918.

[1320] **PA-AA,** Türkei 177, Bd. 17, AA to German Ambassador in Istanbul, 2 March 1918.

[1321] Tamari, Ibid, 29 April 1915, p. 114.

only contributed to the weakening of its prestige among the local people.[1322] The following months of the War didn't make any contribution to the amelioration of the relations between the Government and the Arabs. In September 1916, The Governor Tahsin Bey reported that the atrocities to seize grain and other requisitions made the Syrian public opinion totally infelicitous towards the Ottoman Government.[1323] Towards the end of the War, the peasants started to hide their grain from the Governmental officials. In return, the Government increased the proportion of the taxes on their products, which contributed to the rise of the irregularities in the situation of requisitions.[1324]

In this sense, the insistence on the circulation of the paper money in the grain market and the atrocities and illegal methods of the Gendarmerie caused great disturbance among the local people, especially among the Bedouin producers of cereals.[1325] In October 1916, upon the payment of the price of their cereals with paper money by the Government, and the incursions of some undisciplined Gendarmerie troops who collected the cereals of these Bedouins on behalf of the concessionaries assigned by the Government, the Bedouins of Hauran rebelled against the Government. They attacked the stations of the Hijaz Railway, killed the gendarmeries providing the security of the Railway, plundered the grain stores, and cut the telegraph lines. The insurgents were the members of the Ruela, Huwaitat and Beni Sakhr tribes, the dwellers of five villages in Hauran and the army deserters living among them.[1326]

[1322] **HHStA,** PA 12/209, Pallavicini to Burian, "Zur allgemeinen Situation", Constantinople, 15 July 1915.

[1323] **BOA,** DH.ŞFR. 533/36, Tahsin to Talat, Damascus, 12 Eylül 1332 [25 September 1916].

[1324] **BOA,** DH.ŞFR. 570/103, Bedri to Talat, Aleppo, 7 Teşrin-i Sani 1333 [7 November 1917].

[1325] In May 1918, the Deputy Chief of the Gendarmerie Regiment in Lebanon, Şevket Efendi, was brought to Court Martial since he sold 8.000 kg of the cereals in the Army stores: **BOA,** DH.ŞFR. 584/79, İsmail Hakkı to Ministry of Interior, Beirut, 16 May 1918.

[1326] **HHStA,** PA 38/369, Ranzi to Burian, "Der Aufruhr im Hauran", Damascus, 9 October 1916; **HHStA,** PA 38/369, Ranzi to Burian, "Beendigung des Aufruhrs im Hauran", Damascus, 1 November 1916; **BOA,** DH.ŞFR. 533/84, Tahsin to Talat, Damascus, 17 Eylül 1332 [30 September 1916]; **BOA,** DH.ŞFR. 533/63, Tahsin to Talat, Damascus, 13 Eylül 1332 [26 September 1916].

According to the remarks of the Governor Tahsin Bey, the movement didn't have any political aspect[1327], but Cemal Pasha writes that the rebellion was provoked by the supporters of Sharif Hussein to spread the Sharif's movement in Syria. In his memoires, Cemal condemns Tahsin Bey of being inexperienced about the reailities of the region and, therefore, of thinking wrongly about the reasons of the incidents, seeking those responsible inside the country.[1328] The Austrian and German Consuls thought in a similar way with Tahsin Bey.[1329] In this regard, it is worth to mention that the Druzes, who were to a large extent out of the Governmental control, didn't join in this rebellion because of their privileges to sell their agricultural products freely.[1330]

After a small conflict between the rebellious Bedouins and the Government troops, which took place near the villages Cakim, Tuy and Enhal, the incident were suppressed, and the calmness returned the region.[1331] Meanwhile, in the words of the Governor Tahsin Bey, some undisciplined Gendarmerie divisions, who committed some atrocities against the villagers, left their posts for fear of the revenge of the Bedouins.[1332] Afterwards they

[1327] The Governor Tahsin Bey reported that he received many tips on the cruelties of Gendarmerie on the Bedouins, and the infraction of rules of the small-ranking officials in estimation of tithe on the harvest of the rebellious people. He required the amelioration of the Gendarmerie and the mentioned officials, and the appointment of a powerful governor to Hauran for the restoration of peace permanently: **BOA,** DH.EUM.4.Şb. 7/73, Tahsin to Talat, 29 Eylül 1916 [11 October 1916]; **BOA,** DH.ŞFR. 533/102, Tahsin to Talat, Damascus, 17 Eylül 1332 [30 September 1916]. **BOA,** DH.ŞFR. 533/63, Tahsin to Talat, Damascus, 13 Eylül 1332 [26 September 1916].

[1328] Cemal Pasha, Ibid, p. 217.

[1329] **HHStA,** PA 38/369, Ranzi to Burian, "Der Aufruhr im Hauran", Damascus, 9 October 1916; **PA-AA,** Türkei 165, Bd.40, Löytvet to Bethmann-Hollweg, Damascus, 12 October 1916.

[1330] **HHStA,** PA 38/369, Ranzi to Burian, "Beendigung des Aufruhrs im Hauran", Damascus, 1 November 1916; **BOA,** DH.ŞFR. 533/84, Tahsin to Talat, Damascus, 13 Eylül 1332 [26 September 1916].

[1331] **BOA,** DH.ŞFR. 533/19, Tahsin to Talat, Damascus, 24 Eylül 1332 [7 October 1916]; in the conflicts from the rebellious, 140 men were killed and more than 50 were wounded: **BOA,** DH.ŞFR. 534/74, Tahsin to Talat, Deraa, 24 Eylül 1332 [7 October 1916].

[1332] **BOA,** DH.ŞFR. 533/102, Tahsin to Talat, Damascus, 17 Eylül 1332 [30 September 1916].

were captured by the Army troops and sent to Damascus for trial. In addition, due to their responsibilities in the uprising, the administrators of three *nahiye* in Hauran were brought to Damascus with the same purpose. The responsibles Gendarmerie were delivered to the Court Martial.[1333] As for the rebellious groups, since the Bedouins ran away in the desert, the Government could only arrest some villagers. Few of them were sentenced to the death penalty and the others received imprisonment.[1334] After the incident, 50-60 men from the chiefs of the rebellious tribes came to the Governor of Syria for the restoration of the peace. In the meeting, they expressed that the rebellion broke out because of the payment of the paper money in the purchase of their grains.[1335] The suppression of the rebellion was crucial for the Ottoman Government since the place of its occurrence had a potential of spread to the north of Medina, and thus to contribute to the Sharif's movement cutting the connection between Medina and Damascus.[1336]

8.4. Epidemics and the Struggle against them

The tremendous increase in the spread of the epidemics created another traumatic social impact of the famine. Throughout the War period, various diseases like Typhus, Cholera, Typhoid, Malaria Tropica emerged in different districts of Syria, and its spread was promoted by malnutrition. Besides starvation, the decrease in the number of physicians and nurses, who were available for service, was another reason for the spread of

[1333] **BOA,** DH.ŞFR. 533/19, Tahsin to Talat, Damascus, 24 Eylül 1332 [7 October 1916].

[1334] **HHStA,** PA 38/369, Ranzi to Burian, "Beendigung des Aufruhrs im Hauran", Damascus, 1 November 1916.

[1335] **BOA,** DH.EUM.4.Şb. 7/73, Tahsin to Talat, 29 Eylül 1916 [11 October 1916]

[1336] **HHStA,** PA 38/369, Ranzi to Burian, "Der Aufruhr im Hauran", Damascus, 9 October 1916.

the diseases. Before the war, many of the medical persons living in Syria were the subjects of the Entente states, who were expelled on the Ottoman declaration of war. In addition, the large part of the Ottoman physicians was called up for the military service. Some others fell victim to the typhus epidemic of 1915. Therefore, the number of the physicians, who cared for the civil people, was so dramatically decreased that, in Jaffa, there were only four physicians for 40.000 inhabitants while, in Jerusalem, their numbers were six or eight for 80.000 people. The number of civil physicians was between twenty or thirty for each town before the War.[1337] Because of the lack of physicians, in the year 1916, 14 doctors, who were older than 45, had to be conscripted to struggle with the epidemics.[1338]

A typhus epidemic, as the first case in this sense, appeared in Damascus in April 1915. A pediculosis of the soldiers, which became the reason of the spread of the typhus accompanied these epidemics. Upon the risk of the spread of the epidemic typhus and lice among the troops in the Syrian cities, Cemal Pasha assigned the German Professor Mühlens[1339] to fight the epidemic diseases.[1340] Mühlens prepared some instructions to sustain the hygiene in the cities and towns of Syria. He determined the marshy areas in Syria, which had to be dried up to prevent the emergence and spread of the epidemics. In the same regard, the German Professor advised the plumbing of the cities with the Water pipes. The most radical measure he proposed against the epidemics was to burn the town of Afule, which was the source of the cholera disease in Syria.[1341] In Aleppo, at the end of June 1915, a clinic for the infectious diseases was created for the common people and the sanitation commission would follow closely the course of the epidemic, meeting two times

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[1337] **PA-AA,** Türkei 195, Bd.10, Ruppin to AA, 3 November 1916.

[1338] **ATASE Arşivi,** Kls. 3253, Ds. 7, Fih. 8, 8-2, in Tetik, Ibid.

[1339] Prof. Mühlens was appointed as the health adviser to the 4th Army to struggle with the epidemics: Erden, Ibid, p. 141.

[1340] **BA-MA,** RM 40/678, Mühlens to Chief of the Admiralstabs of Marine, 16 April 1916; **HHStA,** PA 38/366, Ranzi to Berchtold, “Die staedtische Verwaltung waehrend des Kriegs”, Damascus, 23 May 1915.

[1341] Erden, Ibid, p. 141.

weekly.[1342] All those instructions were meticulously obeyed. The streets and the water canals were cleaned in this context. Significant sanitary regulations were introduced for the foodstuffs sold by the street hawkers; in some towns, slaughterhouses were established for the butchering of the cattle. In addition, emergency medical services were established in all the Garrisons; in all the hospitals of the towns, special rooms were created to clean the pediculus.[1343] A water supply network was established in Aleppo by an engineer from the German colony in Haifa, Dr. Gottlieb Schumacher, using the water source in Ayintel, 4.5 km distance from Aleppo and spending 15.000 ltq. from the budget of the 4th Army.[1344] Burning of Afule was performed by the orders of Cemal Pasha.[1345] At the end of June 1915, upon the increase of the typhus cases among the people, the Municipality Hospital in Jerusalem was evacuated and allocated to the epidemic diseases. The city of Jerusalem was divided into nine regions and two doctors were assigned by the Army to each region. All the people in Jerusalem were checked up and all the houses were investigated and disinfected with sulphur. A quarantine was implemented for 11 days to the patients and, in short, the disease was checked.[1346]

Upon the arrival of the Armenian refugees from Anatolia, Cemal applied strict measures to prevent the occurrence of the epidemic diseases. On 2nd September 1915, He issued an order to the Army Inspectorship for Logistic Support in Aleppo demanding the examination of the refugees and the other passengers –soldiers or civilians- in the stations before sending their ultimate destination, and ordered the treatment of the sick.[1347] Two

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[1342] **ATASE Arşivi,** Kls. 3243, Ds. 2, Fih. 1, Ali Galib [the Health Director of the Fourth Army] to the Ottoman Headquarter, 29 Haziran 1915, in Tetik, Ibid.

[1343] **BA-MA,** RM 40/678, Mühlens to Chief of the Admiralstabs of Marine, 16 April 1916; **HHStA,** PA 38/366, Ranzi to Berchtold, "Die staedtische Verwaltung waehrend des Kriegs", Damascus, 23 May 1915.

[1344] Cemal Pasha, Ibid, p. 235; Kayalı, "Wartime…", p. 301; Watzinger, Ibid, p. 479.

[1345] Erden, Ibid, p. 141; in a telegram sent to the Comissariat in Aleppo, Cemal warns them to follow strictly the measures against the epidemics. For details, see: **ATASE Arşivi,** Kls. 3253, Ds. 5A, Fih.1-5, in Tetik, Ibid.

[1346] **ATASE Arşivi,** Kls. 3253, Ds. 2, Fih. 1-1, 29 June 1915, in Tetik, Ibid.

[1347] **ATASE Arşivi,** Kls. 3253, Ds. 2, Fih. 7; Ds. 5A, Fih. 1-6; Ds.6, Fih. 7-1, 2 September 1915, in Tetik, Ibid.

Armenian Doctors, Hachik Bogosyan and Toros Ovacikyan, were assigned to this job.[1348] In December 1915, an epidemic typhus emerged in Northern Syria.[1349] During December, nearly 500 persons died daily in Aleppo of typhus.[1350] Both soldiers and the civilian people were profoundly influenced by this disease. To prevent the further spread of the disease, Cemal established medical centers in two buildings -one seized from the British Consulate and the second was left in the beginning of the War under construction by a French institution- to fight the disease quarantining and curing the people and soldiers in those buildings.[1351] The confiscated French Hospital in Aleppo was evacuated and allocated to the Armenian sick.[1352] A 200-bed house of isolation and vapor houses with mobile vapor teams [*seyyar buhar ekipleri*].[1353]

A process of informing the common people about the ways of the struggle with the epidemics was commenced in Aleppo at the same time. Cemal have brochures prepared in Arabic and Turkish informing the people how to protect themselves from infection of the epidemic diseases. The brochures were distributed to all houses while posters were hanged in crowded streets and avenues. Besides that, the people would be informed in Mosques, Synagogues, and Churches on the issues written in the mentioned brochures. The ones, who acted against those orders, including the doctors, would be punished heavily. The schools were closed until further notice. The sick would be treated freely in the "French Hospital". They would be treaeted in Doctor Altunyan's Hospital paying 3 Majidiyehs, in

[1348] **ATASE Arşivi,** Kls. 3253, Ds. 6, Fih. 7a, 2 September 1915, in Tetik, Ibid.

[1349] In October 1915, in his correspondence with the Aleppo Consul of Germany, V. Kress were anxious about the possibility of the spread of the epidemic typhus among the troops with the impact of those refugees. For details, see: **BA-MA,** RM 40/678, Aleppo Consul to the Etappen-Kommando in Constantinople, 28 October 1916.

[1350] **PA-AA,** Türkei 195, Bd.10, Ruppin to AA, 3 November 1916.

[1351] **BOA,** DH.ŞFR. 501/106, Fuad to Talat, Aleppo, 4 Kanun-ı Evvel 1331 [17 December 1915]

[1352] **ATASE Arşivi,** Kls. 3254, Ds. 1, Fih. 1-13, in Tetik, Ibid.

[1353] **ATASE Arşivi,** Kls. 2451, Ds. 219, Fih. 3-4, in Tetik, Ibid.

Military Hospital for 1 Majidiyeh, and in the Hospital of the Municipality for 10 qurush.[1354]

That time Cemal appointed another German Physician, Dr. Karl Vayland ?, as coordinator general to struggle with the epidemic diseases. He was endowed 500 ltq. by the Governorate of Aleppo. Vayland would organize the cleansing and disinfection of the city of Aleppo as well as checking over the implementation of the points announced the abovementioned brochures. He would also apply coercive measures, if necessary, and would arrange the patient trafficking between the city and the hospitals. Like Jerusalem, the city of Aleppo was divided into six regions, and, a physician and a commander were allocated for each region. The dead would be buried according to the sanitary rules. Cemal himself also inspected the kitchens, dining halls, acute inpatient wards, to see whether the rules were followed or not.[1355]

The year 1916 can be regarded as the year of the epidemics for the Syrian Provinces. According to the statistics of the 4th Army, in the year 1916, the number of the hospitalized soldiers from an epidemic disease was calculated as 15.130.[1356] Only in January 1916, 685 personnel of the Army would die because of the epidemics.[1357] In March 1916, 532 of 2417 typhoid cases; 230 of 381 dysentery cases; 150 of 1535 relapsing fever resulted with death.[1358] In April, the total number of the deaths from relapsing fever was calculated as 748 of 3060.[1359] To be more specific in terms of localities, in the beginning of the year, an epidemic flecktyphus caused great damage in Jerusalem.[1360] According to Jerusalem consul of Spain, on 16th May 1916, "in a single day there were 97 cases."[1361] Together with the treacherous conditions of the alimentation, the epidemic

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[1354] **ATASE Arşivi,** Kls. 3254, Ds. 1, Fih. 1-13, in Tetik, Ibid.

[1355] **ATASE Arşivi,** Kls. 3254, Ds. 1, Fih. 1-13, in Tetik, Ibid.

[1356] **ATASE Arşivi,** Kls. 2184, Ds. 14, Fih. 14-12, in Tetik, Ibid.

[1357] **ATASE Arşivi,** Kls. 2184, Ds. 14, Fih. 14-14, in Tetik, Ibid.

[1358] **ATASE Arşivi,** Kls. 2184, Ds. 14, Fih. 14-1, in Tetik, Ibid.

[1359] **ATASE Arşivi,** Kls. 2184, Ds. 14, Fih. 14-1a, in Tetik, Ibid.

[1360] **BA-MA,** RM 40/678, Busse to the Chief of the Admiralstab, 7 February 1916.

[1361] Ballobar, Ibid, p. 96.

diseases started to spread. During the summer of the same year, twenty to thirty persons fell victim daily to Cholera, and similarly, in Hebron, 700 died of this disease. In Birüssebi, according to the Spanish consul, on 14th June, there were quite a few cases of cholera; In Asludj, a case of cholera appeared at that day.[1362] However, the consul writes that, by June 1916, in Jerusalem, typhus cases had been reduced to 5 per day, while it was 60 for Damascus.[1363] All through the Syrian country typhoid became endemic and resultant mortality grew to great proportions.[1364] In the viewpoint of Prof. Schilling, the hygienist of the 4th Army, who spoke to Theodor Wiegand, the reasons of the spread of the epidemics were as follows: non-use of any strainer by the municipality for the drinking water, the ineffectiveness of the disinfection instruments of the hospitals because of mishandling, badly purified cisterns, frequent blogging of the water channels and insufficient foodstuffs.[1365]

In the same period of time, the northern provinces of the country were also suffering from Cholera. According to the testimony of the Secretary of the Beirut Branch of the American Presbyterian Board of Missions, the death rate among the soldiers at Islahiye were thirty in a day. The sick soldiers were quarantined and as fast as possible entrained toward Aleppo.[1366] At the same time, according to the diaries of the Ottoman prisoners captured in the Battle of Katia by the British Army, large numbers of the Armenian refugees fell victim to Cholera.[1367] As a measure to prevent the dissemination of the disease, the Germans sent 300.000 anti-cholera injection doses to the bacteriological

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[1362] Ballobar, Ibid, p. 101.

[1363] Ballobar, Ibid, p. 99.

[1364] **PA-AA,** Türkei 195, Bd.10, Ruppin to AA, 3 November 1916.

[1365] Theodor Wiegand to His Wife, 23 October 1916, Jerusalem, in Wiegand, Theodor, *Halbmond in die letzten Viertel: Archaelologische Reiseberichte,* Verlag Bruckann, München: 1970, p. 193.

[1366] **PRO,** FO, 371/2779, Franklin Hoskins to FO, "Memorandum on Journey from Beirut to Berlin, 26 August 1916.

[1367] **PA-AA,** Türkei 177, Bd.13, The Near East, Cairo, 8 August 1916.

laboratory in Jerusalem and these helped to hold it in check.[1368] In the same regard, in February 1916, a 1000-bed *Vatan* [the Motherland] Hospital was opened to service in Aleppo, and another 1000-bed was ordered by Cemal to be constructed.[1369] The establishment of a hospital in Beirut by Dr. Neşet Ömer, the Director for the Struggle with the Epidemic Diseases of the 4th Army, was projected, and 748.000 qurush was promised by Cemal Pasha.[1370] In Damascus, a 2000-bed hospital construction was begun in May 1917.[1371] The Zionist societies in America planned an expedition of physicians to Palestine to stop the spread of the epidemics among the Jewish people.[1372] They achieved to take the permission of the Entente States to pass their blockade in the Syrian Coasts.[1373] However, the realization of their undertakings were not allowed by Cemal Pasha, on the grounds that it would serve the propaganda of the Zionist Movement.[1374]

A special treatment was applied in the convalescent houses for the adaptation of the recovered soldiers to the military service again. In summer, the daily program of the convalescent houses was as such:

> "Breakfast at 7:00 o'clock with milky tea, milky chocolate or milky coffee and a soft-boiled egg with enough bread. Between 09:00 and 11:00 o'clock: light physical training and gymnastic plays. At 12:00 o'clock: Noon time. Lesson [*Ders*] between 16:00 and 18:00. Dinner at 18:00. Lecture by the physician of the convalescent house between 20:00 and 21:00 two times in a week on health in the military, and courses in the same number by the officer of the house on the military [*askeri*] theories."[1375]

1368 **PRO,** FO 371/2783, WO to FO, Report of an Inhabitant of Athlit, Mount Carmel, 3 November 1916.

1369 **ATASE Arşivi,** Kls. 3254, Ds. 1, Fih. 1-20; 1-20a, in Tetik, Ibid.

1370 **ATASE Arşivi,** Kls. 3244, Ds. 9, Fih. 2-2, in Tetik, Ibid.

1371 **ATASE Arşivi,** Kls. 3244, Ds.9, Fih. 3, in Tetik, Ibid.

1372 **PA-AA,** Türkei 195, Bd.9, Warburg and Jacobson to AA, Berlin, 22 October 1916.

1373 **PA-AA,** Türkei 195, Bd.10, Warburg and Jacobson to AA, Berlin, 30 November 1916.

1374 **PA-AA,** Türkei 195, Bd.10, Göppert to AA (Transmitting Lichtheim), Constantinople, 12 December 1916.

1375 **ATASE Arşivi,** Kls. 3254, Ds. 1, Fih. 1-37, in Tetik, Ibid.

The epidemic diseases did not only influence the lower classes and the soldiers, the upper classes of society and the Turkish officials were also severely affected by the varieties of the epidemics. Similarly, many Germans had been unable to avoid it. Although they were careful about the arrangements such as boiling the water, many of them lost their lives. The German Consul in Damascus, Loytved died of Epidemic Typhus. Cemal Pasha's Supervisor for the construction works Maximilian Zürcher was infected with the same disease.[1376] In September 1916, the wife of the director of the Austrian hospital, Mrs. Schrötter died because of an epidemic.[1377] A British intelligence report estimated the amount of the people in Syria who were affected by the epidemics as % 20.[1378]

As the result of precautions taken to prevent the epidemic threat, Cemal created an effective health system working throughout the whole Syrian provinces enabling him to rule over the bodies of the civilians and the soldiers. By December 1917, the 4th Army's sanitation system was working in an energetic way in the rail and chausseed roads line from Pozantı to the Sinai Desert. In Aleppo, Damascus and Jerusalem, sanitation institutions investigated, made bacteriological check-up and injected the soldiers and the suspected civilians. In Jerusalem, there was a laboratory preparing smallpox vaccine, and a medical service for rabies vaccine. In the recruiting offices of Aleppo, Beirut, Damascus and Jerusalem, there were cleansing stations serving only the Army personnel. During the War period, the hospitals were reformed, re-organized and the *Vatan* [the motherland] Hospitals in Adana, Aleppo, Damascus, Nazareth and Jerusalem.[1379]

In conclusion, the conditions conductive to famine emanating from the Ottoman rule were generally due to the increasing control of the Government over the people. The Entente's share was considerable in this disaster, especially for the coastal regions. As for the measures taken by Cemal Pasha, it was essential to provide an order in the social life of

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1376 **PA-AA,** Türkei 177, Bd. 15, Maximilan Zürcher to Arnhold, Jerusalem, 2 June 1917; **PRO,** FO 371/2783, WO to FO, Report of an Inhabitant of Athlit, Mount Carmel, 3 November 1916.

1377 Ballobar, Ibid, p. 110.

1378 **PRO,** FO 371/2783, WO to FO, Report of an Inhabitant of Athlit, Mount Carmel, 3 November 1916.

1379 **ATASE Arşivi,** Kls. 3244, Ds. 10, Fih. 3-1, in Tetik, Ibid.

Syria, and most of his endeavors and measures against the famine aimed at achieving this goal. Cemal aimed at the survival of the citizens in Syria to be able to assert a full control of state over them. On the other hand, as a result of the extraordinary consequences of the Famine in the Syrian realm, the attitude of the people towards the Government took a negative shape. However, it is worth to note as a final remark that this change didn't have any political aspect. It was only dissatisfaction because of the worsening living conditions. The remarks of Ihsan Turjman in his diaries indicate how that reaction was opportunist:

> "Agency news arrived today indicating that German troops have retreated from opposition in France. This could mean the beginning of defeat for the Austrians and the Germans. Thank God. We all need this war to come to an end. I do not care who wins and who loses. If this were a decent government that treats us properly, then my life and my companions' lives would be devoted to the nation. But, as it is, a drop of my blood (and a hair from my leg) is worth the thrones of the Ottoman sultans."[1380]

In a similar way, the diaries of Wasif Jawhariyyeh indicate that some parts of people were delighted with the rigors of life coming to an end rather than being rescued of the Ottoman yoke. Wasif, summarizes his sentiments in his diaries as follows:

> "Truthfully, it was a joyous holiday for all our family because the British had come and the Arab people were rid of the nightmare of the tyrant Turks. We all had great hope for a better future, especially after what we had suffered from war, famine, and disease, in particular, Typhus, which had spread all over the country. Thank God for saving our youth from the damned army service."[1381]

[1380] Tamari, Ibid, p. 30 September 1915, p. 138.

[1381] Jawhariyyeh, "My Last Days…", p. 33.

CHAPTER IX

THE UNDOING OF CEMAL PASHA IN SYRIA

The worsening situation of the Ottoman front in Syria and Iraq against the British troops brought the end of Cemal Pasha's governorate and the rule of the Ottoman Empire in the region. The British defeat at Dardanelles and the capture of an large number of the British troops at Kut on the Mesopotamian Front damaged the British prestige among the Muslims and the Arabs. They embarked on a quest to improve their image. As a result, they decided to avenge the Dardanelles by striking a big blow on the Ottoman troops in Syria and Iraq. However, at the beginning, the progress in the east of the Canal aimed at the neutralization of any Turkish attempt against Egypt. After Dardanelles and Kut, a third Turkish achievement against the British troops in the Suez Front would cause irreparable injuries to the British image in its Muslim colonies. Consequently, an immediate invasion of the Sinai Peninsula was scheduled by General Murray, the Commander-in-Chef of the Egyptian Army.[1382]

[1382] George MacMunn and Cyrill Falls, *Military Operations Egypt and Palestine: From the Outbreak of the War to June 1917,* London: His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1928, p. 87; **PRO**, FO 371/2480, McMachon to FO (Transmitting Kitchener), "Defence of Egypt", Mudros, 11 November 1915; Woodward, Ibid, p. 16, 36; *Birinci Dünya Harbi'nde Türk Harbi IV/I,* p. 324.

For those aims, they concluded to evacuate the Dardanelles Front and to transfer the troops from there to Egypt for a wider expedition in the Sinai Peninsula. They started to withdraw their troops from Gallipoli in the middle of November 1915 and in a month all the troops at Gallipoli had debarked in Egypt.[1383] Thus, the completion of the withdrawal of the forces from the Dardanelles in December 1915 gave the Commander of the British Troops in Egypt the necessary tools to implement this policy.[1384] With the flow of these troops and their equipment, Egypt became the greatest military base outside Britain and France,[1385] and the number of the troops in Egypt reached 300.000 and in a short while they relocated those troops to the east of the Canal.[1386]

In the beginning of its movement toward the east of the Canal, the British Headquarters in Egypt undervalued the strength of the Ottoman troops in Syria. Especially, the preparations made by Cemal in the Sinai Desert to conquer Egypt costed the British troops enormous number of soldiers and a great amount of money and other sources. In that context, this chapter will be concentrating on the analysis of how Cemals regime and the Ottoman domination came to an end in Syria. In the same regard, the role of the Arab troops of Faysal in the British progress will be touched as well to assess the claims of the Arab nationalists that the Arabs had a crucial part in bringing the Ottoman rule to a close.

[1383] MacMunn and Falls, Ibid, p. 87; **PRO**, FO 371/2480, McMachon to FO (Transmitting Kitchener), "Defence of Egypt", Mudros, 11 November 1915; Woodward, Ibid, p. 16, 36.

[1384] General Murray had proposed to create new troops in New Zealand and Australia to struggle with the Turks in the Sinai when he was appointed as the Commander. But, his offer met with great resistance by the Officials in Austraila and New Zealand; **SHD**, GR 7 N 2135, Saint-Quentin to MG, Paris, 10 April 1916.

[1385] David R. Woodward, *Hell in the Holy Land: World War I in the Middle East,* Lexington: The University Press of Kentucky, 2006, p.15.

[1386] Woodward, Ibid, p. 19.

9.1.The Katia Raid, the Battle of Romani and the Gaza Wars

The progress of the British troops in the east of the Canal made a clash with the Ottoman troops in the same region inevitable. By this reason, contrary to his desires, both to stop the British advance and to prevent the movement of the British troops in Egypt to the French front, Cemal was compelled to attack the British troops in the east of Egypt with weaker forces to remind them that the Canal was always threatened by the Ottoman troops. As a second reason, the British troops in the east of the Canal had constructed a railway from Kantara to Romani to supply these troops and they built a constant store at Katia.[1387] Towards the end of April, that railway reached a point, which necessitated for the British side the invasion of the whole district. For the Ottoman troops, on the other hand, the possession of this well-watered zone [Katia] was an issue of life or death with 100 miles of practically waterless desert behind them. [1388]

The battle took place around Katia on 20th-25th April 1916. In this raid, the Ottoman troops won a victory. They took 1 colonel, 23 officers and 230 soldiers prisoners. Several hundred horses were taken as spoils.[1389] In 25 April, all the British forces left Katia.[1390] The Ottoman victory in Katia battle created a great impression in Egypt and a

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[1387] **BA-MA,** RM 40/678, Braasck to Chef des Admiralstab. "Bericht über die Operationen gegen den Suezkanal 1916", 16 October 1916.

[1388] **SHD**, GR 7 N 2135, Quentin to MG, Cairo, 8 May 1916; From the Commander-in-Chief…, p.23-24; Serjean-Major, R.A.M.C., *With the R.A.M.C. in Egypt,* Cassell and Company, Ltd. London, New York, Toronto and Melbourne:1918, p. 94; **SHD**, GR 7 N 2135, Saint-Quentin to MG, Cairo, 24 May 1916.

[1389] **BA-MA,** RM 5/2321, Humann to the Marine-Attache, "Bericht über die Operationen zum dem Suezkanal 1916", 29 November 1916; For a detailed analysis of the Katia Raid by the Ottoman sources, see: *Birinci Dünya Harbi'nde Türk Harbi IV/I,* pp. 354-361.

[1390] **BA-MA,** RM 40/678, Braasck to Chef des Admiralstab. "Bericht über die Operationen gegen den Suezkanal 1916", 16 October 1916.

great fear in the British officials. The Turcophile sentiments among the Egyptians revived.[1391]

Following that attack, the inability of the 4th Army to obtain the requirements for a larger expedition against the Canal and Egypt, and the progress of the British fortifications towards the Ottoman frontier at Sinai, compelled Cemal Pasha to make an attack in smaller scale to give an end to the progress of the British troops in the east of the Canal. For that reason, Cemal decided to organize a second expedition against the Canal. In early days of July 1916, Von Kress was authorized to organize this opoeration by Cemal.[1392] He gives the number of the troops as 16.000 in total. But, he doesn't give any details on the deployment of the troops in various places.[1393] The number of the British troops deployed from Kantara to Romani was 32.000.[1394] The battle started on 4th August, with the attack of the Ottomans against two very strongly entrenched British camps (Mehemdia on the coast and Romani) to enforce the British to leave their positions with a flank attack and a frontal attack. The Ottoman troops progressed up to the middle of the British trenches. They were able to reach the wire fence of their enemies from the left wing of their deployments.[1395]

After that the British troops started to attack the Ottomans. At the end of the battle, the amount of the Ottoman losses as killed and wounded was huge. The 39th Regiment was surrounded by the British and they were captured by them with their officers. Similarly, the 3rd Mountain Artillery Squadron was captured by the British troops. Finally, the 20th Mitralleuse squadron received the retreat order too late and they weren't able to leave their position till morning. In the morning, they were captured as well.[1396]

[1391] **BA-MA**, RM 5 / 2321, Humann to the Chef of the Admiralstab of Marine. Berlin, 29 November 1916; **SHD**, GR 7 N 2135, Quentin to MG, Cairo, 8 May 1916.

[1392] Von Kressenstein, Ibid*, p. 179-180*

[1393] Von Kressenstein, Ibid, p. 181.

[1394] Murray, Ibid, p. 61.

[1395] **ATASE Arşivi,** Kls. 168, Ds. 730, Fih. 102-51, Cemal to Enver, 25 Temmuz 1332 [6 August 1916]; **MAEE**, Guerre 1914-1918, 874/Turquie, Syrie et Palestine, Defrance to MAE, Cairo, 9 September 1916; **BA-MA,** RM 40/678, Braasck to Chef des Admiralstab. "Bericht über die Operationen gegen den Suezkanal 1916", 16 October 1916.

[1396] **ATASE Arşivi,** Kls. 168, Ds. 730, Fih. 102-52, Cemal to Enver, 25 Temmuz 1332 [6 August 1916]; **SHD**, GR 7 N 2136, Saint-Quentin to MG, Cairo, 15 Augugst 1916.

All the Ottoman attacks failed and the groups that made the main attack to the south were destroyed or captured. This defeat led to the retreat of the Turks who were closely pursued by the cavalry of the A.N.Z.A.C. The British reoccupied Katia, then Birelabd on 9th August, and Salmana on 10th August. On 16th August, the Turkish rearguard stayed in Birmezar and Mageibra, the main force returned to Birüssebi and to the Coastal cities, El Arish, Rafa, Khan Yunus, Gazza.[1397]

The commander of the Romani Battle, Von Kress blamed Cemal Pasha for the failure in the Battle of Romani claiming that Cemal attached greater importance to the Hijaz front than the Sinai Front and sent the foodstuffs of the Army to the Hijaz Expeditionary Force.[1398] However, taking his reports and memonrandums sent to both Istanbul and Berlin regarding the needs of the Army for a second larger expedition, it can be easily concluded that Cemal made an energetic effort to procure the needs of the Army for the achievement of the aims of the Canal Expedition rather than attributing greater importance to the Hijaz Expedition.[1399] As will be explained in the section on Faysal's expedition, Cemal didn't give the first priority to the Hijaz front and considered evacuating Medina in favor of the Sinai front due to military reasons.

After the British victory in Romani, they intensified construction works at Sinai, and expanded the railway at an average rate of fifteen miles in a month. The next three months in the aftermath of the Battle of Romani passed in tranquility, but with an intense British work to make the railway expand to *El-Arish*. In the middle of December 1916, they managed to extend the railway within 13 km. of El-Arish. On 21st December, they attacked and occupied El-Arish and then on 23rd December, surrounded the Ottoman Battalion at Magdaba. After a battle, they were able to capture it with 1.282 prisoners while losing 146 men, of which 22 were killed. Following the battle, the British forces withdrew to El-Arish again. With the invasion of El-Arish, the British forces had the

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1397 **ATASE Arşivi,** Kls. 168, Ds. 730, Fih. 102-53, Cemal to Enver, 25 Temmuz 1332 [6 August 1916];**MAEE**, 874/Turquie, Syrie et Palestine, Defrance to MAE, Cairo, 9 September 1916; For an analysis of the Romani Battle by the Ottoman military sources, see: *Birinci Dünya Harbi'nde Türk Harbi IV/I,* pp. 360-392.

1398 Von Kressenstein, Ibid, p. 180.

1399 **ATASE Arşivi,** Kls. 168, Ds.730, Fih.102, Cemal to Enver, 2 Temmuz 1332[14 July 1916]

ability to reinforce its forces there with the help of the ships from the sea. They decided to use El-Arish as a military base for the later attacks.[1400] In the beginning of the year 1917, the British troops were able to control the whole Desert and reach a point threatening the Gaza-Birüssebi line. Throughout the next three months, with the completion of the gathering of the troops at Rafah, Murray believed that he would be able to capture Gaza as the first facilitating step of the great expedition against Palestine and, on 19th March, he acquired permission from the General Headquarters for the realization of this plan.[1401]

Meanwhile, the exploration activities of the Ottoman aviators let them to know about the intention of the British troops. Therefore, with the expectation of a British attack, before the battle, the Ottoman troops were withdrawn from the various places around Gaza to fortify the trenches in that town.[1402] The garrison in Gaza was strengthened by a regiment of infantry and some batteries. The total amount of the Ottoman forces reached seven battalions, five batteries (two Austrian, two Turkish and one German) and some machine gun companies, two of which were German. In addition, the force holding the coast at Jaffa in a fear of possible landing, was ordered down to the Palestine front to meet the expected British attack.[1403]

On the evening of March 25th, the British force was assembled and ready to move on Gaza.[1404] The British first made a frontal attack on 26th March against Gaza with three cavalry troops and another group of the troops tried to surround the east of the city, so as to prevent the retreat of the Ottoman garrison and to hold off Turkish reinforcements.[1405] In the beginning of the battle, the British forces gained some ground and were able to enter

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1400 **ATASE Arşivi,** Kls. 171, Ds. 741. Fih. 2, Cemal to Enver, 25 Kanun-i Evvel 1332 [7 January 1917]; Woodwards, Ibid, p. 52-53; Wavell, Ibid, p. 61, 65; Massey, Ibid, p. 79, 97.

1401 Macmunn and Falls, *Military Operations I,* p. 283.

1402 **ATASE Arşivi,** Kls. 171, Ds. 741, Fih. 43-2, Cemal to Enver, 27 Mart 1333 [27 March 1917].

1403 Wavell, Ibid, p. 70.

1404 MacMunn and Falls, Ibid, p. 307; Wavell, Ibid, p. 71

1405 **ATASE Arşivi,** Kls. 171, Ds. 741, Fih. 43, Cemal to Enver, 26 Mart 1333 [26 March 1917]; Wavell, Ibid, p. 73.

into one battery front of the Austrians. The A.N.Z.A.C. troops captured the commander and the staff of the 53rd Ottoman division. On 27th March, the fighting continued inside the town.[1406] Throughout the daytime, a lot of street and barricade fighting took place in the centre of Gaza. The commanding grounds of the town were captured in the beginning by the British Army, but later the Ottoman forces recaptured them.[1407] On the evening of 27th March, as a consequence of partly the increase in the casualties by the increasing pressure of the Turkish forces, which were converging on Gaza, and partly by considerations of water supply, the British troops were ordered to retreat.[1408]

The first battle of Gaza ended with a great victory for the Ottoman side. In this battle, the British commandership calculated their losses close to 4.000, of which 523 killed, 2.932 wounded, and 512 missing.[1409] 5 officers and 241 other ranks, wounded and unwounded, fell into the Ottoman hands.[1410] According to Cemal Pasha's report to Enver, the Ottoman Casualties were as such: 8 officers and 153 soldiers killed, 9 officers and 409 soldiers wounded, 15 officers 590 soldiers were accounted for lost. A mobile hospital, a labor squadron and 2 batteries were captured by the English. 2 batteries were destroyed by the British fire.[1411]

[1406] **ATASE Arşivi,** Kls. 171, Ds. 741, Fih. 43-2, Cemal to Enver, 27 Mart 1333 [27 March 1917]

[1407] **ATASE Arşivi,** Kls. 171, Ds. 741, Fih., 43-6, Cemal to Enver, 28 Mart 1333 [28 March 1917]

[1408] Wavell, Ibid, p.78; For a detailed description of the First War in Gaza, see: *Birinci Dünya Harbi'nde Türk Harbi IV/I,* pp. 521-555.

[1409] Wavell, Ibid, p. 80

[1410] MacMunn and Falls, *Military Operations I,* p. 315; Cemal guessed the number of the British casualties inside the Gaza in his telegraph in between 3.000 and 4.000. for further details see: **ATASE Arşivi,** Kls. 171, Ds. 741, Fih. 43-6, Cemal to Enver, 28 Mart 1333 [28 March 1917].

[1411] **ATASE Arşivi,** Kls. 171, Ds. 741, Fih. 43-34, 43-35, Cemal to Enver, 3 Nisan 1333 [3 April 1917]. The British official records gave the Turkish losses in prisoner as 837, including 4 Austrian officers and 37 ranks and the divisional commander and staff of the 53rd division; MacMunn and Falls, *Military Operations I,* p. 315; Colonel Wavell gave the number of prisoners as 900 and the total Turkish casualties was about 1.500 less; Wavell, Ibid, 80; The Commander-in-Chef of the British Army, General Murray, blows the

Murray commenced the preparations for a second attack immediately after the first defeat in Gaza. In three weeks between the first and the second attempt against Gaza, both sides worked actively to compensate for their deficiencies. For the British side, the railway was expanded nearer to the Gaza Front. In the first battle, the British railway was 20 miles from Gaza.[1412] In this period, this space was reduced to five miles and reached to Deir al Balah.[1413] They also had the opportunity to supply the needs of their army in Gaza by ships.[1414] On the other hand, the Ottoman forces had covered their troop deficiencies to react to a renewed attack of the British.[1415] The Ottoman trenches were fortified by three regiments in Gaza, two regiments east of the town, two at Hureira, one at Tell esh Sheria and one in the neighborhood of Huj. Thus, the Tell esh Sheria-Gaza line was deployed as a contiguous front.[1416]

On 17th April, the British forces, to make a second attack on Gaza, gathered at Han Yunus and commenced to progress towards Wadi Gaza. On 18th April, some Ottoman trenches in and around Gaza were covered with fire by the artilleries of the warships and by a frontal attack. The main British troops made a ground attack on 19th April with artillery firing aiming at the capture of the south-east of Gaza. They advanced without much difficulty over ground thoroughly explored during the First Battle of Gaza. As occurred the day before, a British warship flottila supported them firing against the Turkish trenches. In the afternoon of the same day, the British infantry made 3 great attacks

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Turkish casualties out of all proportions and calculate in as 8.000 in total; :Murray, Ibid, p. 153.

1412 Anthony Bluett, *With Our Army in Palestine,* Andrew Melrose Ltd.:London, 1919, p.127.

1413 MacMunn and Falls, *Military Operations I,* p. 327; Lieutenant Dukakinzade Feridun, *Filistin Cebhesi,* Askeri Akademiler Kumandanlığı Matbaası, 1927, p. 51; Wavell, Ibid, p. 84.

1414 **ATASE Arşivi,** Kls. 171, Ds. 741, Fih. 52, Cemal to Enver, 8 Nisan 1333 [8 April 1917].

1415 **ATASE Arşivi,** Kls. 171, Ds. 741, Fih. 62, Cemal to Enver, 13 Nisan 1333 [13 April 1917].

1416 Macmunn and Falls, *Military Operations I,* p. 331; Lieutenant Dukakinzade Feridun, Ibid, p. 51.

against the Ottoman trenches inside Gaza. But, they were repulsed by the Ottoman troops. Finally, they ordered the infantry to attack supported by the cavalry and shielded by the armoured cars. They succeeded to capture some outpost lines of the Ottoman deployments.[1417]

However, the Ottoman troops managed to protect their main trenches and took their forward lines of position back with a series of counter attacks against the British infantry.[1418] The battle continued till the morning and then the British forces started to withdraw in the direction of Telelcemaa with the loss of every hope of success on their behalf. On 20th April, the British forces were back in their trenches that they were settled before the expedition. During the battle the Ottoman aviators outclassed the British in the air and they achieved to make a British aviator crash in the air fighting, while another one was destroyed in its station.[1419]

As for the casualties, the consequence was disastrous for the British troops. According to the account of the British official history, "the [British] casualties from the 17th to the 20th April were 6,444, of which the 54th Division suffered 2,870 (the 163rd Brigade alone 1,828), the 52nd Division 1,874, the 53rd Division 584, and the Imperial Mounted Division 547. The total of casualties to animals, including camels, was 2,129, about two hundred prisoners were captured by the British."[1420] Cemal Pasha estimated the British casualties in his report roughly in between 6.000 and 7.000. He didn't give any details about the casualties of the Ottoman troops and only noted its proportional

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[1417] **ATASE Arşivi,** Kls. 171, Ds. 741, Fih. 68, Cemal to Enver, 21 Nisan 1333 [21 April 1917]; Macmunn and Falls, *Military Operations,* p. 332.

[1418] **ATASE Arşivi,** Kls. 171, Ds. 741, Fih. 67, Cemal to Enver, 21 Nisan 1333 [21 April 1917]

[1419] **ATASE Arşivi,** Kls. 171, Ds. 741, Fih. 68, Cemal to Enver, 21 Nisan 1333 [21 April 1917]; Macmunn and Falls, *Military Operations,* p. 332; *Birinci Dünya Harbi'nde Türk Harbi IV/I,* pp. 601-651.

[1420] Macmunn and Falls, *Military Operations I,* p. 348.

smallness.[1421] In a book published by the Turkish War Academy, the amount of the Ottoman casualties was calculated at 1970.[1422]

The British defeat on the Gaza front caused essential changes in the command echelon of the forces deployed around Gaza. "On the 21st April, by order of Sir A. Murray, Lieut.-General Sir Philip Chetwode, Bt., assumed command of the Eastern Force, Lieut.-General Sir Charles Dobell returning to England. Major-General Sir H. G. Chauvel succeeded General Chetwode in command of the Desert Column, and Br.-General E. W. C. Chaytor replaced him in command of the Australian and New Zealand Mounted Division.[1423] In a month following the second defeat, the Commander-in-Chef Murray would share the same fate and he was replaced with General Allenby.[1424]

After the second Ottoman victory in the Gaza Front, Enver demanded a counter-attack by the help of the left wing of the Army and to drive the British forces into the sea. However, the Ottoman abilities for a counter attack were very limited because of the unfavorable situation of the troops in the Sinai Front. Cemal –and also von Kress- always refused his repeated enthusiasm regarding a counter-attack with reason of the transportation and foodstuff deficiencies. He answered that they had to watch the exploratory forces of the British forces to enhance their losses instead.[1425]

After that, the battles in the Palestine front entered into a long period of tranquility. In this time period, with the loss of Baghdad, the Ottoman Headquarters directed its focus to the Iraqi front, whereas the British continued their fortification activities near Gaza with the aim of the conquest of Palestine.

[1421] **ATASE Arşivi,** Kls. 171, Ds. 741, Fih. 68, Cemal to Enver, 21 Nisan 1333 [21 April 1917]

[1422] Lieutenant Dukakinzade Feridun, Ibid, p. 51.

[1423] Macmunn and Falls, *Military Operations I,* p. 351.

[1424] Grainger, Ibid, p. 81.

[1425] Hüseyin Hüsnü, Emir (Erkilet), *Yıldırım,* ATASE Yayınları: Ankara, 2002, p. 47; **ATASE Arşivi,** Kls. 4773, Ds. 25, Fih.7-5, The Commander of Gaza Groups to the Commander of 3rd Division, 1 Mayıs 1333 [1 May 1917]; **BA-MA,** RM 5/2322, Humann to Chef of Admiralstabs of Marine, Constantinople, 16 September 1917.

9.2.Loss of Baghdad, the Yıldırım Undertaking and the End of Cemal's Rule in Syria

While the preparations were continuing for a third battle in Gaza, the situation of the Palestine Front was fundamentally changed with the outbreak of a revolution in Russia and with the capture of Baghdad by the British troops on 11th March 1917. The great change in Russia and the dislocation of the British troops in Salonika released some Ottoman troops on the Easern and Western Front of Anatolia and enabled the Ottoman Headquarters to use those troops in the other fronts. As a result, there were only the fronts in Syria and Iraq where battles continued in the Ottoman lands. All those developments diverted Enver Pasha's interest on the recapture of Baghad, and, without loss of time, he commenced the preparations for the recapture of the city.[1426] Due to the problems in the railway transportation and the telegraph machines, intercommunication between the Headquarter and the Army commanderships in these regions presented some difficulties. For that reason, before the idea of the *Yıldırım* to take Baghdad back, Enver contemplated to remove his headquarters to Aleppo to provide quicker communication with these fronts.[1427] He kept this idea in his mind even after the creation of the *Yıldırım,* until the eve of the capture of Jerusalem by the British troops. In one of his telegrams to Talat in the middle of November 1917, while he was in Syria, Enver was mentioning about the removal of its headquarters to Aleppo in 15 or 20 days.[1428]

On the other hand, Enver Pasha's plan to reconquer Baghdad was appreciated by the German Headquarters. Insomuch that they actively intervened in the process of

[1426] For the process of the decision to recapture Baghdad, see: *Birinci Dünya Harbi'nde Türk Harbi IV/II,* Ankara: Genel Kurmay Basımevi, 1986, pp. 69-74.

[1427] *Yıldırım,* p. 2; Wavell, Ibid, p. 82, 90.

[1428] **TTK Arşivi,** KO Koleksiyonu 1/7, Enver to Talat, Damascus, 16 Teşrin-i Sani 1333 [16 November 1917]; **PA-AA**, Türkei 177, Bd.16, Bernstoff to AA, Constantinople, 24 November 1917.

preparations and prepared a plan necessitating the collection of all the command of the Armies in Syria and Iraq under one German commander. It is not because that the Germans only wanted to assist their allies, but they saw this project as an opportunity to increase the German influence in Arab districts and reserved enormous amount of money for this project. As a result, on 2nd July 1917, they created the *Yıldırım* Army Groups in Istanbul, whose staff officers were mostly Germans, for the recapture of Baghdad and appointed General Falkenhayn, the ex-chief of staff of the German army, as the commander of these groups. The forces released from the Russian Front and the Western Anatolia Front was to constitute the main body of these army groups.[1429]

This army group had been created by the German Headquarters, and it seems that they didn't only disregard the Turkish sentiment, but they neglected to take proper account of the local conditions. According to Liman von Sanders, his mission, which had the advantage of three and a half years' experience of Turkey, was not even consulted in the change of the army structure in Iraq and Syria, nor was its personnel utilised. The headquarters staff of the *Yıldırım* consisted of sixty-five German officers and nine Turks; these latter were junior officers, used mainly for liaison purposes.[1430]

Since they needed the German assistance urgently, the Ottoman Headquarter couldn't oppose this plan very much. The German Headquarter reserved 5 million gold liras and promised to provide for the requirements of soldiers and batteries. They would establish wireless stations and would bring the aviator detachments. In summary, they held out all the requirements for this expedition. Moreover, The Ottoman troops struggling in Roumania were ordered to be brought back for this undertaking.[1431]The testimony of the American consul at Aleppo shows the enthusiasm to recapture Baghdad. He conveyed that:

[1429] *Yıldırım,* p. 13; for the observations of the Americn consul of Damascus regarding the process of the preparations to recapture Baghdad, see; **PRO,** FO 371/3058, Grahame to FO "Memorandum of Conversation with Mr. Samuel Edelman, late United States Consul at Damascus", Paris, 10 June 1917; For a description of the process of the establishment of *Yıldırım,* see: *Birinci Dünya Harbi'nde Türk Harbi IV/II,* pp. 83-88.

[1430] Liman von Sander, *Fünf Jahre Türkei,* Verlag von August Sherl, Berlin:1920, p.219; **PA-AA,** Türkei 177, Bd.16, Bernstoff to Foreign Ministry; (Trasmitting Graf Schdenburg, Damascus), Constantinople, 21 November 1917

[1431] **PRO,** FO 371/3058, Grahame to FO "Memorandum of Conversation with Mr. Samuel Edelman, late United States Consul at Damascus", Paris, 10 June 1917,

> "While en route from Aleppo during the last week in May I met many train loads of troops, ammunition and great quantities of heavy artillery. I spoke to an Austrian officer about this business, who confirmed the fact that transports of heavy artillery on an intensive scale were going on. I imagine from what I saw that some of these guns were 8" or 9" guns… I want to convey the idea that the attack on Baghdad is certain. The information was also confirmed all along my line of journey. Aviators were seen going south in good numbers.
> While in Constantinople from May 29th to July 19th may thousands of troops were sent in that direction which proves that an effort is to be made at an early date in the attempt to re-take Baghdad at all costs."[1432]

Besides the transportation of troops to Iraq, the extention of the Baghdad railroad to Mosul and the production of *Shahtur* boats for sailing the troops towards Baghdad in the Euphrates were planned. Some parts of these plans were commenced to put into practice, especially for those regarding the production of the boats.[1433]

On the other hand, the British troops in the Sinai Front were intensifying their preparations for the capture of Palestine, and that process coincided with the Ottoman organization for an offensive to recapture Baghdad. Both the exploratory flights of the Ottoman aviators and the Bedouin intelligence reports made it clear for Cemal Pasha that in the short run, a third larger attack would take place against Gaza. The appointment of General Allenby, who was famous with his devoutness and bravery, as the commander-in-chief of the EEF with broad authority made it obvious that the British side was seriously considering the invasion of Palestine.[1434]

Unlike the situation in the Sinai Front, although the Ottoman Empire had lost its provincial capital, Baghdad, the state of affairs in the Iraqi front didn't have any indication of urgency. Following that achievement, the British troops proceeded to repair the existing railways and to start the construction of the new ones. Therefore, in the eyes of the Turkish commanders, the British expedition in Iraq had reached its natural boundaries for the time being and in a short while, they didn't expect any British advance in that front.[1435]

[1432] **PRO,** FO 371/3058, British Ambassador in Washington to FO, "Statement made by Mr. Jackson,[late] American Consul from Allepo", Washington, 30 August 1917.

[1433] *Yıldırım,* p. 20-23.

[1434] Von Kress to Cemal, 10 August 1917, in *Yıldırım,* p. 52.

[1435] *Yıldırım,* p. 37.

Moreover, the situation of the Ottoman troops in Aleppo, the Ottoman 7th Army, which reserved for the reconquest of Baghdad didn't paint a promising picture and the means in the hands of the Ottoman Army made the Baghdad project physically impossible. According to the remarks of Mustafa Kemal [Atatürk], the commander of the 7th Army:

> "The effectiveness of the divisions which would carry out the venture are weak and low in value. After two months' marching they would be nothing more than a rabble -to use a slight exaggeration. Our *shakturs* and Camels cannot compare with the enemy's railways and ships to Baghdad. Finally, one of the surest indications of the futility of the plan is that after two days' marching regiments would melt away."[1436]

On the other hand, the conditions of the troops in the Sinai Front needed an urgent reinforcement. According to the remarks of Von Kress, epidemics and desertions weakened very much the effectiveness of the army. The soldiers, who were sent to Gaza to cover the deficiencies of the divisions, arrived there "ruefully"[1437] and %25 of the reinforcement troops sent from Anatolia to cover the soldier deficiencies of the divisions deserted before they arrived at their destinations.[1438] Moreoever, the gap in the amount of the soldiers between the British and the Ottoman sides had tripled in five months after the second battle of Gaza. Therefore, Von Kress urged Cemal to insist before Enver on sending the new troops, which were in Aleppo for an offensive against Baghdad, to the Sinai Front.[1439]

In spite of all these disadvantages, Enver was extremely reluctant in the beginning to abandon the Baghdad enterprise. Persuading Enver Pasha to the necessity of the reinforcement in Gaza costed 5 months for the Ottoman side, which was so valuable for

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[1436] **PRO,** FO 370/215, Mustapha Kemal to Enver Pasha, 30 September 1917; the Turkish version of this report is available at; *Yıldırım*, p. 73. However, the date of the document is written as 20 September. When we take the abolishment date of the 4th Army and the appointment of Falkenhayn as the commander of the troops in Syria -26 September- 20 September is more plausible as the date of this document.

[1437] Von Kress to Cemal, 10 August 1917, in *Yıldırım,* p. 53; **BA-MA,** RM 5/2322, Humann to the Chef of Admiralstabs of Marine, Constantinople, 16 September 1917.

[1438] **PRO,** FO 371/3050, Sykes to FO, "Rough Notes of an Interview with Mr Edelman, recently American Consul at Damascus", Cairo, 6 July 1917.

[1439] Von Kress to Cemal, 10 August 1917, in *Yıldırım,* p. 53; **BA-MA,** RM 5/2322, Humann to the Chef of Admiralstabs of Marine, Constantinople, 16 September 1917.

the preparations in the Sinai Front to react to a strong British attack.[1440] In that period, the British side almost completed all their preparations for a third attack. At the end, in a very late date for the Ottoman troops in the Sinai, Enver understood the critical situation of the Sinai Front, and decided that a defeat in that front would "paralyze his undertaking to invade Baghdad" and was convinced to send the 7th Army to the Sinai Front.[1441]

After the persuasion of Enver, the position of Falkenhayn appeared as another issue, which caused problems between Enver, Cemal and Falkenhayn. Sending him back to Germany meant to abandon the German military and monetary assistance, which was required as the main condition to strenghten the Army in Palestine, and to reconquer Baghdad in its aftermath. Therefore, the question of Falkenhayn needed to be solved as early as possible to get the German assistance for both fronts. The first option was to put him under the command of Cemal Pasha, but he didn't accept it.[1442] On the other hand, Cemal was strongly opposing to putting the Ottoman forces in Syria under the command of Falkenhayn, since it would mean the practical abolition of his authority in Syria.[1443] In addition to that, Cemal was opposing to Enver's and Falkenhyn's course of action regarding the Sinai Front out of military considerations. They were planning to make an offensive to the British forces in the Gaza front by surrounding them in the desert. Instead of this, Cemal considered Palestine as the most critical front of the Ottoman Empire and proposed to reinforce it as strongly as possible with the troops, which would be transferred from the other fronts.[1444] In his telegraph to Enver some 3 three months before the fall of

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[1440] Indeed, Enver didn't change his mind about the recapture of Baghdad, while he was sending Falkenhayn to Gaza. He only delayed this plan as a result of increasing pressure regarding the necessity of reinforcement in Gaza. He explained his ideas on this issue in his telegram that was sent to Cemal Paşa. For further details see: **TTK Arşivi,** KO Koleksiyonu 3/64, Enver to Cemal, 3 Eylül 1333 [3 September 1917]

[1441] **TTK Arşivi,** KO Koleksiyonu 3/62, Enver to Cemal, 1 Eylül 1333 [1 September 1333]

[1442] *Yıldırım,* p. 48-58.

[1443] **PRO,** FO 371/3058, Rumbold to FO, Bern, 4 September 1917; **BA-MA,** RM 5/2322, Humann to Chef of Admiralstabs of Marine, Constantinople, 16 September 1917; **PA-AA,** Türkei 177, Bd.16, Bernstoff to AA, Constantinople, 24 November 1917.

Jerusalem, Cemal expressed his opposition to that kind of action with a very strong language:

> "From now, I would like to clarify that I can not consent to Falkenhayn who drove a nail to the Germans in Verdun to drive a[nother] nail to us in Sinai in the territory of my army as long as I command the 4th Army… I assume it as the strongest treason [*vatansızlık*] to tolerate an action which would be a disaster for the salvation of the fatherland ..."[1445]

In that case, the only solution was to recall Cemal Pasha to Istanbul. Indeed, His replacement had been contemplated in Istanbul with the change of the military situation in Sinai in favour of the British from the beginning of February 1917. The central government considered his removal necessary to win over the Arabs in this critical time. Furthermore, the moderation of the Arab policy and the reconciliation with the Arabs could only be realized by his dismissal.[1446] However, this action was inconvenient for two reasons; firstly, both German and Turkish authorities believed in the necessity of Cemal's "iron fist" on Syria and Palestine to control the "public order" in those regions. Therefore, his dismissal could have invited an uprisal in Syria. Secondly, his departure from Syria could have caused a problem of the provisioning for the Army corps in the Syrian provinces.[1447]

Another issue was the emergence of a possible Turco-German conflict with the appointment of a Christian commander as the head of the army. It was almost certain that putting all the command of the armies in Syria and Iraq under a German commander, would increase the conflict between the Ottoman and German soldiers. Therefore, almost all the Turkish commanders, Cemal Pasha and Mustafa Kemal being in the first place, were opposed to the combination of the armies of these two districts under a non-Muslim

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[1444] **TTK Arşivi,** KO Koleksiyonu 5/54,Cemal to Von Kress, 5 September 1917; Djemal Pasha, Ibid, p. 188; Cemal Paşa, Ibid, p. 14; **TTK Arşivi,** KO Koleksiyonu 5/46, Cemal to Enver, 29 Temmuz 1333 [29 July 1917]

[1445] **TTK Arşivi,** KO Koleksiyonu 5/54, Cemal to Enver, 5 September 1917.

[1446] **PA-AA,** Türkei 165, Bd.41, Kühlmann to Bethmann Hollweg (Transmitting v. Kress, Jerusalem). Constantinople, 23 February 1917.

[1447] **TTK Arşivi,** KO Koleksiyonu 3/62, Enver to Cemal, 1 Eylül 1333 [1 September 1917]; **PA-AA,** Türkei 177, Bd.16, Bernstoff to Foreign Ministry; (Trasmitting Graf Schdenburg, Damascus), Constantinople, 21 November 1917.

commander, and insisted to put Falkenhayn under the command of a Muslim general.[1448] As expected, following the emergence of the *Yıldırım,* most people in the Ottoman conscious circles met it with little symphaty and assessed as a harmful undertaking for the wealth and power of Turkey.[1449]

Howoever, the appointment of Falkenhayn, both would guarantee the German help and the *modus operandi* of the troops Sinai Front would be rearranged in the direction of Enver's desires, i.e. in an offensive way. In his telegram to Cemal, he explained that he sent the 7th Army from Aleppo to Gaza to make a striking offensive to the British forces there and to throw them out of the Sinai Peninsula.[1450] Now a delicate task came to Enver and, in agreement with the German Head Quarter, Enver decided to appoint Falkenhayn as the commander-in-chief of the Armies in Iraq and Syria on 26th September –only one month before the start of the third battle in Gaza. Before he made this decision, he sent a long telegram to Cemal when he was in Germany and convinced him that protecting Palestine from the British occupation could only have been possible when the resources reserved for the recapture of Baghdad transferred there. He also implied that this movement could only be realized if the commandership of these troops put under the command of Falkenhayn. That is to say, the arrival of the German assistance was conditioned with the appointment of him to the Sinai Front. Enver also convinced Cemal that the latter's existence was absolutely necessary for the maintenance of the public order in Syria.[1451] As a result, the 4th Army of Cemal Pasha was abolished and a new

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[1448] **PA-AA,** Türkei 177, Bd.16, Bernstoff to Foreign Ministry; (Trasmitting Graf Schdenburg, Damascus), Constantinople, 21 November 1917; **PRO,** FO 370/215, Mustapha Kemal to Enver Pasha, Ibid; *Yıldırım,* p. 75-76;

[1449] **BA-MA,** RM 5/2322, Humann to Chef of Admiralstabs of Marine, Constantinople, 16 September 1917.

[1450] **TTK Arşivi,** KO Koleksiyonu 3/62, Enver to Cemal, 1 Eylül 1333 [1 September 1333]; Even in the middle of September, Humann, a member of German military mission, conveyed the same remarks from Enver. He expressed that Enver Pasha desired to repulse the British troops from Sinai with a preventive attack before they made sufficient preparations there for an attack against Palestine. **BA-MA,** RM 5/2322, Humann to Chef of Admiralstabs of Marine, Contantinople, 16 September 1917.

[1451] **TTK Arşivi,** KO Koleksiyonu 3/62, Enver to Cemal, 1 Eylül 1333 [1 September 1333]; for the German version of the same telegraph see: **TTK Arşivi,** KO Koleksiyonu 3/63.

commandership was created to rehabilitate his tarnished honor, the commander-generalship of Syria and West Arabia. His headquarter were to be established in Damascus and his only military task was to provide the provisioning of the *Yıldırım* groups.[1452]

9.3.The Defeat in Birüssebi and Gaza, and the Capture of Palestine by the British

While the Ottomans were trying to agree on which front they had to concentrate their attacks, the British optimism on the easiness of the capture of the Palestine had already been destroyed with the shock of the two defeats at Gaza. Following the two battles of Gaza, they understood that they had to make considerable reinforcements to the Sinai Front in the sense of troops and ammunitions to prevail against the Ottoman forces there. As a second reason to make more concentration on Palestine was the British change of strategy comprised the advance on the eastern fronts to resolve the deadlock in the French Front and to enforce the Central Powers to a peace. [1453]

When the shift of the Ottoman and German interests to recapture Baghdad were taken into consideration, to attack the Ottoman front in Palestine was more advantageous for the British side than reinforcing the Iraqi Front since they had already made significant improvement in Iraq and made considerable reinforcement in the Sinai front for the Gaza wars. On the other hand, an occupation of Palestine by the British forces would enforce the Ottomans to transfer their troops to this front instead of mobilizing them to occupy Baghdad.[1454]

[1452] **ATASE Arşivi,** Kls, 77, Ds. 393, Fih. 30-1, Enver to Fourth Army and Yıldırım, 26 Eylül 1333 [26 September 1917]; the same document also available at: **TTK Arşivi,** EP Koleksiyonu, 4/55; and **TTK Arşivi,** KO Koleksiyonu 3/30,

[1453] Wavell, Ibid, p. 95.

[1454] Wavell, Ibid, p. 97.

Meanwhile the Commander of the British troops was changed and Allenby appointed as the Commander General of the troops in Egypt. The new commander was widely supported by the British Headquarters and all his demands were responded to.[1455] When the fighting started in Gaza and Birüssebi on 30th October, as a result of their intense preparations, the British forces were trebled the Ottoman troops.[1456] The third Battle, which took place in Birüssebi and Gaza, continued 9 days in a 50 km long front. The distance between the armies defending Gaza and Birüssebi brought the British army to a successful conclusion. Their achievement was to break the Gaza-Birüssebi line and to cut the intercommunication between the 7th Army defending Gaza and 8th Army defending Birüssebi. Thus, the reinforcement of the troops at Birüssebi was prevented and in a few days, these troops had to retreat behind Gaza. The Ottoman troops lost their grips there, due to the overwhelming prevalence of the British troops with respect to manpower and material support.[1457] On the other hand, the Ottoman troops at Gaza were exposed to cross

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[1455] The existing literature on the history of the Palestine campaigns attributes a special importance to the appointment of Allenby in acquirement of the achievements in Palestine. However, when we considered the enormous support given to him by the War Cabinet and the mentioned developments in the Ottoman front, the impact attributed to the change of the leader of the operations will be minimized. It won't be an exaggeration to conclude that Murray would also acquire the similar consequences, if he had been supported in the same measure; Woodwards, Ibid; Grainger, Ibid; Wavell, Ibid,

[1456] According to the account of the British official history "The official rifle strength of the E.E.F. on the 28th October 1917 was :Infantry Divisions and Camel Brigade 80,000, Cavalry 15,000. These figures include, however, large numbers employed in special duties and not available with battalions and regiments. The actual strengths may be taken as about 60,000 and 12,000 respectively. An army on the defensive can employ a considerably higher proportion of its rifle strength than one which is attacking." Macmunn and Falls, *Military Operations II,* p. 35; On the other hands, the number of the Ottoman infantry was approximately 25.000 souls and the number of the Ottoman artilleries was one-half of the British artilleries, approximately 206. Consequently, the British side had an overwhelming prevalence against the Ottomans in the third battle, quite the reverse of the first two. *Yıldırım,* p. 177; In addition, When the first fightings broke out, the morale of the Ottoman troops started to be progressively worse because of under-feeding. It made the resistance of the Ottoman troops weaker; [1456] **PRO,** FO 371/3058, Thomson to Campell, "Situation in Turkey", New Scotland Yard, 4 October 1917; *Yıldırım,* p. 177-179

[1457] **PA-AA**, Türkei 177, Bd.16, Bernstoff to Foreign Ministry; (Trasmitting Graf Schdenburg, Damascus). Constantinople, 21 November 1917; for the retreat report see: Von Kress to Yıldırım, 8 November 1917, in *Yıldırım,* p. 167; For a detailed description of

fire from the sea and the ground. The response of the German U-boots to the naval action of the British side was so weak because the flat ground of the sea. According to the German consul in Damascus, the British frontal artillery fire and aviator attacks made an additional demoralizing effect on the Ottoman troops. Following that, at the end of a 9-day lasting battle, on 8th November, the Ottoman soldiers started to "stampede" from their trenches towards Jerusalem.[1458]

The loss of Gaza would presumably end up with getting Jerusalem out of hand. The following day of the finalization of the battle for Gaza with its loss, Falkenhayn advised the German Consul of Jerusalem to prepare for the departure from the city. In the same day, the Consul transferred the deposits of the consulate to Damascus and agreed with the Spanish consul on the diplomatic representation of Germany by the latter in Jerusalem. He also told German representative in Jaffa to depart in the direction of Nablus if necessary and wait ready for the departure.[1459] The German diplomatic personnel at Jaffa were left there on 10th November, as soon as they took Falkenhayn's advice.[1460]

On 16th November, The British troops advancing throughout the coast had entered Jaffa. The invasion of Jaffa made them nearer to the capture of Jerusalem. The next day, the British threat against Jerusalem caused to the relocation of Falkenhayn's headquarters to Nablus. After that, the British side started to entrench their positions for an attack against Jerusalem and they reinforced their deployments with new troops. They were very cautious about the attack by the impact of their experiences in the first and second battle of Gaza.[1461]

On 8th December, the British forces made a surprise attack to the Ottoman trenches in Jerusalem taking the advantage of rainy and foggy weather. As a result of the 20 hour

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the third war in Gaza from the Ottoman Military sources, see: *Birinci Dünya Harbi'nde Türk Harbi IV/II,* pp. 130-150.

1458 **PA-AA,** Türkei 177, Bd. 16, Brode to AA, Damascus, 8 December 1917.

1459 **PA-AA,** Türkei 177, Bd.15, Bernstorff to AA (Transmitting Jerusalem Consul), Constantinople, 10 November 1917.

1460 **PA-AA,** Türkei 177, Bd.15, Bernstoff to AA, Constantinople, 14 November 1917.

1461 *Yıldırım,* p. 218-249.

lasting battles the British troops forced the Ottoman forces to evacuate Jerusalem.[1462] According to Ali Fuad's [Erden] report, the commander of the 20th Ottoman Army Corps, he had defended his deployment in Jerusalem. But, Falkenhayn didn't want to cause the destruction of the city of Jerusalem with conflicts and therefore, his army corps evacuated the city and withdrew towards north. He also complained about the lack of reinforcement and claimed that Jerusalem was wasted [by Falkenhayn] *[zayi edilmek]*.[1463] The governor of Jerusalem confirmed his remarks. However, he narrated this event with positive words expressing that his soul wouldn't accept the destruction of such a city, which was presumed as sacred by the entire world, under the artillery fire.[1464] On 8th December, He delivered a letter to the mayor of the city addressing the British commander and created a police force for the maintanence of the order in the city. After that, on 9th December, he left there in a silence with the Ottoman officials under his administration. Thus, the destruction of this sacred city was prevented except for some small damage on the buildings in the exterior side of the city.[1465]

The capture of Jerusalem offered an opportunity to Cemal to criticize both the policies of the Ottoman Central Government and the actions of the Yıldırım Army Group. In each opportunity he criticized Falkenhayn.[1466] In a banquet held in Beirut in his honor, Cemal expressed that he would defend Palestine if the Central Government had not intervened in his actions there, sending Falkenhayn to this front. He, too, devastated the entire front changing the order of the troops from a defensive character to an offensive

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[1462] **TTK Arşivi,** KO Koleksiyonu 10/48, Ali Fuad to Cemal, 10 Aralık 1333 [10 December 1917]; Falkenhayn to Enver, 9 December 1917, in *Yıldırım,* p. 255.

[1463] **TTK Arşivi,** KO Koleksiyonu 10/48, Ali Fuad to Cemal, 10 Aralık 1333 [10 December 1917]

[1464] **DH. ŞFR. 573/68,** İzzet to Talat, Eriha, 10 Kanun-ı Evvel 1333 [10 December 1917].

[1465] **DH. ŞFR. 573/68,** İzzet to Talat, Eriha, 10 Kanun-ı Evvel 1333 [10 December 1917]; **PA-AA,** Türkei 177, Bd.16, Ziemke to Hertling, Jerusalem, 18 December 1917; ; For a detailed description of the military operations around Jerusalem, see: *Birinci Dünya Harbi'nde Türk Harbi IV/II,* pp. 385-439.

[1466] **PA-AA,** Türkei 177, Bd.16, Bernstoff to Foreign Ministry, Constantinople, 24 November 1917.

one.[1467] In another meeting, he expressed his frustration against Falkenhayn with the words "imbecile" and "adventurer".[1468] Similarly, in his telegram sent to Enver immediately after the loss of Jerusalem, he expressed his frustration:

> "I do not give my blessing to Falkenhayn Pasha and I do not forgive him, since he wasted the available forces for the sake of an offensive warfare fantasy, before securing the absolute defense of Jerusalem... [He was the one who] caused the fall of the city. All the material and moral responsibility of this incident belongs to this man, who grasped this title unjustly."[1469]

On the other hand, the capture of Jerusalem made a great echo in Istanbul among the prominent members of the CUP at the same time. A telegram, which was sent, by Cemal Pasha and harshly criticizing Falkenhayn was read in the meeting of the central committee of the CUP in the presence of the ministers. The situation in Jerusalem caused a great demoralization among the members of the Central Committee. However, they were ready to support the government to prevent any internal crisis.[1470]

One of the most interesting reactions came from the Papacy. The State-Secretary of the Pope published a declaration in L'Osservatore Romano (The Roman Observer), the semi-official newspaper of the Holy See, and congragulated the British Army since they saved the holy lands from the yoke of the infidels. The reaction of the German Government to this expression was to respond to the Holy See that the British Expedition against Jerusalem didn't resemble that of the Crusades and it didn't differentiate from their expeditions in Mesopotamia and Dardanelles. At the same time, they endeavored to prevent the dissemination of this declaration inside Germany.[1471] In the response of the

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[1467] **PA-AA,** Türkei 177, Bd. 16, Mutius to Bernstoff, Beirut, 7 December 1917.

[1468] **PA-AA,** Türkei 177, Bd.16, Bernstoff to AA (Trasmitting Graf Schdenburg, Damascus). Constantinople, 21 November 1917.

[1469] **TTK Arşivi,** KO Koleksiyonu 4/14, Cemal to Enver, 11 December 1917.

[1470] **PA-AA,** Türkei 177, Bd.16, Bernstoff to Foreign Ministry, Constantinople, 23 November 1917.

[1471] **PA-AA,** Türkei 177, Bd. 16, Hertling to the Apostolic Nuncio Archbishop Eugen Pacelli in Munich, Berlin, 22 December 1917.

Papacy, it was pointed out that they didn't have any political aim with this explanation. This declaration purely reflected their religious thought.[1472]

The fall of Jerusalem signified the end of Cemal in Syria as well. After it became apparent that Jerusalem would fall into the British hands, Cemal applied to Enver to return to Istanbul. In his telegram to Enver on 20th November, he stated that, after the relocation of the *Yıldırım's* headquarters to Nazareth, he "came to a position that doesn't allow him to stay in Syria." He noted that Akka and Kerak towns were included in the *Yıldırım's* region of control, and soon Damascus would be added to them. Following that, he would be harmfully redundant there. Therefore, he suggested to Enver, leaving all the moral thoughts aside, to accept the following offers: firstly, to abrogate the General Commanderate of Syria and the West Arabia and to re-create the 4th Army again under the Command of Mersinli Cemal Pasha and leave the organization of the Arab affairs to this army, which would be attached to the Central Headquarters directly. Secondly, Cemal offered that the *Yıldırım* Army Groups should have had the authorization to give orders to the 4th Army in the issues of provisioning and transport of the troops. He especially demanded Enver to give the organization of the Arab affairs to Mersinli Cemal Pasha to keep the Germans away from asserting their existence on Syria.[1473] Mersinli Cemal had an advanced grasp of Arabic, and he was employed in the region for a long time. Therefore, The Arabs and the tribes in the region gave a wide credence to him.[1474]

In his supplementary telegram that he sent three days later, Cemal described the way he would be deposed. In his plan, he would be deemed as off-duty for five months under the color of the health problems. In the same telegram, he guaranteed that in case of necessity, he was always ready to return to his post in Syria.[1475] In the same day, Enver

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[1472] **PA-AA,** Türkei 177, Bd.16, Eugen Paulli to Hertling, Monaco, 26 December 1917.

[1473] **TTK Arşivi,** KO Koleksiyonu 7/126, Cemal to Enver, 20 Teşrin-i Sani 1333 [20 November 1917].

[1474] Liman von Sanders, Ibid, p. 269.

[1475] **TTK Arşivi,** KO Koleksiyonu 8/142, Cemal to Enver, 23 Teşrin-i Sani 1333 [23 November 1917].

answered his request and accepted all his offers.[1476] Cemal notified his departure to Falkenhayn. The lattler received this event with pleasure, and expressed his sorrow of not being able to find a way to work together for the mutual aim.[1477] After that, he packed his house and sent it to Istanbul.[1478] On 13th December he left Damascus for Istanbul.[1479] Thus, an era had been closed in the history of Syria.

Shortly after Cemal's return from Syria, Falkenhayn was also dismissed and returned to Germany. After that, Liman von Sanders, the president of the German Military Reform Committee was appointed as the Commander-in-Chief in Syria. The Ottoman Army in Syria could successfully resist the British attacks in the east and west of the Sharia River for some ten months. On 1st October 1918, however, the British forces managed to capture the provincial capital, Damascus, which signified the end of the Ottoman rule in Syria.[1480]

9.4.The Impact of the Sharifian Revolt on the Military Situation in Syria

While the British Expedition was taking place from Egypt against Syria, another expedition started to move towards the same direction in Hicaz under the command of Faysal, the younger son of the Sharif. The prominent members of the Arabist movement and the contemporary Arab academics attributed crucial importance to the role of this

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1476 **TTK Arşivi,** KO Koleksiyonu 8/141, Enver to Cemal, 23 Teşrin-i Sani 1333 [23 November 1917].

1477 **TTK Arşivi,** KO Koleksiyonu 8/148, Falkenhayn to Cemal, 30 Kanun-ı Evvel 1333 [30 December 1917].

1478 **PA-AA,** Türkei 177, Bd.16, Bernstoff to AA (Trasmitting Graf Schdenburg, Damascus), Constantinople, 21 November 1917.

1479 **PA-AA,** Türkei 177, Bd. 16, without signature to AA, 15 December 1917.

1480 **PA-AA,** Türkei 177, Bd.18, Bernstoff to Foreign Ministry (Transmitting consul Damascus), Aleppo, 6 October 1918.

movement in their memoirs[1481] and studies[1482] in the Ottoman rule's coming to a close in the Arab lands. Taking the validity of these claims into question, this section aims at an analysis of the role of Faysal's expedition in the Ottoman defeat in Syria.

Immediately after his proclamation of revolt in Mecca against the Ottoman authority, Sharif Hussein was dismissed from the post of the Meccan Amirate and, instead of him, Ali Haidar was appointed as the new Amir. Simultaneously, Cemal Pasha was ordered by the Central Government to start preparations for an expedition to suppress Hussein's revolt[1483], and to secure the possession of Medina.[1484] As the first measure in this sense, on 28th June, Fahri Pasha, the Commandant of 12th Army Corps was sent by Cemal Pasha to Medina to command the Hijaz Expedition[1485] with considerable amount of auxiliaries. His initial task was to recapture Mecca and to suppress the Sharif's movement. In a month, after the outbreak of the Revolt, 11 battalions, 2 machine-gun companies, 1 Mountain battery and some field batteries were ready to depart for Medina. According to Metternich, a German official, the soldiers, to be sent to Medina were only of Turkish

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[1481] Ahmad Kadri, Ibid, p. 283-288; Darwaza, Ibid, p. 289-292; Amin Saeed, Ibid, p. 229.

[1482] Kadri Kal'acı, *Es-Sevretü'l-Arabiyyetü'l-Kübra 1916-1924,*Beirut: Şeriketü'l-Matbuat li't-Tevzi ve'n-Neşr, 1993; Mustafa Talas, *Es-Sevretü'l-Arabiyyetü'l-Kübra,* Damascus: Talas Liddirasat ve't-Tercume ve'n-Neşr, 1987; Sulaiman Musa, *Es-Sevretü'l-Arabiyyetü'l-Kübra,* Amman: Dairetü's-Sekafe ve'l-Fünun, 1966.

[1483] **PA-AA,** Türkei 165, Bd.40, Marguerr to AA (Transmitting Stotzingen), Jerusalem, 14 September 1916.

[1484] **TTK Arşivi,** KO Koleksiyonu 11/124, Cemal to Enver (transmitting the Protector of Medina), 11 Haziran 1332 [24 June 1916]

[1485] **PRO,** FO 371/2773, McMahon to FO, "Arab Question", Cairo, 28 June 1916. In the beginning of the Revolt, Enver proposed to enable sheding blood between Sharif and the tribes supporting him to facilitate the suppress of the Sharif's movement. It would prevent the collaboration of the two sides for further actions against the Government. He proposed to assign this mission to Ibn Rashid. However, he warned to avoid coshering-şımartmak-Ibn Rashid, while trying to get rid of another one; **TTK Arşivi,** KO Koleksiyonu 11/132, Enver to Cemal, 30 Mayıs 1332 [11 Haziran 1916].

origins, “meaning that they were qualified soldiers”.[1486] Addition to that, to reinforce the troops in Medina, a few regiment from Aleppo were sent there.[1487]

Before the arrival of the Hijaz Expeditionary Force in Medina, the attempt of Sharif’s oldest son, Sharif Ali to capture Medina, synchronous to his father’s uprisal in Mecca, was easily repulsed by the Ottoman forces in Medina. [1488] After reaching some auxiliaries to Medina, Fahri Pasha managed to sustain the Ottoman domination in Medina strongly and guaranteed the security of the Hijaz Railroad.[1489] By 29th July 1916, the Ottoman Government had ensured tranquility in the Northern Hijaz killing 3.000 bedouins, taking 700 of them as hostages and executing 50 of the Medinans who supported the Sharif.[1490]

Cemal had made enthusiastic preparations in the beginnings of the Sharif’s movement to destroy it totally. In a short span of time, he fully realized that this task had great difficulties. First of all, this operation would need a great number of soldiers. In addition, they had to be supplied continuously with foodstuffs from Syria, which was in dire straits itself. Finally, the condition of the railroads reaching Medina was not promising for a continuous support.[1491] As a result of all these problems, in a few months, after the outbreak of the Sharifian Revolt, an idea of the Meccan Expedition was totally abandoned and Fahreddin Pasha’s mission was restricted to protect Medina.[1492]

[1486] **PA-AA,** Türkei 165, Bd.38, Metternich to Bethmann Hollweg, Constantinople, 23 July 1916.

[1487] **PA-AA,** Türkei 165, Bd.38, Metternich to Bethmann Hollweg (Tranmitting Consul Damascus), Constantinople, 2 July 1916.

[1488] **PA-AA,** Türkei 165, Bd.38, Loytved to Bethmann Hollweg, Damascus, 25 June 1916.

[1489] **PA-AA,** Türkei 165, Bd.38, Metternich to Bethmann Hollweg, Constantinople, 23 July 1916.

[1490] **PA-AA,** Türkei 165, Bd.38, Metternich to Bethmann Hollweg, Constantinople, 1 July 1916.

[1491] **PA-AA,** Türkei 165, Bd.40, Marguerr to AA (Transmitting Stotzingen), Jerusalem, 14 September 1916.

[1492] **BOA,** DH. ŞFR. 540/100, Ali Haydar to Talat, Medine, 6 Kanun-ı Evvel 1332 [19 December 1916]; **PA-AA,** Türkei 165, Bd.41, Loytved to Bethmann Hollweg, Damascus, 5 January 1917.

The number of the troops in Medina was around 20.000, and far more exceeding the limitations of this city.[1493] Furthermore, the daily need for provisioning of troops in and around of Medina was reaching 46 tones of grain.[1494] As a result, in a short while, a danger of famine appeared among the troops there. Six months after the outbreak of the revolt, the new Amir, Ali Haidar, was swearing that they didn't have foodstuffs for the troops even for one day.[1495] His greatest fear was to be captured by Sharif Hussein as the consequence of a capture of Medina by the latter.[1496]

However, after a short while, both the difficulties to supply foods in Medina and the deterioration of the Ottoman situation in the Sinai Front made the Ottoman and German officials in Syria thought to relocate the Medina Garrison at Maan to reinforce the defense of Palestine in spite of its tremendous political and religious consequences. With the surrender of Medina, the title of the Ottoman Caliph as the protector of the Holy Places would be meaningless.[1497] On the other hand, the capture of Palestine would mean the loss of Medina as a result of the disconnection of Medina with Syria.[1498] In his visit to Syria, Enver was persuaded by Von Kress to the necessity of an evacuation of Medina with military considerations.[1499] But, Talat objected to this project on the account of the fact that the leaving of Medina to the hands of Sherif would cause the loss of the support of Ibn Reshid and Ibn Saud for the Ottoman Empire. As a result, the idea of evacuation was

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[1493] **PA-AA,** Türkei 165, Bd.41, Kühlmann to Bethmann Hollweg, Constantinople, 13 March 1917; **HHStA,** PA 38/369, From Ranzi to Burian. "Der Aufstand im Hedjas". Damascus, 22 July (June ??) 1916.

[1494] Ali Fuad to Yıldırım, undated, in *Yıldırım,* p. 292-293.

[1495] **BOA,** DH.ŞFR. 540/51, Ali Haidar to Talat, Medine, 2 Kanun-ı Evvel 1332 [15 December 1916].

[1496] **BOA,** DH.ŞFR, 542/64, Ali Haydar to Talat, Medine, 28 Kanun-ı Evvel 1332 [10 January 1917].

[1497] **PA-AA,** Türkei 165, Bd.41, Kühlmann to Bethmann Hollweg, Constantinople, 13 March 1917.

[1498] **PA-AA,** Türkei 165, Bd.41, Kühlmann to Bethmann Hollweg (Transmitting v. Kress). Constantinople, 23 February 1917.

[1499] **PA-AA,** Türkei 165, Bd.41, Kühlmann to Bethmann Hollweg (Transmitting v. Kress), Constantinople, 4 March 1917.

totally shelved.[1500] Instead, the evacuation of Medina was restricted to the relocation of the ones, who didn't have any military function, such as wounded soldiers and some of the local people.[1501]

Meanwhile, the abandonment of the Meccan Expedition and, thus, the certainty that Sharif's rebellion would continue, increased the support to Sharif among the Bedouin tribes in and around Mecca,[1502] who had to find an ally to be able to compensate their needs for foodstuffs.[1503] With the increasing support of Britain and securing the loyalty of the Bedouins by the British gold, the Sharif started to expand his movement towards the north, being tangent to Medina since it was strongly fortified by the Ottoman forces. The move towards the North could only be actualized with gaining the support of the Bedouin tribes on the road. It was not difficult for him as long as the British gold and foodstuffs continued to pour. As was expressed by Cemal Pasha, if the Ottoman Empire had more gold, then the loyalty of these tribes would be obtained by the Ottoman side.[1504]

There were no Ottoman troops untill Akaba. The only thing to be done to take control over those places was to obtain the support of the Bedouins. Faysal advanced up to that place without confronting any serious difficulty by the Ottomans. However, with the appearance of the Sharifian danger for Akaba, the Ottomans reinforced their troops in that place creating the volunteer troops from the Bedouins[1505] and by the forces transferred

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[1500] Talat to Cemal, 7 March 1917, in Feridun Kandemir, *Fahreddin Paşa'nın Medine Müdafaası,* Istanbul: Yağmur Yayınları, 2009, p. 75.

[1501] Kandemir, Ibid, p. 77-79; the transfer of the troops holding in Medina to the Palestine Front had concerned the British Side. Therefore, they tried to manipulate Faysal to surround Medina instead of advancing towards north. Teitelbaum, Ibid, p. 90.

[1502] **TTK Arşivi,** KO Koleksiyonu 11/124, Cemal to Enver (transmitting the Protector of Medina), 11 Haziran 1332 [24 June 1916]

[1503] **ATASE Arşivi,** Kls. 3208, Ds. 16, Fih. 2-1, Cemal [Mersinli] to Cemal, 13 Temmuz 1333 [13 July 1917].

[1504] Djemal Pasha, Ibid, p. 34.

[1505] Rogan, Ibid, p. 233.

from the Canal area, although it was not so strong to assure the city from Faysal's capture.[1506]

In April 1917, Faysal decided to capture Akaba. The following three months passed with the activities to establish good relations with the tribes around Akaba. After securing their support, on 6th July Akaba was surrounded and in two weeks, its capture had been completed.[1507] After the occupation of Akaba, the EEF and Faysal's troops had come very close to each other -180 km[1508] and a direct connection had been established between the two fronts. Therefore, the combination of them was required. The British officials in Cairo sent Lawrence to Jeddah to persuade the Sharif. He persuaded the Sharif and Faysal himself and his troops came under the command of Allenby. Thus, the combination of the two fronts was achieved.[1509]

However, Faysal's troops were not adequate to retain the city for long. The remarks of a member of the British military mission there clarify the situation at Akaba after the invasion:

> "The regular Arab Army although showing great improvement in organization and discipline can as yet scarcely be reckoned on as a fighting unit of much military value. Lack of good officers is the great difficulty, and the old feud between Baghdad and Syrian nationalities among the officers makes itself felt in the lower ranks and impairs its efficiency as a whole. Transport difficulties also have not yet been adjusted, or are likely to be for some time to come, therefore a considerable portion of the Army is quite immobile and could not be supplied in the field with either food or other necessaries. The regular Arab Army therefore and the Bedouins can scarcely be considered a sufficient garrison to Akaba in the event of the Turks making a determined effort to retake the place, and are in reality more of a bluff than an effective fighting force."[1510]

Faysal was "very frightened that any day now the Turks may attack and that he would not have a single transport animal fit to carry supplies and ammunition to his troops". In the

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[1506] **PRO,** FO 371/3047, Viceroy to High Comissioner in Egypt, Delhi, 4 December 1916.

[1507] Teitelbaum, Ibid, p. 91-93.

[1508] Kandemir, Ibid, p. 126.

[1509] Teitelbaum, Ibid, p. 93.

[1510] **PRO,** WO 158/634, Joyce to Clayton, Akaba, 12 September 1917; the weakness of Faysal's troops was also confirmed by a member of French Military Mission in Akaba. For further information see: **MAEE**, Guerre 1914-1918, 881/Turquie, Syrie et Palestine, Mercier to MAE, Cairo, 20 November 1917.

same way, the commander of the Ottoman troops assigned to fight Faysal had expressed in his dispatch to Cemal Pasha that he was sure about recapture Akaba easily.[1511] However, the lack of food and water compelled him to fortify Maan instead of undertaking to recapture Akaba with cavalry and infantry.[1512] In the following months, the provisioning and ammunition of the troops in Akaba was provided by the British and the French Warships from Egypt.[1513]

Although the British Army in Egypt largely supported them, the Ottoman side was outstandingly superior to Faysal's troops in Akaba. His troops organized raids against the Hijaz Railway. Therefore, Mersinli Cemal Pasha, the commander of the 8th Army Corps was assigned to suppress them with a considerable number of troops.[1514] In regard to that, Cafer Pasha el-Askeri was complaining to Mercier, a member of the French Military Mission in Cairo, in his visit to Akaba that the Ottoman field artillery was faster than theirs, and in a battle they had destroyed four of their artillery pieces before the start of the fighting.[1515] The small-scale fightings between the Ottoman soldiers and Faysal's solders culminated in heavy losses of the latter. An Ottoman attack to the Bedouins in Fuyle resulted with heavy losses of them, and the Ottoman troops were always able to control them.[1516] In another attack to Wadi Musa on 21st October, their casualties were 200 in

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[1511] **ATASE Arşivi,** Kls. 3208, Ds. 16, Fih. 3, The Commander of the 8th Army Corps to Cemal, 12 Temmuz 1333 [12 July 1917].

[1512] **PRO,** WO 158/634, Joyce to Clayton, Akaba, 12 September 1917; **ATASE Arşivi,** Kls. 3208, Ds. 16, Fih. 2-1, Cemal [Mersinli] to Cemal, 13 Temmuz 1333 [13 July 1917].

[1513] **MAEE**, Guerre 1914-1918, 881/Turquie, Syrie et Palestine, Mercier to MAE, Cairo, 20 November 1917.

[1514] **ATASE Arşivi,** Kls. 176, Ds. 726, Fih. 26-1, Fuad to Enver, 13 Teşrin-i Sani 1333 [13 November 1917].

[1515] **MAEE**, Guerre 1914-1918, 881/Turquie, Syrie et Palestine, Mercier to MAE, Cairo, 20 November 1917.

[1516] **ATASE Arşivi,** Kls. 3208, Ds. 17, Fih. 18, Cemal to Enver, 2 Agustos 1333 [2 August 1917].

killed and 300 in wounded.[1517] Similar fightings continued at intervals till the total withdrawal of the Ottoman troops from the region.[1518]

Following the occupation of Akaba, the Hijaz Front entered into a period of tranquility. The tribes under the command of Faysal organized small-scale raids against the Ottoman troops resulted with small losses, and sabotaged the Hijaz Railroad that was taking foodstuffs and ammunition to the troops in Medina.[1519] However, In spite of their attacks to the Railroad continuing through the next 1.5 years, they failed to invade the Railroad and cut the communication with the Ottoman troops in Medina.[1520] As a result of the capture of Akaba, the support of the small Bedoun tribes to Faysal in and around the region increased.[1521] Nevertheless, the main improvement of the troops in the east of Sharia River could be possible by the turn of the British troops from Palestine towards the east following the capture of Jerusalem, rather than the success of Faysal's Bedouins. The attempts of General Allenby to combine Faisal's troops with that of himself on 21st February and 25th March 1918 by the invasion of Transjordan was repulsed two times by the Ottomans and his tribal alliances. In the second attack, the British troops obtained a temporary success in Salt, but the Ottomans reconquered it. The position of the Ottoman troops there, was defended till the final British attack on 18-19th September 1918, which

[1517] **PRO,** WO 158/634, Arbur to Dirmilint, Cairo, 26 October 1917.

[1518] For the examples of such attacks see: **ATASE Arşivi,** Kls. 3208, Ds. 17, Fih. 21,21-1, Cemal to Enver, 3 Ağustos 1333 [3 August 1917]; **ATASE Arşivi,** Kls. 3208, Ds. 17, Fih. 23,23-1, Cemal to Enver, 3 Ağustos 1333 [3 August 1917]; **ATASE Arşivi,** Kls. 3208, Ds. 17, Fih. 31, Cemal to Enver, 5 Ağustos 1333 [5 August 1917]; **ATASE Arşivi,** Kls. 3208, Ds. 18, Fih. 20, Cemal to Enver, 22 Ağustos 1333 [22 August 1917]; **ATASE Arşivi,** Kls. 3768, Ds. 28, Fih. 15, Cemal to Enver, 23 Eylül 1333 [23 September 1917];

[1519] **ATASE Arşivi,** Kls. 176, Ds. 126, Fih. 26-1, Fuad to Enver, 13 Teşrin-i Sani 1333 [13 November 1917]; **ATASE Arşivi,** Kls. 3208, Ds. 16, Fih. 76, 76-1, Cemal to Enver, 23 Temmuz 1333 [23 July 1917]

[1520] **PA-AA,** Türkei 177, Bd.17, Oppenheim to Ludendorf, Berlin, 27 July 1918.

[1521] **ATASE Arşivi,** Kls. 3208, Ds. 16, Fih. 15, 15-1, Cemal to Enver, 14 Temmuz 1333 [14 July 1917]; **ATASE Arşivi,** Kls. 3208, Ds. 16, Fih. 34, Cemal to Enver, 14 Temmuz 1333 [14 July 1917]

would cause the end of the Ottoman rule in Syria.[1522] The Ottoman troops defended Kerak, Salt and Hauran with success until the very last moment.[1523] The capture of the east Jordan could be achieved only several days before the capture of Damascus.[1524]

Taking the struggle between the Ottoman troops and that of Faysal into consideration, it can be concluded that the Sharif's revolt didn't acquire an outstanding achievement in military terms against the Ottoman forces both in Medina and in Syria. They were able to make considerable improvement towards Syria after the collapse of the Ottoman front in the east of the Sharia River. In other words, the main share in the capture of Syria belonged to Allenby's forces. On the other hand, the Ottoman Army in Syria was considerably affected with the outburst of Sharif's Revolt both pinning considerable troops in Medina and deploying troops in Maan to drive away the Bedouin raids against the Hijaz Railroad in and around Akaba.

[1522] Rogan, Ibid, pp. 234-240; When the British forces entered into Salt, They proposed to the leaders of the most prominent family of the city, the Tufan family, to take the British side, and promised great rewards in exchange for their support. In reply to that offer, the members of the family refused this offer and preferred to take the Ottoman side. Hereupon, the British forces imprisoned and tortured them. However, the leaders insisted in their attitudes and waited till the recapture of the city by the Ottoman side to release; **BOA,** DH. ŞFR. 584/160, Tahsin to Talat, 21 Mayıs 1334 [21 May 1918].

[1523] Between 26th and 31th March the British forces made several attacks to these places, but in each time they had been repulsed along the whole front following a fierce competition: **BA-MA,** RM 5/2323, Humann to Chef Admiralstabs of Marine, Aleppo, 22 April 1918; Liman von Sanders, Ibid, p. 268-270; They repeated the attack between 30th April and 4th May, and able to capture Salt temporarily. But, the Ottoman troops could recapture there after a decisive victory; Liman von Sanders, Ibid, p. 278-298.

[1524] **PA-AA,** Türkei 177, Bd.18, Waldburg to Hertling (Transmitting Consul Damascus), Constantinople, 25 September 1918; Liman von Sanders, Ibid, pp. 337-382.

CONCLUSION

When Cemal Pasha departed from the Haydar Pasha station in İstanbul for Syria, he was not only determined in terms of the conquest of Egypt as his ultimate goal, but he was seriously premeditating the "re-formation" of the state in Syria, which was "occupied" by the penetration of the foreign states by various instruments for decades. The conquest of Egypt was an exciting ideal for Cemal Pasha, which would make him a hero of the Ottoman history as well as paving the way for the higher positions in the Ottoman Government. Furthermore, a victory in Egypt would bring prestige to the Ottoman state among its citizens, while putting Cemal in the center of the War. The overwhelmingly pro-Ottoman attitude of the various sections of the Egyptian society increased the success expectancy of this operation in spite of the proportional power of the British troops in Egypt. For those reasons, even after the failure of the first expedition, for a long while, Cemal considered to organize a second expedition against the Canal with a larger army. To the contrary of what the existing sources claimed, he earnestly desired the conquest of Egypt and made preparations in Syria for a conquest expedition against Egypt via the Suez Canal. The great construction works of railways and chausseed roads endeavored in the Sinai Desert to facilitate the transport of the soldiers make that aim evident.

When the construction works by Meissner Pasha, in the sense of railroad and chausseed roads in the Sinai Desert upon the order of Cemal, for an expedition against Egypt are taken into consideration, the claims of Cemal Pasha and the people in his entourage that the expedition was organized as a tactic to bind the British troops in Egypt, give the impression that they were, in fact, excuses produced later to legitimize the failure of the expedition. However, in spite of Cemal's failure to capture Egypt, the preparations

made for this expedition in the Desert provided a strong defense to his troops in Syria during the British expedition from Egypt, and caused great casualties to them. If Enver had not intervened in the defense of the Palestine front and had made the necessary assistance to Cemal instead of the organization of a new expedition to recapture Baghdad, it would not have been a weak possibility for Cemal's troops in Gaza to defend their fronts in a stronger way, and perhaps, would enforce Great Britain to a peace without losing the Syrian territories, as indeed claimed by Cemal in his memoirs.

As for the second aim, i.e. the "re-formation" of the state in Syria, or with the remarks of the German consul in Damascus the "re-conquest" of it from the foreign penetaration and any kind of local intermediary, Cemal was more successful at least in the short term. First of all, it is worth to clarify that, throughout his governorate in Syria, Cemal didn't consider the possibility that the Ottoman Rule in Syria would come to an end following the WWI. On the opposite, all his actions analyzed throughout the chapters of this study clearly demonstrate that he calculated the Ottoman rule in Syria as permanent. Thus, Cemal's governorate in Syria was not a life and death struggle to make the Ottoman state living. Rather, he endeavored to "re-form" the Ottoman state in Syria for the post-war period, using the modern nation-states as a model. In this regard, the direction of Cemal's activities in Syria and the picture of the Syrian urban and Bedouin society when he arrived there, also open the consequences of the processes of centralization in the preceding periods up for discussion. On the verge of the WWI, due to the character of the reform movements of the pre-war times that took the localities into consideration and due to the competition with the Great Powers, the local interest groups and some autonomous structures continued to exist as important factors in the local politics of Syria. However, Cemal assessed these socially efficient groups as an impediment or barrier for a direct control of the state over its citizens in Syria, and, as one of the most important leaders of the ruling party CUP and, as a significant member of the Cabinet, he set out to eliminate them.

In this regard, first of all, Cemal turned a hand to the question of Arabism with his strong personality in the Ottoman politics, which showed, according to him, a potential to mobilize the sentiments of the Muslim population in Syria, which constituted the great majority, towards the Ottoman state in future. The CUP circles thought it for a long time

that the Arabist movement, which had some connections with the foreign states, was a threat for the unity of the Ottomans. Although, the CUP leaders looked for a way to compromise with the Arabists after the first Arab congress in Paris in 1913, it is understood from their special reports and memoirs, that they did not consider the Arabists as serious reform demanders, but rather some self-seekers caring for their personal benefits. Due to these misperception, the prejudices of the Republican Turkey regarding the Arabs as the "traitors" to the Empire were based on the Unionist misunderstanding of the aims of the Arabists, and their perception of this movement as an organization facilitating the designs of the Great Powers. It would not be an exaggeration to claim that there was at least one very strong group within the body of the CUP thinking like that.[1525] However, during the CUP time, that bias was only restricted to the Arabists while the Republican Kemalist ideology generalized it to all Arabs. It is worth to mention as a final remark that, the principal Unionist concern was to hold the Empire together, rather than subjugating the "pre-modern" Arabs as claimed by Makdisi.[1526]

On the other hand, the Arabist opposition, consisted mainly of the Arab notables, was considered a social interlayer preventing the penetration of the state to the Syrian realm even before the outbreak of the war. Therefore, Cemal's claim that he punished the Arabists because of their preparations for a rebellion in Syria seems to be a weak argument. Rather than that, he eliminated the influence of the Arabist notables of Syria by executing or exiling them since they could be an impediment for the direct imposition of the state authority on Syria. Although Cemal's atrocities created an antipathy among the people against the State, when his long term policy of "re-formation" of the State in Syria is thought, it is reasonable to conclude that he disregarded the reaction of the Syrians of his day in return for the ideal Syrian-Ottomans, who would be loyal to the Ottoman rule and

[1525] Some intermediation undertakings of the prominent CUP members to save some Arabist from death penalty, which would be detailed below, and some critics in the memoirs demonstrate that there was an opposition within the body of the CUP against the actions of Cemal towards the Arabists. The Governor of Beirut, Azmi Bey intermediated and saved Rıza es-Sulh from death penalty: Arslan, Ibid., p. 139; Similarly, Talat Pasha endeavored several times to save Abdulhamid Zehravi from his fate; Birgen, Ibid., p. 272; and offered Abdulwahab el-Inglizi to help him to go abroad: Kurd Ali, Ibid., p. 152-153.

[1526] Makdisi, Ibid, p. 769.

against any foreign influence in the future. Furthermore, by the destruction of the Arabist movement, he would prevent any demad of autonomy or independence during the peace negotiations after the War. Meanwhile, it is worth to mention that Cemal's punishment of the Arabists did not intend to abolish the existence of the Arab culture and replace it with that of the Turks. His insistence on teaching Turkish, the official language of the Empire, to the Syrians was due to the eagerness for establishing direct communication between the Syrians and the Ottoman state. Yet, he did not do anything to abolish the Arab culture. Rather, he took some protective measures to protect the Arab heritage of Syria, like the restoration of the monuments built by the Umayyads. In his struggle with Arabism, Cemal used an Ottomanist-Islamist discourse to gain the support of the Syrians and published a newspaper called *al-Sharq* to spread those ideas as well as opening a new university named *Selahaddin-i Eyyubi Külliyesi.*

Possibly, Cemal's harsh intervention in the Arabist movemen and the execution of its members made a permanent influence in the Syrian politics for the post-Ottoman period. It can be concluded that, with the destruction of the prominent intellectuals and the civil political leaders, Syrian political life was made more suitable for the ensuing military or authoritarian regimes. It can be asserted that, with these executions, Cemal Pasha played a role in drawing of today's picture of the Syrian politics.

The outbreak of the Sharif's revolt in Mecca turned the tide against the indisputable ruler of Syria and formed an opinion in the Central Government that Cemal's activities in Syria triggered this revolt, although the motives of this movement were very different. When the possibility of suppression of the rebellion disappeared, the Central Government tried to find a way for the moderation in the Arab policy, with the concern of sympathy among the Syrians towards the Sharif. In the beginning, they planned to persuade Cemal to return from Syria. But, because of the critical military situation in the Sinai Front, a change in the command of the Syrian Army was abandoned. Nevertheless, a moderation of the methods took place in the Arab policy. Towards the end of his governorate, Cemal launched the negotiations with the Sharif. Following the removal of Cemal at the end of the year 1917, many of his rigorous policies were abandoned. In this regard, most of the exiles in Anatolia were allowed to return to Syria. In the same direction, the negotiations with the Sharif for a peace agreement were continued. But, the reluctance of the

Government to give some guarantees and some kind of administrative autonomy to the Sharif obstructed the road to arrive at a quick conclusion in these negotiations. While the process was continuing the British forces occupied Syria and caused the interruption of the process.

Besides the Arabist movement, Cemal also intervened with his “iron fist” in the other autonomous bodies in Syria with the same reasons, which had some kind of influence over the peoples there. For this purpose, he endeavored to reconstruct the relations of the Zionists, the Christian clergy and the autonomous Government of Lebanon with the state to limit their impact on the Jews, the Christians and the Lebanese, who were seen as potentially disloyal components of Syrian society. In spite of the resistance of Germany and some circles in İstanbul, due to the strong personality of Cemal, some serious steps were taken to check the Zionist movement: First, all the non-Ottoman Jews were put under the direct authority of the state through naturalization. Those, who did not accept Ottoman citizenship, were deported. Second, the prominent Zionists, who were administering the Zionist organization, were sent into the exile. It is worth to mention that Cemal’s action was not a deliberation aiming at the destruction of the Jews due to an anti-semitic worldview, nor he did endeavor to Turkify Palestine by exiling the Jews. The evacuation of Jaffa makes this aspect evident. Although, in the beginning, Cemal showed tendency for the evacuation of Jaffa as an occasion to weaken the Zionist movement, afterwards this purpose was abandoned and they were distributed to the various cities of Palestine because of the military reasons.

The immunity of the Christian clergy was another issue that Cemal dealt with. Since most of them, especically the Maronites, were the agents of the French influence in Syria, it was important for Cemal to put them under state control. For that purpose, during Cemal’s time of rule, the Maronite patriarch come to be appointed by the decree of the Ottoman Sultan. For the first time similar actions to subjugate the clergy of the Christian sects were undertaken. Thus, the “uncrowned king” of Syria gave the message to the Christian communities that the only power in Syria that they had to rely on was the Ottoman Government. Thus, another interlayer between the state and its citizen had been checked. By all these implementations against the Christians, Cemal tried to abolish the traditions of the *millet* system for the non-Muslims.

The transformations that the Lebanese Government experienced were not different than them. By the intervention of Cemal Pasha, for the first time in the history of the autonomous government of Lebanon, a Muslim-Turk, Ali Münif Bey, was appointed as its governor. As a leading Unionist, Ali Münif Bey undertook to integrate Lebanon into the Ottoman administrative system and to transform Lebanon into an ordinary province of the Empire.

Cemal's treatment of the Armenian deportees could be assessed in the same category. As mentioned before, different from Talat Pasha's attitude of neglect towards the Armenians, Cemal was from the "pro-Armenian" party of the CUP, and wanted to integrate them to the Syrian society as a harmless minority [*cüz'iyet*] politically, dispersing them to various regions of Syria. But it should be clarified that it was not a kind of ethnicity engineering aiming at the turcification of the Armenians. Rather to make them harmless politically for the goals of the CUP.

Quite the reverse of the claims in the existing literature, he intervened in both the deportation and settlement of the Armenians to facilitate the process, as much as he could. Throughout this process, he struggled with the interventions of the Central Government led by Talat, and as a result of his strong influence among the CUP circles and due to his absolute authority in Syria he could save many Armenians from a grave end. Cemal saw the maltreatment of the deportees as an incident that could show the state weak in the eyes of its citizens, which was one of the most sensitive issues for him. That is another reason of his intervention in the process of the deportation and the settlement. On the other hand, he didn't follow a serious policy of conversion to Islam for the Armenians. In the same way, his orphanages did not have a program of Islamization for the Armenian children protected there. It was only a pretext to protect them from the interventions of the "anti-Armenian" party.

While trying to remove the interlayers from the social space, Cemal didn't disregard the struggle with the foreign influence in Syria, which competed with the Ottoman Government for the sympathy of the Syrians, and created a barrier for the control of the Ottoman rule to the country for years as a result of the privileges provided by the Capitulations. In this regard, firstly, Cemal made an effort to erase the French influence in Syria seizing all the institutions established directly or indirectly by France as well as the

deportation of those, who disseminated the French influence such as priests and nurses. In the same direction, he did his best to forestall any replacement by Germany or Austria as foreign powers. Any intervention by a representative of Germany or any other state was rigorously rejected by Cemal. During his period of rule, the Pasha prevented, to a considerable extent, any cultural propaganda of Germany and Austria, since he considered it as a threat for the establishment of the authority of the state in Syria. All these undertakings were performed by mainly Turkish and the CUP member bureaucrats, since Cemal only trusted the Unionist Turks in a struggle against the internal and external "enemies" of the Ottoman unity. However, Cemal's preference of Turks was not due to that he saw the Arabs as the second-class citizens of the Empire. Appointment of many of the Arab bureaucrats to the Anatolian provinces, which was populated in majority by Turks, is the most obvious proof of Cemal's indifference about ethnicity in his governmental actions.

On the other hand, Cemal Pasha didn't neglect to create the necessary means and institutions, which would assert the control of the State in the bodies and minds of the Syrians. In this sense, the process of the conscription, which began with the military mobilization for the Expedition against Egypt, offered a good opportunity for Cemal to control the bodies and bringing the people in discipline, which created an important process to modern states to make their citizens eligibly disciplined. In the beginning of the War, many of the Syrians willingly entered into the military service with the enthusiasm of the Egyptian Campaign. But the failure of the first expedition caused among the Arab soldiers a loss of motivation. In addition, the hardships of the military life combined with constant delay of the second expedition as well as the increasing impact of Cemal's "iron fist" over Syria, made the military life a nightmare for the Arab soldiers. Furthermore, some of them were employed in the labor battalions; most of the construction works done by Cemal in Syria could be realized by the labor battalions consisted of the conscripted Syrians. The Arabs, who didn't experience a military life on that scale before, found the military service difficult and therefore, the desertions in the army considerably increased. Cemal made a considerable effort to suppress their brigandage throughout the War. It is worth to mention that Cemal did not trust on the non-Muslims in the military service and,

different from the Muslims, they were mainly employed in the labor battalions and the other auxiliaries.

Besides that, Cemal opened new educational institutions in Syria to ottomanize the minds of the people in Syria under the supervision of the prominent woman intellectual Halide Edib. That ottomanization was not, however, a transformation of the Arabs culturally into a Turkish character. It rather aimed to develop a sense of Ottomannes among the Syrians, nourished by an antagonism against the Great Powers. He opened schools both in Turkish and Arabic. Cemal solely intended to modernize Syria by the Ottomans instead of the institutions of the Great Powers, which caused, according to him, a shift in the sentiments of the Arabs towards the Ottoman state. Cemal also undertook to transform the cities that would make the visibility and penetration of the State easier and would increase the prestige of the state in the eyes of the Syrians. In this regard, he opened new avenues as well as widening the existing ones. Moreover, the dead-end streets were transformed, as to allow free passage. One aim of all these constructional and educational undertakings was to make Syria as developed as Egypt, which became an ideally developed country following the British invasion in the eyes of the Syrians. Finally in the context of the construction works, some historical monuments were restored by his undertakings. In this enterprise, he didn't only undertake to restore the Ottoman and Byzantine buildings but the monuments belonging to the early periods of Islam constructed by the Arabs were also repaired.

Cemal's policy of the tribal and nomadic Arab societies was rather different than those described above. Quite the reverse of his predecessors' policy of settlement towards the tribal structures to take them under the state control, Cemal maintained the traditional imperial policy of giving freedom of action to those communities because of the War circumstances. He was rather afraid of a rebellion of the Bedouin and the Druze tribes with the provocation of Great Britain. Here, the Government felt ilself comparatively unrivalled till the outbreak of the Sharifian Revolt. However, that movement compelled the Government for further investment for securing the loyalties of the tribal and nomadic societies. In spite of dissemination of the British gold to those communities, almost all of the great tribal dynasties led by chiefs such as Ibn Rashid, Nuri Shaalan, Ibn Saud did not show open hostility to the Ottomans to the very end of the War. When Faysal's failure to

go beyond Akaba towards the north until the end of the War is taken into consideration, this reality will be understood more clearly.

Besides these groups, Cemal had to struggle with a disastrous famine and epidemics, which dealt the heaviest blow in the plans of Cemal Pasha in Syria. Neither his policy of Arabism nor those of the others caused a dislike of the people towards the Ottoman Government as much as the social impact of the famine. The decrease in the quantity of the grains due to the conscription of the agricultural labor increased the impact of the military requisitions, which paved the way to antagonize the peasants with the State. Similarly, the problems of provisioning in the cities created the same results for the urban societies. However, Cemal's rule was not the only guilty one in the issue of Famine; the entente states used famine as a weapon to make the Arabs revolt against the Ottoman authority. On the other hand, as a result of malnutrition, several epidemic diseases caused the death of a considerable number of people. The Ottoman struggle with the epidemics also provided them to control the bodies of the people in a modern way.

All of these projects, which were implemented by an "iron fist" in Syria, created a significant dissatisfaction among the peoples there. However, it is worth to mention that today's image of Cemal Pasha al-Saffah [*sanguinary*] did not emerge as a result of Cemal's atrocities. It was rather the result of following process of nationalization. The Arab nationalists, who became influential in Syrian society following the end of the Ottoman rule, utilized the atrocities of Cemal Pasha to otherize the Ottoman period.[1527] Thus, the image of Cemal Pasha was transformed to *al-Saffah* during the process of the nationalization of the Syrian society following the termination of Ottoman rule.

As for Cemal's relations with the Central Government during his governorate, in spite of some problems emanating from the actions of the latter in contradiction of the regulations of the former, Cemal worked in a considerable harmony with the Central Government in many issues and took the consent of the Central bureaucracy in his activities. The most important confrontation of him with the Centre was in the issue of the

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[1527] For a study on the influence of the Arab nationalists in the post-Ottoman Syria, see: Khoury, Philip S., "The Paradoxical in the Arab Nationalism: Interwar Syria Revisited", in James Jankowski and Israel Gershoni (eds.), *Rethinking Nationalism in the Arab Middle East,* New York: Columbia University Press, 1997, pp. 273-287.

Armenian deportees. Cemal was opposed to the implementations of the Government and adopted a protective attitude towards the Armenians. In reverse, in the issue of the Arab executions, the Central Government was more lenient and made some attempts to prevent their implementations. Apart from these, as a member of the acting cabinet, Cemal was in harmony with the Central Government, and took the consent of his friends in Istanbul in all his implementations.

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APPENDICES

Appendix 1: BOA, DH.EUM 5.Şb 3/23, Cemal to the Governorates of Syria, Beirut and Aleppo, 28 Teşrin-i Evvel 1330 [10 November 1914]

4.Ordu ve Bütün Suriye ahalisinin umum kumandanı sıfatıyla memleketin müdafaası için atideki tedbiratın ittihazını ilzam görüyorum.

(1)Bütün sevahil mevkii kumandanları ve jandarma fırkaları kamilen ba'dema emrim tahtında ve bugünden itibaren bütün müracaatlarını bana yapacaklardır. Yalnız Akabe'de, Bi'rüsseb'de, Hanyunus'ta bulunan bölükler 8.Kolordu emri tahtında bulunacaklardır.

(2) Mülkiye memurları memleketin müdafaasına ve aşayişin teminine aid bilcümle mesail-i siyasiyede doğrudan doğruya orduya merbut ve ordudan emir alacaklardır. Bu husus için icabında ordudan aldıkları emirleri dakikasında icra ve neticesinden mafevklerine malumat vermelidirler. mafevklerinden emr geldiğinde icra-yı te'hir etmeyeceklerdir.

(3)Ecnebi konsolosları, memurlarıyla birlikte memleketi terk edebilecekler yalnız Rus konsolosları memurları burada alıkonulacaktır. Düşman hükümatının bütün tebaları İstanbul'dan vürud edecek evamire kadar katiyyen memlekette kalmalıdırlar. Onların burada bırakılmalarından maksad sevahil şehirlerimizin düşman gemileri tarafından bombardıman edilmemesini temindir. tebaların bulundukları mahalleri terk etmemelerini başka bir suretle temin etmek kabil olamazsa o vakit düşman hükümet tebaları bu mahallerde tevkif olunacaktır. Firar niyetinde olanların ve kendi harb gemilerine haber vermeye teşebbüs edenlerin birahmane kurşuna dizileceklerinin teba-yı mezkura tebliği lazımdır.

(4) Muharib devletler bankalarına vaz-ı yed edilecek ve bütün nukudları hemen Osmanlı Bankası'nın Şam, Halep ve Kudüs Şubelerine tevdi edilecektir. alınan nukud miktarı derhal orduya bildirilecektir.

(5) Memleketin iç taraflarına rehn olarak götürülen ecnebi tebaları evamir-i ahireye kadar bulundukları mahallerde kalacaklardır.

(6) Ahali tarafından düşman hükümeti tebalarına vuku bulacak hakarete katiyyen meydan verilmemeli. su-i muameleden muhafaza edilmelidir. Me'murin-i askeriye, mülkiye memurini tarafından istenilen muaveneti diriğ etmeyecektir.

(8) işbu emrin alındığı saat telgrafla bildirilecektir.

Appendix 2: BOA, DH.ŞFR.453/28, Cemal to Ministry of Interior, Damascus, 29 Teşrin-i Sani 1330 [11 December 1914]

Lübnanlılara bir beyanname neşr eyledim bunda Lübnanın nizamatının mahfuz olduğu fakat idare-i örfiyyenin Lübnana da şamil olduğunu ilan ve ahaliyi taht-ı liva-yı saltanat-ı osmaniyye etrafında toplanmağa davet etdim Lübnansunuf-ı muhtelifeden mürekkeb müfreze tarafından işgal edilmişdir müfreze kumandanlığına Miralay Rıza Beyi tayin eyledim Devletin yeniden gösterdiği lutf ve atûfetin kadrini Lübnanlıların takdir eylemelerini ihtar etdim Lübnanlılar namına arz-ı sadakat etmek üzere bu sabah Maruni Patriki tarafından bir heyet-i mebuse geldi Heyet-i mebuse teyid-i sadakat etdi Lübnanlıların saadetlerini devlet-i aliye-i Osmaniyyeye medyun olduklarını temin etdi. Kendilerine ahkam-ı örfiyyeye riayet etmek şartıyla nizamat-ı mevcude Baki olduğunu tebliğ ve fimabad refah ve saadetlerini düvel-i hamiyyeden beklemeyüb yegâne devlet-i hâmiyye olan saltanat-ı seniyyeye rabt-ı kalb eylemelerini tavsiye eyledim. Lübnan müfreze kumandanına ahalinin namusunu mal ve canını müvekkil olmasının parasız hiçbir şey mübayaa etmemesini asker tarafından hukuk-ı şahsiyyeye karşu vaki olacak edna tecavüzün mütecasirini derhal ve bila-istizan eşedd-i ceza ile tecziyye idebileceğini emr etdim. Beyrut Divan-ı Harb-i Örfisini de müfreze kumandanlığının emrine verdim. Lübnan jandarna kumandanı inzibatca müfreze kumandanının taht-ı emrine verilmişdir. İdari ve mülki nukât-ı nazarca mutasarrıflığa merbut kalacakdır. Lübnan dahilindeki düvel-i muhasamaya mensub müessesat işgal olacak ve bundan askerin ikametime lazım olmayanları Lübnan Maarif-i milliyyesine tahsis olunacakdır. Lübnan meselesinin bu suretle hal edilmiş olduğun ifade ederim. Lübnan Mutasarrıfı cesur ve metin bir zat değildir. Vaziyeti takdir eyledi ve lede'l-hâce artık bir davet üzerine istifa ideceğini söyledi. Mûmâ-ileyhin tebdili içün şimdilik bir sebeb yok ise de eger İstanbul'da daha muvâfık bir zat var ise buraya gönderilür. Mûmâ-ileyh muvasalatını mütakib mutasarrıf-ı hazır istifa etdirilür ve bade mutasarrıf-ı cedid ba-irade-i seniyye-i mülukane tayin buyurulur ise düvel-i hamiyyenin inzimam-ı muvafakati olmaksızın hükümet-i seniyyece mutasarrıf tayin edilmesi maddesi de emr-i vaki haline getirilmesi re'y-i alinize menutdur bu telgraf makam-ı sadaret-i uzmaya arz edilmişdir fi 28 Teşrin-i sani sene 330

Appendix 3: BOA, DH. ŞFR. 486/115, Bekir Sami to Ministry of Interior, Aleppo, 19 Ağustos 1331 [1 August 1915].

Haleb. 19 Ağustos 1331 tarihli yazıya cevaptır. Seferberlik bidayetinden beri vilayet dâhilinde Ermenilerin ahali-i İslamiye'ye ve hükümete karşı tecavüz ve hareket-i isyaniyelerine delalet eder bir halleri görülmediği ve şu kadar ki muhacirine muhalefet eden ve binaenaleyh çekilen Antakya'nın Süveydiye nahiyesi muzafatından birkaç Ermeni karyesi ahalisinin tedib ve tenkil için kuva-yı askeriye sevk olunduğu ve geçen Kilis kazasının ve Çingen karyelerine gelen otuz kadar müsellah Zeytunlu ve Kervenli eşkıyadan da meyyiten istihsal edilerek diğerlerinin Maraş ihtilaliyesine ve Kilis Ermenilerinin de iştiraki mahalli Ermeni rahibinin oğlu Hınçak cemiyetinin kâtibi Tomasi ile bu cemiyet müseccel efradından Agop Kazaz'ın Dersaadet Divan-ı Harb-i Örfisi kararıyla aldırılarak orada akdem eli muhakeme sulben idam edilmeleriyle sabit ise de esbab-ı avalimesinin buraca meçhul Ayıntab'da cihet-i mülkiye ve askeriyece cem' edilmiş elli üç parça fotoğraf ve dokuz takım evrak olup bunların da fırkadan altıncı kolordu kumandanlık vekâletinden gönderildiği ve Haleb'de edilen şüphe vuku bulan ihbar üzerine bazı Ermeni haneleri taharri olunmuş ise de haiz-i ehemmiyet vesaik bulunmadığı ve bunlardan başka bir hadise olmayıp Ayıntab'dan gönderilen evrakın bera-yı mutalaa kumandanlıktan istenildiği ve bade'l-mutalaa neticesinin bildirileceği maruzdur.

Appendix 4: BOA, DH. ŞFR. 475/9, Cemal to Talat, 28 Mayıs 1331[10 June 1915].

Karargâh, Kudüs. Malum-ı âlileridir ki, Filistin kıtasında Siyonizm namıyla bir mesele-i siyasiye vardır. Bu mesele-i siyasiye zannedildiği kadar ehemmiyetsiz bir mesele değildir. Çünkü bunun aleyhine hareket edildi mi umumiyetle Yahudilik aleyhine hareket ediliyormuş gibi göstererek bütün cihana yayılmış olan Siyonistler gayet bi-edebane yaygaralara başlıyorlar. Hükümetin menafiine ilka-yı zarar ediyorlar. Bunun suret-i katiyede halli için uzun uzadıya düşünerek bir plan hazırladım. Fakat bu planı tatbik için adama ihtiyaç vardır. Soruşturdum. Selanik Hahambaşısı Jakob Mayer Efendi'yi tavsiye ettiler. Eğer bu zatın hüsn-i ahlakına bize muhibb ve sadık olduğuna sizin kanaat-i vicdaniyeniz var ise İstanbul'da Hahambaşı Nahum Efendi'yi celb ettiniz. Şimdiki Kudüs Hahambaşısını azl ile yerine Jakob Mayer Efendi'yi tayin ettirdiniz. Mümaileyh Jakob Mayer Efendi İstanbul'a gelinceye kadar Kudüs Hahambaşılığına tayin edildiğini ilan

etmeyiniz. Bu icraatı yaparsanız ben de o zaman mufassal bir rapor ile Siyonizm mesele-i siyasiyesi aleyhine harekete devam etmekle beraber arz-ı Filistin Yahudi mesele-i ictimaiyesini kemal-i sühuletle nasıl halledebileceğimizi arz eylerim. Emr-i cevabınıza muntazırım.

Appendix 5: BOA, DH.ŞFR. 479/21, Cemal to Talat, 24 Haziran 1331 [7 July 1915]

Bera-yı teftiş Haleb'e muvasalatımda Ermenilerin hüsn-i iskânı meselesiyle meşgul oldum. Bunların Bab, Mübeytim ve Ma're kazalarına iskânını münasib görerek mezkur üç kaza kaymakamı talimat-ı şifahiye ile davet ettim. Meselenin ehemmiyet ve nezaketine nokta-i nazarlarını bizzat celb etmek için Haleb öşrüne münhemik olduğunu haber almıştım. Mümaileyh filhakika benimle görüşmek için Haleb'e de sarhoş gelmiş ve Haleb'de de her gün mest-i la-ya'kal gezmekten çekinmemiştir. İktidarsızlığını zam edince derhal azlini Haleb valisi beyefendiye söyledim. Bu suretle şimdiden vazifeden el çektirildi. Mümaileyhin şu hal-i müstehasına nazaran artık memuriyet-i devletin istihdama uğrayacağından kanun-ı cedid mucibince salahiyet-i devletleri dairesinde tekaüde sevkini istirham ederim. Kaza kaymakamları hakkında tetkikat-ı amika icra etmekte olduğumdan kendilerinden katiyen fayda memul olmayan ve liyakat ve ehliyetleri kaymakamlık için gayr-i kafi gelenlerin tekaüdleri icra kılınmak üzere kariben esamisini arz edeceğim.

Appendix 6: BOA, DH.ŞFR. 491/112, Hulusi to Talat, 19 Eylül 1331 [2 September 1915].

Dördüncü ordu kumandanı Cemal Paşa hazretlerinden alınan 17 ve18 Eylül sene 1331 tarihli telgrafname hülasa-i müeddası vaziyet-i coğrafiye ve Ermeni muhacirlerinin Suriye vilayeti dâhilinde iskânını icab ettirdiğinden ve bu mesele cereyan-ı resmiyesine bırakılırsa ağleb-i ihtimal kısm-ı azamının mahv olacağından insaniyetin bunu takdir ile kaydetmeyeceğinden bahisle bu gibi kurun-ı vusta harekâtının men edilmesi dördüncü ordu mıntıkasının temiz kalarak isminin lekelendirilmemesi zımnında bunların bir an evvel yerleştirilmesi Ermeni köyleri teşkil olunması suretiyle hem acizleri ve hem memleket namına şeref kazanılması için memurların bu hususa fevkalade bezl-i ihtimam eylemeleri ve bu günün en mühimi Ermeni işini tedabir-i ameliye ile ber-vech-i maruz netayice isal eyleyecek esbabı temin eylemek üzere acizleri tarafından Kerek ve Havran cihetlerinde bir

seyahat-ı teftişiye yapılması merkezindedir. Kumandanlığının salifü'l-beyan mutalaat-ı vesayasını mevki-i icraya koymak hayli mesarif ihtiyarına ol babda tedabir-i mahsusa ittihazına mütevakkıf olduğu evvel ve ahir huzur-ı devletlerine arz olunmuş idi. Gerek alınan telgrafname cevabında tertib ve teşebbüsat için muhacirin müdürü Şükrü Beyin bu havaliye izam kılındığı bildirilmiş ise de mümaileyh henüz buraya vasıl olmadığından kumandanlığının anifü'l-beyan tebliğ ve mutalaatı fiile isal etmek üzere her nerede ise Şükrü Bey'in Şam'a gelmesi zımnında kendisine emr ve vilayete de malumat ita buyrulması mütevakkıf-ı rey-i devletleridir.

Appendix 7: BOA, DH. ŞFR. 487/35, Bekir Sami to Ministry of Interior, 23 Ağustos 1331 [5 September 1915]

Haleb. Riyak'taki muhacirinin sevkine kadar Haleb'e muhacirin sevkine nihayet verilmesi Adana vilayeti, Urfa ve Osmaniye mutasarrıflıklarına yazılmış ise de hala bu Haleb'e sevkine devam edildiği ve Adana vilayetinden cevaben alınan telgrafnamede Haleb'e gelmek üzere yollarda yüz bin nüfus mevcud olduğu ve Adana Ermenilerinin de bunlara ilaveten sevkleri zaruri olduğu işar olunuyor. El-yevm nefs-i Malatya'da on yedi bini mütecaviz muhacir ve Resü'l-ayn ile Rase'den başlayarak buraya kadar muhtelif istasyonlarda da takriben yirmi bini mütecaviz Ermeni bulunduğuna ve yollarla istasyonlarda bunlardan günde iki üç yüz vefat vukua gelerek ve vefatlarına yetişememekte olunduğuna nazaran bu müthiş mikdardaki muhacirini Haleb'e doldurmak bunların bir an evvel mahallerine ve dolayısıyla buralarda her türlü emraz-i müstevliyeye maruz bırakarak gerek şehrin ve gerek ordunun sıhhat-ı umumiyesini tehlikeye bırakacağından, buradakilerin arkasını alıncaya kadar sevkiyatın tehiri lüzumunun icab edenlere emr buyrulması selamet-i memleket namına istirham ederim.

Appendix 8: BOA, DH.ŞFR. 487/119, Cemal to Talat, 25 Ağustos 1331 [7 September 1915]

Maruzatımın tervici hakkındaki lutf-ı samilerine arz-ı şükran ederim. El-yevm Nasıra kaymakamlığında Ruhi Efendi'nin Duma kaymakamlığından ne suretle kaldırılmış olduğunu dosyasını bi't-tetkik anlayacak olursanız mümaileyh bir daha kaymakamlıkta kullanılmamak için bir tedbir ittihaz buyurursanız halbuki biz buralarda pek muktedir

kaymakamlara muhtacız. Mümaileyh azl edildiği takdirde yerine Birü's-seba kaymakamı nakl buyurmanızı ve Birü's-seba içinde pek muktedir bir Türk bulup tayin etmenizi rica ederim. Bilmiyorum Azmi Bey nasıl düşünür. Akka mutasarrıf-ı lahiki Hakkı Behiç Bey ile becayiş ettirseniz pek musib olur kanaatindeyim. Ahiren gerek mutasarrıflığa Asaf Bey isminde birisini tayin etmiş olduğunuzu gazetelerde okudum. Bu Asaf Bey Adana vukuatı zamanında Cebel-i Bereket mutasarrıfı olan Asaf Bey ise onun mutasarrıf tayin edilmesini katiyen muvafık görmedim. Bu derece korkak ve iş bilmez bir adamı gerek mutasarrıflığa tayin etmeyi bilmem ki nasıl terviç buyurdunuz. Allah aşkına rica ederim bu adamı geri gönderiniz. Şayet adam bulamıyorsanız harbin nihayetine kadar ben ümera-yı askeriyeden pek muktedir birisini intihab ederim. Vekâleten onu tayin buyursanız Kerek'te urbanın ufak bir hareket çıkarmaması ve Suriye'deki gibi teşebbüsatımı alt üst eden Asaf Bey benim bildiğim oraya gelir gelmez on on beş gün sonra vukuat-ı adidenin pek tahaddüs edeceğine kanaat-ı kamilem vardır. Şayet mutasarrıf yapmak için adama ihtiyaç var ise size pek muktedir bir mülkiye memuru tavsiye edeyim. El-yevm Yafa kaymakamlığında bulunan zat eğer pek genç ve pek kıdemsiz değilse bir müddet sonra başka tarafa kaldırılmasını galiba Azmi Bey ile müştereken rica edeceğimiz Nablus mutasarrıfı Yusuf Ziya Bey'in yerine terfi ettirirseniz pek isabet buyurmuş olursunuz. Hülasa Hama sancağı da el-yevm pek muktedir bir mutasarrıfa intizar ediyor. Nasıra kaymakamı Fevzi Beyefendinin Safed kazasını idare edeceğini ümit ediyorum. Her halde tayinini rica ederim.

Appendix 9: BOA, DH.ŞFR. 506/108, Cemal to Talat, 12 Kanun-u Sani 1331 [25 January 1916].

Akka mutasarrıfı beceriksiz Pek hafif bir zattır. Benim bu kanaatime Beyrut valisi Azmi Bey ve sekizinci kolordu kumandanı Cemal Paşa dahi iştirak ediyor. Eğer kendisini Anadolu'da sehlü'l-idare bir mutasarrıflığa nakl ettirirseniz pek isabet buyrulmuş olur. onun yerine evvel Suriye vilayeti mektupçusu iken Hulusi Beyin münasebetsizliği yüzünden taaccübünüzü kaybettiğine kani olduğum Tortum kaymakamlığından müstafi Nuri Beyi tavsiye ederim. Bu zatın her halde buralarda iyi bir mutasarrıf olabileceğini zannediyorum. Muvafakatinize dair cevab-ı alinize muntazırım.

Appendix 10: BOA, DH. ŞFR. 537/39, Azmi to Talat, Beirut 3 Şubat 1332 [16 February 1916]

Beyrut. Pek mevsuk-ı külliyede buradaki Amerika konsolosu Cebel-i Lübnan ve Beyrut'a bir vapur zahire celbi için sefir vasıtasıyla itilafçılar nezdinde teşebbüsatta bulunduğunu haber aldım. Şayet böyle ise ve hükümette bunun müsait bulunmaya mecbur kalacaksa Amerika sefirleri nezdinizde doğrudan doğruya teşebbüsatta bulunularak orduya verilmeyeceği temin edilmek ve bedeli buraca tesviye olunmak şartıyla on bin tonluk bir vapurla Beyrut ve Cebel-i Lübnan'a zahire celbi pek muvafık olur. Muvaffakiyet hasıl olur ise vesait-i nakliye fıkdanından dolayı Cebel-i Lübnan'da pek büyük sefalet başlayacaktır. Buna mani olarak Beyrut'ta dahi iaşeyi tevsi etmiş oluruz. İtilafçıların müsaade etmemesi halinde dahi efkar-ı umumiye üzerinde her türlü teşebbüsatta bulunduğumuz anlaşılarak mevkiimiz yükselir. Her gün güçlenmekte olan düşmanlar için dahi mucib-i nefret ve lanet oluyor. Bendenizce muvafık olan bu suret tasvib buyrulduğu takdirde işar buyrulmasını arz ederim efendim.

Appendix 11: BOA, DH. ŞFR, 527/19, Cemal to Ministry of Interior, Damascus, 20 Temmuz 1332 [2 August 1916].

Karargâh/Şam, 17 Temmuz 1332'ye cevaptır. Zor'a sevk olunan Ermenilerin orada mütekâsif bir halde kalmalarına mani' olmak üzere yegâne çare olarak benim Suriye'de tatbik eylediğim usulün derhal vaziyetini bulmaktayım. Ben Suriye'ye külliyetli mikdarda sevk olunan bu Ermenilerin çöl hududlarında topladım. Ve teşvik ettiğim bazı zevat vasıtasıyla Müslüman olmalarını temin ederek ve içlerinden la-akall binini Müslüman yaparak Suriye'nin kasabalarına serptim. Dul kadınları Müslüman erkeklerle tezviç ve yetimlerini de tesis ettiğim darü'l-eytamlara sevk ederek Müslüman terbiyesiyle Müslüman olmamakta mütemerrid olanları da çöle ve vilayetin münteha-yı şarkiyesine sevk ettirmiyorum. Ve hiçbir yerde ekseriyet-i azime teşkil etmeyeceklerine meydan vermiyorum. Bu usulün ahiren pek ziyade kesb-i ehemmiyet eden Zor ve havalisinde de derhal tatbikini bir emr-i zaruri telakki ediyorum. Ancak bunu orada mutasarrıfın başına çıkarılmayacağını ilaveten arz ederim. Bunun zat-ı devletlerince şayan-ı itimat zikr ve cüretkâr birinin on yirmi bin lira ile Zor'a izamını ve bu suretle orada ıslahatın icrası lazımdır. Zor jandarmasının takviyesi meselesine külliyetli ve gayr-i kabil icra olunacağını

müsaadenizle arz etmeye mecburum. Çünkü hala ordunun jandarma kuvvetleri kendi mıntıkalarının bile asayişi muhafaza ve idameden aciz ve gayr-i kâfidir. Bundan dolayıdır ki Urfa sancağı dördüncü ordu emrinde iken, liva jandarma kuvvetini tezyid etmiştim. Haleb de aynı haldedir. Nizamiye kuvvetinin sevki ise adimü'l-imkândır. Ba-husus bu liva ahiren dördüncü ordunun mıntıkasından fekk-i irtibat etmiştir.

Appendix 12: BOA, DH. ŞFR. 542/3, Azmi to Talat, 20 Kanun-u Evvel 1332 [2 January 1917]

Beyrut. Amerika'dan zahire celbi hakkında dahi zat-ı samileriyle cereyan eden muhabere üzerine Ali Münif dahi bazı maruzatının olduğunu kendisinden haber aldım. Müşarünileyhin nokta-i nazarı menafi-i memlekete muzır gördüğüm cihetle tasdike cesaret ettim. Ali Münif Bey Cebel'deki fukara yollu bin kişinin emr ve iaşesi buradaki Amerikalılara tevzi suretiyle Amerika'dan zahire celbi imkânı ihzar ettiğinden dolayı memnundur. Suret-i iaşe ve tevziatta her ne tedbiri ittihaz etsin, Amerikalılar vasıtasıyla Cebel'deki fukaranın iaşesi öteden beri Fransa ve İngilizlerin siyasi propagandalarına maruz kalan ve hemen hiçbir rabıtası olmayan bilhassa Cebel-i Lübnan'da harpten sonra hükümet etmek ve bu halka bir Osmanlı hükümeti var olduğunun anlatmak imkânını elden çıkarır, harpten evvel arz ettiğim siyasi propagandalara diğer bir vesile ile karışmış olarak cebelde kendilerinin dahi bir mevki tutmalarına çalışan Amerikalılar fırsatı bir nasihat bilirler ve kendisinden ilan-ı meserret eyliyorlar. Bendeniz Ali Münif Beyefendi ile bu hususu birleşemedim. Bendeniz gelecek olan ilk zehairi şimdiye kadar cereyan ve devam ettiği vechle tevzi ettirdiği Amerikalılara kabul ettirdim. Amerikalılar nokta-i nazar-ı aciziyi kendi sıfatlarına muvafık olmadığı halde takdir ettiklerini haber alıyorum. Cebelin ihtiyacatı hakikaten pek azimdir. Cebelde açlıktan telefat cidden şayan-ı endişe bir haldedir. Fakat Ali Münif Bey ile bendeniz büyük bir mesai sarf ettiğimiz halde pek azim müşgilatı iktimam mecburiyetinde olmakla beraber iaşeyi mümkün mertebe temin edeceğimize ve açlıktan insan ölmesine mümanaat edeceğimize kaniim. Bu defaki tetkikatıma göre Hama livasında daha yedi milyon zahire mübayaa etmek mümkündür. Bunun sevki hususunda biraz mücadele ile beraber bu zehairi Cebel ve Beyrut'u iaşe edebilir. Beyrut'ta bugün Cebel'den nakleden cebellilerle beraber yüz elli bin, burada üç yüz bin nüfusu vardır. Beyrut'ta da ihtiyac-ı insan nispetinde zahire verilmemekle beraber

açlıktan fevt olmuş bir şahıs yoktur. Açtığım fukara tahaffuzhaneleri ile ve sair vesaitle halkını iaşeye muvaffakiyet hâsıl olacaktır. Şayet evvelce arz ettiğim vechle hükümet veya belediye namına zahire celbi mümkün olursa bu halleri için bir olursa yoksa Amerikalılar tam Cebel-i Lübnan'a gelecek ve anlar vasıtasıyla tevzi edilecek zehair Cebel-i Lübnan'ı elde etmekten bizi uzaklaştırır ve harpten yüzlerde pek nafi vazifeler elde edecek, sonra olan hükümet her hususta karşısında Amerikalıları görecek ve Cebel'in bunlara karşı şimdiden hâsıl olan minnettarlığı hükümeti buralarda cidden küçük düşürecektir. Bu hali arz etmeyi zat-ı samilerini tasdike cüret-yab oldum efendim. 20 Kanunu evvel sene 1332.

Appendix 13: BOA, DH. ŞFR. 560/10, Cemal to Talat, 19 Temmuz 1333 [19 July 1917].

Aliye Karargâhı, Kudüs. Vilayata tebliğ buyrulduğu üzere Arab ailelerinin hafiyeten nezaret ve takip altına alınmaları muvafıktır. Bunun kâffesinin bulundukları yerlerde iskanları ve memleketlerindeki emlak ve araziye mukabeleten gittikleri yerlerde kendilerine emlak ve arazi itası takarrür ettiğine ve yalnız bir iki vilayette hepsinin memleketlerindeki emlak ve arazilerine tekabül edecek emlak ve arazi bulunamayacağına nazaran bir iki vilayette cem' eylemeleri caiz olamayacağı kanaatindeyim. Bu emlak ve arazi mübadelelerine esas olacak defterleri kısmen takdim ettim. Kısm-ı mütebakisini Kudüs'ten takdim edeceğim. Bu maddenin bir an evvel itmamı yed-i eşhasın avdet ve afv ümitlerini kesecektir efendim.

Appendix 14: BOA, DH. ŞFR. 572/23, Tahsin to Talat, Damascus, 24 Teşrin-i Sani 1333 [24 November 1917].

Şam. Paşazade Abdülkadir'in ……….'dan firar ederek bu havaliye geldiği ve ara sıra ailesiyle de temas ettiği hakkında ordu kumandanı paşa hazretlerine vuku bulan işarat-ı fehimanelerine muttali oldum. Abdülkadir ihtifa eylediği köyden bendenize mahrem bir vasıta ile haber gönderdi. Mülakat taleb etti. Kendisine aman verdim. Ve müracaatını kabul ettim. Hissiyat-ı kalbiye ve diniyesini uzun uzadıya İslam'dan müteellim olduğunu kendisine Şam ve havalisinde ika-i ihtilal ettiğinden para verildiği fakat vicdanının buna müsaade etmediği, bilakis hükümet lehine teklif edilen her emri ifaya amade olduğunu ağlayarak söyledi. Mütekaiden kumandan paşa hazretleriyle de görüştü. Müşarünileyhte

tensibleriyle cibale göndererek mektub ve şahıs takibatında bulundu. Tekevvül ettiğini görüyorum. Her halde bu adamdan her ne mikyasta olursa olsun bir fayda ve hizmet ümit ediyorum. Arz ettiğim şekil ve sebebler Abdülkadir elimizde ve takib-i setr lehimize hizmet ediyor. Ve yaptıklarını bittabi peyderpey arz ederim.

Appendix 15: TTK Arşivi, KO Koleksiyonu, 1/70, Tahsin to Cemal, Damascus, 26 Kanun-ı Sani 1334 [26 January 1918]

Şerif Faysal Bey'e yeni gönderdiğiniz mektubların cevabı geldi. Biri gayet mufassal, resmi, diğeri kendi hatt-ı destiyle imzasız olarak hususidir. Ba husus mektubu şifre ederek aynen arz ediyorum. Mufassal mektubun mündericatı her vakit tekrar eden müddeiyattan ibarettir. Vehib Paşa'nın hicaz valiliğindeki ahvalini, Arablik, Türklük, gayesinin takib edildiğini ve itilaf devletlerince Araplığın ve Arab hükümetinin muahedat ile taht ı emniyete alındığı uzun uzadıya bahsettikten sonra suriyedeki icraatı malumeyi tenkid ediyor. Bu ahvale ne kendi ve ne de pederi tarafından sebebiyet verilmediğini ve zat ıakdesi hilafetpenahiye, hanedan ı ali osmana merbutiyeti kalbiyeleri bulunduğunu beyan ediyor. Bu mektubu posta ile takdim edeceğim. Şeyh bedreddin ve Emir Abdülkadire yazdığı cevabda ise beynelmüslimin kan döküldüğüne müteessir bulunduğunu ve hükümeti seniyyece arablık that ı temine alındığı halde anlaşabileceklerini ve itilaf mülakatının kendi mıntıkaları dahilinde yapılabileceğini ileri sürüyor. Şifre edilen hususi mektub faysalın bütün hissiyatını ve efkarını ve amalini teşrihe kafidir. Hususi malumata nazaran ingilizlerle şerifin ve Abdullah ile faysalın arası yani kendilerine olan taahüd ve mütalebelerden dolayı ictihadları şu günlerden hadi bir şekil almıştır. Faysal bu metubda bundan bahsetmiyorsa da her türlü tehlikeyi göze alarak zat-ı alilerine arz ı hal ediyor. Mektubda ne istediği pek güzel anlaşılıyor. Cemal Paşa ile uzun uzadıya görüştük. Kendisi dün akşam kereğe gitti. Ya benim veyahud Cemal Paşayla muayyen bir noktadan meseleyi daha yakın ve daha esaslı müzakere etmekliğimizi teklif ediyoruz. Çünkü mektubun bir fıkrasında anlaşmak için zaman geçmediğini [yani zamanın geç olmadığını] ve zat-ı devletlerlerinin cevabı alınıncaya kadar muhasemata pek resmi olarak devam edeceği yazılıyor. Buna binaen bu mülakatı teklif ettik. Kendisi bir [burada boşluk var] mahiyetinde teklifte bulunur ise bittab' sözü orada keseceğiz. Yok mevzu ve dini tekalifte bulunur ise bab ı aliye arz ile alınacak talimat mucibince hareket edeceğiz. Mülakatı Kabul

etmekdiği halde Kerekde bulunan Cemal Paşa daha sıkı bir muhabere ve mürasele temin ederek maksadını anlayacaktır. Bugün de Urbanın vaziyeti mühim bir şekil almıştır. Faysal müheyyic bir kuvvet ile vadi-i musada şerif ali ve nasır kalatürrızktadırlar. Kendisini ziyarete giden hüseyin naïf ve rüfekasını bu defa şerif nasır tevkif ettirmiştir…. Para alınamadığından dolayı urbana ve hatta malumul esasi eshabı maişete tedibat yapamıyoruz. Zahire mubayaatı durmuş ordunun iaşesi hemen tehlikeli bir vaziyet almıştır. Şu hale nazaran şarif faysal ile az çok fedakarlık ederek bir mukaranet tesis vatanın selameti namına şayanı arzudur. Ahvali dahilliyye hemen kendi haline kalmış ve bundan hem inglizler hem şerif istifade etmiştir. Ordunun açlığı ahvalin keşmekeşliği tufeylenin sukutu yek diğerini ettiği takdirde şu güzel suriyeye yazık olacağını bir daha arz ederim.

Suriye valisi tahsin

Suret

Husus gerek taraf ı alilerinizden ve gerekse şeyh bedreddin effendi tarafından namıma gelen tahriratın bu tarzda kaleme alınmış bulunmasından dolayı cevab-ı mezkuru tahrire mecbur oldum. Cenab-ı hakk bilir ki hiçbir maksad ı şahsi takib etmiyorum. Vicdanıma karşı mahkum olmamak ve dediğiniz gibi bir hizmet-i din ifa eylemek maksadıyla gayet sarih fakat hususi olarak beyanat-ı atide bulunmayı bir vazife bilirim. Paşa hazretleri! Eğer buyurduğunuz gibi maksad İslamiyet ise hakiki, açık konuşalım. Hakikati arayalım. Siz de takdir edersiniz ki maalesef bugün türkler ve türklük pek elim bir vaziyette bulunuyor. Bunun için aff-ı umumi gibi ali kelimeleri bırakalım. Teala yolunu arayalım. Mektubunuzda, son telgrafınızda bahs buyuruyorsunuz. Ve ledeynatını anlamak istiyorsanız bunun için derim ki hakikatte o ledeynat mevcut. Fakat evvela içinizi, zımmiyenizi bilmekliğim lazım. Bu sulh teklifinizin mahiyetini anlamaklığım iktiza eder. Hakikat mi, telaib –oyunlar- mi yoksa aliye hapishanelerini doldurmak mı ? affınıza mağruren bunları gayet sarih ve hususi yazıyorum. Biliyorum ki bu kelimelerle izzet-i nefsinize dokunuyorum. Fakat hakikat-i hal her ne kadar acı ise de yine hakikattir. Zat ı aillerinizi karşımda zannederek gıyaben müşafehede bulunuyorum. Bilirsiniz ki ben her şeye vakıfım. Çünkü bütün hayatımı Türklerle geçirdim. Sizinle iyi müşerref oldum. Ve iyice tanıdım. Vesikaya hacet yok. Çünki sizce idama mahkum bir adamım. Zaten sizinle hal-i harbde bulunuyorum. Fakat emin olunuz vicdanım beni dinime ve vatanıma karşı mahkum etmemiştir. Ihtimal ki mektubuma hiddetle, hayretle ve yahud başka bir nazarla

bakarsınız. Bu benim vazifem değil. Vazifem fırsat bulmuş iken hakikati ifşa etmektir. Siz nasıl telakki edeseniz ediniz. Yalnız efendim bu yönetimde? üç şey mevcud. Birincisi müslümanlık, ikincisi Arablık, üçüncüsü türklük. Çünkü hayatımın kısm ı azamını onlarla geçirdim. Binaenaleyh müslümanlık ve arablık bence mukaddestir. Türklük üçüncü derecede kalır. Eğer sizlerde arablar için ufak bir merhamet görmüş olsaydım hadd-ı e^alim sizlerden ayrılmazdım. Fakat ne diyeyim. Karşımda arabları astılar. Hükümetiniz pederimin hatırını kırdı. Mahv etmek istedi. Ve müslümanlığı uğraş için bir alet gibi kullanmak istedi. Vicdanınız her halde bu hakikati inkar etmez. Binaberin bazı halleri görürüm de nasıl tahammül ederim. Tabii ma'zurum. Vicdanım buna mani olur. Düvel-i itilafiye zahiren ve batınen Arablığı ve Arab hükümetini tasdik etti. Muahedenameleri mahfuz. Katiyyen şeke ve şüpheye mahal yok. Fakat hususi bir zan vardır. O da arabları türklerle birleşmektir. Menafi-i milliye herşeyin fevkindedir. Siz buna kizb deyiniz. Ne derseniz deyiniz. Fakat bir şartla ki her iki millet hukukunu bilsin. Hiç birisi diğerinin hukukuna ve umuruna müdahale etmesin. Her ikisi yek vücud olarak çalışsın. Bu suretle hakiki bir İttihad-ı İslam husule gelsin. Pek büyük bir saadet. Fakat bugün Arablar, Türklerden korkuyor. Ne yalan söyleyeyim. Ben bunun için kavi ve sağlam bir kefil bulunmadıkça emniyet edemem. Çünkü intikamdan gayet ilğaya ? korkarım. Milletimin Ermeniler gibi olmasını istemem. Hicaz ve Arabistan kıyamı bir emr-i zaruri ve icbari idi. Üç milyon nüfusu açlıktan ölecek idi. Hicaz ve Suriye Arabları bilacürüm aileleriyle beraber ermenilerle becayiş ettiriliyordu. Her ne hal ise orasını geçelim. Muhakkak ki bugün arablar türk-alman ittihadına dahil olur ise safha-i harb başka bir şekil alır zannederim. Vaziyet-i coğrafiye ve askeriye bugün Arapları hakim bir vaziyette bulunduruyor. Tabii askersiniz. Meseleyi benden daha iyi takdir edersiniz. Hal böyle iken bu dediklerim hasıl olursa ümid ederim ki aradaki kan davaları kavi bir ittihada münkalib olur. Buyurduğunuz gibi bu mesele müslümanlık lehine halledilmiş olur. Cesede giren cism-i habisden kolaylıkla bir eser kalmaz. Bil ki o zaman Osmanlı İmparatorluğu Garbi Afrika'dan Şarki Asyaya kadar hükümran olur. Beyanat-ı sayikama ciddi nazarla bakınız. Dökülen müslüman kanları tahkim için kaçamak yolları arayanların boynundadır. Vaziyet tebedddül etse de etmese de ben sözümde ölünceye kadar sabitim. Mamafih müslümanlığı ve müslümanca dermeyan eden beyanatı nazar ı itibara alarak harekatı harbiyeme cevab ı kati alınıncaya kadar hafif bir surette devam edeceğim. Eğer mektubunuz hüsnü niyetle

makrun değilse türklerin sözüne itimad caiz olmadığına bir delil daha nazarıma karşı çıkacaktır. Herhalde cenab ı hakk ümmet I islamiyeye hayırlısını nasib etsin temennisiyle hitam-ı kelam ederim.

Appendix 16: BOA, DH. ŞFR. 584/160, Tahsin to Ministry of Interior, Damascus, 21 Mayıs 1334 [21 May 1918].

Şam. İngilizlerin iki defa Salt'a girip çıkarıldıkları malum-ı samileridir. Arabistan'da bu din u devlete cidden sadık ve tealisi için cidden fedakâr pek çok zevata ve ailelere tesadüf olunuyor. İngilizler Salt'a girdikleri zaman Salt'ın en büyük bir ailesi sayılan Tufan ailesine İngilizler kendilerine hizmet ve sadakat gösterdikleri takdirde pek büyük mükâfata nail olacaklarını söyledikleri halde bu ailenin iki rükn-i mühimi olan Seyfeddin ve Alaattin Tufan Beyler bunu şediden red ve Osmanlılıkla öleceklerini bir lisan-ı kati ile beyan etmişlerdir. İngilizler her iki zatı hapis ve ta'zib ettikleri halde bu âli cenab iki kardeş iman ve kanaatinizden tekevvül etmemişler ve Osmanlı ordusunun Salt'a girmesiyle kendilerine hiçbir şey yapılmayarak tahlis edilmişlerdir. Kendilerine Babıâli namına teşekkür edilmesini ve gazetelerle ilanını ve her ikisine üçüncü rütbeden Osmanî nişanı itasını istirham ederim.

Appendix 17: BOA, DH. ŞFR. 594/31, Nazım to Ministry of Interior, Adana, 2 Eylül 1334 [2 September 1918].

Adana. Şam'a tehcir olunan Ermenilerden Adana havalisi ahalisinden bulunanların develerle ve çöl tarikiyle bila-mezuniyet dolaşmakta olduklarından seyahat varakasız olarak ubur edenlerin tarassuduyla mahfuzan iadeleri Suriye vilayetinden bildirilmiştir. Şimdiye kadar techizden firaren avdet bu kabil Ermenilerin firaren istihsaliyle tebaları icra kılınmakta idi. Firaren avdet edecek olup da müessesata kayd olunanların adem-i kabulüyle memurlarının teb'id oldukları mahallere izamı için ahz-i asker riyasetice derdest olunan bu kabil eşhasda canib-i mülkiyeye tevdi' eden 29 kanun-ı sani sene 1332 tarihli telgrafname-i samilerine tevfikan kafile suretinde sevkleri icra tutulmak üzere firar-ı askerisinin itası zımnında on ikinci kolordu kumandanlığına vaki olan işara cevaben merkumların isnan erbabından bulunmalarından mebni mesele ihdasına gayr-i muktedir bulunduğundan cihet-i askeriye menfaatine harekat-ı muhtelife ile hasat işlerinde

istihdamlarına lüzum gösterilmiş; ve vilayetçe de işar-ı vaki münasib görülmüştü. Sahil olmak itibarıyla ehemmiyet-i askeriyesi ve haiz olmasından dolayı mukaddema mensubinlerinden dolayı buradan uzaklaştırılan bu eşhas ile geleceklerin tekrar burada müctemi bir halde bulundurulması her ihtimale karşı mahzurdan gayr-i salim görülmektedir. Suriye'den firarı bildirilen eşhasın bugünlerde Dürzîleri muhtemel bulunduğundan iade ve cihet-i askeriyeye ve Dürzîler hususlarında tereddüd hâsıl olmuştur. Bunlarla isnan dâhilinde bulunmayan kadın ve erkekler hakkında olunacak muamelenin tayin ve idaresi maruzdur.

Appendix 18: PA-AA, Türkei 177, Bd. 17.

Abschrift.

Kaiserlich
sches Vizekonsulat
n Tripolis.

Tripolis(Syrien) den 19 Februar 1918.

J.№ 230.

Kaiserlichem Konsulate zu Beyrouth beehre ich mich ergebenst mitzuteilen,dass schon seit längerer Zeit -circa drei Wochen- hier immer wieder kleine Kinder im Alter von 5 bis 8 Jahren verschwunden sind,ohne dass es den Eltern gelungen wäre eine Spur derselben aufzutreiben.-

Vor einigen Tagen hat sich nun durch Zufall-ein kleines Mädchen trug die Jacke eines der verschwundenen Kinder - herausgestellt,dass diese Kinder von zwei,hier in der Marine wohnhaften Frauen,in deren Wohnung gelockt,dort kunstgerecht geschlachtet,gekocht und gegessen worden sind.Die Ueberbleibsel der Kinder, gekochte Kopfe und Knochen,wurden in einem leeren Brunnen in der Wohnung der beiden Frauen gefunden.Einer der Köpfe,der noch ganz frisch war,befand sich in der Küche der beiden Frauen,in ein Tuch eingeschlagen,und harrte noch der Zubereitung.Die Köpfe-im Ganzen neun Stück- wurden auf das Serail in der Marine gebracht,wo sie der Unterzeichnete mit eigenen Augen gesehen hat.Die beiden Frauen die körperlich sehr heruntergekommen sind,gaben bei dem Verhör vor der Polizei,ohne jede besondere Erregung zu,dass sie die Kinder geschlachtet,gekocht und gegessen hätten.Als Motiv der grausenhaften That bezeichneten sie » Hunger » und der Körperzustand der Megären spricht für die Richtigkeit dieser Behauptung.Die beiden Frauen sind libanesischen Ursprungs und gehören dem maronitischen Ritus an,sollen aber schon längere Zeit hier wohnhaft sein.Eine Beteiligung weiterer Personen an diesen Kanibalenmahlzeiten war bisher nicht nachzuweisen,auch erklärten die beiden Frauen bisher hartnäckig keine Mitschuldigen zu haben.

An das

Kaiserliche Konsulat zu
Beyrouth.

Bei dem in der Küche vorgefundenen, noch nicht zubereiteten, Kopf handelt es sich um die einzige Tochter eines hiesigen Angestellten der Municipalität, ein Mädchen im Alter von circa 6 Jahren, das angeblich zwei Tage vor Auffindung der Ueberreste verschwunden war. Der Vater war bei der Auffindung der Köpfe nicht hier anwesend, da er am selben Morgen ins Inland gereist war um einer Zigeunerbande nachzuspüren, die sich am Tage des Abhandenkommens des Kindes hier aufgehalten hatte und die er im Verdacht hatte, das Kind entführt zu haben.

So unglaublich die Schreckensthat auch klingt, so buchstäblich wahr ist sie in allen Teilen, was der Unterzeichnete hiermit unter Bezugnahme auf seinen Diensteid erklärt.

Dass Arme, gefallene Tiere, in trautem Verein mit den Strassenhunden, in unmenschlicher Gier roh verzehren ist hier durchaus kein seltener Anblick mehr, dass aber Menschen in solche zynischer Weise gemordet, gekocht und verzehrt werden, war auch hier bisher unerhört.-Ein vor circa 4 Wochen gemeldeter Fall, wonach in dem Dorfe Kalmoun, circa 4 Km südlich von Tripolis, eine Frau ihr gestorbenes Kind verzehrt haben sollte, war nicht nachzuweisen und fand deshalb keinen Glauben, während der vorgeschilderte Fall so über jeden Zweifel erhaben ist, dass es keinen Zweck hat sich gegen die Thatsachen zu sträuben.

Dass hier eine Hungersnot herrscht, wie sie schlimmer nicht gedacht werden kann, ist keine Frage mehr und wenn die Osmanische Regierung sich nicht endlich entschliesst, energische Maasregeln zu ergreifen um diesen Zuständen ein Ende zu machen, werden wir vielleicht noch mehrere derartige Fälle zu verzeichnen haben.

Ich bin fest davon überzeugt, dass es bei den bestehenden Lebensmittelbeständen in unserer Gegend durchaus nicht nötig wäre, dass nur eine einzige Person am Hunger stirbt- dass thatsächlich schon Tausende und Abertausende hier und in der Umgebung am Hunger gestorben sind ist zu allgemein bekannt um einer besonderen Erwähnung zu bedürfen-wenn die Regierung sich endlich entschliessen

würde der verbrecherischen Speculation in Getreide ein Ende zu machen. Wo die Weizenvorräte sich befinden ist genau bekannt und es würde, das ist meine heiligste Ueberzeugung, nur ganz wenig Energie von Seiten der Regierung bedürfen um die Grossgrundbesitzer und Speculanten in Akkar zu veranlassen ihre Bestände herauszugeben. Bei den heutigen Getreidepreisen, die unter Zugrundelegung des Papiergeldwertes über 50 mal so hoch sind wie in Friedenszeiten, ist es auch der privaten Mildthätigkeit, die leider nur von einigen wenigen Menschenfreunden geübt wird, ausserordentlich schwierig, in irgend wie nennenswertem Masse einzugreifen.

Der Unterzeichnete, dem von privater Seite kleinere Geldmittel zur Verfügung standen, hat während 20 Tage circa 80 Arme mit Mittagessen versorgt und hierzu im Ganzen einen Betrag von Ltq.105.- benötigt, wobei allerdings mit äusserster Sparsamkeit vorgegangen werden musste. Leider ist nun aber der Geldbetrag erschöpft und die Verteilung muss notgedrungen eingestellt werden. Mit einigen Hundert Pfund pro Monat wäre schon viel zu machen, doch ist sowohl die Regierung, als auch die Bevölkerung so wenig interessiert, dass es bisher nicht möglich war, eine geordnete Armen-Unterstützung in's Leben zu rufen und durchzuführen.

Ich wäre Ihnen dankbar, wenn Sie den vorstehenden Bericht zur Kenntniss des Herrn Reichskanzlers bringen würden und ergebenst anregen würden, ob es nicht möglich wäre, mir aus öffentlichen Fonds des deutschen Reiches einen bestimmten Betrag monatlich anzuweisen, der dazu dienen würde, die bisher von mir privatim bethätigte Armenspeisung in grösserem Masse und regelmässig durchzuführen. Der Mühe die Speisen herstellen zu lassen und gerecht zu verteilen würde ich mich im Interesse der Sache gerne unterziehen.

Der Kaiserliche Vizekonsul

Hoffmann

Appendix 19: HHStA, PA 38/366.

Druck

11 SEP 1915

K.und K.österr.ung.Konsulat
Damaskus.

Damaskus,20.August 1915.

No.51/P

Das Geheimkomité zur Errichtung eines arabischen Khalifats.

An Seine Excellenz den Herrn Minister des K.und K.Hauses und des Aeussern Stephan Baron Burián .

Die mit h.a.Berichte vom 6.August d.J.No.48/P gemeldete Strafverfolgung hatte,was das Wilajet Damaskus betrifft,bisher keine weiteren Verhaftungen zur Folge.Nur der algerische Emir Omar,der Oheim des im citierten Berichte erwähnten Emir Tahir,ist,um der bevorstehenden Verhaftung zu entgehen,flüchtig geworden.

Ueber das Wesen des Geheimkomités ist man hier vorläufig nur ungenau informiert,zumal die Untersuchung streng geheimgehalten wird. Gewiss ist,dass die Entdeckung durch die Beschlagnahme von Papieren bei Abdulkerim el Chalil,dem Präsidenten des arabischen litterarischen Clubs

(munteda el edebi)in Konstantinopel, erfolgte,welche Entdeckung zugleich die Liste seiner Mitglieder zu Tage förderte.Abdul Kerim wurde von Konstantinopel nach Syrien gebracht und sollen auch eine Anzahl anderer Angehöriger des genannten Clubs in die Affäre verwickelt sein,doch nicht als Mitglieder dieses sondern eines Geheimkomités,welches man mit dem seinerzeitigen Dezentralisations Komité in Kairo identifiziert und dessen Zweck die Errichtung eines arabischen Khalifats sein soll.

Die allermeisten der durch die vorgefundene Liste oder die Aussagen der Verhafteten kompromittierten Syrer sind nicht mehr in Syrien selbst wohnhaft,sondern seit kürzerer oder längerer Zeit dauernd nach Egypten übersiedelt.Manche Familien haben seit den Massakern des Jahres 1860 und in ihrer Gänze Syrien verlassen,während bei anderen Familien ein Teil in Syrien zurückgeblieben ist. Viele von ihnen haben ausserdem ihre Güter und Besitztümer in Syrien bewahrt.

Der mit der strafgerichtlichen Untersuchung beschäftigte Kriegsgerichtshof in Aleh hat gegen diese nach Egypten ausgewanderten Syrer, welche der Mitgliedschaft des Komités beschuldigt werden,Vorladungs - resp.Haftbefehle erlassen,mit der Androhung der Konfiskation ihres im Lande be-

findlichen Vermögens im Falle ihres Nichterscheinens. Vom Wilajet Damaskus stammen die in beiliegender Liste verzeichneten Personen resp. Familien.

Allem Anscheine nach bildet übrigens nicht eine jetzige sondern die frühere Tätigkeit des Komités Gegenstand der Strafverfolgung. Es würde sich also wie im Falle des Prozesses Nachle Pascha Mutran und des Priesters Joussef el Hajek um Delikte handeln, die lange vor Zeit des Kriegsausbruches zurückdatieren und würde die Einleitung der Strafverfolgung demzufolge mehr den Charakter einer Einschüchterungsmassregel tragen.

Gleichlautend berichte ich unter gleichem Datum und gleicher Zahl nach Konstantinopel.

Der K.und K.Generalconsul:

ad Ka Damaskus 20.8.15 87

Druck

Refik Bey el Muajjed Hakki Bey el Muajjed	beide aus Damaskus;unter dem Abdul-Hamid'schen Regime türkische Beamte;seit der Konstitution haben sie Syrien verlassen und leben in Kairo. Die Familie Muajjed ,ein Zweig der Familie Azm,ist in Damaskus sehr angesehen und verbreitet.
Chalil eff.Mutran	aus Baalbek;Redakteur des egyptischen Blattes el Ahram; seit vielen Jahren in Kairo. Die Familie Mutran ist in Baalbek ansässig und begütert.
Georges Bahri Aziz Bahri	beide aus Damaskus;Beamte bei der egyptischen Regierung.Die ganze Familie hat Syrien seit vielen Jahren verlassen.
Henri Habib Bulad	aus Damaskus;Kaufmann in Kairo.Ein Teil der Familie lebt in Damaskus.
Nedjib Kressati	aus Damaskus;seit einigen Jahren in Kairo als Banquier etabliert.Seine Verwandten leben in Damaskus,

Nedjib Gannagé	aus Damaskus;seit vielen Jahren Apotheker in Kairo. Der grösste Teil der Familie lebt in Damaskus.
Dr.Jussef Kahil	aus Damaskus;seit ca 8 Jahren in Kairo als Arzt.Verwandte derselben Familie befinden sich in Damaskus.
Dr.Chalil Meschakka	aus Damaskus;seit vielen Jahren Arzt in Kairo.Die meisten Mitglieder der Familie sind in Damaskus verblieben.
Jussef Sem'an Sednaui	aus Damaskus;die ganze Familie ist seit vielen Jahren nach Egypten ausgewandert.
Elias Habib Zananiri	
Jussef Habib Zananiri	aus Damaskus;die ganze Familie ist seit Jahren in Egypten ansässig.
Salih Bey Heidar	aus Baalbek;Strassenbauunternehmer;die Familie ist in Baalbek begütert.
Naif eff.Tillo	Steuereinnehmer im Bezirk Bekaa.Die ganze grosse Familie lebt in Damaskus.
	Die beiden letztgenannten sind flüchtig geworden.

Appendix 20: Le Journal de Beyrouth,Semi Official Newspaper of the Ottoman government

QUATRIEME ANNÉE N 622 | LE NUMÉRO 1 METALIQUE | BEYROUTH SAMEDI 6 Mai 1916

جورنال بيروت

LE JOURNAL DE BEYROUTH

Journal ottoman quotidien

Directeur - Propriétaire : GEORGES HARFOUCHE

Rédacteur : HALIM HARFOUCHE

ABONNEMENT		
Beyrouth	un an	4 Medj
Provinces	» »	5 »
Etranger	» »	25 Fr

ANNONCES	
1re page, la ligne	Pts 5
2me et 3me page	» 4
Direction : Souk el-Gémil	

L'enquête menée depuis plusieurs mois par la cour martiale de Beyrouth et du Liban siègeant à Aley, concernant les membres du comité constitué en vue de placer la Syrie et la Palestine sous l'administration étrangère a pris fin et le jugement a été rendu. Les membres de ce comité masqué sous la dénomination de " Parti de décentralisation „ ont reçu ce matin le châtiment mérité pour leur trahison envers la patrie et le gouvernement.

Nous publions le communiqué de S. E. Ahmed Djémal pacha, commandant en chef de la 4me armée ainsi que les documents authentiques relatifs à cette enquête :

Communiqué de S.E. le commandant en chef de la 4me armée

Lorsque les personnes faisant partie du comité constitué en Egypte et dans l'Empire Ottoman, sous la dénomination fallacieuse de «*parti de décentralisation*», ont été condamnés et punis par la cour martiale d'Aley, j'avais dit dans le communiqué, publié au commencement du mois d'août 331, que l'enquête se poursuivait minutieusement au sujet de leurs complices qui n'avaient pas été encore arrêtés.

Les documents officiels, trouvés aux consulats de France à Damas et à Beyrouth et les aveux faits par *Abdul-Ghani Arayssi*, ex-directeur du journal Al-Mufid, en fuite d'abord, mais arrêté bientôt après, ainsi que les aveux faits par *Seyfeldine Khatib*, ex-membre du tribunal de première instance à Caiffa, et de *Réfik Rezk Salloum*, officier de réserve et par les autres complices ont contribué à éclaircir l'affaire sur tous les points. Les individus, convaincus d'avoir entretenu des relations avec les ennemis du Khalifat et de l'intégrité de l'Empire et qui ont pris une part effective à la trahison en s'associant à ces ennemis pour travailler à la réussite de leurs desseins et plans perfides consistant à détacher la Syrie, la Palestine et l'Irak de l'Empire Ottoman pour en former une principauté indépendante, avaient été deférés à la cour matiale, qui, après enquête minutieuse, les a condamné, chacun selon le degré de gravité de sa culpabilité.

Par conséquent, ont été condamnés à *mort*, les individus suivants, ayant été prouvé qu'ils ont pris une part *effective* et *active* à ce complot :

Chéfik Ahmed Moayad Azm, Emir Omar Abdul Kader, Omar Mustafa Hamad, Réfik Moussa Rizk Saloum, Mehmed Hussein El-Chanti, Chucri Badri Ali Assli, Abdul Ghani Mehmed Arayssi, Aref Mohamed Saïd Chéhabi, Toufik Ahmed El-Bassat, Seyfeldine Abi-Nassr Khatib, Cheikh Ahmed Hassan Tabbara, Abdul Wahab Ahmed Inklisi, Saïd Fadel Akl, Petro Paoulé, Georges Moussa Haddad, Selim Mohamed Said Djezaïri, Ali Haji Omar, Ruchdi Ahmed Chamaa, Amin Loutfi, Mehmed Hafiz, Djélal Selim Elbakhari.

Ceux des complices qui s'y sont plus ou moins compromis, ont été condamnés aux peines suivantes :

Salem Mustafa Mazloum, à cinq ans de réclusion dans une forteresse, Toufic Mohamed Natour et Youssouf Mokhaibir Suleyman à 10 ans ; Hussein Halil Haidar à 15 ans; Riyad Riza Solh, à l'exil perpétuel ; Emir Taher Ahmed Djezairi à 10 ans, de travaux forcés.

Ceux, qui n'ayant pas compris le vrai but et les vrais intentions du dit comité et qui ont eu des relations manifestes avec lui soit pàr séduction soit par ignorance, et à l'égard desquels le tribunal n'a pas trouvé des documents attestant leur véritable complicité, tels que Riza Solh et Assad Haidar, ont été renvoyés à leur lieu d'exil.

Par contre ont été acquités:

Mohamed Elnédi, Kamel Hachem, Ibrahim Kassem, Sami Azni, Cheikh Djémaleddine Khatib, Abdul-Hamid, professeur de dessin, Muhieddine Freiha, le vétérinaire Hussein Sabri, Ruchdi El-Ghazzi, Assim Bessisso El-Ghazzi, Izzet Elahzani, Mustafa Kilani, Abdul Rahim Hanoun, Dr Hassameldine, Nedjib Shoucair, Cheikh Fethallah, Dr Ahmed Kadri, Selim Tayara, Djémil Husseini, le mufti Saïd effendi Elbani, Selim Chamaa, Selim Bekhasi, Faïz Khouri, Réchid Hcheimé, Omar Atassi, le major Ali Riza, Dr Amin Kazma, Said Adra, Dr Abdul Hafiz, le capitaine Djémil, Ferid pacha El-Yafi, Osman Azm.

[illegible] condamnés à mort, les individus suivants :

Chefik Moayad, Emir Omar, Chucri Assli, Abdul-Wahab Inklisi, Ruchdi Chamaa et Réfik Rezk Salloum, ont été exécutés ce matin à Damas, et les autres, à Beyrouth. Tous les autres condamnés ont été emprisonnés ou envoyés à leur lieu d'exil.

Ainsi le calme et la sécurité ont été assurés pour toujours en Syrie et en Palestine.

Prochainement, un recueil paraitra contenant les documents importants qui ont fait la lumière sur cette affaire et qui ont amené à découvrir le vrai but de ce «parti de décentralisation» avec les correspondances saisies aux consulats de France à Beyrouth et à Damas, et les aveux des accusés précédé de l'historique de cette affaire.

Ceux qui liront avec attention ces documents s'apperceveront :

1 Que ces individus ont sacrifié sans hésiter tout ce qu'ils ont de plus sacré en fait de religion et de patriotisme pour leurs intérêts bas et matériels ; ils ont déployé leurs efforts et usé de leur influence

et pouvoir en favour de l'Angleterre et de la France, ces deux puissances auxquelles le monde musulman a déclaré la guerre, sans merci, sous l'étendard du Djihad et ont travaillé à préparer les esprits dans le pays à l'idée d'une violation du territoire de la part de ces deux puissances.

2 Ces documents ont dévoilé les véritables intentions de la France à notre égard, cette puissance qui ne cessait de déclarer par la bouche de ses premiers ministres et de ceux des affaires Etrangères qu'elle respecterait notre indépendance. Cela prouve encore combien nous avions raison d'être en guerre avec elle.

On y remarquera encore que ces tentatives, n'avaient pas eu prise sur tout l'élément arabe, dont la sincérité envers l'Empire et les sentiments religieux sont hors de suspicion, mais bien seulement sur quelques individus musulmans et chrétiens, d'aucune importance et dont le nombre ne dépasse pas les deux cent.

Ces individus vils ont déjà été condamnés, antérieurement, et dernièrement, soit par défaut, soit contradictoirement.

En vertu des pouvoirs que me confére l'art. 2 de la loi en date du 14 mai 1331, concernant les dispositions à prendre par les autorités militaires, pendant la mobilisation générale, contre les ennemis du gouvernement, je prends des mesures pour éloigner dans les vilayets de l'Anatolie, les personnes qui font des droits sacrés du gouvernement un hochet pour leurs intérêts personnels ainsi que ceux qui ont des relations avec eux ou avec leurs familles de près ou de loin.

J'ai aussi pris les mesures nécessaires pour assurer la subsistance des familles éloignées, sous la sauvegarde du gouvernement Impérial qui leur donnera des terrains et des propriétés dans le lieu de leur exil équivalant aux biens qu'ils possèdent en Syrie.

Je recommmande à tous les habitants de la Syrie et de la Palestine la tranquillité, qu'ils soient sûrs, que désormais il n'y aura plus de poursuites ni de déportations, sauf dans le cas où des noms figureraient dans des documents attestant leur trahison.

Le commandant de la 4me armée
et ministre de la marine
Ahmed Djémal

LES DOCUMENTS

— 1 —

Télégramme chiffré No. 59

Paris le 4 Janvier 1913
arrivé à Damas le 4 Janvier à 9 h. 43 soir.

Je réponds à votre télégramme No. 11.

Veuillez remettre à la famille d'Abdul-Kader, la somme de 3940 francs conformément à la répartition du 14 juillet.

Poincaré

Télégramme chiffré envoyé par M. Bompard, ambassadeur de France à M. Ottavi consul de France à Damas.

Péra le 15 Janvier 1913

L'ancien député Chefik bey El-Mouayad est venu me voir hier, avant de partir pour le Caire, d'où il se rendra à Beyrouth et Damas.

Je l'ai assuré de la sympathie avec laquelle l'Ambassade de France suivra les travaux du comité qui s'est chargé de préparer un plan de réformes pour la Syrie, mais j'ai tenu à bien lui faire comprendre que l'intérêt de son pays était de rester uni à l'Empire Ottoman. Je l'ai engagé à s'entretenir avec vous en toute confiance des questions qui font l'objet des préoccupations de ses compatriotes ; je serais heureux qu'il put retirer de ces entretiens la conviction que les Syriens musulmans trouvent auprès de nous les mêmes encouragements que les chrétiens.

Communiqué à Beyrouth.

Bompard

II

Le ministre des Affaires Etrangères à M. Couget, chargé du consulat général à Beyrouth.

Confidentielle

Affaires de Syrie. No. IO

Paris le 22 janvier 1913.

Par une dépêche en date du 15 de ce mois, l'ambassadeur de la République à Constantinople m'a rendu compte d'une interessante conversation qu'il a eue avec Chéfik bey El Mouayad au sujet des affaires de Syrie et des tendances séparatistes qui se manifestent dans le monde arabe.

Je crois utile de vous communiquer pour votre information confidentielle copie de la dépêche que M. Bompard m'a adressée, à ce sujet.

Pour le ministre et par autorisation. Le ministre plénipotentiaire adjoint au directeur des Affaires Politiques et commerciales. P. de Margerie

M. Bompard, ambassadeur de la république française à Constantinople à M. Poincaré, président du conseil, ministre des Affaires Etrangères.

No. 3I Affaires de Syrie

Péra le 15 janvier 1913

Je viens de reçevoir la visite de Chefik bey el Moayad, ancien député de Damas, qui appartient à une des familles les plus considérables de cette ville et y jouit personnellement d'une grande situation. Il venait m'entretenir des affaires de Syrie que les revers turcs en Roumélie ont mis à l'ordre du jour.

Après le préambule long et complimenteux qui est d'usage en Orient, il a abordé la question qui l'amenait et m'a interrogé tout d'abord, avec maintes réticences, sur la signification et la portée des déclarations de V. Exc. relatives aux chrétiens de Turquie. Il tenait à savoir si la sollicitude du Gouvernement français serait réservée à l'avenir aux chrétiens et ne s'étendrait pas aussi bien aux populations musulmanes de la Syrie qui avaient coutume de regarder la France comme une seconde patrie.

Je lui ai répondu que V. Exc. avait jugé à propos récemment de rappeler le rôle particulier qui est dévolu à la France dans tout le Levant à l'égard des Catholiques, mais qu'elle était également fidèle aux traditions françaises d'amitié et d'assistance en ce qui concerne la Syrie et tous ses habitants sans distinction de religion. Chefik bey el Moayad, avait été visiblement impressionné par la campagne poursuivie auprès des musulmans Syriens en faveur de l'Angleterre et pour laquelle ont été largement utilisées les paroles de V.Exc. au sujet des chrétiens de Turquie, car il s'est montré très soulagé à la suite des explications que je lui ai données, qu'il m'a fait repéter plusieurs fois et dont il m'a chaleureusement remercié.

Chéfik bey El Mouayad, entrant alors dans le vit du sujet, m'a parlé des réformes à apporter à l'administration de la Syrie de la décentralisation, de la réunion des trois vilayets syriens en une seule province, de l'exclusion des Turcs des fonctions publiques, puis il m'a dit que le Gouvernement Ottoman était contraire à tous ces projets et qu'il n'hesiterait pas à recourir à la force pour les faire échouer. Il m'a alors demandé nettement si, au cas où des troupes turques seraient dirigées sur la Syrie pour la maintenir sous le joug ottoman, le gouvernement français était prêt à envoyer à Alep un corps d'armée pour leur barrer le passage.

J'ai répondu à Chéfik bey El Moayad que le gouvernement ottoman voyait en effet d'un mauvais œil la décentralisation parce qu'il craignait qu'elle conduisit rapidement à la sécession et que par conséquent le premier soin des réformateurs devait être de le persuader du contraire. Il importait de mettre le loyalisme des Syriens hors de toute contestation. Si ceux-ci obtenaient des fonctionnaires civils et judiciaires parlant leur langue, des ressources suffisantes pour alimenter les bndgets des vilayets et des municipalités, ils auraient réalisé ainsi toutes les réformes réalisables aujourd'hui et desquelles pourraient par la suite sortir toutes les autres. Je lui ai recommandé la prudence en même temps que la tenacité, me gardant bien de le suivre sur le terrain brûlant où de bonne foi ou non, il tentait de m'attirer.

Chéfik bey el Moayad est parti le jour même pour l'Egypte où il fera sans doute aux autorités anglaises des communications analogues à celles qu'il m'a apportées et il comparera leurs réponses aux miennes. Je souhaite qu'elles soient aussi correctes, il se rendra ensuite à Beyrouth où le vali, au grand mécontentement de Kiamil pacha, m'a-t-il dit, a réuni une commission de réformes aux travaux de laquelle il prendra part avant de gagner Damas. Il mettra alors en mouvement ses amis de cette ville qui ont jusqu'ici montré beaucoup d'apathie et laissé le champ libre aux Beyrouthins. La question syrienne murit donc rapidement et l'agitation qui a pris naissance sur la côte ne tardera pas à s'étendre à l'intérieur au sein des populations plus rudes et plus violentes que les habitants en somme policés et pacifiques du littoral.

III

Le ministre des Affaires Etrangères à M. Ottavi, consul général de France *à Damas.*

No. 15 A. S. de la Syrie

Paris le 25 Mars 1913.

Confidentiel

Le ministre de France au Caire m'a télégraphié à la date du 22 mars, qu'une importante réunion du Comité de décentralisation ottomane composée de Syriens chrétiens et musulmans a eu lieu la veille au Caire. M. Tueini, drogman du consulat général de France à Beyrouth, y assistait en qualité de délégué du Comité de décentralisation existant en Syrie, et est venu rendre compte à M. Defrance de la séance.

Tous les membres du Comité y compris les Musulmans seraient tombés d'accord pour reconnaitre que la solution, la plus desirable de la question syrienne était la suivante : constitution de la Syrie en Principauté autonome gouvernée par un Prince musulman librement choisi par la population et placée sous là protection de la France. Les assistants auraient pris la résolution de travailler activement pour attenidre ce but.

M. Tueini ayant dit à M. Defrance qu'il avait été chargé par le Comité de me faire part de ces résolutions.

Celui-ci l'a remercié de sa démarche en consentant sur sa demande à en rendre compte au Département, mais à simple titre d'indication et en lui conseillant de maintenir l'action du comité dans la voie de la prudence et de la légalité.

J'ai l'honneur de vous communiquer ces renseignements pour votre information personnelle.

Pour le ministre et par autorisation, le Conseiller d'état, ministre plénipotentiaire Directeur. Paleologue

IV

Le ministre des Affaires Etrangères à M. *Couget premier secrétaire chargé du Consulat général de* France *à Beyrouth.*

Paris le 28 Avril 1913

L'agent diplomatique de France au Caire m'a fait parvenir d'interessantes indications sur les résolutions adoptées récemment par le Comité de la décentralisation ottomane en ce qui concerne la Syrie.

Je crois devoir vous communiquer à toutes fins utiles et pour votre information confidentielle copie de la dépêche que M. Defrance m'a adressée à ce sujet.

P. de Margerie

Copie

Le Caire 28 mars 1913

No. 131 — La Syrie. Comité de la décentralisation ottomane.

M. Defrance, ministre plénipotentiaire de la République française au Caire à M *Pichon ministre des affaires étrangères.*

Les Syriens résidant au Caire sont très actifs en ce moment, ou du moins, s'excitent beaucoup mutuellement à l'activité.

Le 22 de ce mois, par mon télégramme No. 17, j'ai signalé la réunion du Comité de Décentralisation à laquelle avait assisté M. Michel Tueini, Drogman auxiliaire de notre consulat général à Beyrouth.

Des informations complémentaires que j'ai pu, depuis lors, recueillir, il ressort que les résolutions adoptées par le comité n'ont pas été si décisives ni si unanimes qu'il avait semblé à M. Tueni lequel, n'agissant d'ailleurs qu'à titre privé en qualité de notable syrien et nullement en raison des fonctions officielles qu'il remplit à Beyrouth, fait preuve d'une ardeur quelque peu excessive en faveur d'une solution immédiate et radicale de la question Syrienne.

Il est d'ailleurs intéressant de constater que les tendances manifestées par le comité de Décentralisation confirment au moins sur un point, les renseignements qui m'avaient été récemment donnés sur la façon dont les musulmans syriens envisagent l'avenir probable de leur pays et que j'ai transmis au Département par ma lettre No. 123 du 21 mars.

Il semble bien que les Syriens musulmans et chrétiens — au moins ceux résidant en Egypte — accordent leurs préférences à la seconde des solutions éventuelles indiquées dans ma lettre précitée ; celle qui consisterait à faire de la Syrie une principauté autonome gouvernée par un prince musulman.

J'ai appris que Kiamil pacha, actuellement au Caire, flattait beaucoup les membres du comité de Décentralisation, déclarait approuver entièrement leur programme de réformes et leur promettait s'il revenait au pouvoir de donner satisfaction à tous leurs désirs ; mais si tous ceux qui ont recueilli ces assurances ne doutent pas que le vieil homme d'Etat n'hésiterait pas à renouveler ses promesses en redevenant Grand Vizir ; ils sont également convaincus que ces promesses ne seraient suivies d'aucun effet et que les Syriens seraient trompés une fois de plus par de belles paroles. Et telle est la raison qui fait considérer comme innacceptable la première solution consistant dans l'organisation d'un régime de décentralisation administrative.

Le point sur lequel les opinions exposées dans ma lettre No. 123 ne concordent plus avec les tendances manifestées d'après M. Tueni, par le comité est celui de la protection étrangère sous laquelle, les Syriens désireraient voir placer éventuellement la future principauté; d'après mon informateur de la semaine dernière, les musulmans syriens voudraient à l'exclusion de toute autre la protection de l'Angleterre ; d'après M. Tueni, les musulmans et les chrétiens du comité seraient d'accord pour ne désirer que la protection de la France. Il faut, à ce propos remarquer que le premier est un fonctionnaire du gouvernement Anglo-Egyptien, tandis que M. Tueni est animé de sympathies françaises, très ardentes, et la vérité sur ce point me parait entre les deux extrêmes ; si la Syrie devait un jour être placée sous une protection étrangère, les Syriens chrétiens désireraient à l'unanimité ou presque, que cette protection fut celle de la France ; et parmi les musulmans dont une partie très notable a des préférences pour l'Angleterre, les uns accepteraient la protection française, parce qu'ils en seraient sincèrement partisans, les autres accepteraient indifféremment une protection française ou anglaise suivant ce qui serait décidé en dehors d'eux.

Le comité ayant marqué sa préférence pour la constitution éventuelle de la Syrie en province autonome, devait naturellement être amené à rechercher les personnalités qu'il pourrait être désirable d'appeler à diriger les destinées de la future principauté la question n'a été abordée, que je sache, dans aucune des séances du Comité, mais plusieurs membres de ce comité s'en sont déjà préoccupés. J'ai indiqué dans ma précédente lettre No 123 que le président du Comité, Réfik El Azm, était d'avis que le futur Prince de Syrie ne pouvait être que le chef de sa famille Chefik bey el Mouayad El Azm.

D'autres membres du Comité sont d'avis que jamais les Syriens n'accepteraient de reconnaître comme prince l'un des leurs, chacun se jugeant égal sinon supérieur à tous les autres, et ils préconisent le choix d'un prince de la famille khédiviale ; parmi eux se trouve encore M. Tueini qui est venu me parler de son idée partagée, dit-il, par plusieurs syriens de mettre en avant, lorsque le moment serait venu, la candidature du prince Youssouf Kémal pacha, cousin du Khédive, possesseur d'une énorme fortune, vivant de façon très indépendante et qui, déjà pressenti aurait laissé entendre qu'il accepterait peut-être mais à la condition formelle que si la Syrie doit être placée sous une protection étrangère cette protection serait celle de la France à l'exclusion de toute autre et surtout de la protection anglaise.

Ce qui précède, démontre les inquiétudes et le désir d'agir dont sont incontestablement animés les Syriens musulmans ou chrétiens, mais du désir d'agir à l'action réelle, il y a un grand pas à franchir et les Syriens du Caire ne me paraissent pas, pour le moment du moins, en état de franchir ce pas sans y être nettement encouragés. Il est inutile d'ajouter que si je reçois, ou même si je provoque certaines confidences afin d'être en mesure de tenir V.Exc. au courant des idées et des tentatives d'action assez incohérentes des Syriens d'Egypte ni les membres du comité de décentralisation, ni les personnalités syriennes isolées ne trouvent à l'agence de la République les encouragements qui leur seraient nécessaires et qu'ils souhaiteraient sans doute recevoir.

V

M. le consul général de France *à Beyrouth, à S. E.* M. *Pichon, ministre des Affaires Etrangères.*

Beyrouth le 22 avril 1913

No. 85

Sous la date du 22 janvier No 10, V. Exc. a bien, voulu me donner connaissance d'une lettre du 15 du même mois N 31, dans laquelle, S. Exc. M. Bompard lui rendait compte d'une conversation qu'il avait eu avec Chéfik bey El Mouayad.

Cet ancien député arrivé tout récemment à Beyrouth, après un long séjour en Egypte, est venu me voir hier. Je me suis attaché, naturellement à conformer mon langage à celui que lui avait tenu notre ambassadeur. D'ailleurs notre conversation a surtout coulé sur la dernière manifestation du mouvement réformiste à Beyrouth.

Chefik bey, trouve que ses chefs ont montré leur inactivité et leur inexperience en semblant croire qu'il leur suffirait d'établir un plan de réformes pour que le gouvernement central accepte sa mise en application.

Eux-même l'ont compris, d'ailleurs, et mon interlocuteur m'a confirmé que quelques délégués, entre autres Ahmed Mouhtar Beyhum, l'un des plus intelligents, parmi les musulmans d'ici, projetaient de se rendre à Constantinople et en Europe pour discuter la question Syrienne avec le gouvernement ottoman et les représentants des Puissances tant à Londres qu'à Paris.

Mon interlocuteur, considère avec raison, qu'un résultat important est dès a présent atteint dans le sentiment créé entre les différentes parties de la population, d'une certaine solidarité au point de vue politique malgré leurs traditionnelles rivalités religieuses.

Chefik bey, se rendra à Damas, où le mouvement réformiste est loin d'avoir gagné autant de terrain qu'à Beyrouth; il compte aussi pousser à la

formation de comités intitulés, non plus réformistes, mais de centralisateurs, qu'il mettrait en relations avec le comité de décentralisation existant en Egypte.

VI

Consul français

Déchiffrement

Péra le 27 Janvier

« Arrivée le 28 à midi »

Je répond à votre télégramme No. 3.

Sans doute le retour au pouvoir du parti Union et Progrès qui pendant son règne a poursuivi avec tant de vigueur la Turquisation de l'Empire ottoman ne pouvait manquer de produire une grande émotion au sein des populations arabes, auxquelles le cabinet de Kiamil pacha avait laissé espérer des réformes concues dans le sens de la décentralisation administrative, mais pour apprécier les démarches qui sont faites auprès de vous ; il faut compter aussi sur la situation dans laquelle si trouve aujourd'hui placés les notables arabes réduits au silence depuis 1908 et qui revenus aujourd'hui d'exil ou sortis de la réserve qui leur était imposée se sont au cours des derniers mois occupé activement de politique en réagissant contre la Comité Union et Progrès.

Des personnages qui se sont adressés à vous par l'intermédiaire de l'Emir Omar, j'ai lieu de croire qu'ils sont de ceux que leur sécurité personnelle préoccupe particulièrement. Vous ne devez pas moins les écouter avec sympathie, car il importe que les Syriens musulmans et chrétiens sachent qu'ils peuvent compter sur toute notre bienveillance mais vous aurez à veiller avec le plur grand soin à ce que l'intérêt que nous leur témoignons ne les encourage pas à comettre quelque imprudence, au moment où les grandes puissances se trouvent aux prises avec de si graves difficultés pour le réglement des questions qui concernant la Turquie d'Europe; il importe que la question de la Turquie d'Asie ne se pose pas à son tour. Il vous appartient tout en conservant le contact le plus cordial avec les notables musulmans ou chrétiens qui s'adressent à vous d'empêcher les Syriens de prendre quelque initiative qui soit susceptible d'ouvrir une pareille question et en même temps d'engager notre politique en dehors de notre gouvernement et du même coup celle de nos alliés, sans leur aveu.

Si les circonstances mettaient quelques hauts personnages de votre résidence dans le cas de rechercher refuge à votre consulat vous les acceuillerez et si l'autorité vous les réclame vous refuserez de les livrer et repondrez que vous en refererez à cette ambassade.

VII

M. F. *Couget Consul général de France à Beyrouth.*}

Beyrouth le 12 mars 1913

Monsieur le consul général

Les soussignés, membres chrétiens du comité exécutif de l'Assemblée générale élue par les conseils de toutes les communautés de Beyrouth à l'effet d'élaborer un projet de réformes pour ce vilayet. Considérant que la France est la protectrice des chrétiens ottomans et la Patrie d'adoption des chrétiens de Syrie. Ont l'honneur de soumettre à la bienveillante attention de Mr le consul général de France en Syrie, les considérations suivantes relatives : A la situation des chrétiens ottomans. Au projet de réformes élaboré par le comité exécutif. Aux aspirations des chrétiens de Syrie. Et prient Mr le Consul Général de transmettre ces considérations au Gouvernement de la République Française en les appuyant de son autorité.

Situation des chrétiens ottomans : De tous temps la situation des Chrétiens dans l'Empire Ottoman fut triste et l'amentable. Cette situation tend à s'agraver considérablement par suite de la guerre balcanique et les défaites turques dont les conséquences immédiates seront. (1) une augmentation d'impôts, (2) une recrudescence de fanatisme musulman, (3) encouragement de l'émigration des chrétiens de Syrie.

(1) Augmentation d'impots: Par suite de ses provinces d'Europe le gouvernement turc cherchera — il cherche déjà — à faire supporter à ses provinces asiatiques les charges qui incombaient aux provinces perdues. Or pour qui connait la partialité et les procédés vexatoires de l'administration turque dans la répartition et la perception des impôts, il ne fait aucun doute que ces nouvelles charges péseront surtout sur la population chrétienne.

(2) Récrudescence du fanatisme musulman : Le fanatisme musulman fut toujours entre les moins des politiciens turcs un facteur précieux et infaillible. Aussi ceux-ci n'ont-ils pas manqué de l'exploiter au cours de ces derniers événements balcaniques. Il en est résulté un fait certain : La guerre des Balcans est considérée par les musulmans comme une guerre de religion, une croisade, la Croix contre le Croissant, la chrétienté coalisée contre l'Islam. De là pour les musulmans, à croire que l'existence des chrétiens dans l'Empire Ottoman est la cause primordiale de la décadence et de la déroute turques, il n'y a pas loin. La mentalité des musulmans est telle que les Chrétiens Ottomans sont considérés comme les véritables auteurs des désastres qui s'abattent sur l'Empire, comme les véritables ennemis. Ils seront l'objet de toutes les vexations, de toutes les tyrannies, non pas, certes, de cette tyrannie ouverte et déclarée qui pourrait donner prétexte à une intervention étrngère (Les Turcs sont trop rusés et avisés pour celà) mais de ce cette tyrannie sourde et vexatoire dans laquelle excelle l'Administration turque et par laquelle elle trouve un auxiliaire précieux dans l'élasticité de la loi.

(3) Encouragement à l'émigration des Chrétiens de Syrie. Depuis le commencement de la guerre balcanique bon nombre de Musulmans de la Macédoine et de la Thrace ont émigré en Syrie. Ce mouvement qui tend à s'accroître est certainement encouragé par les pouvoirs publics. Il en résultera fatalement au détriment des Chrétiens, une rupture d'équilibre entre le nombre des Chrétiens et celui des Musulmans en Syrie. Ceux-ci étaient déjà les maîtres et les despotes de par leur religion, le deviendrout encore d'avantage par la force écrasante du nombre. Les Chrétiens de Syrie se sont déjà émus de cette situation, et plusieurs d'entre-eux, out, de par ce fait, émigré en Amérique. De telle sorte que l'état de choses actuel constitue une prime d'encouragement à une double émigration : l'émigration des Musulmans en Syrie et celle des Chrétiens en Amérique. Pour peu que cette situation dure, c'est l'anéantissement à brève échéance de l'élément chrétien en Syrie.

Projet de réformes — Au lendemain du discours de M. Poincaré, alors président du Conseil, par lequel l'éminent homme d'Etat engageait la Turquie à introduire des réformes dans ses provinces d'Asie, le gouvernement turc déclara spontanément qu'il était disposé à accorder des réformes dans ses vilayets et invita les valis à engager leurs ressortissants à élaborer un projet de ces reformes. Instruits par le passé les Chrétiens Ottomans savaient à quoi s'entenir sur la sincérité des intentions du Gouvernement. Ce projet de réformes ne devait servir, le cas échéant, qu'à paralyser l'intervention de l'Europe le jour où celle-ci demanderait à la Turquie l'introduction de certaines réformes précises et déterminées. La Turquie trouverait dans le projet des réformes, soit-disant élaboré par les habitants, mais en réalité inspiré par lui, quelques prétexte ou quelque faux-fuyant pour refuser les réformes demandées par l'Europe en alléguant que celles-ci ne sont pas comprises dans le projet rédigé par les interessés eux-mêmes.

Les Chrétiens de Beyrouth ont cependant consenti à collaborer avec les Musulmans à l'élaboration du projet des Réformes, pour les deux raisons ruivantes : (1) déjouer la manœuvre du gouvernement turc en empêchant que le projet fut rédigé dans le sens qu'il escomptait. (2) faire introduire dans ce projet le principe du contrôle européen dans toutes les branches de l'administration. Ce principe, une fois admis par tous les membres, tant chrétiens que musulmans de la Commission constituerait de la part de la population entière, un aveu irréfutable que toute réforme est impossible, en Turquie sans le concours de l'Europe.

Aspirations des chrétiens de Syrie. — En supposant même que des réformes puissent être introduites avec ou sans le concours de l'Europe, cette solution ne saurait répondre aux véritables aspirations des chrétiens de Syrie. Ceux-ci sont indissolublement attachés à la France et ne pourraient jamais oublier ce qu'ils doivent d'admiration pour son génie et sa civilisation et de reconnaissance pour sa sollicitude dans les jours de malheur. Le grand vœu des chrétiens de Syrie, c'est l'occupation de la Syrie par la France.

Cela étant, les membres soussignés, agissant au nom des chrétiens de Beyrouth, leurs mandats exposant ci-après dans l'ordre de leur préférence, les seules solutions suivantes qui leur paraissent devoir seules convenir au Statut politique de la Syrie :

1 Occupation de la Syrie par la France.


2 Autonomie complète du vilayet de Beyrouth, sous la protection et le contrôle effectif de la France.

3 Rattachement au Liban du vilayet de Beyrouth, passés tous deux sous le contrôle effectif de la France.

Michel Tueini, Joseph Hani, Pierre Trad, Dr Eyoub Tabet, Rizkallah Arcache, Halil Zeinié.

Imp. du « Journal de Beyrouth»

Appendix 21:al-Sharq, Arabic newspaper published by Cemal Pasha in Damascus



25 sep. 1917

GENEVA 17 DEC. 1917

العدد ٤٣٤ — السنة الثانية — ثمن النسخة الجديدة ١٠ بارات

الشرق

جريدة سياسية ادبية اقتصادية
تصدر كل يوم

صاحب الامتياز : خليل الرفعي الانصاري
المخابرات تكون مع مدير الادارة : ف. ضيا كوهر
محل الادارة : ساحة الاتحاد * دمشق
الثلاثاء ٨ ذي الحجة ١٣٣٥

المدير المسئول محمد تاج الدين الحسني
الاشتراك : ... الدفع سلفاً ورقاً عثمانياً
لا تعاد الاوراق التي لم تنشر
الثلاثاء ٢٥ ايلول ١٣٣٣

سياسيات

جمهورية روسيا

انبأ البرق بان الحكومة الموقتة الروسية اقرت على اعلان الجمهورية الديمقراطية في مملكة القياصرة بعد عراك شديد وفتن اهلية استطار شررها منذ تخلي القيصر نقولا عن عرش آل رومانوف . وهو قرار سهل في القول والنظريات صعب جداً في العمل والتطبيقات .

لا يكاد يبلغ العنصر السلافي الحاكم في روسيا تسعين مليوناً والباقي من سكانها تتار مسلمون وهم ثلاثون مليوناً وفنلانديون والمان وبولونيون واسرائيليون وامثالهم من العناصر الآسياوية المخالفة للروس جنساً ولساناً ومذهباً . والولايات الروسية الا قليلاً مزيج من هذه العناصر التي يعتبرها الروس الاصليون اعداءهم لا مواطنيهم وهم محرومون من حقوق الوطني محجوبون عن حظيرة المدنية .

يضرب المثل في القرب بالجهل الروسي ويقول عنه الدارسون طرائق هذا العنصر ان الروس آسياويون تحضروا ولكنهم لم يبلغوا مبلغ سائر عناصر اوربا الراقية من درجات الرقي الاجتماعي والمدني والسياسي . والنور الى اليوم لم يدخل الا الى المدن اما القرى والضواحي ومنها يتألف السواد الاعظم من السكان فقد بقيت في جاهلية جهلاء لا تعرف ما لها وما عليها وملايين منهم يقولون الى اليوم بتقديس القيصر ويعتقدون انه يحل ويربط في الارض مستمداً قوته من السماء .

ولقد كان الضابط لهذه الشعوب الغريبة في تركيبها سوط الحاكم المطلق فلما نفس خناقهم بتراجع صفوف روسيا في هذه الحرب وانفسخت بولونيا وهي اثنى عشر مليوناً من السكان من جسم البلاد الروسية وقطعت فنلاندا وهي ثلاثة ملايين علائقها مع بطرسبرج وهبت اوكرانيا تحذو هذا الحذو ولا يبعد ان تسير على اثرها غداً قافقاسيا وتركستان . والواقع كل هذا صحت عزائم العملة والفلاحين على الانتقاض على الحكومة غير مسلم القائمين على ازمتها واكثرهم ... الا ان يلهو الشعب بنغمة الجمهورية وهي عذبة على السماع متعذرة التطبيق في تلك البقاع على من كانوا متنافرين في التقاليد والطباع .

ان امة واسعة الرقعة كثيرة الجماعات عاشت قروناً في حكم استبدادي جائر لا اثر للعقل فيه يستحيل على اعظم المشرعين السياسيين ان ينقلها من طورها الاول الذي ألفته وعرفته الى طور آخر ليس لها من اسبابه ما يؤهلها للتلبس به .

ولا بد لكل امة اسرعت في تبديل نظامها ان تدخل الخلل اليه طوعاً او كرهاً فيسرع اليها الخراب والفناء بتشعب المذاهب والآراء ولا اضر على الامم من انقسامها على نفسها وكل بيت ينقسم على نفسه يخرب لا محالة .

مضى قرن على جمهورية الولايات المتحدة والى الآن لم تستقر على ما يجب وتتأصل مبادئها في نفوس سكان اميركا الشمالية مع ان الشعب الاميركي بشهادة العارفين ارقى عنصراً من الشعب الروسي بمراحل ومضى نحو نصف قرن على الجمهورية الثالثة في فرنسا والشعب الفرنسوي سار شوطاً واسعاً في طريق الحضارة وعلى هذا حال الامتين من الانقسام والشقاق ما ترى فما الحال بالممالك الصغرى مثل جمهوريات اميركا الجنوبية او مثل جمهورية البور فمثال هذه الجمهوريات ولا شك من مضحكات المبكيات .

الحكم الجمهوري لم يناسب امة كما ناسب سويسرا فكل فرد من افرادها جمهورية ديمقراطية مصغرة في ذاته ولا غرو فقد عاشوا تحت الاحكام الجمهورية الشورية نحو ستة قرون فتأصلت مبادئها في صميم نفوسهم وورثتها ابناؤهم عن اجدادهم وآبائهم فالسويسريون اصلاء في الشورى الحقيقية ولا يعاني ان تلحق غبارهم امة من امم الارض الا اذا قدر لها ان تربت كما تربى الشعب السويسري وانتقلت الاحكام الجمهورية عصراً بعد عصر في ابنائها على اختلاف البطون والقرون .

انا نخاف ان تكون جمهورية روسيا كما كانت جمهورية فنزيلوس في قسم من بلاد يونان دفعه اليها الائتلافيون حتى يخلع لهم الملك بالزال قسطنطين عن عرش اثينة ويتصرفوا بمملكة يونان تصرف المالك بملكه والراعي بنعاجه وخرافه وقد تم لهم ما ارادوا فساقوا الى مهاوي الهلكة شعباً كان آمناً في صامه لا يحب الاشتراك في فتنة ضررها عليه اكثر من غيرها اضعافاً مضاعفة .


يدل الاستقراء التام والتقلبات الاخيرة وحوادث الايام ان الجمهورية الديموقراطية في روسيا الاوتوقراطية لا تعيش اذا كتب لها البقاء الا زمناً قصيراً . والحياة السعيدة للروس بعد انهزاماتهم المتواترة ان يمدوا ايديهم للحلفاء ويصالحوهم صلحاً منفرداً كما هو ارادة اهل البصيرة في مملكة روسيا ويساعدهم على ارائهم

رجاء

يمكن لمن يجدد الاشتراك في الجريدة الحاضرة ان يبعث ببدل اشتراكه مع الموزع الذي يوصل اليه الجريدة ولكن بشرط ان يطلب من الموزع ان يأتي له بالوصل في اليوم التالي . وان لم يأت له به يبادر الى مراجعة الادارة

الادارة

Appendix 22: Sample from the DH.ŞFR. Documents: DH.ŞFR. 475/9



TELEGRAMME تلغرافنامه

دولت علیهٔ عثمانیه تلغراف اداره‌سی

ADMINISTRATION DES TELEGRAPHES DE L'EMPIRE OTTOMAN

L'état n'accepte aucune responsabilité à raison du service de la télégraphie

دولت تلغراف معاملاتندن دولتی مسئولیت قبول ایتمز

Retransmission ou Expédition تکرار کشیده ویا سوق				RECEPTION اخذ			
سوق نومروسی No d'expédit.	کشیده اولنان مرکز transmis à	Date تاریخ	مأمور امضاسی Signature de l'employé	مأمور امضاسی Signature de l'employé	Date تاریخ	واسطه مرکزی Reçu de	صره نومروسی No d'ordre

De … Pour … موردی

No … Date … H. ساعت M. دقیقه … تاریخ … کلمات

Voie … Indic. Eventuelles اشارات محتمله

DH. ŞFR 475/9/1

TELEGRAMME تلغرافنامه

دولت علیهٔ عثمانیه تلغراف اداره‌سی

ADMINISTRATION DES TELEGRAPHES DE L'EMPIRE OTTOMAN

L'état n'accepte aucune responsabilité à raison du service de la télégraphie — دولت تلغراف معاملاتندن دولایی مسئولیت قبول ایتمز

[نمونه ۸۰۱]

Retransmission ou Expédition تکرار کشیده ویا سوق				RECEPTION اخذ			
سوق نومروسی No d'expédit.	کشیده اولنان مرکز transmis à	Date تاریخ	مأمور امضاسی Signature de l'employé	مأمور امضاسی Signature de l'employé	Date تاریخ	واسطه مرکزی Reçu de	سره نومروسی Nº d'ordre
		ساعت ... دقیقه ... H. ... M. ...			ساعت ... دقیقه ... H. ... M. ...		

De ... Pour ... موردی ... مبدأ


Nº ... Mots ... Date ... H. ساعت ... M. دقیقه ... تاریخ ... کلمات غروب ... سرو


Voie ... Indic. Eventuelles ... اشارات محتمله ... وسائط

ده حاخام باشی ناحوم افندی

DH.ŞFR 475/9/2

Appendix 23: Sample from the DH.ŞFR. Documents: DH.ŞFR. 527/19




دولت عثمانیه
پوسته و تلغراف و تلفون نظارتی
DH.ŞFR. 577/19/2